Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 In re K.M. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR In re K.M. et al., Persons Coming B351588 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. 21CCJP03547, 21CCJP03547B-C) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. J.A., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Dismissed. John Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION The juvenile court sustained multiple jurisdictional allegations against the parents of minors K.M. and D.A. The court removed both children from Erika M. (mother) and placed them with Jose A. (father). Father appealed, challenging one of the court’s jurisdictional findings against him.1 While his appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and entered an order awarding father sole legal and physical custody of both children. We conclude father’s appeal is moot and dismiss it. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues presented on appeal. Mother and father have two children together: K.M. (born 2020) and D.A. (born 2024). Mother and father have a history of dependency proceedings. In 2021, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over K.M., sustaining allegations against both parents. As to father, the juvenile court sustained allegations that he knew that mother had mental health issues, including a history of violence and aggression, and failed to protect K.M. from 1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. 2 mother. The juvenile court also sustained the allegation that father refused to take custody of—or provide care for—K.M. when she was detained from mother. The juvenile court ultimately terminated jurisdiction, awarding mother sole physical custody of K.M. and providing for joint legal custody with unmonitored visitation for father. The family again came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) in August 2025 when mother got into a physical altercation with several individuals at a park while she was caring for both children. Mother was arrested and charged with child endangerment for her role in the altercation. The Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,2 asserting various counts against mother and father. As subsequently amended, the Department alleged two counts against father: b- 5 and b-6. Count b-5 alleged that father had a history of alcohol and cocaine abuse that posed a danger to the health and safety of the children. It also alleged father was a “recent abuser of alcohol” and was currently on house arrest following a June 2025 arrest for driving under the influence. Count b-6 stated that mother and father had a mutual history of domestic violence. The petition alleged that in November 2024, father physically assaulted mother in the presence of the children while he was intoxicated. It also alleged a separate occasion where mother physically assaulted father. The petition stated that this “violent conduct” by mother and father endangered the children’s health and safety. When interviewed by the Department, K.M. indicated she did not spend time with father. Father confirmed he had not visited either child 2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 3 since June 2025 as he chose to abandon his visitation rights rather than deal with mother. At the initial hearing in August 2025, the juvenile court ordered the children detained from mother and released to father. At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in December 2025, father pled no contest to the substance abuse allegations of count b-5 and stated he was only challenging the domestic violence allegations against him in count b-6. Father argued that his history of domestic violence did not pose a present risk to the children because circumstances had changed, as there was no suggestion that he had engaged in domestic violence against mother in the year since the November 2024 incident. The court sustained count b-5 against father and sustained count b-6 against both parents.3 In sustaining count b-6, the court relied on mother’s and father’s prior convictions stemming from domestic violence with other partners. The court also noted the continuing friction and hostility between mother and the paternal family continuing past November 2024. The court reasoned that the lack of domestic violence since the children were placed with father could be attributed to the court supervision and Department oversight inherent in dependency proceedings. Because they would have to co-parent and interact with each other going forward, the court concluded there was a current risk of future harm to the children if the parents did not address their tendencies toward violent behavior. The juvenile court declared K.M. and D.A. dependents of the court, removed them from mother’s care, and placed them with father. Father timely appealed the sustained findings against him on count b-6. 3 The juvenile court sustained additional counts against mother which are not relevant to any issues raised on appeal. 4 While father’s appeal was pending, the matter was transferred from Los Angeles County to Riverside County.4 In July 2026, the Riverside County juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and awarded father sole physical and legal custody of both children, with supervised visitation for mother. DISCUSSION On appeal, father argues the juvenile court’s sustained finding against him on count b-6 is not supported by substantial evidence. The Department argues father’s appeal should be dismissed as moot. I. Mootness “In general, it is a court’s duty to decide ‘“‘actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’”’ [Citation.]” (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644, overruled in part by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 303 (D.P.).) Father’s appeal is potentially moot for two reasons. First, father only challenges the jurisdictional findings of count b-6. But the juvenile court sustained multiple jurisdictional allegations against mother and also sustained count b-5 against father. No party has challenged these alternative bases for jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court had multiple unassailable bases to exercise jurisdiction over K.M. and D.A. As our 4 Father’s requests for judicial notice are granted. Father’s motion to transfer exhibits is denied. 5 Supreme Court has explained, “the principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that “‘[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate,”’” so that “where there are multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.) Second, while father’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and entered an order awarding father sole legal and physical custody of both children. “[A]n order terminating jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from a prior order in a dependency proceeding moot.” (In re Miguel J. (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 266, 277-278.) Ultimately, “the critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) “This rule applies in the dependency context.” (Ibid.) In an attempt to meet the first requirement of ongoing harm, father argues there is a possibility that mother could try to point to the sustained b- 6 count findings to gain a “tactical advantage” over him in hypothetical “future family law custody proceedings.” Father argues that under Family Code section 3044, there is a “presumption against [awarding] custody to [the] perpetrator of domestic violence.”5 Father reasons that this 5 Family Code section 3044, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years against the other party seeking custody of the child . . . there is a rebuttable presumption 6 presumption could lead to a change in the order awarding him sole physical and legal custody of the children. Father’s argument is unpersuasive. Count b-6 was sustained against both parents and stated that both mother and father had, at differing times, been the aggressor in perpetrating domestic violence against the other. Accordingly, mother could not rely on the sustained findings of b-6 to obtain a “tactical advantage” under Family Code section 3044, because that presumption against awarding custody would apply with equal force to mother. Father has thus not established any potential for prejudice under the Family Code. Furthermore, the law is clear that a juvenile court’s custody order issued at the termination of jurisdiction can only be modified on a showing “that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d); see also In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 870–872.) Here, the juvenile court issued its order awarding sole physical and legal custody to father in July 2026. On appeal, father does not explain how mother could rely on the sustained finding that he instigated domestic violence in 2024 to establish that circumstances had changed since July 2026 such as to justify modification of the custody order. On these facts, father has not shown any ongoing harm flowing from the sustained findings against him on count b-6. At most, father has suggested that there is a speculative possibility that mother could attempt to refer to the sustained allegations at some point in the future. But he has not that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child . . . .” 7 shown how he would be prejudiced or harmed if she did so. The mere possibility that mother could attempt to refer to the b-6 allegations in the future is “too speculative for purposes of avoiding mootness.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 280 [a showing of “speculative future harm” is insufficient to avoid a finding of mootness].) For these reasons, we conclude father’s appeal is moot. II. Discretionary Review Our conclusion that father’s appeal has been rendered moot does not automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal. “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Courts will generally exercise that discretion “only when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties or when a material question remains for the court’s determination.” (In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 224.) In D.P., the Supreme Court identified additional factors for appellate courts to consider when exercising this discretion in dependency proceedings. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 284–286.) Those factors include: (1) whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings, (2) the egregiousness or stigma of the allegations against the parent, and (3) the reason the case became moot. (Ibid.) Additionally, when “the outcome of the appeal could be ‘the difference between father’s being an “offending” parent versus a “non-offending” parent,’ a finding that could result in far-reaching consequences with respect to these and future dependency proceedings, [it may be] appropriate to exercise our 8 discretion to consider the appeal on the merits.” (In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613.) But these factors “are not exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal. Ultimately, in deciding whether to exercise its discretion, a court should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citations.]” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Father argues we should exercise our discretion to reach the merits of his appeal because his case only became moot because he promptly complied with his case plan, leading the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction shortly after the case was transferred. The Department acknowledges that the record suggests father promptly complied with his case plan; however, it argues all the other factors weigh against exercising our discretion to reach the merits of father’s appeal. On the record before us, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of father’s moot appeal. While it is undisputed that the juvenile court ultimately terminated jurisdiction because father was in compliance with his case plan, this is only one reason his appeal is moot. As discussed above, father’s appeal is also moot because there are multiple, unassailable alternative bases for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction that are unchallenged on appeal. This alone renders father’s appeal moot regardless of his subsequent compliance with his case plan. Additionally, father’s appeal does not implicate any issue of public importance or present a controversy that is likely to recur. The sustained 9 findings against father on count b-6 are not particularly pernicious, stigmatizing, or prejudicial, especially given father’s prior criminal convictions and the unchallenged findings regarding father’s history of substance abuse. Further, as count b-5 was sustained against father, he would remain an “offending parent” even if we were to reverse the juvenile court’s findings against him on count b-6. And the sole issue raised by father’s appeal has no implications for the safety and well-being of K.M. and D.A. such that exercising our discretion would serve “the overarching goals of the dependency system.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of father’s appeal. We note that even if we were to reach the merits of father’s appeal, we would likely affirm the juvenile court’s order. We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s findings and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of those findings. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) It is true that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that father engaged in domestic violence against mother since November 2024. However, there was evidence before the juvenile court that father previously assaulted mother in the children’s presence, was previously convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a different partner, was recently charged with assault with a deadly weapon and inflicting corporal injury on a different partner, was more likely to become violent when abusing substances, had multiple prior convictions for driving under the influence, and was recently arrested and under house arrest for driving under the influence. (See In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [“‘[P]ast violent behavior in a 10 relationship is “the best predictor of future violence”’”], disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7; In re John M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 [a single incident of domestic violence may be sufficient to support a jurisdictional finding under § 300, subd. (b)], disapproved on another ground in R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629.) The record also suggests that father was able to avoid further violent confrontations with mother by abandoning his visitation rights. But once the juvenile court placed the children with father and awarded mother visitation, father could no longer simply avoid interacting with mother. As there was ongoing evidence of hostility between mother and the paternal family, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the children were at risk of harm if the parents did not both learn how to co-parent without resorting to violence. DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ZUKIN, P. J. We concur: TAMZARIAN, J. DAUM, J. 11