In re N.R. CA5

Filed 11/3/26 In re N.R. CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re N.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF F090482 SOCIAL SERVICES/CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, (Super. Ct. Nos. MJP019364, MJP019365, MJP019366, Plaintiff and Respondent, MJP019367) v. J.R., OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County. Timothy A. Kams, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Fresno Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Regina A. Garza, County Counsel, and Christopher B. Dorian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo-  J.R. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders sustaining a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and asserting dependency jurisdiction over her four adoptive children. We dismiss the appeal as moot. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 Mother is the sole adoptive parent of four children – three girls that include now 15-year-old N.R. (daughter), 12-year-old A.R. and five-year-old L.G., and one boy, now 13-year-old Jordan R. (the siblings) (collectively, the children.)3 Mother had been in a 10-year relationship with her boyfriend, R.G. (boyfriend), who lived with mother and the children, along with his two biological children with mother.4 The family came to the attention of the Madera County Department of Social Services, Child Welfare Services (department) on June 18, 2025, when the department was advised that law enforcement placed a section 300 hold on then 13-year-old daughter. A detective told the social worker that about three weeks before, daughter disclosed that boyfriend had sexually assaulted her. Boyfriend was arrested and his cellphone was taken into evidence. After mother bailed him out of jail, law enforcement discovered child pornography videos and photos of daughter on his cellphone. Boyfriend was rearrested, again posted bail, and reportedly returned to the family residence. Daughter told the detective that she did not feel safe at home. Law enforcement declined 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of this court’s nonpublished opinion in the related appeal in daughter’s case, In re N.R. (Nov 2, 2026, F090966). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a) & (d), 459, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1); Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1171, 1173 [court may take judicial notice of unpublished opinions in related appeals on its own motion].) Our summary of the pertinent factual and procedural background includes some information taken from this opinion. 3 Mother is the children’s paternal aunt, who adopted the children around 2019. 4 The biological children were not part of this dependency case and are not subjects of this appeal. 2. to place a protective hold on the siblings after mother told them she had not seen boyfriend since his arrest in May. On June 23, 2025, the department filed a section 300 petition alleging as to daughter that: (1) mother’s failure or inability to supervise or protect daughter created a substantial risk that daughter would suffer serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (b)(1) (count b–1)); (2) daughter had been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that she will be sexually abused, as defined in Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (b), by a member of the child’s household (§ 300, subd. (d) (count d–1)); and (3) mother failed to protect daughter adequately from sexual abuse and knew or reasonably should have known she was in danger of sexual abuse (id., subd. (d) (count d–2)). As to the siblings, the petition alleged that their sibling had been abused or neglected as defined in subdivisions (b) and (d) and there was a substantial risk that the children would be abused or neglected as defined in those subdivisions (id., subd. (j) (count j–1)). The b–1, d–1, and j–1 counts were based on identical factual allegations: “On June 18, 2025, Fresno Sheriff’s County Detective [Tamayo] (Event #: 25-5475) advised [s]ocial [w]orker F. Rodriguez that approximately 3 weeks ago, N[.R.] disclosed being sexually assaulted by [mother]’s boyfriend, .… [Boyfriend] was arrested, and his partner and adoptive mother of N[.R.], [mother], bailed him out of jail. Detective Tamayo went on to say that when [boyfriend] was arrested, his cell phone was taken into evidence. Approximately 1 week ago, Fresno [s]heriff’s [d]eputies discovered child pornography videos and photos of N[.R.] on [boyfriend]’s cellphone. Deputies rearrested [boyfriend], and he made bail again and was said to be at the family’s residence. N[.R.] told Detective Tamayo she does not feel safe at home, and the Fresno Sheriff’s Department placed the [protective] [custody] 300 hold on N[.R.].” The d–2 count alleged the following facts: “On June 19, 2025, [mother] admitted to [s]ocial [w]orker [F. Rodriguez] having posted bail for [boyfriend] the first time he was arrested. [Mother] reported being aware of N[.R.]’s disclosure and refused to serve 3. alleged perpetrator, [boyfriend], with a protective order.” The b–1, d–2, and j–1 counts further alleged: “[Mother] knew or reasonably should have known of the abuse of the child, but failed to protect N[.R.] by continuing to allow [boyfriend] in the home and have access to the child. The mother’s failure to protect the child placed the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm and/or further abuse.” On July 31, 2025, following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition in its entirety. At the disposition hearing held on September 9, 2025, the hearing for daughter was continued because mother wished to waive reunification services,5 while the juvenile court ordered the siblings placed with mother with family maintenance services. In September 2025, mother filed a notice of appeal from the September 2025 disposition order, which listed all four children as the subjects of the appeal. The disposition hearing as to daughter was not held until December 2025. The juvenile court removed daughter from mother’s physical custody and denied mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(14). Daughter remained in foster care with a permanent plan goal of legal guardianship.6 On March 9, 2026, during the pendency of this appeal, a review hearing was held with respect to the siblings. The juvenile court granted mother sole legal and physical custody of the siblings and dismissed dependency jurisdiction over them.7 5 Mother filed a written waiver of reunification services as to daughter only. 6 Mother separately appealed from daughter’s dispositional orders, which was assigned case No. F090966. 7 We advised the parties that we were considering taking judicial notice of the juvenile court’s March 9, 2026, orders dismissing dependency jurisdiction and directed the parties to address the propriety of such an action. The parties filed letter briefs stating they did not object to our taking judicial notice of the orders. Accordingly, we take judicial notice of the March 9, 2026, minute orders and Recommended Advisements, Inquiries, Findings & Orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) 4.  DISCUSSION “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) A case is moot when events render it “ ‘ “impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Effective” relief has two conditions. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the requested outcome must directly redress or rectify that harm. (In re S.R. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042, 1051 (S.R.); see D.P., at p. 276.) This rule applies in dependency cases. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) A reviewing court must “ ‘ “ ‘decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in subsequent proceeding.’ ” ’ ” (S.R., at p. 1051; see D.P., at p. 276.) But even where an appeal is moot, “courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., at p. 282; accord, S.R., at p. 1051.) Mother’s appeal concerning the siblings is potentially moot because the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over the siblings and granted mother sole physical and legal custody. “An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436 [an appeal “may become moot where subsequent events, including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief”].) However, “when a juvenile court’s finding We also asked the parties to address the propriety of dismissing the appeal as moot because we cannot render any effectual relief and the appeal of superior court case No. MJP019364 as not being from an appealable order. The parties addressed these issues in their letter briefs, which we discuss below. 5. forms the basis for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights—for instance, by restricting visitation or custody—that jurisdictional finding remains subject to challenge, even if the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Conversely, when “the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction without issuing any order that continues to impact the parents,” “complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect on the [parent’s] legal status that is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277; accord, S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1051.) “A reviewing court must “ ‘decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (D.P., at p. 276; see S.R., at p. 1051.) Mother contends her appeal is not moot because it challenges findings that are reportable for inclusion in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI), which could affect her ability to retain her license as a registered nurse. “ ‘[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case is not moot, and merits review is required.’ ” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1052.) One such consequence is mandatory listing on the CACI. (S.R., at p. 1048; D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.) “ ‘[I]nformation included in the CACI is available to a wide variety of state agencies, employers, and law enforcement,’ and inclusion of a parent’s conduct in the CACI carries significant consequences for the parent.” (S.R., at p. 1048, see D.P., at p. 279.) “Where a juvenile court sustains an allegation of child abuse, a parent may later be estopped from challenging his or her inclusion in the CACI.” (S.R., at p. 1055; see Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (e).) We first consider whether mother has identified an ongoing harm. The conduct that necessitates reporting for inclusion in the CACI is not defined by section 300 but by specific provisions in the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code, § 11164, et seq. (CANRA)). Agencies such as the department are required to only forward 6. substantiated reports of “child abuse or severe neglect” to the California Department of Justice for inclusion in the CACI. (Pen. Code, §§ 11169, subd. (a), 11165.9.) “Child abuse” includes the term “sexual abuse” as defined by Penal Code section 11165.1, which includes sexual assault or sexual exploitation. (Pen. Code, §§ 11165.6, 11165.1.) The term does not appear to include acts that put a child at risk of sexual abuse or that constitute failure to protect a child from sexual abuse; rather, it appears to include only acts that constitute abuse in and of themselves. Its placement in the Penal Code “supports an inference that it was aimed at criminal conduct.” (Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72, 89; see, S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1144 [“the criteria for a CACI listing based on ‘child abuse or severe neglect’ under CANRA generally appear to be narrower than the grounds of juvenile dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300”].) Mother does not explain how her conduct would require the department to issue a report for inclusion in the CACI. There is no sustained allegation that mother sexually abused daughter and as to the sustained failure to protect allegations, it is not clear these would fall within the definition of “severe neglect” required for reporting to the CACI. (See Pen. Code, §§ 11165.2, subd. (a), 11169, subd. (a).) It is not necessary for us to determine whether the sustained allegations here mandate a report to CACI. Rather, we assume without deciding that the failure to protect is reportable conduct, which constitutes ongoing harm: that the conduct described in the petition has been or will be reported for inclusion in the CACI. (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1053.) We next consider whether this ongoing harm is “capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) “[W]here a court reverses a jurisdictional finding of severe child abuse for lack of sufficient evidence, an individual may no longer be listed in the CACI.” (S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1055, citing Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a).) And, if the parent remains listed in the CACI after such a reversal, he or she may request a grievance hearing to seek removal. (S.R., at p. 1055, 7. citing Pen. Code, § 11169, subds. (d), (e), & (h).) Thus, reversal of jurisdictional findings describing conduct that is reportable for inclusion in the CACI could redress an ongoing harm. Here, in the related appeal concerning daughter’s case, we affirmed the jurisdictional findings as to daughter under section 300, subdivision (d), which alleged that daughter was sexually abused by a household member and mother failed to protect daughter after learning of the abuse. These same allegations support jurisdiction as to the siblings under subdivision (j). Accordingly, even if we reversed the (j) count, the identical conduct described in the sustained subdivision (d) count would be reportable. Reversal would not redress mother’s ongoing harm, meaning we cannot grant her effective relief from potential CACI inclusion. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.) Accordingly, we conclude the appeal is moot as to the siblings’ cases. This leaves the appeal as to daughter, whose superior court case number and name were listed in the notice of appeal. When the notice of appeal was filed on September 19, 2025, dispositional orders had been made with respect to the siblings, but the disposition hearing for daughter had not yet taken place. An appeal cannot be taken directly from a court’s jurisdictional order; instead, a jurisdictional order is appealable through a challenge to the subsequent dispositional order. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490, fn. 4; see, In re Candida S. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1249 [a party may only appeal from the dispositional order, not the jurisdictional findings].) Thus, the appeal as to daughter was premature. Since mother subsequently appealed from the dispositional order as to daughter, which as we have noted was assigned a different case number, and we have addressed her jurisdictional challenge as to daughter in that appeal, we dismiss the appeal as to daughter in this case as being from a nonappealable order. 8.  DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed as moot insofar as it concerns the siblings and is dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order insofar as it concerns daughter. SANDHU, J. WE CONCUR: Levy, Acting P. J. DETJEN, J. 9.