Full Opinion

Filed 10/27/26 In re E.J. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE In re E.J., Jr., a Person Coming B350541 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP03069A) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.J., Sr., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Dismissed. Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _____________________ I. INTRODUCTION E.J., Sr., (father) appeals from an order terminating reunification services at a 12-month review hearing conducted pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f).1 While this appeal was pending, E.J., Jr., (the child) turned 18 years old.2 We dismiss the appeal as moot. II. BACKGROUND A. Dependency Petition and Jurisdiction On September 30, 2024, the Department filed a dependency petition, which was sustained as amended by the juvenile court as follows: “b-1 [and j-1] 1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a request for judicial notice of the August 12, 2026, minute order. We grant the request. 2 “On 09/17/24, the child[’s] … father … inappropriately disciplined the child by repeatedly striking the child with father’s open hand. The child reported pain in the left shoulder and chest. In May 2023, the father struck the child, inflicting marks and bruises on the child. Such inappropriate discipline caused the child unreasonable pain and suffering. The child’s maternal sibling … and the child’s sibling … were prior dependents of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt due to … father using inappropriate discipline on the maternal sibling … . Such inappropriate discipline of the child by … father endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, and physical abuse.” At the adjudication and disposition hearing, father pled no contest to the allegations and submitted a waiver of rights form. The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition as amended. For the disposition, the juvenile court declared the child a dependent of the court and ordered him removed from father’s care. The court ordered family reunification services for father, including conjoint counseling with the child, a parenting program to address appropriate methods of discipline, and individual counseling to address anger issues, child protection, and appropriate methods of discipline. The court also awarded father monitored visits. B. Termination of Reunification Services On November 6, 2025, the juvenile court conducted the 12- month status review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (f). The Department recommended that the court terminate reunification services. Counsel for the child joined in the Department’s recommendation. 3 Father’s counsel requested that the juvenile court extend reunification services for six more months and argued that the Department had not provided father with reasonable services. The Department opposed the request and argued that it had provided reasonable services under the circumstances, which included father’s failure to maintain contact with and provide contact information to the Department. Following argument, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and found that the Department had provided father with reasonable services. Father timely appealed. C. Post-Appeal Proceeding On August 12, 2026, the juvenile court held a permanency planning review hearing. The court found the child had turned 18 years old and declared him to be a nonminor dependent. III. DISCUSSION The Department asserts the appeal is now moot, while father contends there is a justiciable controversy regarding the termination of reunification services. We agree with the Department. “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any 4 effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) Father contends the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided reasonable reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence. The child, however, is 18 years old now and cannot be ordered to reunify with father. (See In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 640 [“the statutory framework does not allow a parent to reunify with a dependent child who has turned 18 because a parent cannot have physical custody of an adult”]; see § 303, subd. (d)(1) [“Nothing in this code … shall be construed to provide legal custody of a person who has attained 18 years of age to the county welfare or probation department or to otherwise abrogate any other rights that a person who has attained 18 years of age may have as an adult under California law”]; see also Fam. Code, § 7505, subd. (c) [parental authority over child ceases by operation of law when child reaches age of majority].)3 Father contends that notwithstanding the child’s age, the case is not moot because father may suffer an adverse consequence in the future involving reunification services and “any further and younger sibling” the child may have. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278 [case not moot if orders 3 Father also argued that the court failed to comply with its duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state statutes. In a supplemental brief, father concedes that his ICWA-related argument is moot. 5 adversely affect parent].) He cites section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A), which provides that a juvenile court need not provide reunification services if the court ordered termination of reunification services for the child’s sibling or half-sibling because the parent failed to reunify, and that same parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the child. We reject his contention. Father has not identified any other child subject to dependency jurisdiction and the record demonstrates that the child’s siblings referenced in the petition are now adults. His claim is therefore “too speculative to demonstrate a specific legal consequence that a favorable judgment could redress.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) We also decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits. Father does not argue, and we do not find, that: the case presents an issue of broad interest that is likely to recur, there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or there is a material question remaining for the court’s determination. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) 6 IV. DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS KIM (D.), J. We concur: HOFFSTADT, P. J. MOOR, J. 7