In re Sanchez
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketC105344
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
In re CALLIE SANCHEZ on Habeas Corpus. C105344
(Super. Ct. No. 25FE002319)
OPINION ON TRANSFER
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Relief
granted. Shauna Franklin and Kevin J. McCormick, Judges.
Amanda Benson, Public Defender, and John W. H. Stoller, Assistant Public
Defender, for Petitioner Callie Sanchez.
Thien Ho, District Attorney, Kaci R. Lopez and Colin Jones, Deputy District
Attorneys, for Respondent the People.
The California Constitution recognizes the right to pretrial release on bail or less
restrictive means in criminal cases, subject to delineated exceptions. (In re Kowalczyk
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 593, 606.) “For noncapital offenses, these exceptions are set forth in
subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12 [of article I of the California Constitution], which
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified
for publication with the exception of part I of the Discussion.
1
limit the right to release on bail in certain felony cases involving violence, sexual assault,
or threats of great bodily harm.” 1 (In re Kowalczyk, at p. 606.)
In this case, Callie Sanchez is charged with the second degree murder of Victoria
Tom and unlawful possession of fentanyl for sale. The murder charge is premised on the
theory that Sanchez sold Tom the fentanyl that caused her death, with knowledge of the
deadly ramifications pertaining to ingestion of the drug based on several prior personal
experiences. 2
After the trial court thrice denied Sanchez’s motions for pretrial release, Sanchez
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (petition) in this court. She argued the trial court
erred in denying her motions because the exception to the constitutional right to pretrial
release in section 12(b) does not apply.
Section 12(b) has three clauses that must be satisfied before the trial court can
deny pretrial release. The first clause addresses the qualifying offense criteria, i.e., the
charged felony must be an offense “involving acts of violence” or be a crime of sexual
assault “on another person.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, subd. (b).) The second clause
requires the trial court to look at the strength of the case against the defendant and find
the evidence in the record is sufficient to sustain a conviction of the qualifying offense.
(Ibid.; In re White (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 18, 25 [the phrasing, “ ‘the facts are evident or
the presumption great,’ ” in section 12(b) “is archaic” but “has long been held to mean
simply that the evidence in the record would be sufficient to sustain a conviction”].)
Finally, the third clause addresses the danger of pretrial release and requires the trial
court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a substantial likelihood the
1 We hereafter refer to article I, section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c) of the California
Constitution as section 12(b) and section 12(c).
2 People v. Tseng (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 117, 126 [“Fentanyl is an opioid 100 times
more potent than morphine.”].)
2
defendant’s release will result in great bodily harm to others. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12,
subd. (b).)
After this court summarily denied the petition, our Supreme Court granted
Sanchez’s petition for review and directed this court to issue an order to show cause as to
whether Sanchez is charged with a qualifying felony within the meaning of the first
clause of section 12(b). Our Supreme Court thereafter also decided In re Kowalczyk,
supra, 19 Cal.5th 593, in which it clarified that for noncapital offenses, pretrial release
may be denied only if the requirements of section 12(b) or 12(c) are met. (In re
Kowalczyk, at pp. 606-607.) 3
We issued an order to show cause as directed by our Supreme Court and later
expanded the scope of the order to all three clauses of section 12(b), in light of In re
Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th 593. We now consider whether the trial court erred in
denying pretrial release under section 12(b). In that regard, we initially reject the
People’s 4 argument that the petition is untimely.
In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude the second degree murder
charge is a qualifying offense under section 12(b) because it is a felony that involves acts
of violence on Tom. As we explain, the acts of violence on Tom were perpetrated by the
fentanyl; and the second degree murder charge involves those acts of violence because
Sanchez is accused of illegally selling and supplying the deadly drug to Tom despite
3 Specifically, our Supreme Court held that article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(3) of the
California Constitution “does not expand the list of offenses for which release on bail
may be denied beyond those delineated in” section 12. (In re Kowalczyk, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 607.)
4 The order to show cause was directed at the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. The
return and supplemental return were, however, filed by the District Attorney of
Sacramento County on behalf of the People of the State of California. We use the term
“the People” to collectively refer to the District Attorney of Sacramento County and the
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office.
3
Sanchez’s knowledge of and prior experiences with the physical destruction caused by
the drug.
Finally, in the unpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude the trial court
abused its discretion in denying pretrial release because the record does not show that the
trial court made the findings required under the second and third clauses of section 12(b).
We accordingly vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the court to hold a new
hearing to consider the criteria in the second and third clauses of section 12(b), as
provided in In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th 593.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article I, section 12, of the California Constitution “has evolved over time. As
ratified by voters in 1849, the California Constitution provided that ‘[a]ll persons shall be
bailable, by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, when the proof is evident or
the presumption great.’ [Citations.] This provision was later shifted to article I, section 6
within the California Constitution of 1879, yet its language remained unchanged until
1974. At that time, as part of a more extensive constitutional revision, article I, section 6
was moved to section 12 within the same article and certain changes were made to the
provision’s text, including the replacement of ‘proof is evident’ with ‘facts are evident.’
Finally, in 1982, [the voters] broadened the circumstances in which courts may deny bail
by adding subdivisions (b) and (c) to article I, section 12.” (In re Harris (2024) 16
Cal.5th 292, 308.)
“In June of 1982, the voters passed two ‘competing initiative measure[s] on the
same ballot’ that contained provisions pertaining to bail—Propositions 4 and 8 (Primary
Elec. (June 8, 1982)).” 5 (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 610.) “Because
Proposition 4 received more votes than did Proposition 8, the bail and [own
5 All references to Propositions 4 and 8 herein are to those put before the voters in the
Primary Election on June 8, 1982.
4
recognizance] release provisions contained in Proposition 4 are deemed to prevail over
those set forth in Proposition 8.” (In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1140, fn. 4.)
Proposition 4, as approved by the voters in 1982, provided a bail exception as
follows:
“A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for:
“(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great;
“(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person when the facts
are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and convincing
evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great
bodily harm to others;[ 6] or
“(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the
court finds based on clear and convincing evidence that the person has threatened another
with great bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood that the person would
carry out the threat if released.
“Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the amount of bail, the court shall
take into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal
record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing
of the case.
“A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court’s
discretion.” (Cal. Const., art. I, former § 12, as amended by Prop. 4, Primary Elec. (June
8, 1982).)
6 Notably, in contrast, had Proposition 8 prevailed over Proposition 4, the text of
proposed section 28, subdivisions (e) and (g) that would have been added to article I of
the California Constitution would have required that “no person charged with the
commission of any serious felony shall be released on his or her own recognizance,” as
“the term ‘serious felony’ is … defined in Penal Code, Section 1192.7(c).” (Ballot
Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) text of Prop. 8, p. 33, italics omitted.)
5
The “[e]xcessive bail” clause in section 12 substantially adopted the language in
Penal Code section 1275, which was added to the Penal Code in 1927. (Stats. 1927, ch.
737, § 1, p. 1387.) In the Proposition 4 ballot pamphlet, the Legislative Analyst noted
that, “[i]n effect, [the incorporation of the same factors now required by statute in Penal
Code section 1275] would prevent the Legislature from changing the requirements that
now govern the courts in setting bail, without a vote of the electorate.” (Ballot Pamp.,
supra, analysis of Prop. 4 by Legis. Analyst, p. 16.)
In the ballot pamphlet, “the analysis prepared by the Legislative Analyst [further]
informed voters that, under then-current law, ‘courts may deny bail only for those who
are accused of crimes punishable by death’ and that Proposition 4 would ‘broaden the
circumstances under which the courts may deny bail’ to those cases where defendants
were charged with noncapital felonies under the circumstances described” therein. (In re
Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 611.) The “two additional sets of circumstances” were
described as follows: “1. Bail could be denied in felony cases involving acts of violence
against another person when (a) the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is
great and (b) there is a substantial likelihood that the accused’s release would result in
great bodily harm to others; [and ¶] 2. Bail could be denied in felony cases when (a) the
proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great and (b) the accused has
threatened another with great bodily harm and there is a substantial likelihood that the
threat would be carried out if the person were released.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis
of Prop. 4 by Legis. Analyst, p. 16.)
Proposition 4 originated as a legislative constitutional amendment, Assembly
Constitutional Amendment No. 14 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) (Amendment No. 14). (In re
O’Connor (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 90, 104.) The language of Amendment No. 14 evolved
substantially from its introduction in the Assembly in 1981 to its adoption by the
Legislature and its presentation to the voters in 1982.
6
Pertinent here, as introduced, Amendment No. 14 proposed to amend section 12 to
state: “No person charged with the commission of, or attempt to commit murder, rape,
robbery, kidnapping, mayhem, felony child molestation, residential burglary, any felony
involving the willful infliction of great bodily injury, or any felony involving the use of a
firearm shall be released on his or her own recognizance.” (Assem. Const. Amend. No.
14 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 15, 1981, italics omitted.) The Assembly
Committee on Criminal Justice queried whether there was “justification for a list of
crimes to be placed in the California Constitution” and stated it could “conflict with the
federal due process requirement under the prevailing view of the California court.”
(Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice (June 8, 1981) Analysis of Assem. Const. Amend. No.
14, as amended May 6, 1981, p. 5.) The paragraph delineating the qualifying offenses
was stricken in the Assembly’s amendment on June 17, 1981, and replaced with the
broad language ultimately adopted by the voters—i.e., “felony offenses involving acts of
violence on another person.” (Assem. Const. Amend. No. 14, supra, as amended
June 17, 1981, pp. 2-3, italics omitted.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2025, Sanchez was charged with second degree murder and
unlawful possession of fentanyl for sale. The murder charge stems from Tom’s death as
a result of fentanyl intoxication a day after Sanchez allegedly sold her fentanyl.
Sanchez filed a motion for release on her own recognizance or to set appropriate
bail. The trial court denied the motion on April 1, 2025.7 The trial court found that
releasing Sanchez would pose “an unreasonable risk to public safety” and the court could
not impose any less restrictive means to ensure public safety than custodial detention.
The trial court explained there was clear and convincing evidence and a substantial
7 The motion was heard by Honorable Shauna Franklin.
7
likelihood that, if she were released, Sanchez would be a danger to herself and others due
to her continued struggle with narcotic addiction, which “is often funded by capitalizing
on the narcotic addictions of others.” The trial court also relayed its concerns that
Sanchez did not respond to the “wake-up call” when “she had to use Narcan on her own
child” 8; she had a “somewhat uncertain housing situation”; and she might not return to
court given the seriousness of and potential life sentence associated with the charges.
Sanchez renewed her motion for release on her own recognizance or on bail
following the preliminary hearing. During the preliminary hearing, the trial court heard
testimony that: between September 24 and September 29, 2024, 9 Tom made three drug
purchases from Sanchez, with the last one finalized just after midnight on September 29;
cell phone evidence indicated that Tom used the fentanyl purchased from Sanchez a few
times prior to her death; the second to last time that Tom used the drug, her boyfriend,
who was on the phone with her while she was using the drug, expressed concern that she
was “overdoing” it, being “irresponsible,” and “death growling”; Sanchez used fentanyl
for the last time on the evening of September 29 and into the morning of September 30,
while her boyfriend was on the phone with her; Sanchez’s boyfriend expressed concern
about Tom’s drug use, stating he was “taking that batch away” from her, she could not
“have any more tonight” because it would kill her, and she did not know what she was
doing.
A detective testified that he used Tom’s phone during his investigation to engage
in a text exchange with Sanchez, while pretending to be Tom. He indicated to Sanchez
that he wanted to buy fentanyl and asked about the potency or strength of the fentanyl.
Sanchez responded that she had “stronger stuff” and they “went into talking about
8 Narcan is a drug used to reverse an opioid overdose.
9 Further undesignated date references are to 2024.
8
overdosing” and ensuring someone is present “just in case … you overdose or fall out.”
When the detective asked Sanchez if the fentanyl would kill him, she said “no.” Sanchez,
however, recommended that Tom’s boyfriend be on the phone while she was taking the
drug and to have Tom’s family’s phone number available in case of an overdose.
When the detective met Sanchez in person and asked her if fentanyl was
dangerous, Sanchez said that she had given Narcan to about 15 to 20 people who “were
dead, stiff and blue,” had once given Narcan to five people in one week, and “one of her
good friends was being tried in Placer County for dealing something that led to
someone’s death.” Tom’s boyfriend was one of the recipients of Narcan. Sanchez also
mentioned that her son had an overdose experience in an alley, but the detective was not
sure if it was related to fentanyl. Sanchez acknowledged that fentanyl was killing people
“every 20 minutes” and agreed it had the same risk and consequences as “dealing and
playing Russian roulette.” Sanchez acknowledged that she sold fentanyl to Tom in the
days prior to her death and, when she handed the fentanyl on her person over to the
detective during their meeting, said “that could have been someone’s life.”
On July 2, 2025, the trial court denied the renewed motion for pretrial release
based on the finding that Sanchez continued to sell and distribute fentanyl despite her
knowledge and understanding of the dangers and risks associated with the drug.10 The
trial court relied on the fact that Sanchez, “knowing that somebody she sold to was dead
as a result of fentanyl ingestion,” was thereafter found in possession of fentanyl again in
November. The trial court said the evidence showed that Sanchez sells fentanyl to others,
which endangers the buyers and the public. It explained there was no less restrictive
means available to prevent Sanchez from continuing to distribute fentanyl because an
ankle monitor would only relay her physical location and narcotics testing would only
10 The motion was heard by Honorable Kevin McCormick.
9
show whether she was using the drug. After defense counsel clarified, and the prosecutor
agreed, that Sanchez did not know about Tom’s death prior to being found in possession
of fentanyl in November, the trial court replied it “wouldn’t really change the analysis”
because her statements to the police showed that she knew the risks of selling fentanyl
and yet continued to do so.
On September 18, 2025, Sanchez filed another motion to be released on her own
recognizance or to set appropriate bail. Sanchez requested that the trial court re-examine
bail based on changed circumstances because she required “surgical interventions which
the Sacramento County Main Jail will not perform.” Sanchez further argued that she was
not a danger to public safety. The trial court denied the request, finding there was no
change in circumstance based on medical necessity. 11 The trial court further explained
that it would not “rereview her bail” without a change in circumstance because the
motion had been denied twice before.
Sanchez petitioned this court for habeas corpus review in December 2025. She
argued that she is eligible for bail under section 12(b), the trial court’s finding that her
appearance could not adequately be secured through bail or other measures is not
supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court erred in denying her request for
pretrial release based on medical necessity, which is prejudicial because she will not
receive appropriate medical care while in jail. We summarily denied the petition.
In March 2026, our Supreme Court granted Sanchez’s petition for review and
transferred the matter back to this court with a directive to vacate the summary denial of
the petition and issue an order to show cause, returnable before this court. In accordance
with our Supreme Court’s directive, on March 23, 2026, we ordered the Sacramento
County Sheriff’s Office to show cause “why petitioner is not entitled to relief on the
11 The motion was heard by Honorable Shauna Franklin.
10
ground that she is not charged with ‘[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on
another person’ as required for denial of bail pursuant to article I, section 12, subdivision
(b) of the California Constitution.”
After the People filed the return, our Supreme Court decided In re Kowalczyk,
supra, 19 Cal.5th 593, which, as pertinent here, held that pretrial detention may only be
ordered if the requirements of section 12(b) are met (In re Kowalczyk, at pp. 606-607).
On June 11, 2026, we expanded the scope of the order to show cause and directed the
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office to show cause why Sanchez is not entitled to relief
under section 12(b). Following receipt of the parties’ supplemental briefs, this matter
was deemed fully briefed on July 6, 2026. Oral argument was held, and the matter was
submitted on September 21, 2026.
DISCUSSION
I
The Petition Is Deemed Timely
We initially consider the People’s threshold argument that the petition is untimely
because the substance of Sanchez’s petition focuses primarily on the original denial of
pretrial release on April 1, 2025, which was decided 266 days before the petition was
filed, and the second denial of her motion on July 2, 2025, which was decided 174 days
before the petition was filed. They further rely on our orders to show cause, which
expressly provide that the trial court retains jurisdiction to hold a new bail hearing and
the fact that Sanchez has not sought further review of her custodial status in the trial court
in light of those orders.
In her petition, Sanchez asserts the petition is timely because, “[w]hile the third
bail review was denied September 29, 2025, [she] did not seek review due to the filing of
a motion to dismiss—had the [Penal Code section] 995 motion been granted, she would
have received another bail hearing. That motion was heard and denied on November 21,
2025, less than thirty days [prior to filing the petition].” In her supplemental traverse,
11
Sanchez further argues that she has consistently pursued bail relief in the superior court,
this court, and our Supreme Court and alleges that “after the original [order to show
cause] issued, [the parties’ counsel] participated in discussions with Judge Franklin
regarding bail, during which the court indicated it would not change its bail ruling.”
“For noncapital cases in California, there is no express time window in which a
petitioner must seek habeas corpus relief. [Citation.] Rather, the general rule is that the
petition must be filed ‘as promptly as the circumstances allow ….’ [Citation.] An
untimely petition for writ of habeas corpus may still be considered if the delay is justified
by the petitioner, who bears the burden of demonstrating either: ‘(i) absence of
substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an
exception to the bar of untimeliness.’ ” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 242-
243.) Even when a petition for writ of habeas corpus is substantially delayed, it may be
considered on the merits when “the defects alleged by the petitioner constitute a
‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 244.)
We deem the petition timely because: (1) Sanchez has shown consistent effort in
seeking pretrial release by thrice requesting to be released on her own recognizance or on
bail, filing her petition in this court, and petitioning the California Supreme Court for
review; and (2) the alleged error is of a constitutional magnitude that may constitute a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.
II
The Murder Charge Is a Qualifying Felony Under Section 12(b)
We now turn to the legal question posed by our Supreme Court, which is whether
the second degree murder charge constitutes a qualifying felony under the first clause of
section 12(b), i.e., whether it is a felony “involving acts of violence on another person.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, subd. (b).) Sanchez asserts she is not charged with a qualifying
felony within the meaning of section 12(b) because the second degree murder charge is
not premised on the theory that she took any act of violence against Tom; rather, she
12
posits, the charge is premised on the theory that Tom’s death was the result of an illegal
drug sale. The People disagree and counter that second degree murder is a violent felony
within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c) (section 667.5(c)), and
hence automatically a qualifying felony under section 12(b). In the alternative, the
People maintain that In re O’Connor, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 90 is instructive because,
like O’Connor, Sanchez indirectly participated in the acts of violence on the victim.
Before we delve into the analysis, we note that in considering the scope and
application of the first clause of section 12(b), we do not evaluate whether the
requirements in the second and third clauses of the constitutional provision are met. This
is important because Sanchez appears to raise arguments pertaining to proximate cause—
which is tied to the actus reus of the murder charge—in the analysis of the first clause.
(People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660 [“To satisfy the actus reus element of
murder, an act of either the defendant or an accomplice must be the proximate cause of
death.” (italics omitted)].) Section 12(b) does not, however, equate the “act of violence”
requirement in the first clause with the actus reus of the underlying offense. And
proximate cause forms part of the analysis under the second clause, which pertains to the
strength of the case against the defendant. We accordingly do not address Sanchez’s
arguments that the sale and overdose occurred approximately a day apart, Tom’s death
was the result of an accidental overdose, Tom self-administered the drug (thereby
deciding how much to take), and the prosecution’s “theory is disjointed to union of act
and intent.”
A. Interpretation Principles
In interpreting section 12(b), “we apply principles of interpretation ‘ “similar to
those governing statutory construction.” ’ ” (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at
p. 615.) “ ‘ “[S]ince a written constitution is intended as and is the mere framework
according to whose general outlines specific legislation must be framed and modeled, and
is therefore … necessarily couched in general terms or language, it is not to be interpreted
13
according to narrow or supertechnical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines,
so that it may accomplish in full measure the objects of its establishment and so carry out
the great principles of government.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644,
655.)
“ ‘ “[O]ur paramount task is to ascertain the intent of those who enacted [the
constitutional provisions].” ’ ” (In re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 615.) We first
look at the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning.
(Ibid.) “ ‘[W]henever possible, significance must be given to every word [in a
constitutional provision] in pursuing the [voters’] purpose, and the court should avoid a
construction that makes some words surplusage.’ ” (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th
498, 506.) Likewise, “ ‘[w]hile every word of a [constitutional provision] must be
presumed to have been used for a purpose, it is also the case that every word excluded
from a [constitutional provision] must be presumed to have been excluded for a
purpose.’ ” (Arden Carmichael, Inc. v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
507, 516.) We may look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of
the language in a constitutional provision. (In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 933.)
However, “[a]ny interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided.”
(Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.)
Absent ambiguity in the language of the constitutional provision, we “ ‘ “presume
that the voters intend the meaning apparent on the face of an initiative measure.” ’ ” (In
re Kowalczyk, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 615-616.) We “ ‘ “may not add to the
[Constitution] or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that is not apparent in its
language.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) If the language is ambiguous, “ ‘ “we consider extrinsic
evidence of the enacting body’s intent” ’ ” (id. at pp. 615-616), such as ballot summaries
and arguments (id. at p. 616).
14
B. Section 12(b) Does Not Incorporate Section 667.5(c)
The People argue that we need not undertake a fact-specific review under the first
clause of section 12(b) because murder is automatically a qualifying offense by virtue of
the list of violent felonies in section 667.5(c). We disagree. 12
Initially, we find no merit in the People’s assertion that the phrase “[f]elony
offenses involving acts of violence on another person” in section 12(b) is similar to the
language in section 667.5(c), which provides that the enhancements demonstrate
“society’s condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person.”
Section 12(b) includes the material terms “involving” and “acts,” which are notably
absent from the language in section 667.5(c). We also find no basis for concluding that
the Legislature and voters incorporated section 667.5(c)’s list of violent felonies into
section 12(b).
We reject the premise that the Legislature and voters must have intended to
incorporate section 667.5(c) into section 12(b) because section 667.5(c) was enacted
before the voters approved Proposition 4. The People cite no authority to support this
proposition, and we are aware of none.
12 We also disagree with the conclusory proposal in the concurrence that the phrase
“ ‘[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on another person’ ” means “that it is the
felonies themselves that must be violent” such that the felony offenses, “as a matter of
law,” “necessarily” or “inherently” involve acts of violence. (Conc. opn., post, at pp. 2,
5, 7, italics omitted.) Neither “necessarily” nor “inherently” appears in section 12(b), and
we decline to read words into the constitutional provision, as explained post. It is further
unclear what legal meaning is ascribed to the proposed terms (or the term “chargeable
offenses”) and what qualifies as a felony involving an act of violence “as a matter of law”
under the concurrence’s rationale. It does not appear to us that the trial court’s
application of the qualifying offense criteria to the facts of the alleged crime conflicts
with the second clause or clear and convincing evidence standard in the third clause of
section 12(b), or is inconsistent with judicial interpretation of section 12(b). (Conc. opn.,
post, at pp. 3-4.) We thus find no basis for concluding that a second degree murder
charge constitutes a qualifying offense as a matter of law under the first clause of section
12(b). (Conc. opn., post, at pp. 1, 7-8.)
15
It is true that, “[i]n the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative or popular
intent, terms used in a constitutional amendment are normally construed in light of
existing statutory definitions or judicial interpretations in effect at the time of the
amendment’s adoption.” (Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 487.)
That canon of interpretation is not, however, applicable here because section 12(b) does
not use the term “violent felony,” which is the term defined in section 667.5(c).
(See County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 849-850 [the canon to
construe terms in a constitutional amendment “ ‘in the light of their statutory meaning or
interpretation in effect at the time of its adoption’ ” applies when the language in the
constitutional amendment is “virtually identical” to that of the statute]; cf. Heckendorn, at
pp. 486-487 [where voters used the term “ad valorem tax” and the Legislature had
previously defined that term by statute, the statutory definition was deemed incorporated
into the constitutional provision].) Had the Legislature and voters intended to incorporate
section 667.5(c) into section 12(b), they could have expressly done so, as they did with
Penal Code section 1275. (See In re Bergstrom (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 709, 724 [“the
term ‘ “great bodily injury,” ’ in the context of an enhancement provision,” did not
inform the meaning of “ ‘great bodily harm’ ” in section 12 because “the Legislature
could have incorporated the term ‘great bodily injury’ rather than ‘great bodily harm’ ”
into Amendment No. 14, but did not]; see also Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 8, p. 33
[Prop. 8, put before the voters at the same time as Prop. 4 and dealing with the same
subject matter, stated the measure used the term “serious felony” as “defined in Penal
Code, Section 1192.7(c)”].)
Notably, the Legislature also did not, when it approved Amendment No. 14,
amend section 667.5(c)’s limitation that the definition of “violent felony” contained
therein is “[f]or the purpose of th[at] section” alone. Consistent with this limitation,
generally, when the Legislature has intended to incorporate the definition of “violent
felony,” or a portion thereof, into other statutes, the Legislature has expressly referenced
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section 667.5(c). (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 602, subd. (t)(4), 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J), 1203,
subd. (k), 1203.44, subd. (b)(1)(C), 1203.425, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iv)(II).) One such statute
implements section 12(b).
Penal Code section 1270.1 provides that a hearing “shall be held in open court”
when a person is arrested for “a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section
667.5, but not including a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 460 (residential
burglary),” among other crimes, before the person “may be released on bail,” as
specified, or on their own recognizance. (Pen. Code, § 1270.1, subd. (a)(1).) In other
words, when a felony offense falls within the first clause of section 12(b), the court must
hold a hearing before granting pretrial release, if the felony also qualifies as a violent
felony under section 667.5(c), except for residential burglary.
The residential burglary exception to the pretrial release hearing requirement
highlights another problem with the People’s incorporation argument—not all of the
offenses listed in section 667.5(c) necessarily involve acts of violence on another person,
as required under section 12(b). Indeed, the residential burglary offense is defined as
“[a]ny burglary of the first degree, … wherein it is charged and proved that another
person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of
the burglary.” (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21), italics added; see also id., subd. (c)(19)
[including extortion when conducted for the benefit of a criminal street gang].)
The Legislature’s implementation of section 12 with regard to sex crimes cuts
against the People’s incorporation argument as well. Two years after the voters approved
Proposition 4, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 292, identifying sex crimes that
are “deemed to be a felony offense involving an act of violence and a felony offense
involving great bodily harm” within the meaning of section 12(b) and section 12(c).
Those sex crimes included violations of subdivision (2) of Penal Code section 261, and
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subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 288. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1202, § 1, pp. 4123-4124.) 13
If, as the People argue, the list in section 667.5(c) was incorporated into section 12(b) in
1982, the inclusion of the foregoing two sex crimes in Penal Code section 292 in 1984
would have been superfluous because those crimes already appeared on the list in section
667.5(c) in 1982. (See Stats. 1980, ch. 587, § 3, p. 1596.) Moreover, to the extent the
People’s position is that section 12(b) continues to incorporate section 667.5(c), as it is
amended over time, then Penal Code section 292 would be substantially superfluous
because all of the sex crimes identified in Penal Code section 292 are now included in
section 667.5(c) as well. (Compare Pen. Code, § 292 with § 667.5, subd. (c)(3)-(6), (11),
(18).) We do not read the constitutional amendment to render related subsequently
enacted statutes superfluous. (Greene v. Marin County Flood Control & Water
Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 277, 290-291 [“ ‘when the Legislature has enacted
a statute with the relevant constitutional prescriptions clearly in mind[,] the statute
represents a considered legislative judgment as to the appropriate reach of the
constitutional provision’ ” and is subject to “ ‘significant weight and deference’ ”].)
Additionally, in reading the text of statutory and constitutional provisions to
ascertain their meaning, “[c]ontext is important.” (People v. Superior Court (Sanchez-
Flores) (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 692, 699.) The different contexts within which section
12(b) and section 667.5(c) apply are noteworthy. Indeed, several of the offenses in
section 667.5(c) do not qualify as a “violent felony” unless they are “charged and
proved” or “pleaded and proved” (see, e.g., Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(8), (21),
(24))—a condition that is not at issue in the bail context, where the standard under section
13 We disagree with the concurrence’s conclusion that because Penal Code section 292
identified specific sex crimes as felony offenses involving an act of violence under the
first clause of section 12(b), the court must presume the Legislature also determined “that
section 12(b) applies to qualifying offenses definable as a matter of law instead of
requiring a factual, case-by-case analysis.” (Conc. opn., post, at p. 6.)
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12(b) is that “ ‘the facts are evident or the presumption great.’ ” Bail hearings
“commonly involve informal proffers by the prosecution and defense alike” and the “
‘facts are evident’ ” standard is not intended to assure “the production of admissible
evidence.” (In re Harris, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 311-312.) The People present no
argument as to how the “charged and proved” or “pleaded and proved” violent felonies
apply in the context of section 12(b).
We recognize, as the People point out, that courts have described section 12(b) as
the “violent felony exception” (Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876,
884) and stated that it applies to “those charged with violent felonies” (In re Kowalczyk,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 611). Such statements do not, however, “compel[] one to consult
the list of crimes in [section] 667.5(c) that defines that term,” as the People assert.
Judicially ascribed labels do not change substantive law. No court has considered nor
held that a section 667.5(c) charge automatically constitutes a qualifying offense under
section 12(b) and “[c]ases are not authority for propositions not considered therein.”
(State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 614.)