Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION* IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) In re CALLIE SANCHEZ on Habeas Corpus. C105344 (Super. Ct. No. 25FE002319) OPINION ON TRANSFER ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Relief granted. Shauna Franklin and Kevin J. McCormick, Judges. Amanda Benson, Public Defender, and John W. H. Stoller, Assistant Public Defender, for Petitioner Callie Sanchez. Thien Ho, District Attorney, Kaci R. Lopez and Colin Jones, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent the People. The California Constitution recognizes the right to pretrial release on bail or less restrictive means in criminal cases, subject to delineated exceptions. (In re Kowalczyk (2026) 19 Cal.5th 593, 606.) “For noncapital offenses, these exceptions are set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12 [of article I of the California Constitution], which * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part I of the Discussion. 1 limit the right to release on bail in certain felony cases involving violence, sexual assault, or threats of great bodily harm.” 1 (In re Kowalczyk, at p. 606.) In this case, Callie Sanchez is charged with the second degree murder of Victoria Tom and unlawful possession of fentanyl for sale. The murder charge is premised on the theory that Sanchez sold Tom the fentanyl that caused her death, with knowledge of the deadly ramifications pertaining to ingestion of the drug based on several prior personal experiences. 2 After the trial court thrice denied Sanchez’s motions for pretrial release, Sanchez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (petition) in this court. She argued the trial court erred in denying her motions because the exception to the constitutional right to pretrial release in section 12(b) does not apply. Section 12(b) has three clauses that must be satisfied before the trial court can deny pretrial release. The first clause addresses the qualifying offense criteria, i.e., the charged felony must be an offense “involving acts of violence” or be a crime of sexual assault “on another person.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, subd. (b).) The second clause requires the trial court to look at the strength of the case against the defendant and find the evidence in the record is sufficient to sustain a conviction of the qualifying offense. (Ibid.; In re White (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 18, 25 [the phrasing, “ ‘the facts are evident or the presumption great,’ ” in section 12(b) “is archaic” but “has long been held to mean simply that the evidence in the record would be sufficient to sustain a conviction”].) Finally, the third clause addresses the danger of pretrial release and requires the trial court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a substantial likelihood the 1 We hereafter refer to article I, section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c) of the California Constitution as section 12(b) and section 12(c). 2 People v. Tseng (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 117, 126 [“Fentanyl is an opioid 100 times more potent than morphine.”].) 2 defendant’s release will result in great bodily harm to others. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, subd. (b).) After this court summarily denied the petition, our Supreme Court granted Sanchez’s petition for review and directed this court to issue an order to show cause as to whether Sanchez is charged with a qualifying felony within the meaning of the first clause of section 12(b). Our Supreme Court thereafter also decided In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th 593, in which it clarified that for noncapital offenses, pretrial release may be denied only if the requirements of section 12(b) or 12(c) are met. (In re Kowalczyk, at pp. 606-607.) 3 We issued an order to show cause as directed by our Supreme Court and later expanded the scope of the order to all three clauses of section 12(b), in light of In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th 593. We now consider whether the trial court erred in denying pretrial release under section 12(b). In that regard, we initially reject the People’s 4 argument that the petition is untimely. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the second degree murder charge is a qualifying offense under section 12(b) because it is a felony that involves acts of violence on Tom. As we explain, the acts of violence on Tom were perpetrated by the fentanyl; and the second degree murder charge involves those acts of violence because Sanchez is accused of illegally selling and supplying the deadly drug to Tom despite 3 Specifically, our Supreme Court held that article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(3) of the California Constitution “does not expand the list of offenses for which release on bail may be denied beyond those delineated in” section 12. (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 607.) 4 The order to show cause was directed at the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. The return and supplemental return were, however, filed by the District Attorney of Sacramento County on behalf of the People of the State of California. We use the term “the People” to collectively refer to the District Attorney of Sacramento County and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. 3 Sanchez’s knowledge of and prior experiences with the physical destruction caused by the drug. Finally, in the unpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying pretrial release because the record does not show that the trial court made the findings required under the second and third clauses of section 12(b). We accordingly vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the court to hold a new hearing to consider the criteria in the second and third clauses of section 12(b), as provided in In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th 593. LEGAL BACKGROUND Article I, section 12, of the California Constitution “has evolved over time. As ratified by voters in 1849, the California Constitution provided that ‘[a]ll persons shall be bailable, by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.’ [Citations.] This provision was later shifted to article I, section 6 within the California Constitution of 1879, yet its language remained unchanged until 1974. At that time, as part of a more extensive constitutional revision, article I, section 6 was moved to section 12 within the same article and certain changes were made to the provision’s text, including the replacement of ‘proof is evident’ with ‘facts are evident.’ Finally, in 1982, [the voters] broadened the circumstances in which courts may deny bail by adding subdivisions (b) and (c) to article I, section 12.” (In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292, 308.) “In June of 1982, the voters passed two ‘competing initiative measure[s] on the same ballot’ that contained provisions pertaining to bail—Propositions 4 and 8 (Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982)).” 5 (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 610.) “Because Proposition 4 received more votes than did Proposition 8, the bail and [own 5 All references to Propositions 4 and 8 herein are to those put before the voters in the Primary Election on June 8, 1982. 4 recognizance] release provisions contained in Proposition 4 are deemed to prevail over those set forth in Proposition 8.” (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1140, fn. 4.) Proposition 4, as approved by the voters in 1982, provided a bail exception as follows: “A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for: “(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great; “(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others;[ 6] or “(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based on clear and convincing evidence that the person has threatened another with great bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person would carry out the threat if released. “Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the amount of bail, the court shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. “A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court’s discretion.” (Cal. Const., art. I, former § 12, as amended by Prop. 4, Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982).) 6 Notably, in contrast, had Proposition 8 prevailed over Proposition 4, the text of proposed section 28, subdivisions (e) and (g) that would have been added to article I of the California Constitution would have required that “no person charged with the commission of any serious felony shall be released on his or her own recognizance,” as “the term ‘serious felony’ is … defined in Penal Code, Section 1192.7(c).” (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, p. 33, italics omitted.) 5 The “[e]xcessive bail” clause in section 12 substantially adopted the language in Penal Code section 1275, which was added to the Penal Code in 1927. (Stats. 1927, ch. 737, § 1, p. 1387.) In the Proposition 4 ballot pamphlet, the Legislative Analyst noted that, “[i]n effect, [the incorporation of the same factors now required by statute in Penal Code section 1275] would prevent the Legislature from changing the requirements that now govern the courts in setting bail, without a vote of the electorate.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis of Prop. 4 by Legis. Analyst, p. 16.) In the ballot pamphlet, “the analysis prepared by the Legislative Analyst [further] informed voters that, under then-current law, ‘courts may deny bail only for those who are accused of crimes punishable by death’ and that Proposition 4 would ‘broaden the circumstances under which the courts may deny bail’ to those cases where defendants were charged with noncapital felonies under the circumstances described” therein. (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 611.) The “two additional sets of circumstances” were described as follows: “1. Bail could be denied in felony cases involving acts of violence against another person when (a) the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great and (b) there is a substantial likelihood that the accused’s release would result in great bodily harm to others; [and ¶] 2. Bail could be denied in felony cases when (a) the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great and (b) the accused has threatened another with great bodily harm and there is a substantial likelihood that the threat would be carried out if the person were released.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis of Prop. 4 by Legis. Analyst, p. 16.) Proposition 4 originated as a legislative constitutional amendment, Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 14 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (Amendment No. 14). (In re O’Connor (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 90, 104.) The language of Amendment No. 14 evolved substantially from its introduction in the Assembly in 1981 to its adoption by the Legislature and its presentation to the voters in 1982. 6 Pertinent here, as introduced, Amendment No. 14 proposed to amend section 12 to state: “No person charged with the commission of, or attempt to commit murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, mayhem, felony child molestation, residential burglary, any felony involving the willful infliction of great bodily injury, or any felony involving the use of a firearm shall be released on his or her own recognizance.” (Assem. Const. Amend. No. 14 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 15, 1981, italics omitted.) The Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice queried whether there was “justification for a list of crimes to be placed in the California Constitution” and stated it could “conflict with the federal due process requirement under the prevailing view of the California court.” (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice (June 8, 1981) Analysis of Assem. Const. Amend. No. 14, as amended May 6, 1981, p. 5.) The paragraph delineating the qualifying offenses was stricken in the Assembly’s amendment on June 17, 1981, and replaced with the broad language ultimately adopted by the voters—i.e., “felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person.” (Assem. Const. Amend. No. 14, supra, as amended June 17, 1981, pp. 2-3, italics omitted.) FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 6, 2025, Sanchez was charged with second degree murder and unlawful possession of fentanyl for sale. The murder charge stems from Tom’s death as a result of fentanyl intoxication a day after Sanchez allegedly sold her fentanyl. Sanchez filed a motion for release on her own recognizance or to set appropriate bail. The trial court denied the motion on April 1, 2025.7 The trial court found that releasing Sanchez would pose “an unreasonable risk to public safety” and the court could not impose any less restrictive means to ensure public safety than custodial detention. The trial court explained there was clear and convincing evidence and a substantial 7 The motion was heard by Honorable Shauna Franklin. 7 likelihood that, if she were released, Sanchez would be a danger to herself and others due to her continued struggle with narcotic addiction, which “is often funded by capitalizing on the narcotic addictions of others.” The trial court also relayed its concerns that Sanchez did not respond to the “wake-up call” when “she had to use Narcan on her own child” 8; she had a “somewhat uncertain housing situation”; and she might not return to court given the seriousness of and potential life sentence associated with the charges. Sanchez renewed her motion for release on her own recognizance or on bail following the preliminary hearing. During the preliminary hearing, the trial court heard testimony that: between September 24 and September 29, 2024, 9 Tom made three drug purchases from Sanchez, with the last one finalized just after midnight on September 29; cell phone evidence indicated that Tom used the fentanyl purchased from Sanchez a few times prior to her death; the second to last time that Tom used the drug, her boyfriend, who was on the phone with her while she was using the drug, expressed concern that she was “overdoing” it, being “irresponsible,” and “death growling”; Sanchez used fentanyl for the last time on the evening of September 29 and into the morning of September 30, while her boyfriend was on the phone with her; Sanchez’s boyfriend expressed concern about Tom’s drug use, stating he was “taking that batch away” from her, she could not “have any more tonight” because it would kill her, and she did not know what she was doing. A detective testified that he used Tom’s phone during his investigation to engage in a text exchange with Sanchez, while pretending to be Tom. He indicated to Sanchez that he wanted to buy fentanyl and asked about the potency or strength of the fentanyl. Sanchez responded that she had “stronger stuff” and they “went into talking about 8 Narcan is a drug used to reverse an opioid overdose. 9 Further undesignated date references are to 2024. 8 overdosing” and ensuring someone is present “just in case … you overdose or fall out.” When the detective asked Sanchez if the fentanyl would kill him, she said “no.” Sanchez, however, recommended that Tom’s boyfriend be on the phone while she was taking the drug and to have Tom’s family’s phone number available in case of an overdose. When the detective met Sanchez in person and asked her if fentanyl was dangerous, Sanchez said that she had given Narcan to about 15 to 20 people who “were dead, stiff and blue,” had once given Narcan to five people in one week, and “one of her good friends was being tried in Placer County for dealing something that led to someone’s death.” Tom’s boyfriend was one of the recipients of Narcan. Sanchez also mentioned that her son had an overdose experience in an alley, but the detective was not sure if it was related to fentanyl. Sanchez acknowledged that fentanyl was killing people “every 20 minutes” and agreed it had the same risk and consequences as “dealing and playing Russian roulette.” Sanchez acknowledged that she sold fentanyl to Tom in the days prior to her death and, when she handed the fentanyl on her person over to the detective during their meeting, said “that could have been someone’s life.” On July 2, 2025, the trial court denied the renewed motion for pretrial release based on the finding that Sanchez continued to sell and distribute fentanyl despite her knowledge and understanding of the dangers and risks associated with the drug.10 The trial court relied on the fact that Sanchez, “knowing that somebody she sold to was dead as a result of fentanyl ingestion,” was thereafter found in possession of fentanyl again in November. The trial court said the evidence showed that Sanchez sells fentanyl to others, which endangers the buyers and the public. It explained there was no less restrictive means available to prevent Sanchez from continuing to distribute fentanyl because an ankle monitor would only relay her physical location and narcotics testing would only 10 The motion was heard by Honorable Kevin McCormick. 9 show whether she was using the drug. After defense counsel clarified, and the prosecutor agreed, that Sanchez did not know about Tom’s death prior to being found in possession of fentanyl in November, the trial court replied it “wouldn’t really change the analysis” because her statements to the police showed that she knew the risks of selling fentanyl and yet continued to do so. On September 18, 2025, Sanchez filed another motion to be released on her own recognizance or to set appropriate bail. Sanchez requested that the trial court re-examine bail based on changed circumstances because she required “surgical interventions which the Sacramento County Main Jail will not perform.” Sanchez further argued that she was not a danger to public safety. The trial court denied the request, finding there was no change in circumstance based on medical necessity. 11 The trial court further explained that it would not “rereview her bail” without a change in circumstance because the motion had been denied twice before. Sanchez petitioned this court for habeas corpus review in December 2025. She argued that she is eligible for bail under section 12(b), the trial court’s finding that her appearance could not adequately be secured through bail or other measures is not supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court erred in denying her request for pretrial release based on medical necessity, which is prejudicial because she will not receive appropriate medical care while in jail. We summarily denied the petition. In March 2026, our Supreme Court granted Sanchez’s petition for review and transferred the matter back to this court with a directive to vacate the summary denial of the petition and issue an order to show cause, returnable before this court. In accordance with our Supreme Court’s directive, on March 23, 2026, we ordered the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office to show cause “why petitioner is not entitled to relief on the 11 The motion was heard by Honorable Shauna Franklin. 10 ground that she is not charged with ‘[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on another person’ as required for denial of bail pursuant to article I, section 12, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution.” After the People filed the return, our Supreme Court decided In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th 593, which, as pertinent here, held that pretrial detention may only be ordered if the requirements of section 12(b) are met (In re Kowalczyk, at pp. 606-607). On June 11, 2026, we expanded the scope of the order to show cause and directed the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office to show cause why Sanchez is not entitled to relief under section 12(b). Following receipt of the parties’ supplemental briefs, this matter was deemed fully briefed on July 6, 2026. Oral argument was held, and the matter was submitted on September 21, 2026. DISCUSSION I The Petition Is Deemed Timely We initially consider the People’s threshold argument that the petition is untimely because the substance of Sanchez’s petition focuses primarily on the original denial of pretrial release on April 1, 2025, which was decided 266 days before the petition was filed, and the second denial of her motion on July 2, 2025, which was decided 174 days before the petition was filed. They further rely on our orders to show cause, which expressly provide that the trial court retains jurisdiction to hold a new bail hearing and the fact that Sanchez has not sought further review of her custodial status in the trial court in light of those orders. In her petition, Sanchez asserts the petition is timely because, “[w]hile the third bail review was denied September 29, 2025, [she] did not seek review due to the filing of a motion to dismiss—had the [Penal Code section] 995 motion been granted, she would have received another bail hearing. That motion was heard and denied on November 21, 2025, less than thirty days [prior to filing the petition].” In her supplemental traverse, 11 Sanchez further argues that she has consistently pursued bail relief in the superior court, this court, and our Supreme Court and alleges that “after the original [order to show cause] issued, [the parties’ counsel] participated in discussions with Judge Franklin regarding bail, during which the court indicated it would not change its bail ruling.” “For noncapital cases in California, there is no express time window in which a petitioner must seek habeas corpus relief. [Citation.] Rather, the general rule is that the petition must be filed ‘as promptly as the circumstances allow ….’ [Citation.] An untimely petition for writ of habeas corpus may still be considered if the delay is justified by the petitioner, who bears the burden of demonstrating either: ‘(i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.’ ” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 242- 243.) Even when a petition for writ of habeas corpus is substantially delayed, it may be considered on the merits when “the defects alleged by the petitioner constitute a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 244.) We deem the petition timely because: (1) Sanchez has shown consistent effort in seeking pretrial release by thrice requesting to be released on her own recognizance or on bail, filing her petition in this court, and petitioning the California Supreme Court for review; and (2) the alleged error is of a constitutional magnitude that may constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. II The Murder Charge Is a Qualifying Felony Under Section 12(b) We now turn to the legal question posed by our Supreme Court, which is whether the second degree murder charge constitutes a qualifying felony under the first clause of section 12(b), i.e., whether it is a felony “involving acts of violence on another person.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, subd. (b).) Sanchez asserts she is not charged with a qualifying felony within the meaning of section 12(b) because the second degree murder charge is not premised on the theory that she took any act of violence against Tom; rather, she 12 posits, the charge is premised on the theory that Tom’s death was the result of an illegal drug sale. The People disagree and counter that second degree murder is a violent felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c) (section 667.5(c)), and hence automatically a qualifying felony under section 12(b). In the alternative, the People maintain that In re O’Connor, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 90 is instructive because, like O’Connor, Sanchez indirectly participated in the acts of violence on the victim. Before we delve into the analysis, we note that in considering the scope and application of the first clause of section 12(b), we do not evaluate whether the requirements in the second and third clauses of the constitutional provision are met. This is important because Sanchez appears to raise arguments pertaining to proximate cause— which is tied to the actus reus of the murder charge—in the analysis of the first clause. (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660 [“To satisfy the actus reus element of murder, an act of either the defendant or an accomplice must be the proximate cause of death.” (italics omitted)].) Section 12(b) does not, however, equate the “act of violence” requirement in the first clause with the actus reus of the underlying offense. And proximate cause forms part of the analysis under the second clause, which pertains to the strength of the case against the defendant. We accordingly do not address Sanchez’s arguments that the sale and overdose occurred approximately a day apart, Tom’s death was the result of an accidental overdose, Tom self-administered the drug (thereby deciding how much to take), and the prosecution’s “theory is disjointed to union of act and intent.” A. Interpretation Principles In interpreting section 12(b), “we apply principles of interpretation ‘ “similar to those governing statutory construction.” ’ ” (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 615.) “ ‘ “[S]ince a written constitution is intended as and is the mere framework according to whose general outlines specific legislation must be framed and modeled, and is therefore … necessarily couched in general terms or language, it is not to be interpreted 13 according to narrow or supertechnical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, so that it may accomplish in full measure the objects of its establishment and so carry out the great principles of government.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 655.) “ ‘ “[O]ur paramount task is to ascertain the intent of those who enacted [the constitutional provisions].” ’ ” (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 615.) We first look at the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) “ ‘[W]henever possible, significance must be given to every word [in a constitutional provision] in pursuing the [voters’] purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some words surplusage.’ ” (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506.) Likewise, “ ‘[w]hile every word of a [constitutional provision] must be presumed to have been used for a purpose, it is also the case that every word excluded from a [constitutional provision] must be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.’ ” (Arden Carmichael, Inc. v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 507, 516.) We may look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of the language in a constitutional provision. (In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 933.) However, “[a]ny interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided.” (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.) Absent ambiguity in the language of the constitutional provision, we “ ‘ “presume that the voters intend the meaning apparent on the face of an initiative measure.” ’ ” (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 615-616.) We “ ‘ “may not add to the [Constitution] or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that is not apparent in its language.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) If the language is ambiguous, “ ‘ “we consider extrinsic evidence of the enacting body’s intent” ’ ” (id. at pp. 615-616), such as ballot summaries and arguments (id. at p. 616). 14 B. Section 12(b) Does Not Incorporate Section 667.5(c) The People argue that we need not undertake a fact-specific review under the first clause of section 12(b) because murder is automatically a qualifying offense by virtue of the list of violent felonies in section 667.5(c). We disagree. 12 Initially, we find no merit in the People’s assertion that the phrase “[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on another person” in section 12(b) is similar to the language in section 667.5(c), which provides that the enhancements demonstrate “society’s condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person.” Section 12(b) includes the material terms “involving” and “acts,” which are notably absent from the language in section 667.5(c). We also find no basis for concluding that the Legislature and voters incorporated section 667.5(c)’s list of violent felonies into section 12(b). We reject the premise that the Legislature and voters must have intended to incorporate section 667.5(c) into section 12(b) because section 667.5(c) was enacted before the voters approved Proposition 4. The People cite no authority to support this proposition, and we are aware of none. 12 We also disagree with the conclusory proposal in the concurrence that the phrase “ ‘[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on another person’ ” means “that it is the felonies themselves that must be violent” such that the felony offenses, “as a matter of law,” “necessarily” or “inherently” involve acts of violence. (Conc. opn., post, at pp. 2, 5, 7, italics omitted.) Neither “necessarily” nor “inherently” appears in section 12(b), and we decline to read words into the constitutional provision, as explained post. It is further unclear what legal meaning is ascribed to the proposed terms (or the term “chargeable offenses”) and what qualifies as a felony involving an act of violence “as a matter of law” under the concurrence’s rationale. It does not appear to us that the trial court’s application of the qualifying offense criteria to the facts of the alleged crime conflicts with the second clause or clear and convincing evidence standard in the third clause of section 12(b), or is inconsistent with judicial interpretation of section 12(b). (Conc. opn., post, at pp. 3-4.) We thus find no basis for concluding that a second degree murder charge constitutes a qualifying offense as a matter of law under the first clause of section 12(b). (Conc. opn., post, at pp. 1, 7-8.) 15 It is true that, “[i]n the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative or popular intent, terms used in a constitutional amendment are normally construed in light of existing statutory definitions or judicial interpretations in effect at the time of the amendment’s adoption.” (Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 487.) That canon of interpretation is not, however, applicable here because section 12(b) does not use the term “violent felony,” which is the term defined in section 667.5(c). (See County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 849-850 [the canon to construe terms in a constitutional amendment “ ‘in the light of their statutory meaning or interpretation in effect at the time of its adoption’ ” applies when the language in the constitutional amendment is “virtually identical” to that of the statute]; cf. Heckendorn, at pp. 486-487 [where voters used the term “ad valorem tax” and the Legislature had previously defined that term by statute, the statutory definition was deemed incorporated into the constitutional provision].) Had the Legislature and voters intended to incorporate section 667.5(c) into section 12(b), they could have expressly done so, as they did with Penal Code section 1275. (See In re Bergstrom (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 709, 724 [“the term ‘ “great bodily injury,” ’ in the context of an enhancement provision,” did not inform the meaning of “ ‘great bodily harm’ ” in section 12 because “the Legislature could have incorporated the term ‘great bodily injury’ rather than ‘great bodily harm’ ” into Amendment No. 14, but did not]; see also Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 8, p. 33 [Prop. 8, put before the voters at the same time as Prop. 4 and dealing with the same subject matter, stated the measure used the term “serious felony” as “defined in Penal Code, Section 1192.7(c)”].) Notably, the Legislature also did not, when it approved Amendment No. 14, amend section 667.5(c)’s limitation that the definition of “violent felony” contained therein is “[f]or the purpose of th[at] section” alone. Consistent with this limitation, generally, when the Legislature has intended to incorporate the definition of “violent felony,” or a portion thereof, into other statutes, the Legislature has expressly referenced 16 section 667.5(c). (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 602, subd. (t)(4), 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J), 1203, subd. (k), 1203.44, subd. (b)(1)(C), 1203.425, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iv)(II).) One such statute implements section 12(b). Penal Code section 1270.1 provides that a hearing “shall be held in open court” when a person is arrested for “a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, but not including a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 460 (residential burglary),” among other crimes, before the person “may be released on bail,” as specified, or on their own recognizance. (Pen. Code, § 1270.1, subd. (a)(1).) In other words, when a felony offense falls within the first clause of section 12(b), the court must hold a hearing before granting pretrial release, if the felony also qualifies as a violent felony under section 667.5(c), except for residential burglary. The residential burglary exception to the pretrial release hearing requirement highlights another problem with the People’s incorporation argument—not all of the offenses listed in section 667.5(c) necessarily involve acts of violence on another person, as required under section 12(b). Indeed, the residential burglary offense is defined as “[a]ny burglary of the first degree, … wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary.” (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21), italics added; see also id., subd. (c)(19) [including extortion when conducted for the benefit of a criminal street gang].) The Legislature’s implementation of section 12 with regard to sex crimes cuts against the People’s incorporation argument as well. Two years after the voters approved Proposition 4, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 292, identifying sex crimes that are “deemed to be a felony offense involving an act of violence and a felony offense involving great bodily harm” within the meaning of section 12(b) and section 12(c). Those sex crimes included violations of subdivision (2) of Penal Code section 261, and 17 subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 288. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1202, § 1, pp. 4123-4124.) 13 If, as the People argue, the list in section 667.5(c) was incorporated into section 12(b) in 1982, the inclusion of the foregoing two sex crimes in Penal Code section 292 in 1984 would have been superfluous because those crimes already appeared on the list in section 667.5(c) in 1982. (See Stats. 1980, ch. 587, § 3, p. 1596.) Moreover, to the extent the People’s position is that section 12(b) continues to incorporate section 667.5(c), as it is amended over time, then Penal Code section 292 would be substantially superfluous because all of the sex crimes identified in Penal Code section 292 are now included in section 667.5(c) as well. (Compare Pen. Code, § 292 with § 667.5, subd. (c)(3)-(6), (11), (18).) We do not read the constitutional amendment to render related subsequently enacted statutes superfluous. (Greene v. Marin County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 277, 290-291 [“ ‘when the Legislature has enacted a statute with the relevant constitutional prescriptions clearly in mind[,] the statute represents a considered legislative judgment as to the appropriate reach of the constitutional provision’ ” and is subject to “ ‘significant weight and deference’ ”].) Additionally, in reading the text of statutory and constitutional provisions to ascertain their meaning, “[c]ontext is important.” (People v. Superior Court (Sanchez- Flores) (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 692, 699.) The different contexts within which section 12(b) and section 667.5(c) apply are noteworthy. Indeed, several of the offenses in section 667.5(c) do not qualify as a “violent felony” unless they are “charged and proved” or “pleaded and proved” (see, e.g., Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(8), (21), (24))—a condition that is not at issue in the bail context, where the standard under section 13 We disagree with the concurrence’s conclusion that because Penal Code section 292 identified specific sex crimes as felony offenses involving an act of violence under the first clause of section 12(b), the court must presume the Legislature also determined “that section 12(b) applies to qualifying offenses definable as a matter of law instead of requiring a factual, case-by-case analysis.” (Conc. opn., post, at p. 6.) 18 12(b) is that “ ‘the facts are evident or the presumption great.’ ” Bail hearings “commonly involve informal proffers by the prosecution and defense alike” and the “ ‘facts are evident’ ” standard is not intended to assure “the production of admissible evidence.” (In re Harris, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 311-312.) The People present no argument as to how the “charged and proved” or “pleaded and proved” violent felonies apply in the context of section 12(b). We recognize, as the People point out, that courts have described section 12(b) as the “violent felony exception” (Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876, 884) and stated that it applies to “those charged with violent felonies” (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 611). Such statements do not, however, “compel[] one to consult the list of crimes in [section] 667.5(c) that defines that term,” as the People assert. Judicially ascribed labels do not change substantive law. No court has considered nor held that a section 667.5(c) charge automatically constitutes a qualifying offense under section 12(b) and “[c]ases are not authority for propositions not considered therein.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 614.)