In re C.J. CA1/2

Filed 11/12/26 In re C.J. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re C.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, A176243 v. (Lake County N.J. et al., Super. Ct. Nos. JV320725-A, Defendants and Appellants. JV320725-B, JV320725-C, JV320725-D) M.J. (father) has four children—three of whose mother is N.J. (mother)—who are the subjects of the instant dependency, initiated in May 2025. In August of 2025, mother and father relocated to Sacramento County. Over the next several months, they repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought to transfer the case there, closer to where the children were placed with foster parents. Along the way, in October 2025, and again in April 2026, father failed to participate in a court-ordered psychological evaluation. In May of 2026, the juvenile court granted a motion by the Lake County Department of Social Services (department) to terminate father’s reunification services and set a permanency hearing with respect to three of his children based on that 1 failure under the doctrine of disentitlement. Father challenged that decision by petitioning this court for extraordinary writ, and on September 11, 2026, we granted the petition. (M.J. v. Superior Court (Sep. 11, 2026, A176630) [nonpub. opn.] (M.J.).) Meanwhile, mother appealed the juvenile court’s denial of the parents’ February 2, 2026 motion for transfer, and father appealed the court’s denial of a similar motion filed on March 30. The parents argue that the court abused its discretion in denying both motions because no substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the requested transfer would not be in the best interests of their children. We agree, and we reverse. BACKGROUND1 Father has two daughters, I.J. and S.J.; and two sons, C.J. and M.J. I.J.’s mother is J.M.; mother is the mother of the other three children. As of May 7, 2025, I.J., C.J., S.J., and M.J. were nine, eight, six, and five years old, respectively. Initial Petition and Detention On May 9, 2025, the department filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) with respect to the children. The petition alleged that the children were at serious risk of physical harm because father was regularly giving them “higher medication doses than prescribed, despite being cautioned by medical staff of the possible 1 Some of the factual recitation that follows is taken from our previous opinion in father’s petition for extraordinary writ, M.J., supra, A176630. On October 15, 2026, we granted father’s unopposed request that we take judicial notice of that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 dangers,” and that he refused to “schedule or allow medical testing to confirm the children’s diagnoses and the appropriate medication and dosing.” Two days earlier, the department had sought and was granted a protective custody warrant pursuant to section 340 with respect to all four children, who were taken into custody. Jurisdiction, Disposition, and the First Evaluation Appointment On July 9, a contested jurisdiction hearing was held, at the conclusion of which the juvenile court found the jurisdictional allegations true and sustained the petition. On July 22, the department filed a disposition report, attaching as “Exhibit H” an initial case plan, requiring father to participate in parenting education, domestic violence prevention plan, maintain visitation, and participate in a psychological evaluation. On August 19, as will be discussed in greater detail, the parents evidently relocated to Sacramento County. On September 10, a contested disposition hearing was held at which father was not present. There is no transcript of this hearing in the record, but according to the minutes, father’s counsel informed the juvenile court that she “made it very clear to [father] that he should not file any further JV- 180,” and that she had received several emails from her client “demanding a transfer be filed as he moved and will never be coming back . . . .” She then requested to be relieved as father’s counsel, a request the court denied. Counsel for the department stated that the department was “unable to confirm the parties moved,” and then “inform[ed] the Court that [father] has had six difference residen[ces] in five different counties in the last 3 years.” The parties and the court then proceeded to the issue of disposition, following 3 which the court adopted the recommendations of the department and ordered that both parents submit to psychological evaluations to “be used for the purposes of tailoring services.”3 The last substantive line of the minutes for the September 10 hearing reads: “The Court agrees that if the parents moved to Sacramento the matter can be transferred.” Father’s October 10 Motion to Transfer On October 10, father—acting in propria persona—filed a motion to transfer the dependencies to Sacramento County, using Judicial Council form JV-550. The motion attached father’s declaration, testifying that he and mother had moved to North Highlands on August 19, 2025, that all four of the children were “currently placed in foster homes within approximately one hour of our residence,” and that “CPS [had] conducted a home visit to verify our new address.” His declaration further explained that he had filed his motion in propria persona, despite being represented by counsel, because his counsel “was informed in writing multiple times to file a request for transfer,” and “acknowledged that transfer would be appropriate, yet no motion was filed.” The motion attached several documents, including notices of change of address for both parents, filed with the court on August 21; a copy of father’s 3 Father filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s September 10 dispositional orders (A174873). In its respondent’s brief, filed February 19, the department indicated that it would stipulate to a conditional reversal in order to supplement and clarify the record regarding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). On March 12, we conditionally reversed and remanded for further ICWA findings. And on March 23, the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply, and subsequently issued a written order to that effect on April 9. 4 driver’s license bearing the North Highlands address; and copies of email correspondence with father’s counsel. On October 15, the department filed opposition. It asserted that the parents had agreed to an inspection of their new address by a Lake County social worker, who found that they “appeared to be renting one room of a small house on the outskirts of Sacramento,” with “[t]he other rooms . . . rented to other adults they do not know. The [parents] reported that the children can live in a toolshed behind this house when they are returned to the parents’ custody.” The opposition went on to argue that father’s “average of six months per residence over the past three years . . . does not inspire confidence that the parents intend to live in Sacramento on a long-term basis,” and that transfer was not in the children’s best interests because “[t]here is no reason to believe [father] will follow the orders of the Sacramento juvenile court,” and “[d]isregard of court orders poses a risk of harm to the children.” As for the potential benefit of transferring the case, the motion argued there was none, as the parents had “refused to participate in services,” and thus “the availability of services in Sacramento is moot,” and because the parents were “not currently allowed in- person visits with their children . . . their proximity to the children is immaterial.” The department’s opposition was not accompanied by a declaration, but nevertheless attached several exhibits. They included a “timeline of moves,” listing what purported to be six addresses for father beginning in January of 2019; and delivered service logs from Merced County dating between October and December of 2023, indicating that on October 12, 2023, a social worker had made contact with father and the children at their residence in Los Banos, but had returned on December 18 to find “the home appeared to be 5 vacant.” According to the logs, the social worker later learned that father and the children had moved to Modesto, apparently at some point in November. On October 20, a hearing was held on the motion. Father was not present, but was represented by counsel. Again, there is no transcript of the hearing in the record, but according to the minutes, there was “a discussion regarding the father filing documents without [his counsel’s] knowledge,” following which, “[t]here being no appearance by the father, the Court denie[d] the motion for transfer without prejudice. The reconsideration of jurisdiction and the transfer motion can be brought again.” The court also ordered both parents “to comply with the Psychological Evaluation,” then scheduled for October 2—an appointment that father did not attend. (See M.J., supra, A176243, p. 4.) Marsden Motions, the Motion to Terminate Reunification Services, and New Counsel On December 15, the juvenile court granted separate motions by each parent to relieve their appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.4 And on January 2, 2026, the department filed a “Motion to Terminate Family Reunification Services,” invoking the doctrine of disentitlement and arguing that father’s reunification services should be terminated based on his failure to obey the court’s order to participate in a psychological evaluation. On January 12, the court appointed new counsel for both parents, and continued the six-month review hearing to March 2. There was also a 4 That same day, the parents filed a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition with this court, seeking transfer of the matter to Sacramento County. On December 23, we denied the petition (A175044). 6 “discussion regarding the father not complying with the Court ordered” evaluation, and the court ordered that a new evaluation be scheduled. An appointment for father to have a psychological evaluation was scheduled for April 30—an appointment that, as before, he ultimately did not attend. (See M.J., supra, A176630, pp. 5–6.) Father’s February 2 Motion to Transfer On February 2, father—this time acting through his new counsel— again moved for a transfer to Sacramento County, using Judicial Council form JV-548. The motion argued that the proposed transfer was in the best interests of the children because “[b]oth Parents reside in Sacramento County, non[e] of the children is placed in Lake County, but they are placed around Sacramento County. The services can be best provided in Sacramento which is in the best interest of the children.” The motion indicated that a Lake County social worker had verified the parents’ new address on October 20, and stated that it attached a driver’s license and lease agreement, although those documents are not attached to the motion in the record. The motion was argued at a hearing on March 2. Father’s counsel briefly argued that both parents lived and “will continue to live in Sacramento,” and that father had “already started services in Sacramento County” and had “graduated some of them.” Mother’s counsel joined in the motion. Counsel for the children agreed that it was “probably appropriate to transfer the case.” He noted that the children were “actually located closer to Sacramento than they are to Lake County,” in four different foster placements where they were “doing well,” and that “Sacramento being a bigger county will have more services available for parents and children.” 7 Finally, he observed that “one of the other practical things from my viewpoint is the relationship between [the department] and the parents is not very good. And for reunification to happen, I would be hopeful that perhaps some new eyes and . . . new voices from the attorneys would be helpful in the reunification process.”5 After indicating that she had “filed an objection to the motion . . . largely similar to the objection I filed in October,”6 counsel for the department went on: “[a]gain, the parents have refused to participate in services, refused to work with us, refused to follow the Court’s orders to have psychological evaluations and to participate in reunification services.” She argued that “[w]hen a parent won’t follow this Court’s orders, we have no reason to believe that they would follow another court’s orders. So transferring the case to Sacramento with a promise to follow court orders is highly dangerous for these children. [¶] . . . [¶] As far as the relationship not being great between the [parents] and this department, I also don’t believe we have any reason to think that the relationship would be better between the [parents] and another department.” The juvenile court later ruled as follows: “THE COURT: Okay. So I think there’s a danger to the children if we were to transfer this to Sacramento. I think the clear issue that has gone on 5 Mother’s counsel later indicated that she “would . . . join in the comments that there does seem to be a relationship and trust breakdown with this agency in Lake County between both of the parents and the agency. I believe that being transferred to Sacramento County reunification services could actually be facilitated and both parents would be willing to participate in those services because the communication and the relationships would be drastically improved.” 6 Such written objection does not appear to be in the record. 8 in this case is that [father] has lived at, at least that we can tell, at least six addresses in five different counties over the past three years, one of which he changed very immediately after there was an inquiry from Child Protective Services in that particular county. And there seems to be a pattern of moving around to avoid—well, to avoid services. And my biggest fear is that—is that somehow transferring it to Sacramento County, it will get lost in the transfer. And I think that is not helpful for these children. It sounds like from what [the children’s counsel] is saying that they’re doing well in their placements, and we want to make sure we have some continuity of a department who has understanding of what’s going on. “There’s also some credibility issues as it goes to the documents that [father] has submitted as to his residence as well as the fact that one minute [the parents] are getting a divorce,[7] then they’re back together providing a stable home and both living in Sacramento. All of this is questionable as to the veracity of the claims as well—and that veracity, if Sacramento was not immediately aware of what was going on, could be a danger to the children. So I don’t believe that this is appropriate to be transferred at this time. So I’m denying that motion.” Later on at the March 2 hearing, the juvenile court granted the department’s request for a three-year domestic violence restraining order protecting the children from mother, an order the department requested to “reinforc[e]” the rules of foster placement after actions mother allegedly “took to try to ascertain the children’s whereabouts [and] to demand welfare 7 The record contains a marriage certificate indicating the parents were married on May 28, 2025 in Nevada, as well as mother’s petition for dissolution of marriage, filed February 18, 2026, in Sacramento County Superior Court. 9 checks,” actions that allegedly resulted in C.J.’s foster mother being contacted by law enforcement. On March 30, mother filed a notice of appeal.8 Father’s Motion for Transfer Redux At some point thereafter, father again moved to transfer the case to Sacramento County, and on April 6, the department again filed opposition.9 The court heard argument on the motion on April 13. Father’s counsel argued that father had “maintained a consistent verified address in Sacramento County,” and that because the department’s opposition had conceded that father’s “history—his moves, his contact, his noncompliance— is fully documented in the record,” it could not “simultaneously argue that . . . transfer is dangerous because the new court will not have the full picture.” As for the “adversarial relationship with the agency,” he argued that father did not seek to “re-litigate who is responsible for the dynamic,” because “the question is not who caused the breakdown; it’s whether a fresh start with Sacramento County agency without this history gives these children a better chance at reunification.” Finally, after noting that since the March 2 hearing, mother had waived reunification services, father’s counsel concluded that “[i]f these children are going to reunify with a parent[,] which remains the primary goal of the dependency system, it will be through my 8 Mother’s notice indicates that she also appeals from the juvenile court’s grant of the domestic violence restraining order, but her opening brief makes no argument of error with respect to it. We will treat this aspect of mother’s appeal as abandoned. (See, e.g., Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653 [“An appellant abandons an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief.”].) 9 Father’s motion is not in the record, but according to the department’s opposition, it was filed on March 30. 10 client. He lives in Sacramento County. His services are in Sacramento County. The children are placed in counties adjacent to Sacramento. No one in this case is in Lake County. Managing this family’s reunification from 80 miles away does not serve these children.” Counsel for the department argued that “nothing has changed since this Court denied this same exact motion three weeks ago,” going on to discuss what she characterized as “a couple of the more egregious mischaracterizations of the evidence” with respect to father’s participation in services and the court-ordered psychological evaluation. She then argued that if “a fresh start in another county would give the children a better chance at reunification . . . , then no child could reunify in the same county where they were removed from,” asserted that “the Department is not the only professional [sic] who Father has problems with,” and concluded that “yes, actually, it does matter where the problem in the breakdown of the relationship occurred because that tells us whether or not the children can actually have safety if the case is transferred to another county.” After joining in the arguments of father’s counsel, mother’s counsel again argued that “a fresh start in a different county with a different agency that would work consistently with this family would promote reunification,” and noted that “the record would transfer in totality to the Sacramento Child Welfare agency, and [the department] did confirm [father’s] address.” Counsel for I.J.’s mother likewise supported the motion, telling the court that she “ha[d] to agree with parents’ counsel on this,” because “nobody 11 lives in this county,” including her client,10 and “I think all of [the] prongs [of the test for transfer] have been met under Father’s argument.”11 Finally, counsel for the children again supported transfer: “I still support the transfer out as I did before. I don’t see the danger of a different county taking over and managing this case for these children. And in fact, I can see where it may benefit the children, in that it may help with regard to reunification.” After counsel for the parties concluded their arguments, father interrupted the proceedings “just to correct the statements again,” an interruption spanning three pages of the transcript. The court then began to rule as follows: “THE COURT: All right. Okay. So I have reviewed the documents extensively in this case and there are numerous credibility issues even to the—to the—to the residence in Sacramento— “[Father]: They just visited my residence for the second time. She walked through the whole house. And she had another—a CPS officer with her. And— “[Father’s counsel]: Stop interrupting the Judge. “[Father]: I’ve lived here since August 19th. Four-bedroom, two-bath house, front backyard, fenced in. “THE COURT: There are numerous credibility issues as it relates to documents that [father] submits to the court whether through his attorney or through his own filings. There are inconsistencies. There are, you know, 10 At the March 2 hearing, I.J.’s mother had indicated that she “live[d] in Bakersfield and [would] be moving back to Modesto.” 11 The court had previously (on March 23) bifurcated I.J.’s dependency from the others. 12 cross-outs. There are different things like that. And [father]’s representations to the Court lack credibility. And so the Court cannot—well, I guess the problem is the best interests of the children and nothing that [father] brings in front of this Court of late, including the repeated requests for transfer to Sacramento based on residence, there’s just weird things with the leases and a bunch of things. So that being—we can’t even establish concretely—” At this point, father began another lengthy interruption of the court, an interruption that again spans three pages of the reporter’s transcript. After his counsel interjected, “I think that’s enough,” the court ruled that, “[f]or the reasons stated in the last hearing, the Court is going to deny the transfer out.” Father filed a notice of appeal. DISCUSSION Applicable Law and the Standard of Review Section 375, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: “[W]henever, subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county where that minor resides, the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of the minor were it not for the existence of a court order issued pursuant to this chapter is changed to another county, the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile court of the county where that person then resides . . . .” And California Rules of Court, rule 5.610 permits the juvenile court to transfer the case to the county where the child resides. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(c)(1), (a)(1).) “In either situation, the law indisputably directs that the paramount consideration is whether the proposed transfer will serve the child’s best interest. (In re Andrew J. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 678, 693 (Andrew J.); In re R.D. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 679, 13 685; In re J.C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 993–994; In re Christopher T. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1291; see also § 202, subd. (d) [‘[j]uvenile courts and other public agencies charged with enforcing, interpreting, and administering the juvenile court law shall consider . . . the best interests of the minor in all deliberations pursuant to this chapter’].)” (In re Nia A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1248 (Nia A.); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(e) [court “must consider” whether transfer would be in the child’s best interest and “may not” transfer the case unless doing so would “protect or further” that interest].) We review the juvenile court’s decision whether to grant a transfer for abuse of discretion. (Andrew J., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 692; In re R.D., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 684.) A juvenile court “ ‘abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or its factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718, 728; see In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288 [“ ‘[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence’ ”].) Such was the case here, as the juvenile court’s finding that transfer would not be in the children’s best interests is not supported by any substantial evidence in the record. The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying the Parents’ Transfer Motions Both parents argue that in considering their motions for transfer, the juvenile court failed to give the required “paramount consideration” to whether such transfer would serve the children’s best interests, and that no 14 substantial evidence in the record supports the court’s conclusion that it would not. (Nia A., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248.) We agree. We turn first to the parents’ March 2 motion to transfer. As noted, the court explained its reasoning by noting that father had lived at “six addresses in five different counties over the past three years, one of which he changed very immediately after there was an inquiry from Child Protective Services,” that there were “credibility issues as it goes to some of the documents he submitted as to his residence,” and “the fact that one minute . . . [parents] are getting a divorce, then they’re back together providing a stable home and both living in Sacramento.” And to the extent the court expressed different reasons for denying father’s next motion for transfer at the April 13 hearing, those reasons again amounted to doubt about father’s credibility and whether the parents had truly relocated to Sacramento, pointing to unexplained “inconsistencies,” “cross-outs,” and “weird things with the leases.” There is no question that father was a difficult litigant—as we previously observed, his “behavior is not to be condoned, and the frustration of the department and the juvenile court are quite understandable.” (M.J., supra, A176630, p. 12.) And the juvenile court, as the “sole judge of . . . credibility,” was certainly entitled to conclude that he was a less than forthright one. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373.) But the parties never disputed that father’s “residence . . . was changed” to Sacramento County on August 19, 2025. (§ 375, subd. (a).) Nor do they do so here. According to his motion, father had a driver’s license bearing his new address and a lease agreement for it—a lease that the juvenile court indicated it had reviewed. And the department’s brief concedes that the department had, at some point to March 2, conducted an “inspection” of that address. In short, father’s change of residence to Sacramento County appears 15 to have been undisputed, and the only question before the court was whether transfer was in the children’s best interests. (See In re R.D., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th p. 687 [“At a transfer-out hearing, the transferring court is required to make findings not only as to the child’s residence, but also as to whether the transfer is in the child’s best interests.”].) On this score, the department’s brief simply asserts that “[t]he juvenile court had substantial evidence from which it properly deduced that transfer would be a danger to the children.” As such evidence, the department points to “the chaotic relationship between the parents,” their “refus[al] to comply with the court’s orders for psychological evaluations,” father’s “pattern of moving around to avoid services,” and the “complicated procedural and psychological [sic] history” of the case. We think this argument seriously misses the point. What has any of the evidence just discussed to do with whether transfer would be in the best interests of the children? Under section 375, the determination of whether a transfer should be granted does not turn on whether the parents have a “chaotic” relationship; whether they have submitted to a court-ordered psychological evaluation; whether they have moved frequently and recently; or whether the dependency at issue has a “complicated” history, procedural or otherwise. As father’s reply brief rightly notes, such evidence bears on whether reunification is likely, not with “how a Sacramento juvenile court supervising children placed near Sacramento would protect them less effectively than a Lake County court eighty miles away.” (See In re J.C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 994 [the “focus of the proceedings should have been which county could best monitor the children’s well-being and the suitability of their placement on a monthly basis, as well as keep tabs on their academic progress and other needs”]; In re R.D., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 16 at pp. 687–688.) As noted, the law “indisputably directs that the paramount consideration is whether the proposed transfer will serve the child’s best interest.” (Nia A., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248.) Neither the juvenile court’s ruling nor the department’s brief articulates any real connection between the evidence the department relies on and that question. Apparently acknowledging that the juvenile court failed to make any real and express finding that transfer would not benefit the children, the department argues that we should nevertheless affirm, under the rule that “[w]here the statute does not mandate explicit findings, and where substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, [such] findings may be implied.” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1166.) But the evidence the department cites purportedly supporting denial of the transfer (e.g., the parents’ “abrupt” marriage and divorce, their “refusal to follow court orders,” and the “juvenile court’s determination that Father’s representations were not credible”) again has little or nothing to do with whether transfer would serve the children’s best interests. We are left with no substantial evidence to support any finding—express or implied—that would support the juvenile court’s order. Denial of the motions was therefore an abuse of discretion.12 (In re R.F., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.) Indeed, on this record, the only reasonable inference is that transfer to Sacramento County would be in the children’s best interests. As to that question, all the parties—save the department—were in agreement. It was 12 For much the same reasons given in our previous opinion in M.J., supra, A176630, we reject the department’s argument that we should apply the doctrine of disentitlement to dismiss the parents’ appeal for failure to comply with the court’s order that they submit to a psychological evaluation. (See id. at pp. 9–17.) 17 undisputed that at the time of the transfer motions, no relevant parties remained in Lake County—the parents had relocated to Sacramento County, I.J.’s mother was in Bakersfield with plans to “mov[e] back to Modesto,” and the children were “located closer to Sacramento than they are to Lake County.” (See Andrew J., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 693 [“Other things being equal, it will generally be the case that a ward’s best interest will be served if he is a ward of the county in which he lives, not some other county”].) Most significantly, counsel for the children supported both transfer motions, explaining that “[t]he children . . . want to reunify with their father,” that he did not “see the detriment or the danger of this case transferring to Sacramento County,” and that “it may help with regard to reunification.” It is also undisputed that the relationship between the parties has significantly soured over the course of these dependencies. Indeed, the department’s counsel acknowledged a “breakdown” in that relationship, describing it as “not . . . great” and even “adversarial.” As counsel for the children and their parents repeatedly observed, such state of affairs cannot possibly serve the children’s best interests, nor the dependency law’s goal of enabling reunification. (See In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1228 [“Family preservation, with the attendant reunification plan and reunification services, is the first priority” in dependency proceedings, “implement[ing] ‘the law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible’ ”].) Moreover, according to the department’s opposition, father’s March 30, 2026 motion was the fifth time he had requested that the dependencies be transferred to Sacramento County, after his having relocated there on August 19, 2025. Despite having opposed all five of these motions, the department 18 has failed to point us to any substantial evidence in the record in support of the conclusion that transfer would not be in the children’s best interests. (See Estate of Swetmann (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 807, 822–823 [directing entry of judgment in favor of appellant where respondents “had their day in court, assumedly having marshalled the best case they could”], citing Mid–Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1220.) Under these circumstances, we will reverse and remand with directions to grant father’s motion for transfer. (See Andrew J., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 693 [reversing grant of motion to transfer because “[o]n this record, the only reasonable inference is that it was not in [the minor’s] best interest for the case to be transferred”].) DISPOSITION The March 2 and April 13, 2026 orders denying the parents’ motions to transfer are reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to grant father’s motion to transfer all four dependencies to Sacramento County. 19  RICHMAN, J. We concur. STEWART, P. J. SWEET, J. (A176243N)  Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 20