So v. Schulman CA2/4

Filed 10/22/26 So v. Schulman CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANANSA SO, B348989 (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 25LBCV00124) v. MARK SCHULMAN et al. Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of Michael Okayo and Michael Okayo for Plaintiff and Appellant. Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld and Ellyn E. Nesbit for Defendants and Respondents.  Anansa So’s former tenants obtained a money judgment against her that they later assigned to the Mark Schulman 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan—Roth Account (the Plan). In 2025, So brought this action against the Plan and Mark Schulman (Schulman) (together, defendants) asserting claims arising from allegedly wrongful levies of execution that were completed in 2018. The trial court granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)1 and entered judgment of dismissal. So appeals.2 All of her claims arise from protected judgment enforcement activity. The claims lack minimal merit because one claim is time-barred and the rest are barred by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c)). We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Complaint The following facts are drawn from the verified complaint and exhibits. Richard Guido and Leigh Anne Delport successfully sued So for breach of a lease agreement and fraud, and in 2011, obtained a $149,705.62 judgment against her. (Guido v. So, Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 2011, No. BC407302.) In December 2017, Guido filed an acknowledgment of assignment of 1 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 So moved to consolidate this appeal with her appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for attorney fees (So v. Schulman (B351135, app. pending)). No briefs have been filed in case No. B351135. In the interest of avoiding delay, we deny her motion. 2 the judgment. He represented he had acquired Delport’s rights in the judgment, and as sole judgment creditor, was assigning all his rights to the Plan. The Plan filed an affidavit of identity pursuant to section 680.1353 in April 2018 and an application for and renewal of the judgment in October 2018. In the renewal document, the Plan represented that the judgment amount had not been reduced by any credits but had increased to about $258,000 due to post-judgment costs and accrued interest. The Plan filed a proof of service stating the document was mailed to So at an address in Long Beach. So alleged she did not live at that address. Sometime in 2018, So’s bank notified her that the sheriff had taken $28,000 from her account and a Cartier watch from her safe deposit box. She learned that Schulman, as the judgment’s assignee, was responsible for the alleged “confiscation” of her assets. The Plan served a notice of renewal of the judgment in December 2023, which So received on January 7, 2024. More than a year later, on January 21, 2025, So filed her complaint. She alleged the assignment of the judgment was void because its purpose was to defraud Guido’s creditors. So maintained she was not informed of the assignment or any enforcement action because defendants sent documents to an incorrect address so they could “surreptitiously” take her property. The lack of notice left her unable to “claim her property 3 At the time it files for a writ of execution or abstract of judgment, a judgment creditor must execute and file an affidavit that provides certain information about the case and names used by the judgment debtor. (§ 680.135.) 3 rights” and prevent a “wrongful[ ] attach[ment]” of her property. So asserted claims for abuse of process, wrongful attachment, violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Debt Collection Act), conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair competition (UCL, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), declaratory relief, constructive trust, accounting, and injunctive relief. B. The Anti-SLAPP Proceedings 1. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion Defendants moved to strike the entire complaint. They argued that judgment enforcement activities were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. They contended So’s claims arose from these activities, and for each claim, identified the following supporting allegations of wrongdoing. The abuse of process count was premised on defendants’ misusing the “‘civil attachment process’” by “‘failing to send the requisite statutory notices’” to So. The wrongful attachment count alleged their filing of “‘invalid, void and[/]or fraudulent renewals of judgment.’” The Debt Collection Act count was premised on “‘false and misleading representations’” and unfair and abusive practices for the purpose of “‘attaching [So’s] property to pay the alleged debt.’” The conversion count alleged that defendants deprived So of the contents of her bank account and safe deposit box. The unjust enrichment count incorporated the general allegations, which challenged the validity of the assignment of the judgment and alleged the renewal notice was sent to an incorrect address. The acts underlying the UCL count involved defendants’ failure to serve So with judgment renewal notices, signing perjured affidavits and proofs of service to obtain 4 writs of attachment from the court, and various improper acts of levying. The IIED count arose from defendants’ failure to provide notice of the “‘confiscation’” of the contents of So’s bank account and safe deposit box, false representations that deprived her of cash, abuse of judicial process, and fraud on the court. The declaratory relief count alleged disputes concerning property ownership, validity of the judgment renewals, the legality of the judgment enforcement efforts, and the alleged statutory violations. Defendants argued So’s claims lacked minimal merit because the Debt Collection Act claim was time-barred and the remaining claims were barred by the litigation privilege. 2. So’s Opposition So conceded her claims were based on the judgment assignment and levy. More specifically, she stated they were based upon Schulman’s “arrogat[ing] to himself the powers” of the court and sheriff “in the name of being a judgment debt ‘assignee,’” filing of false affidavits of service, mailing the earlier renewal notice to an incorrect address, and failing to serve “notices of attachment as required by statute.” She argued, however, that her statutory (§ 703.010 et seq.) and constitutional rights of exemption were violated when her bank account was “illegally raided” and property in her safe deposit box was “illegally seized.” Citing Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley), she argued, such illegal activities were not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. So filed no declarations but requested judicial notice of certain documents or facts not mentioned in her complaint: (1) filings in several unrelated civil and family court cases 5 involving Guido; (2) People v. Chao ((Aug. 17, 2017, B266774) [nonpub. opn.]), a criminal appeal involving Peter and Phoebe Chao; (3) a 2023 civil complaint So’s counsel filed against defendants on behalf of a different client, Ricky Carrell; and (4) a Secretary of State business entity search result for “Active Statewide Funding, LLC” (Active). According to So, the documents showed that Schulman was “in the business of defrauding California residents by assuming judgment creditor status based on fraudulent assignments and committing fraud upon the court.” So argued Schulman, Guido, and the Chaos had been “co-conspirators” in a scheme in which Active assigned a predatory debt to Schulman, who enforced it by foreclosing on Carrell’s property. Guido’s assignment of the judgment to the Plan, she argued, was “[l]ike the fraudulent ‘assignment’ in the Carrell Case.” So also contended the Plan was not a “genuine assignee” of the judgment because the assignment was a “fraudulent transfer.” Guido, she argued, had been found liable in an unrelated lawsuit for making a fraudulent transfer to evade his creditors, and Schulman “could not legally have priority” over the claims of those creditors. So did not respond to defendants’ contention that the litigation privilege barred her claims. She argued her Debt Collection Act claim was not time-barred because she had alleged a conspiracy, the conspiratorial acts were ongoing, and she was not aware of “fraudulent affidavits” until January 7, 2024. 6  3. Other Filings and the Order Granting the Anti-SLAPP Motion Defendants’ reply was accompanied by a declaration from Schulman and objections to So’s request for judicial notice. So filed a brief in which she responded to the objections and requested an order striking the new declaration or granting leave to file her own declaration and a sur-reply. At the hearing, the trial court denied an oral request by So’s counsel for judicial notice of Penal Code sections 118, 154 and 5314 and denied her request to file a sur-reply and evidence. The court took judicial notice that the court records existed and were what they purported to be, but not the truth of factual assertions in them. It took judicial notice of the Secretary of State search result but not the Chao opinion. The court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and entered judgment of dismissal. So appealed. DISCUSSION A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the 4 Penal Code section 118 defines perjury. Penal Code section 154 makes it a crime for a debtor to “fraudulently . . . assign[ ]” property “with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his or her creditors of their rights, claims, or demands.” Under Penal Code section 531, a party to any conveyance made to defeat, hinder, or delay creditors or others, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Townsend v. State Bar (1948) 32 Cal.2d 592, 598.) 7 plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Anti- SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Ibid.) We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and employ the same two-step analysis. (Waterford Property Co. v. County of Orange (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 530, 538.) B. Step One: So's Claims Arose From Protected Activity In the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant need not demonstrate that its actions were protected as a matter of law; it must only make a prima facie showing that the actions fell into one of the categories listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 314.) These categories include statements or writings made “before a . . . judicial proceeding . . .” or “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1), (2).) Courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 (Kashian).) Protected activities include actions taken to enforce a judgment. (See Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 8 Cal.App.5th 269, 285–286, fn. 3 [obtaining and recording an abstract of judgment to create a lien against real property]; Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 829 [fraudulent representations made to obtain judgments and orders].) Here, defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in connection with the assignment and renewals of the judgment, levies, and related notices were protected litigation-related activities and central to each claim.5 Defendants have carried their step one burden. So attempts to avoid this outcome by casting the challenged activity as “the conspiracy between Defendant and his attorney and others not yet named in the lawsuit, to assert dominion and control over” her funds and property and the “wrongful conversion of property.” This argument is unpersuasive.6 5 So contends defendants failed to satisfy their first-step burden “by not analyzing the causes of action stated in the Complaint and identifying how the acts alleged in each claim are protected under the Anti-S[LAPP] statute.” We disagree. Defendants separately analyzed the first through eighth causes of action, and for each, quoted and provided paragraph numbers of the allegations supplying the acts of wrongdoing or, in the case of declaratory relief, the alleged disputes. The remaining “causes of action” (constructive trust, accounting, and injunctive relief) are not independent causes of action and only describe remedies. (Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 65, 82, overruled in part in McWilliams v. City of Long Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613, 626). The claims for these remedies, in any event, arose from the same conduct alleged in support of the other claims. 6 To the extent that So failed to articulate this argument below in the manner she does on appeal, or to cite sufficient authority to support it, she has also forfeited it. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 769–770 [undeveloped argument not sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal].) 9  So does not direct us to any conspiracy allegations in the complaint. The issues in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings. (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883.) We determine the acts underlying a claim from the plaintiff’s allegations and will not insert into a pleading claims for relief based on allegations of activities that the plaintiff has not identified. (Ibid.) So cannot avoid the anti-SLAPP statute by asserting her case involves an unalleged conspiracy. To argue her case is based upon unprotected conversion, So relies on Greco v. Greco (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 810 (Greco) and Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388 (Optional). These cases are distinguishable. In both cases, the courts found claims alleging the misappropriation of funds did not arise from protected conduct. But the defendants in those cases were not accused of using court processes to take the plaintiffs’ funds.7 Here, So undisputedly owes money pursuant to a judgment, and the judgment was enforced against her assets. The taking of her assets was allegedly wrongful because the assignment of the judgment was void, the renewals were procured by fraud, and notices were not served. Protected litigation-related activities were the linchpin of the theory of wrongdoing underlying all of So’s claims. 7 The Greco plaintiff alleged her brother wrongfully took money from their parents’ trust and estate and then used it to fund vindictive litigation against her. (Greco, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 816–817.) The Optional plaintiff alleged that DAS and others “looted from its corporate coffers” and deposited the funds in a bank account. The funds were released to DAS after it settled a lawsuit with other alleged looters, and the plaintiff sued to recover the funds. (Optional, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1392, 1400–1401.) 10  So next argues that defendants’ conduct was illegal and therefore unprotected by the anti-SLAPP statute. So contends the court erred in denying her request for judicial notice of Penal Code sections 154, 531, and 118 and by ignoring allegations of fraudulent conduct by defendants and their “co-conspirators.” We disagree. Even if the statutes and allegations of fraud are considered, So fails to show the conduct was illegal as a matter of law as required to bring defendants’ conduct outside of the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Flatley describes a narrow exception to the application of the anti-SLAPP statute: the statute does not apply when the moving defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petitioning activity was illegal as a matter of law. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.) Further, it has been held that the plaintiff must prove criminal – not merely illegal – conduct by the defendant. (Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 151.) Here, defendants do not concede they perjured themselves (Pen. Code, § 118), were parties to a fraudulent conveyance (id., §§ 154, 531), or participated in a criminal conspiracy. The existence of judgments, orders, or complaints against defendants and Guido in unrelated cases does not conclusively prove any crime was committed when Guido assigned the judgment or when the Plan renewed and enforced it. So fails to show her claims arose from conduct that was criminal as a matter of law. Thus, the narrow Flatley exception does not apply. C. Step Two – Minimal Merit In the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court determines whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient 11 claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Only claims with minimal merit may proceed. (Ibid.) The trial court found that So’s claims lacked minimal merit because the Debt Collection Act claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (f)) and the remaining claims were barred by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c)). We agree. 1. The Debt Collection Act Claim Is Time-Barred The Debt Collection Act provides that “[a]ny action” under its provisions “may be brought . . . within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (f); Paredes v. Credit Consulting Services, Inc. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 410, 426.) So argues her Debt Collection Act claim was not time-barred because she alleged an ongoing conspiracy and did not become aware of “fraudulent affidavits” until January 7, 2024. Even if we accept for the purposes of argument that a conspiracy delayed her awareness of fraud until January 7, 2024,8 that date is more than one year before So filed the complaint on January 21, 2025. In other words, So 8 Because So does not explain with facts or law how any conspiracy or collusion tolled the statute of limitations in this case, she has forfeited this argument. An appellant’s “conclusory presentation, without pertinent argument or an attempt to apply the law to the circumstances of this case, is inadequate.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852; In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 244, 255 [failure of citation to authority permits court to find forfeiture].) 12 admittedly did not file her case within the applicable statute of limitations period. Accordingly, she fails to demonstrate the Debt Collection Act claim has minimal merit. 2. The Remaining Claims Are Barred by the Litigation Privilege A plaintiff cannot carry the step two burden if the litigation privilege precludes liability for the challenged claims. (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 661.) When the litigation privilege applies, it bars all tort theories of recovery except malicious prosecution. (Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) It extends to acts necessary to enforce a judgment, including applying for writ of execution and levying. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1052.) The trial court found the litigation privilege was a complete defense to the counts for abuse of process, wrongful attachment, unjust enrichment, UCL, conversion, IIED, and declaratory relief. On appeal, So does not challenge the ruling as to four of these counts (abuse of process, wrongful attachment, unjust enrichment, and conversion). She argues only that the trial court “failed to discuss” the claims for UCL, IIED, declaratory relief, constructive trust, accounting, and injunctive relief. We disagree. The trial court acknowledged defendants’ argument that “all” causes of action except the Debt Collection Act claim were barred by the litigation privilege. It found the litigation privilege’s elements “are met here” because “[a]ll acts in the complaint were for the purposes of collecting on a debt[;] Defendants, as assignees, are parties to litigation and/or authorized by law to act on their behalf[;] the steps were taken to achieve the object of collecting the debt[;] and the steps bear 13 logical relationship to debt collection.” (Italics added.) The court concluded that “the litigation privilege acts as a complete defense to each of Plaintiff’s asserted claims (with the exception of the [Debt Collection Act] cause of action) . . . .” (Italics added.) Though the trial court did not address each claim individually, it is apparent from the order that its reasoning and findings applied to all of So’s claims. So does not show that the trial court erred in conducting its step-two analysis. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS MORI, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J. 14