In re O.M. CA5

Filed 11/10/26 In re O.M. CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re O.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY F091429 SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. JVDP-26-000031) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OPINION T.M., Defendant and Appellant. O.M., a Minor, etc., Respondent. THE COURT * APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette Rees, Judge. * Before DeSantos, Acting P. J., Harrell, J. and Guerra, J.  Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas Boze, County Counsel, Jonathan Lee, Deputy County Counsel; Gordon- Creed, Kelley, Holl & Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman and Ella Wesly for Plaintiff and Respondent. Kimball J.P. Sargeant, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent O.M. -ooOoo- INTRODUCTION In this juvenile dependency case, T.M. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order as to his minor daughter, O.M. His sole contention on appeal is that the court erred by limiting his educational and developmental services decisionmaking rights (educational rights) and assigning them to O.M.’s care provider. In response, the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) submits the matter on the record because it did not advocate for or against limiting father’s educational rights below and instead deferred to the juvenile court. The agency notes, however, it did not then and does not now object to the juvenile court’s order. Given the agency’s position and the fact that O.M. was the proponent of the challenged order below, we appointed O.M. counsel while this appeal was pending to ensure her interests were adequately represented. Her appointed attorney has since informed this court he is not taking a formal position in this appeal and has stated that O.M. has most recently informed him through her trial counsel she does not currently oppose father sharing educational rights with her care provider. After reviewing father’s contentions and the record, we conclude the juvenile court did not err based on the evidence before it at the time of the hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the order limiting father’s educational rights. 2.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 18, 2026, the agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of then 16-year-old O.M. It was alleged that O.M. came within the court’s jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). Specifically, the petition alleged that father, with whom O.M. resided, placed O.M. at substantial risk of harm by failing to supervise or protect her adequately and by failing to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. O.M.’s mother, R.M. (mother)’s whereabouts were unknown. The investigation leading to the petition revealed that according to O.M., father had allowed a woman and her daughter to live in the home with them who exposed O.M. to drug use and prostitution. The woman physically abused O.M., and father was aware but did not intervene. Additionally, O.M. reported that on a couple of occasions, father had “grabbed her and put her on the ground.” According to O.M., father was also verbally abusive, including “yelling and getting in her face” and calling her names like “bitch.” O.M. further reported that father “barely [took] care” of her. She had specific medical needs that father was not ensuring got met, and father had not taken her to the dentist in two to three years, despite O.M.’s “begging” that father make medical and dental appointments for her. O.M. had been receiving mental health services since she was 12 years old. She had a history of suicide attempts and ideations resulting in 38 prior hospitalizations. According to her, she had to go to the “mental hospital” so much to get away from father, as he was a trigger for her because of his neglect of her medical and other needs. A staff member from O.M.’s mental health services provider reported the home smelled of 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 3. animal urine and feces and that father, though he consented to O.M. receiving services, indicated he did not want to be involved and did not participate in or engage with O.M.’s services. O.M. further stated that father did not let her go to school or leave the house. The agency confirmed that O.M. had not physically attended school since September 2025 and had not completed any schoolwork since October 2025. She had an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) to address “emotional disability” and disruptive behaviors. In ninth and tenth grade, she received Cs and Ds and failed most courses in 11th grade. She had been enrolled in an alternative school but needed more intensive care, so the school arranged for her to enter a residential facility. She began receiving care at a residential facility and reportedly did well but had to leave after four weeks due to a medical emergency. At one point, father needed to complete paperwork for a group home but he did not and got upset when he was approached about it. O.M. reported she was supposed to go back to school, but father did not follow through with what was needed. Father denied the allegations of neglect, blaming O.M. for her circumstances, including missing school, and calling her a liar. He believed psychotropic medication caused many of her medical problems and expressed frustration with the services O.M. had received and the way the systems had failed them. He felt O.M. needed a structured program and more supervision but did not believe this was available due to O.M.’s “medical, behavioral, and mental conditions.” O.M. was eventually placed in protective custody based on her assertions she did not feel safe with father, father’s lack of cooperation with the agency and other providers, and the allegations that he neglected O.M.’s medical, dental, and other basic daily needs, in addition to past child welfare referrals. At the detention hearing conducted on February 19, 2026, the juvenile court ordered O.M. to remain detained. Father was to have supervised visits, but O.M. would not be forced to visit if she did not want to. The agency requested that the court appoint a 4. district surrogate to be a joint educational rights holder with father “based on some of the allegations in the report” and because O.M. had “very high needs and would benefit from the involvement of the district surrogate.” The court granted the agency’s request. The court subsequently signed an order designating educational rights holder (Judicial Council form JV-535) indicating that mother’s educational and developmental- services decisionmaking rights were temporarily limited (§ 319, subd. (j)) and that father’s were retained. The form designated another individual to hold educational rights jointly with father. O.M. subsequently reported she did not want any contact with father and did not want to reunify with him. For his part, father did not seek to set up visitation with O.M. and did not engage with any voluntary services. O.M. had been placed in a “Small Family Home.” She was enjoying her placement and did not want to leave. She was reported to be in “stable” health but had to undergo five root canal procedures and had nine cavities that needed to be filled. She started attending school in March 2026 and had an active IEP. She was assessed for and qualified to receive mental health services. The department recommended the juvenile court sustain the petition, adjudge O.M. a dependent, remove her from the parents’ custody, grant father reunification services, and deny mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1), as her whereabouts were still unknown. The department recommended that father’s educational rights not be limited but that the court be assigned sole authority to make orders regarding administration of O.M.’s prescribed psychotropic medication. The combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was conducted on March 26, 2026. O.M.’s attorney reaffirmed O.M.’s stated interest that she did not wish to reunify with father and noted that O.M.’s and father’s relationship was “severely damaged.” Father’s attorney made a “standard offer of proof,” indicating father did not agree with the allegations in the petition but agreed with the recommendations and wished to work 5. towards reunification. After hearing from the parties, the court adopted the agency’s recommendations, except for those regarding educational rights. As for educational rights, O.M.’s attorney requested that father’s educational rights be limited and that O.M.’s care provider be appointed as her educational rights holder. Counsel explained that O.M. did not want father to know where she was residing. Father’s attorney objected, and counsel for the agency noted O.M. had the right to give her opinion and deferred to the juvenile court. In ruling on O.M.’s request, the juvenile court noted its concern was O.M.’s safety, and “it would be detrimental at this time for [father] to hold [educational] rights based on then having knowledge of where to find and contact [O.M.] She still remains concerned for her safety, and until that is alleviated, that would be detrimental to her.” The court appointed O.M.’s care provider educational rights holder. A JV-535 form was subsequently completed and filed reflecting the court’s oral pronouncement limiting father’s (as well as mother’s) educational rights and designating O.M.’s care provider as the educational rights holder. DISCUSSION While parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing their children’s education, when a child is adjudged a dependent, the juvenile court may limit a parent’s ability to make educational decisions on the child’s behalf so long as the limitations do not exceed those necessary to protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (a); In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276.) Factors to consider include whether “the parent … is unwilling or unable to participate in making an educational decision for their child, or if other circumstances exist that compromise the ability of the parent … to make educational decisions for the child.” (See § 366.1, subd. (e).) Educational decisions must be based on the best interests of the child. (In re Samuel G. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 502, 510.) 6.  “ ‘We review the juvenile court’s order limiting parents’ educational rights under an abuse of discretion standard [citation], bearing in mind “[t]he focus of dependency proceedings is on the child, not the parent” [citation].’ ” (In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 58.) Under this standard, we may not substitute our decision for that of the juvenile court and may reverse only if the court’s order exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) We recognize that as we prepare this opinion, some circumstances appear to have changed. O.M.’s appellate attorney has informed us that O.M., now 17 years old, no longer objects to father holding educational rights jointly with her care provider. Our task, however, is to review the juvenile court’s order based on the evidence before it at the time the order was made. We do not, and have not been asked by any party to, consider any postjudgment evidence. (See In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676.) We conclude that at the time the juvenile court made the order limiting father’s educational rights, it did not abuse its discretion. At the time the juvenile court made its order, a major thread running through the sustained jurisdictional allegations and supporting evidence, which father does not challenge on appeal, was father’s direct neglect of O.M.’s educational needs, as well as neglect of her medical and mental health needs, which were substantial and intertwined with her educational needs. At the time the agency intervened, O.M. had not attended school for months. Prior to her ceasing to attend school, her education was unstable and ineffective. Her grades were poor, and she had needs that were not able to be met by the alternative school in which she was enrolled and a medical emergency that necessitated her leaving the residential program she subsequently attended. Father’s inability or unwillingness to ensure that O.M. received the mental and medical treatment she needed to function in a healthy manner, was, in turn, detrimental to her education. Additionally, father did not appear to have any plan to try to get O.M. into school in the months leading 7. to the department’s investigation and appeared resigned to the belief that O.M.’s needs rendered her unable to receive any type of education. Coupled with this was O.M.’s stated desire for father not to hold educational rights because she did not want him to know where she went to school nor the area where she was residing. Although a child’s preferences are not determinative of their best interests, they are “powerful demonstrative evidence” of such. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432; In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087.) O.M. was an older child able to state her preference, was vulnerable in many ways, and her relationship with father generally was a major source of instability for her. While father is correct in pointing out on appeal there was no evidence that father was actively seeking to find O.M. or harass her in her placement, O.M.’s safety concerns were not completely unfounded, contrary to father’s assertions. Part of the sustained jurisdictional allegations included physically assaultive behavior and verbal abuse by father, as well as his failure to intervene to stop physical abuse by others. Even if father knowing where O.M. lived did not pose a direct threat to her, given her fragile mental state and the risk father’s neglect posed to her when she was residing with him, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that O.M.’s perception of a threat and resulting emotional disturbance warranted protection through limitation of educational rights. O.M. was also adamant at the time of the disposition hearing that she did not want any contact with father. The juvenile court could reasonably infer that her and father’s volatile relationship would impair father’s ability to make fully informed decisions regarding O.M.’s education. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.650(f)(3)(A) [the educational rights holder must meet with the child as often as necessary to make decisions that are in their best interest].) Taken together, the above provided the court with a reasonable basis to conclude that father was unwilling or unable to make educational decisions for O.M. that were in her best interests. We conclude the juvenile court acted well within its discretion in 8. determining that the totality of the circumstances rendered it necessary to limit father’s educational rights to protect O.M. Father is not without a remedy given the changed circumstances we have alluded to above. At each review hearing, the juvenile court is required to consider whether a parent’s previously limited educational rights should be restored (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(H)). Father may petition the court to restore his educational rights, and O.M. may state her nonopposition for the court to consider at that time. We express no opinion on how the juvenile court should rule on any request to restore father’s educational rights. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s order from which father appeals is affirmed. 9.