Zaima v. Zaima CA4/1

Filed 10/26/26 Zaima v. Zaima CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA HAROLD ZAIMA et al., D085892 Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00027 464-CU-OR-CTL) ARLENE ZAIMA, Individually and as Trustee, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Affirmed. Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris and Steven M. Brunolli for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Williams Iagmin, Jon R. Williams and Thomas E. Robertson for Defendants and Respondents.  I. INTRODUCTION This appeal arises from a troubling family dispute over residential property once jointly owned by Satsuki Zaima and her daughter Arlene Zaima (together with Arlene’s husband, Theodore Hahnenfeld (Ted)).1 Satsuki provided the purchase money for the undeveloped land in 1993, and Arlene and Ted (together, Defendants) paid for construction of the house. Satsuki and her ailing husband lived in the house with Defendants and Defendants’ son. In 1999, Satsuki signed a quitclaim deed transferring her one-half interest in the property to Defendants. In 2016, Satsuki’s estate planning attorney informed Satsuki that then-current title records showed that Satsuki had no ownership interest in the property — Defendants held full title. About a year later, Satsuki consulted with a real estate attorney who confirmed the state of the property’s title and showed Satsuki the 1999 quitclaim deed she signed. In 2021, Satsuki moved from the property into a retirement community. In June 2021 — five years after her estate planning attorney notified her of the title issue and just under four years after the real estate attorney confirmed it — Satsuki (through her son Harold Zaima (Hal), acting as her attorney-in-fact) sued Defendants to quiet title to the property, to cancel the quitclaim deed, and for financial elder abuse and fraud. Satsuki alleged that Arlene exploited her position of trust and Satsuki’s limited understanding of 1 Because many of the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names as the parties did in their appellate briefing. We intend no disrespect to the individuals involved. (See Dae v. Traver (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 447, 450, fn. 2.) 2 English to convince Satsuki to sign the 1999 quitclaim deed without fully understanding it. The trial court summarily adjudicated the elder abuse claim on statute of limitation grounds. Applying the “discovery rule” — which delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff “discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7) — the trial court reasoned the estate planning attorney provided Satsuki with enough information to put her on inquiry notice of a potential legal claim in 2016, outside the applicable four-year limitations period. The court later conducted a bench trial on Satsuki’s remaining claims and found that she knowingly transferred the property to Arlene in 1999 without any wrongdoing by Arlene. The court entered judgment for Defendants. On appeal, Satsuki challenges only the trial court’s ruling that her elder abuse cause of action was time-barred. She contends that while the trial court found her cause of action accrued in 2016 when she was put on inquiry that her ownership interest in the property was impaired, the cause of action did not actually accrue until 2021 when Arlene “evicted” Satsuki and impaired her possessory enjoyment of the property. Alternatively, Satsuki contends that even if accrual was triggered by impairment of her ownership interest, summary adjudication was improper because there are factual disputes about when she was put on inquiry notice. We conclude, based on the undisputed facts, that Satsuki’s elder abuse claim accrued in 2016 when the estate planning attorney informed Satsuki that she had no ownership interest in the property. This was enough information to cause an objectively reasonable person to inquire about the true state of ownership. It is undisputed that a reasonable inquiry conducted 3 in 2016 would have disclosed the existence of the 1999 quitclaim and confirmed the basis for Satsuki’s elder abuse claim. Because Satsuki did not sue on that claim until more than four years later, the trial court correctly concluded her claim was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. Family Background Satsuki was born in Japan in 1930. She married Kenneth Zaima, a U.S. citizen born and raised in Hawaii, who worked as a civil servant for the Air Force in Japan. Kenneth’s native language was English and he spoke a mixture of English and Japanese with Satsuki. Satsuki and Kenneth had three children together in Japan: Janis, Hal, and Arlene. Around 1972, after Janis and Hal moved to the United States to attend college, Satsuki, Kenneth, and Arlene (still a minor) moved from Japan to Sacramento. Satsuki worked as a chef in an Italian restaurant for about 10 years and spoke “broken and limited” English at work. After living in Sacramento for 15 years, Satsuki and Kenneth moved to Kauai. Satsuki worked at a retail store where she spoke English in limited interactions selling merchandise and handling the cash register. While living in Kauai, Kenneth suffered a debilitating stroke that left him partially paralyzed. Satsuki was his primary caregiver. 2 We base our factual summary on the undisputed facts established in the summary judgment proceedings. 4  In 1990, Satsuki and Kenneth moved in with Arlene, Ted, and their infant son at a house on Caliban Court in Encinitas. Arlene spoke only broken Japanese, so Satsuki spoke with the family primarily in English. In 1991, Satsuki sold the house that she and Kenneth owned in Kauai. She communicated with the realtor in English to the extent of her comprehension and understood generally that she was selling the property. Satsuki signed several documents pertaining to this transaction. B. The Rosemont Property In 1992, Satsuki and Defendants purchased undeveloped residential land on Rosemont Lane in Encinitas (the Rosemont Property). They held title as tenants in common, with Satsuki owning a one-half interest, and Defendants owning the other one-half interest. Satsuki paid $270,000 to acquire the land, and Defendants took out a construction loan to build a house on the Rosemont Property. To facilitate the construction loan, Satsuki temporarily transferred her interest in the property to Defendants. Specifically, in August 1993, Satsuki signed a grant deed conveying her one-half interest in the Rosemont Property to Defendants as “husband and wife as joint tenants.” This deed was publicly recorded on September 9, 1993. A few months later, in November 1993, Defendants conveyed Satsuki’s one-half interest back to her. In this grant deed, Defendants granted themselves, as “husband and wife as joint tenants, . . . an undivided 50% interest,” and granted Satsuki, “a married women as her sole and separate property, . . . an undivided 50% interest.” This deed was publicly recorded on November 5, 1993. 5  The house on the Rosemont Property was built around 1993. Satsuki and Kenneth lived there with Defendants and Defendants’ son. Satsuki paid half of the property tax and Defendants paid the other half. In May 1994, Satsuki amended her estate planning documents to eventually leave her interest in the Rosemont Property to Arlene. C. The 1999 Quitclaim Deed In 1999, when Satsuki was 69 years old, she signed a quitclaim deed conveying her one-half interest in the Rosemont Property to Defendants’ family trust. The circumstances of this deed’s execution are contested and led to this lawsuit. The quitclaim deed identifies Satsuki and Defendants as grantors, and conveys their respective one-half interests in the Rosemont Property to Defendants as “Co-Trustees of the Hahnenfeld and Zaima Family Trust dated July 10, 1999.” Satsuki’s signature is dated July 30, 1999, and is notarized as of that date. Defendants’ signatures are dated August 4, 1999, and are notarized as of that date. The first page of the quitclaim deed contains its operative provisions and Defendants’ signatures; the second page contains only Satsuki’s signature and notarizations for all the signatures. The bottom of the first page states, “The conveyance by Satsuki Zaima is a gift. There is no consideration for the transfer.” The quitclaim deed was publicly recorded on September 22, 1999. According to Satsuki, Arlene presented only one page of an otherwise blank document with a signature line for Satsuki. Arlene explained only that if Satsuki signed the document, Satsuki would no longer have to pay her half of the property tax for the Rosemont Property. Arlene never explained that Satsuki was immediately conveying her one-half interest in the property. 6 Satsuki told Hal, “ ‘I trust Arlene, and they put it in front of me, and I signed it.’ ” Satsuki intended to gift her interest in the Rosemont Property to Arlene only after Satsuki’s death. The quitclaim deed conflicted with this intent. According to Arlene, Satsuki “always said that she was going to give [Defendants] . . . her half of the house” as a gift. Defendants were “getting ready to do a trust” and asked Satsuki if she would gift her interest in the Rosemont Property then “so [they] could include it in [the] trust.” When Satsuki asked why, Arlene responded that she “just want[ed] to make sure other people don’t come after the house.” According to Arlene, Satsuki “agreed and signed the quitclaim deed.” Kenneth died a few months later in November 1999. After Satsuki signed the quitclaim deed, Defendants paid all property taxes for, and funded all improvements to, the Rosemont Property. D. Satsuki’s Relationship with Arlene Deteriorates After Kenneth died, Satsuki’s relationship with Arlene deteriorated. According to Hal, “Arlene stopped talking to [Satsuki] completely,” other than to “yell[] at her about things.” Satsuki lived primarily out of her bedroom and bathroom and had “lots of . . . pots and pans and plates in her bathroom.” “[O]n a number of occasions,” Arlene yelled at Satsuki about moving out, saying, “ ‘You need to get out of here.’ ” Satsuki would respond, “ ‘If you pay me for half of my house, then I’ll move out,’ ” which “kind of shut Arlene up.” Satsuki told Hal “she was basically a prisoner in her own house.” E. Satsuki Updates Her Estate Plan in 2016 In 2016, Satsuki met with Ikuko Sano, a Japanese-speaking estate planning attorney, to update Satsuki’s estate plan. They spoke only in Japanese, never in English. 7  Satsuki wanted to leave her one-half interest in the Rosemont Property to Arlene at death, and to evenly divide the remainder of her estate between Janis and Hal. In doing her “research to make sure that the trust is funded,” Sano “came across the current deed, which show[ed] the residence is owned by [Defendants] in their trust.” Sano related this to Satsuki and explained that, because “the current title did not reflect her interest in Rosemont,” Sano “can’t include that in [the] trust agreement.” Satsuki “was adamant that she own[ed] 50 percent” and showed Sano “the old title document” from when Satsuki provided the purchase money for the land. Sano later testified in deposition that “because [Satsuki] was adamant about owning 50 percent and denied ever giving Arlene or [Ted] her 50 percent,” Sano drafted a new amendment to Satsuki’s trust “accordingly.” But based on Sano’s determination that Satsuki no longer held any interest in the Rosemont Property, Sano included “back-up” language in the trust amendment to reflect that fact. Specifically, the provision in Satsuki’s Second Amended and Restated Zaima Family Trust (Second Amended Trust) addressing “Gifts of Real Property” stated: I own [an] undivided fifty percent (50%) interest in and to [the Rosemont Property]. The remaining undivided fifty percent (50%) interest is owned by my daughter, Arlene Zaima and her spouse, Theodore Hahnenfeld. I paid one hundred percent (100%) of the down payment towards acquisition of the residence, in the amount of . . . $270,000.00 . . . . Upon my death, the Trustee shall distribute all of my rights, title, and interest in and to [the Rosemont Property] to my daughter, Arlene Zaima, provided she survives me. If I do not own any transferable title to my residence at my death, my daughter, Arlene Zaima shall receive my interest in and to the $270,000.00 down 8  payment I made towards acquisition of the residence. If Arlene Zaima does not survive me, this gift shall pass to her issue who survive her, by right of representation. (Italics added.) Sano explained the Second Amended Trust to Satsuki in Japanese before Satsuki signed it on June 17, 2016. Before that, Sano had several conversations with Satsuki in Japanese confirming Sano’s view that Satsuki had no ownership interest in the Rosemont Property. F. Hal and Satsuki Investigate Title to the Rosemont Property About six months later, in March 2017, Satsuki asked Hal “to take a look at some documents” because “Arlene was getting more and more aggressive” about “trying to force [Satsuki] out of the house.” Hal contacted Sano to discuss Satsuki’s estate planning documents. In an email about title to the Rosemont Property, Sano explained to Hal that she was “certain” she and Satsuki “discussed the issue (that the current title does not reflect her interest)” in connection with revising Satsuki’s estate plan. Sano elaborated that although Satsuki “has the original deed (dated back in early 1990’s) which shows her 50% interest, . . . the current title does not. I only have . . . access to the current deed, which shows that Arlene and her husband hold the title in their trust.” Sano offered to further research the title history. Hal responded to Sano by stating that the materials she sent him included “title insurance and escrow documents that show[] [Satsuki] and [Defendants] owning [the Rosemont Property] 50/50.” Hal added he was reluctant to confront Arlene about the potential title issue, “especially if she directed the new deed to be written without [Satsuki] included.” 9  Sano replied that “some research is required to trace back the title to early 1990’s” to determine whether Satsuki “conveyed her 50% interest to [Defendants].” A few days later, after conducting research at the county recorder’s office, Sano emailed Hal about her findings. “Unfortunately,” Sano wrote, “I found a deed, in which [Satsuki] conveyed her 50% interest to [Defendants].” Sano was referring to the 1993 deed that temporarily conveyed Satsuki’s interest in the property to Defendants to facilitate the construction loan. Based on her assessment that “it would be extremely difficult to [challenge] the validity of this deed,” Sano concluded Defendants “are the 100% rightful owners of the property.” Sano added that she had not yet told Satsuki about the findings on this “delicate issue” because Sano “wanted to run it by [Hal] first.” Hal responded that Sano’s findings were consistent with Sano’s temporary conveyance in 1993 to facilitate the construction loan. Sano replied that the 1993 deed conveyed Satsuki’s entire one-half interest in the Rosemont Property such that Defendants acquired a 100-percent interest in the property. Sano punctuated her message: “There are no subsequent (recorded) deeds that reconvey the interest back to [Satsuki].”3 Hal asked whether Satsuki’s trust documents needed to be revised to reflect the fact that Satsuki held no interest in the Rosemont Property. Sano responded that this was unnecessary because the “back-up” language (“if I do not own any transferable title to my residence at my death”) already covered this scenario. 3 It appears that at this stage Sano was unaware of the November 1993 grant deed reconveying Satsuki’s one-half interest in the Rosemont Property back to her. 10  Sano updated Satsuki on the recent title research findings. Sano reported on this conversation to Hal: “She does not recall signing the deed, but she said that it is possible she signed it when presented without knowing what it was. [¶] I advised her not to bring this up to Arlene at this time. [¶] This concludes the work requested at this time.” Hal agreed it was best to “let sleeping dogs lie and not have [Satsuki] bring it up to Arlene.” A few months later, in August 2017, Hal conveyed to Sano a request from Satsuki for a referral to a real estate lawyer. Sano referred Hal to attorney Joseph Stine. Sano also recommended an elder abuse attorney. In October 2017, Hal contacted Stine. Hal reported to Stine that Sano had “indicated that the deed of the property and house is now in the name of [Defendants] and [Satsuki] is no longer named on the deed.” Therefore, Satsuki was “concerned that if [Defendants] attempt to ‘kick her out’ of the house, she would have no recourse.” Stine met with Satsuki and Hal on November 4, 2017. Hal testified that he attended the meeting to help interpret because Satsuki “has difficulty understanding English.” During this meeting, Stine provided the 1999 quitclaim deed, which confirmed Sano’s prior conclusion that title to the Rosemont Property was held entirely by Defendants’ trust — Satsuki held no ownership interest. G. Satsuki Moves Out of the Rosemont Property Nearly four years later, on May 17, 2021, Satsuki signed a durable power of attorney designating Hal as her “attorney-in-fact.” The next day, Hal applied on Satsuki’s behalf to reside in a retirement community in Carlsbad. About a week later, Satsuki amended her trust to disinherit Arlene. 11  Satsuki moved into the retirement community in June 2021. H. Complaint On June 24, 2021, Hal, in his capacity as Satsuki’s attorney-in-fact, filed this lawsuit against Defendants (individually and in their capacities as trustees of their family trust). The complaint asserted eight causes of action: three for cancellation of the 1999 quitclaim deed (based on fraud, mistake, and undue influence), and one each to quiet title to the Rosemont Property, to partition the property by sale, for fraud, for financial abuse of an elder, and to impose a constructive trust. Only the trial court’s ruling on the elder abuse cause of action is on appeal. Satsuki alleged that when Arlene presented the quitclaim deed for signature in 1999, “Satsuki was approximately 70 years old”; “her ability to read English . . . was limited”; she “did not understand the nature of the document or its legal effect”; she “signed it in reliance on Defendants’ representations”; and she only “later discovered that the document was a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer” her interest in the Rosemont Property to Defendants as trustees of their family trust. The complaint further alleged that, “[r]ecently,” Defendants told Satsuki she “needed to move out without delay” because they were selling the Rosemont Property and moving to Oregon. Defendants refused Satsuki’s request for half of the sales proceeds, telling Satsuki “she no longer had a half interest in the Rosemont Property and that she would ‘get nothing.’ ” Satsuki then “learned through an examination of title that the document she signed” in 1999 “was in fact a conveyance of her one-half interest in the Rosemont Property,” a “fact [that] had been concealed from her by Defendants.” 12  Satsuki alleged that these actions constituted financial elder abuse because Defendants “took, appropriated, obtained, and/or retained Satsuki’s property for a wrongful use and with the intent to defraud, and did so through deceit and undue influence.” Satsuki asserted her damages consisted of attorney fees in bringing the instant case to cancel the quitclaim deed and to quiet title, and, if the quitclaim deed was not canceled, additional damages “including, but not limited to, the loss of her interest in the Rosemont Property.” I. Demurrer Defendants demurred to the complaint, arguing all the causes of action were time-barred. As to the financial elder abuse count, which is subject to a four year statute of limitations (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7), Defendants argued the claim was untimely because the cause of action accrued in 1999 when Satsuki signed the quitclaim deed, yet she did not sue until 2021 — nearly 22 years later. Defendants argued Satsuki alleged no facts justifying a delayed discovery of her legal rights. In opposition, Satsuki argued the elder abuse cause of action was timely under the discovery rule because Defendants “affirmatively misrepresented the content of the 1999 [quitclaim deed],” the true nature of which she first discovered on November 4, 2017 when she consulted with real estate attorney Stine. The trial court overruled the demurrer as to all but the fraud cause of action. The court found the elder abuse cause of action timely “because it was brought on June 24, 2021, within four years of November 4, 2017 when [Satsuki] states [she] discovered facts supporting her claim.” 13  J. Summary Judgment Defendants later moved for summary judgment on untimeliness grounds. Defendants argued that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for the elder abuse cause of action accrued no later than June 17, 2016, when estate planning attorney Sano explained to Satsuki in Japanese “that [Defendants] were 100% owners” of the Rosemont Property. Defendants reasoned this information put Satsuki “on inquiry notice” that she had a potential legal claim against Defendants, as further evidenced by the fact that Satsuki and Hal did, in fact, further inquire as to the true state of title to the Rosemont Property. Defendants calculated that the applicable four-year limitations period, when tolled under COVID-19 emergency rules,4 expired on December 11, 2020, yet Hal did not sue on Satsuki’s behalf until June 24, 2021 — 196 days too late. Defendants argued the remaining causes of action were barred by the doctrine of laches because Satsuki sat on her rights for 21 years after signing the quitclaim deed in 1999. Satsuki opposed the summary judgment motion. She maintained that the discovery rule delayed accrual of her elder abuse claim until November 4, 2017, when real estate attorney Stine provided her a copy of the 1999 quitclaim deed. Satsuki argued accrual was not triggered by Sano’s earlier disclosure because “Sano was referring to the 1993 deed [to facilitate the construction loan], not the 1999 [quitclaim deed].” Satsuki reasoned that because she was aware of the 1993 deed, she understood that Sano was 4 As relevant here, California Rules of Court, appendix I, emergency rule 9 tolled statutes of limitations from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020. 14 mistakenly relying on that transaction and that awareness of such a mistaken understanding would not trigger accrual. Assuming the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 2017, Satsuki’s elder abuse claim would be timely. Satsuki further argued laches did not bar her remaining claims because the equities favored her and she had no knowledge of Defendants’ underlying misconduct until November 2017. In reply, Defendants emphasized Sano’s deposition testimony that she told Satsuki “just . . . the facts, that you do not own 50 percent” of the Rosemont Property. Defendants reasoned “this created a suspicion in Satsuki and [Hal] because they followed up with Ms. Sano on this exact subject and asked for referrals.” The trial court granted summary adjudication for Defendants on the elder abuse claim. The court concluded the cause of action accrued when “Sano alerted [Satsuki] to the fact that her name was not on current title and Defendants were the sole titleholders of the property.” The court reasoned that, “upon being told that they lacked current title, a reasonable person would have suspicion of wrongdoing and investigate further.” Indeed, the court observed, “Sano’s communications to Satsuki . . . did, in fact, lead to an investigation where a real estate attorney . . . eventually uncovered the 1999 Quitclaim Deed.” “In other words,” the court stated, “Sano’s representations to Satsuki and [Hal] did lead to further inquiry because it was inquiry notice.” The trial court denied summary judgment on the remaining causes of action. The court declined to apply laches at the summary judgment stage because Satsuki’s “case rests on the assertion that she only discovered the effect of Defendants’ conduct in 2016 or 2017,” rather than when she signed 15 the quitclaim deed in 1999. The court declined to find this delay unreasonable at the summary judgment stage because “there exist disputed facts as to [Satsuki]’s understanding of the 1999 Quitclaim Deed.” K. Trial The trial court heard Satsuki’s remaining claims in a bench trial, ultimately ruling in Defendants’ favor. The court initially found that a presumption of undue influence by Arlene over Satsuki existed with respect to the 1999 quitclaim deed because of their close relationship, Arlene’s active participation in the conveyance, and the “undue profit” Arlene received. The court further found, however, that Defendants rebutted the presumption and established that “in executing the 1999 Quitclaim Deed Satsuki freely exercised her judgment, and that the deed was not the product of undue influence.” The court noted “[t]here was little evidence presented that Satsuki was particularly vulnerable when she signed the 1999 Quitclaim Deed” — she was only 69 years old, which “is not particularly aged”; “[t]here was no evidence that she was cognitively impaired” at that time; “it was clear from the evidence, including Satsuki’s testimony, that . . . [she] possessed sufficient command of the English language to sign the deed freely and voluntarily with awareness of its consequences”; she “had at least some experience with buying and selling real estate”; and she “acted as someone who had gifted her share in the home to [Defendants],” (e.g., by no longer paying her share of property taxes). The court entered judgment for Defendants. III. DISCUSSION Satsuki contends her elder abuse cause of action was timely because it did not accrue until 2021 when Defendants allegedly forced her out of the 16 Rosemont Property. Alternatively, she argues that if accrual was triggered by the loss of her ownership interest, summary adjudication was improper because there are factual disputes about when she was put on inquiry notice. We disagree with both arguments. A. Summary Judgment Principles “ ‘A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment where “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.’ ” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250 (Conroy).) “We review orders granting summary judgment de novo.” (Trovato v. Beckman Coulter, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 319, 322 (Trovato); accord, Hampton, at p. 347.) “ ‘ “We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ’ ” (Hampton, at p. 347.) “A defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts support summary judgment based on the application of an affirmative defense.” (Trovato, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 322; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 [a defendant moving for summary judgment has met his “ ‘burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if’ he ‘has shown that . . . there is a complete defense to that cause of action’ ”].) “[D]efendants mov[ing] for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations . . . have the ‘burden of 17 persuasion’ on that point, meaning they must convince the court that no reasonable trier of fact could find in plaintiffs’ favor on the statute of limitations issue.” (The Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Page (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 336, 340.) “To accomplish that, defendants must first present evidence establishing that plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. It then falls to plaintiffs to counter with evidence creating a dispute about a fact relevant to that defense.” (Ibid.) “If defendants presented evidence establishing the defense and plaintiffs did not effectively dispute any of the relevant facts, summary judgment was properly granted.” (Ibid.) “While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112 (Jolly); see Bartel v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 655, 679 [“the application of the statute of limitations on undisputed facts is a purely legal question that we review de novo”].) B. Statute of Limitations Principles “A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox); see Civ. Code, § 312 [“Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed . . . , after the cause of action shall have accrued”].) The limitations period on an action for financial elder abuse is four years. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7.) “Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 806; see Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 930–931 (Pollock) [“a cause of action accrues at the moment 18 when the party alleging injury is entitled to ‘ “ ‘begin and prosecute an action thereon’ ” ’ ”].) “An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox, at p. 806.) The Legislature expressly incorporated the discovery rule into the elder abuse statute of limitations. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7 [“An action for damages . . . for financial abuse of an elder . . . shall be commenced within four years after the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse” (italics added)]; Fox, at p. 808 [the Legislature uses “should have discovered” when “codifying the discovery rule”].) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’ ” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.) In the context of the discovery rule, “a plaintiff’s suspicion of ‘elements’ of a cause of action . . . refer[s] to the ‘generic’ elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm.” (Ibid.) We therefore “look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them”; we do not undertake a “hypertechnical” analysis of “each specific legal element of a particular cause of action.” (Ibid.; see Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 399 [“the plaintiff discovers the cause of action . . . when, simply put, he at least ‘suspects . . . that someone has done something wrong’ to him [citation], ‘wrong’ being used, not in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with its ‘lay understanding’ ”].) “The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have ‘ “ ‘information of circumstances to put 19 [them] on inquiry’ ” ’ or if they have ‘ “ ‘the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.’ ” ’ [Citations.] In other words, plaintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by such an investigation.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807, fn. omitted; see Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1110–1111 [“the limitations period begins once the plaintiff ‘ “ ‘has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry’ ” ’ ”].) “Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Jolly, at p. 1111.) “Simply put, in order to employ the discovery rule to delay accrual of a cause of action, a potential plaintiff who suspects that an injury has been wrongfully caused must conduct a reasonable investigation of all potential causes of that injury. If such an investigation would have disclosed a factual basis for a cause of action, the statute of limitations begins to run on that cause of action when the investigation would have brought such information to light.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 808–809.) C. The Accrual Trigger Was the Impairment of Satsuki’s Ownership Interest, Not Possessory Enjoyment Satsuki argues her elder abuse cause of action did not accrue until 2021 when she “was ultimately forced out” of the Rosemont Property. She reasons that although “Arlene may have ‘wronged’ Satsuki back in 1999 when she deceived [Satsuki] into signing the Quitclaim Deed[,] . . . the first time [Satsuki] was damaged by Arlene’s deception” was when Satsuki “was 20 ultimately forced out [of the residence] in June of 2021.” (First italics added.) Defendants argue Satsuki forfeited this argument because she did not raise it in the trial court. On the merits, Defendants maintain the cause of action accrued when Satsuki was put on inquiry in June 2016 that her ownership interest in the Rosemont Property was impaired. Satsuki counters that the argument is not forfeited because she raised it in opposition to Defendants’ laches attack on her other causes of action. We decline to find this accrual argument forfeited. Although arguments are generally forfeited if raised for the first time on appeal, “a new theory raising a pure question of law on undisputed facts can be raised for the first time on appeal.” (Fort Bragg Unified School Dist. v. Colonial American Casualty & Surety Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 891, 907, italics added.) “Where, as here, ‘the underlying facts are not in dispute . . . , the question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law.” (San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 563, 576.) Therefore, assuming without deciding that Satsuki raised this theory for the first time on appeal, we decline to find it forfeited because it presents a pure question of law that we decide de novo on undisputed facts.5 The argument, however, fails on the merits. The “ ‘generic’ elements” of Satsuki’s cause of action — “wrongdoing, causation, and harm” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807) — were present when Defendants allegedly wronged Satsuki by deceiving her into signing the quitclaim deed, which caused her to lose her ownership interest in the Rosemont Property, toward which she had 5 To be clear, the facts are undisputed; their legal significance is not. 21 contributed $270,000 in purchase money. Satsuki’s cause of action therefore accrued when her ownership interest was impaired. (See Herbert A. Crocker & Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1722, 1729 (Transamerica Title) [negligence claim against title insurer accrued in 1970 when the insurer belatedly disclosed a “ ‘possible [adverse] interest’ ” consisting of a public conservation easement, rather than in 1988 when the government asserted its rights under that easement]; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1395 [fraud claim for allegedly concealing a restrictive covenant that limited resale to low-income purchasers accrued when the property owner discovered the restrictive covenant, not later when forced to sell at a reduced price]; Vera v. REL-BC, LLC (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 57, 70, 72 (Vera) [nondisclosure claim accrued before close of escrow when homebuyer’s own inspectors disclosed potential damage that was inconsistent with sellers’ disclosures, not later when the homebuyer suffered actual damage].) Satsuki essentially acknowledges in her complaint, summary judgment briefing, and appellate briefing that the accrual trigger for her elder abuse cause of action was Defendants’ acquisition of her ownership interest in the Rosemont Property and not her subsequent removal from it. In her complaint, for example, Satsuki identifies Defendants’ wrongful conduct as “appropriat[ing], obtain[ing], and/or retain[ing] Satsuki’s property,” which caused her to suffer damages “including, but not limited to, the loss of her interest in the Rosemont Property.” (See Conroy, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1250 [“The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings”].) Likewise, in opposing summary judgment, Satsuki acknowledged that her elder abuse cause of action accrued when she “discover[ed] or h