Weinsaft v. Deckel CA2/4

Filed 10/20/26 Weinsaft v. Deckel CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR LEONARD B. WEINSAFT, B343222 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV03524) v. AMI and PHOEBE DECKEL, Defendants; JONATHAN JOSEPH DECKEL, Non-party Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Dismissed. Jonathan Joseph Deckel, in pro. per., for Non-party Appellant. Venable, Max N. Wellman and Witt W. Chang for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for Defendants.  This is the second appeal by non-party Jonathan Deckel. In 2022, we affirmed the trial court’s order denying Jonathan’s1 motion to intervene in a property partition action. Our prior ruling is final and binding. Now, Jonathan has appealed the same order a second time. He cannot do so. Jonathan also purports to challenge other rulings in the partition action. But, because he was denied leave to intervene, and because we upheld that denial on appeal, Jonathan was never a party to the partition action. As a non-party, he has no standing to appeal the trial court’s rulings in the partition action. Put simply, there is no basis for this appeal. We therefore dismiss it. We deny respondent Leonard Weinsaft’s requests to designate Jonathan as a vexatious litigant and to award attorney fees. We cannot do so for the reasons explained below. BACKGROUND We briefly recite the relevant factual and procedural background, drawn in part from the corresponding sections of our prior unpublished opinion in this case, Weinsaft v. Deckel (Dec. 9, 2022, B313200). Pursuant to Evidence Code sections 459 and 452, subdivision (d), we take judicial notice of our prior unpublished opinion. (See Mayer v. C.W. Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 61.) In 2019, Weinsaft filed a lawsuit against his sister, Phoebe, and her husband, Ami. The lawsuit concerned apartment buildings Weinsaft, Phoebe, and Ami jointly owned via their respective trusts. Weinsaft sought the partition of the property, appointment of a receiver, and an accounting. 1 We refer to members of the Deckel family by first name for clarity. No disrespect is intended. 2  In March 2020, Weinsaft, Phoebe, and Ami entered into a settlement agreement on behalf of their respective trusts. The agreement provided for the sale of the apartment buildings. The parties agreed to dismiss the partition action, with the trial court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.2 If the parties were unable to sell the property within one year, either party could move to have a stipulated judgment entered by the court. The stipulated judgment included the appointment of a referee to manage and sell the property. The settlement agreement also contained a provision stating that the agreement “shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of any beneficiaries, executors, administrators, heirs, successors and assigns of each Party.” The court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to the settlement agreement on March 11, 2020. In October 2020, Ami deeded his interest in the property to his three children, Jonathan, Adam, and Alyssa.3 Neither Jonathan nor his siblings were ever named as parties to the partition action. At the time of Ami’s property transfer, they did not seek to intervene in the action (or even to notify the court of the transfer). On April 1, 2021, consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement, Weinsaft applied to the trial court to enter the stipulated judgment and appoint a referee. The court granted the application and entered the stipulated judgment on April 8, 2021. On April 23, 2021, Jonathan and his siblings, through counsel, moved to intervene in the partition action. They also sought to rescind the 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 Phoebe passed away in March 2020, leaving Ami with a 50 percent interest in the property. 3 settlement agreement, vacate the stipulated judgment, and relieve the referee. The trial court denied the motion on May 25, 2021. The trial court found that the attempt to intervene was untimely. The court noted that the Deckel siblings “made no effort to intervene until several months after they had acquired their respective interests.” The court further observed that “[s]ince the claimed November 2020 transfer of his interest, Ami Deckel has remained as Defendant, and through his counsel has continued to participate in this case.” The Deckel siblings appealed from the denial of the motion to intervene. On December 9, 2022, this court affirmed. (Weinsaft v. Deckel, supra.) We found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that the motion was untimely. We explained that “appellants moved to intervene 15 days after the stipulated partition judgment was entered, 200 days after appellants received their interest in the Property, and more than 400 days after the entire case was settled and dismissed.” (Ibid.) We also found that appellants provided “no cogent reason for failing to intervene earlier,” and that their “belated attempt to enter into the proceedings jeopardized the settlement and the partition proceedings long since agreed upon by the parties.” (Ibid.) According to Weinsaft, following the unsuccessful appeal, Jonathan (now proceeding in propria persona) engaged in ongoing attempts to obstruct the referee in his efforts to manage the property and secure a buyer. This included filing a separate lawsuit against Weinsaft in May 2023. The trial court dismissed that action in January 2024, after granting Weinsaft’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. In July 2023, the trial court issued an order confirming the sale of the property. Jonathan moved to vacate the order, which the court denied for lack of standing. In November 2023, 4 Jonathan filed a complaint in federal district court against Weinsaft and others, alleging that the defendants were “enemy combatant citizen pirates” for their conduct in partition action. The federal court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On July 5, 2024, the trial court granted the referee’s motion approving the final report and accounting, approving the recommended distribution of funds, and terminating the referee’s appointment.4 The referee served a notice of entry of the order on July 17, 2024. Jonathan filed his notice of appeal on December 6, 2024, listing as the bases for his appeal the “final judgment” entered July 5, 2024, and a denial of a motion to vacate on September 19, 2024.5 DISCUSSION I. Justiciability Jonathan raises multiple arguments on appeal. However, we agree with Weinsaft that Jonathan lacks standing to appeal from any judgment or order in the partition action other than the denial of his motion for intervention—the subject of his prior appeal.6 “‘[G]enerally ... only parties of record may appeal; consequently one who is denied the right to intervene in an action ordinarily may not appeal from a judgment subsequently entered in the case. [Citations.] Instead, he 4 We note that Ami continued to appear as a party in these proceedings, including filing an opposition to this motion. 5 We have not found any document in the record related to a motion to vacate around that date and Jonathan does not reference it in his opening brief on appeal. 6 Jonathan did not file a reply brief on appeal and has not addressed Weinsaft’s arguments. 5 may appeal from the order denying intervention.’” (Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 263; see also § 902.) Additionally, a person “‘who is legally “aggrieved” by a judgment may become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663.’” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 710.) Jonathan has never been a party of record in this action. Further, there is no indication in the record before us that he moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to section 663, nor does he claim to have done so in his appellant’s brief. Thus, he lacks standing to appeal from the judgment or any order entered by the trial court other than the order denying intervention. Jonathan, of course, had a right to appeal from the order denying his motion to intervene. An “order denying intervention is appealable because ‘it operates as a final determination against the intervenor and is appealable as a final judgment against him.’” (Royal Indemnity Co. v. United Enterprises, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 194, 202.) However, Jonathan already appealed the order denying his motion to intervene, and this court affirmed the order. He cannot raise the same issue in a subsequent appeal. Our decision affirming the trial court’s order is “law of the case and is binding upon the parties and the trial court.” (Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 306, 315.) “The law of the case must be adhered to both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal.” (Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 149, 156; see also Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 [law of the case doctrine “promotes finality by preventing relitigation of issues previously decided”].) As such, we cannot 6 review Jonathan’s challenge to the denial of his motion to intervene on the merits. Since (a) we cannot review the denial of the leave to intervene and (b) Jonathan lacks standing to challenge any other rulings in this case, the appeal is not justiciable. It should therefore be dismissed. (See In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 294 [“When an appellant lacks standing, the appeal is subject to dismissal”].) It appears that Jonathan also seeks to appeal from rulings made in other cases to which he is a party, including a case involving “criminal arrests” and an unlawful detainer action. Any rulings arising from cases other than the partition action are outside the scope of this appeal. (See Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from’”].) In short, Jonathan’s appeal is not justiciable. The appeal is dismissed. II. Request for Vexatious Litigant Finding In his respondent’s brief, Weinsaft asks us to declare Jonathan a vexatious litigant. Weinsaft points to Jonathan’s history of failed lawsuits. Weinsaft also asserts that Jonathan harassed the referee and attempted to delay the sale of the property. A litigant is vexatious if they have “commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona” at least five civil litigations within the past seven years that were “finally determined adversely” to them. (§ 391, subd. (b)(1)(i) [excluding actions in small claims court].) Section 391, subdivision (b) also lists additional categories of qualifying conduct, including where a self-represented litigant has “relitigated or attempted to relitigate matters previously determined against him or her, repeatedly pursued unmeritorious 7 or frivolous tactics in litigation, or who has previously been declared a vexatious litigant in a related action.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169–1170.) Weinsaft fails to articulate the precise basis for a vexatious litigant finding. He outlines Jonathan’s litigation conduct over the past several years, including filing pleadings in this case and initiating three new actions.7 But his cursory discussion does not establish how Jonathan’s conduct meets the statutory requirements of a vexatious litigant. Most notably, Weinsaft has not shown that Jonathan filed or maintained at least five qualifying actions while self-represented and that those actions were finally decided adversely to Jonathan. Nor does Weinsaft explain the precise statutory remedy he seeks. On the record before us, we decline to find that Jonathan meets the requirements of a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 391, subdivision (b). However, we caution Jonathan to be mindful that he could be subject to a vexatious litigant finding in the future if warranted by his conduct. III. Request for Attorney Fees Weinsaft also seeks his attorney fees incurred on appeal. He contends he is entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to a provision of the settlement agreement. We do not believe that Weinsaft has made an adequate showing to receive an award of fees. The attorney fee provision of the settlement provides, “if any action or proceeding is commenced by any Party to this Settlement Agreement in order to interpret or enforce the provisions of this Settlement Agreement or to recover any amounts due under this Settlement Agreement, the prevailing 7 We grant Weinsaft’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the dockets of several of these actions. 8 Party shall be entitled to an award ... of its costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred, in connection with said action or proceeding.” Weinsaft contends he is entitled to attorney fees incurred in the appeal under this provision. But Weinsaft’s brief omitted the language limiting the fee provision’s application to actions brought by a party “to interpret or enforce the provisions of this Settlement Agreement or to recover any amounts due under this Settlement Agreement.” He has not shown how this appeal by Jonathan satisfies this requirement. Moreover, Weinsaft’s contention that the fee provision can apply against Jonathan, who was not a party to the settlement agreement or the underlying litigation, is based solely on his citation to the provision in the settlement agreement that it “shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of any beneficiaries, executors, administrators, heirs, successors and assigns of each Party.” We note our prior finding that Jonathan and his siblings failed to show “any evidence that Ami assigned his rights and obligations under the settlement agreement to them.” (Weinsaft v. Deckel, supra, at p. *6; see also Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 284, 292 [“The burden of proving an assignment falls upon the party asserting rights thereunder” to show the assignment with “clear and positive” evidence].) Weinsaft cites no basis for a contrary finding. We therefore deny Weinsaft’s request for attorney fees on appeal. 9  DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. Weinsaft is entitled to recover his costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS DAUM, J. We concur: MORI, Acting P. J. TAMZARIAN, J. 10