In re K.M. CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB351588
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 In re K.M. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re K.M. et al., Persons Coming B351588
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
21CCJP03547,
21CCJP03547B-C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
J.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Natalie Nardecchia, Judge. Dismissed.
John Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, Brian Mahler, County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court sustained multiple jurisdictional allegations against
the parents of minors K.M. and D.A. The court removed both children from
Erika M. (mother) and placed them with Jose A. (father). Father appealed,
challenging one of the court’s jurisdictional findings against him.1 While his
appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and entered
an order awarding father sole legal and physical custody of both children. We
conclude father’s appeal is moot and dismiss it.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the
case, we do not restate those details in full here. Below, we discuss only the
facts and history as needed to resolve—and provide context for—the issues
presented on appeal.
Mother and father have two children together: K.M. (born 2020) and
D.A. (born 2024). Mother and father have a history of dependency
proceedings. In 2021, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over K.M.,
sustaining allegations against both parents. As to father, the juvenile court
sustained allegations that he knew that mother had mental health issues,
including a history of violence and aggression, and failed to protect K.M. from
1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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mother. The juvenile court also sustained the allegation that father refused
to take custody of—or provide care for—K.M. when she was detained from
mother. The juvenile court ultimately terminated jurisdiction, awarding
mother sole physical custody of K.M. and providing for joint legal custody
with unmonitored visitation for father.
The family again came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) in August 2025
when mother got into a physical altercation with several individuals at a
park while she was caring for both children. Mother was arrested and
charged with child endangerment for her role in the altercation.
The Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300,2 asserting various counts against mother and father. As
subsequently amended, the Department alleged two counts against father: b-
5 and b-6. Count b-5 alleged that father had a history of alcohol and cocaine
abuse that posed a danger to the health and safety of the children. It also
alleged father was a “recent abuser of alcohol” and was currently on house
arrest following a June 2025 arrest for driving under the influence.
Count b-6 stated that mother and father had a mutual history of
domestic violence. The petition alleged that in November 2024, father
physically assaulted mother in the presence of the children while he was
intoxicated. It also alleged a separate occasion where mother physically
assaulted father. The petition stated that this “violent conduct” by mother
and father endangered the children’s health and safety.
When interviewed by the Department, K.M. indicated she did not
spend time with father. Father confirmed he had not visited either child
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.
3
since June 2025 as he chose to abandon his visitation rights rather than deal
with mother.
At the initial hearing in August 2025, the juvenile court ordered the
children detained from mother and released to father.
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in December 2025,
father pled no contest to the substance abuse allegations of count b-5 and
stated he was only challenging the domestic violence allegations against him
in count b-6. Father argued that his history of domestic violence did not pose
a present risk to the children because circumstances had changed, as there
was no suggestion that he had engaged in domestic violence against mother
in the year since the November 2024 incident.
The court sustained count b-5 against father and sustained count b-6
against both parents.3 In sustaining count b-6, the court relied on mother’s
and father’s prior convictions stemming from domestic violence with other
partners. The court also noted the continuing friction and hostility between
mother and the paternal family continuing past November 2024. The court
reasoned that the lack of domestic violence since the children were placed
with father could be attributed to the court supervision and Department
oversight inherent in dependency proceedings. Because they would have to
co-parent and interact with each other going forward, the court concluded
there was a current risk of future harm to the children if the parents did not
address their tendencies toward violent behavior.
The juvenile court declared K.M. and D.A. dependents of the court,
removed them from mother’s care, and placed them with father. Father
timely appealed the sustained findings against him on count b-6.
3 The juvenile court sustained additional counts against mother which
are not relevant to any issues raised on appeal.
4
While father’s appeal was pending, the matter was transferred from
Los Angeles County to Riverside County.4 In July 2026, the Riverside
County juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and awarded father sole
physical and legal custody of both children, with supervised visitation for
mother.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, father argues the juvenile court’s sustained finding against
him on count b-6 is not supported by substantial evidence. The Department
argues father’s appeal should be dismissed as moot.
I. Mootness
“In general, it is a court’s duty to decide ‘“‘actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’”’ [Citation.]”
(In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644, overruled in part by In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 303 (D.P.).)
Father’s appeal is potentially moot for two reasons. First, father only
challenges the jurisdictional findings of count b-6. But the juvenile court
sustained multiple jurisdictional allegations against mother and also
sustained count b-5 against father. No party has challenged these
alternative bases for jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court had multiple
unassailable bases to exercise jurisdiction over K.M. and D.A. As our
4 Father’s requests for judicial notice are granted. Father’s motion to
transfer exhibits is denied.
5
Supreme Court has explained, “the principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction
attaches to a child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that “‘[a]s long
as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that
another might be inappropriate,”’” so that “where there are multiple findings
against one parent; the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s
attempt to challenge the others.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.)
Second, while father’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction and entered an order awarding father sole legal and
physical custody of both children. “[A]n order terminating jurisdiction
generally renders an appeal from a prior order in a dependency proceeding
moot.” (In re Miguel J. (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 266, 277-278.)
Ultimately, “the critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief
if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “For
relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 276.) “This rule applies in the dependency context.” (Ibid.)
In an attempt to meet the first requirement of ongoing harm, father
argues there is a possibility that mother could try to point to the sustained b-
6 count findings to gain a “tactical advantage” over him in hypothetical
“future family law custody proceedings.” Father argues that under Family
Code section 3044, there is a “presumption against [awarding] custody to
[the] perpetrator of domestic violence.”5 Father reasons that this
5 Family Code section 3044, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part:
“Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years against the
other party seeking custody of the child . . . there is a rebuttable presumption
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presumption could lead to a change in the order awarding him sole physical
and legal custody of the children.
Father’s argument is unpersuasive. Count b-6 was sustained against
both parents and stated that both mother and father had, at differing times,
been the aggressor in perpetrating domestic violence against the other.
Accordingly, mother could not rely on the sustained findings of b-6 to obtain a
“tactical advantage” under Family Code section 3044, because that
presumption against awarding custody would apply with equal force to
mother. Father has thus not established any potential for prejudice under
the Family Code.
Furthermore, the law is clear that a juvenile court’s custody order
issued at the termination of jurisdiction can only be modified on a showing
“that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile
court issued the order and modification of the order is in the best interests of
the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d); see also In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870,
870–872.) Here, the juvenile court issued its order awarding sole physical
and legal custody to father in July 2026. On appeal, father does not explain
how mother could rely on the sustained finding that he instigated domestic
violence in 2024 to establish that circumstances had changed since July 2026
such as to justify modification of the custody order.
On these facts, father has not shown any ongoing harm flowing from
the sustained findings against him on count b-6. At most, father has
suggested that there is a speculative possibility that mother could attempt to
refer to the sustained allegations at some point in the future. But he has not
that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person
who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of
the child . . . .”
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shown how he would be prejudiced or harmed if she did so. The mere
possibility that mother could attempt to refer to the b-6 allegations in the
future is “too speculative for purposes of avoiding mootness.” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 280 [a showing of “speculative future harm” is insufficient to
avoid a finding of mootness].)
For these reasons, we conclude father’s appeal is moot.
II. Discretionary Review
Our conclusion that father’s appeal has been rendered moot does not
automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal. “Even when a case is
moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Courts will generally exercise
that discretion “only when the case presents an issue of broad public interest
that is likely to recur, when there may be a recurrence of the controversy
between the parties or when a material question remains for the court’s
determination.” (In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 224.)
In D.P., the Supreme Court identified additional factors for appellate
courts to consider when exercising this discretion in dependency proceedings.
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 284–286.) Those factors include: (1) whether
the challenged jurisdiction finding could potentially impact the current or
future dependency proceedings, (2) the egregiousness or stigma of the
allegations against the parent, and (3) the reason the case became moot.
(Ibid.) Additionally, when “the outcome of the appeal could be ‘the difference
between father’s being an “offending” parent versus a “non-offending” parent,’
a finding that could result in far-reaching consequences with respect to these
and future dependency proceedings, [it may be] appropriate to exercise our
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discretion to consider the appeal on the merits.” (In re Quentin H. (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 608, 613.)
But these factors “are not exhaustive, and no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise discretionary
review of a moot appeal. Ultimately, in deciding whether to exercise its
discretion, a court should be guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’
with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citations.]”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
Father argues we should exercise our discretion to reach the merits of
his appeal because his case only became moot because he promptly complied
with his case plan, leading the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction shortly
after the case was transferred. The Department acknowledges that the
record suggests father promptly complied with his case plan; however, it
argues all the other factors weigh against exercising our discretion to reach
the merits of father’s appeal.
On the record before us, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of father’s moot appeal. While it is undisputed that the
juvenile court ultimately terminated jurisdiction because father was in
compliance with his case plan, this is only one reason his appeal is moot. As
discussed above, father’s appeal is also moot because there are multiple,
unassailable alternative bases for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction that are
unchallenged on appeal. This alone renders father’s appeal moot regardless
of his subsequent compliance with his case plan.
Additionally, father’s appeal does not implicate any issue of public
importance or present a controversy that is likely to recur. The sustained
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findings against father on count b-6 are not particularly pernicious,
stigmatizing, or prejudicial, especially given father’s prior criminal
convictions and the unchallenged findings regarding father’s history of
substance abuse. Further, as count b-5 was sustained against father, he
would remain an “offending parent” even if we were to reverse the juvenile
court’s findings against him on count b-6. And the sole issue raised by
father’s appeal has no implications for the safety and well-being of K.M. and
D.A. such that exercising our discretion would serve “the overarching goals of
the dependency system.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of
father’s appeal.
We note that even if we were to reach the merits of father’s appeal, we
would likely affirm the juvenile court’s order. We review a juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) We review the record in the light most favorable to
the court’s findings and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of those findings. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
It is true that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that father
engaged in domestic violence against mother since November 2024.
However, there was evidence before the juvenile court that father previously
assaulted mother in the children’s presence, was previously convicted of
inflicting corporal injury on a different partner, was recently charged with
assault with a deadly weapon and inflicting corporal injury on a different
partner, was more likely to become violent when abusing substances, had
multiple prior convictions for driving under the influence, and was recently
arrested and under house arrest for driving under the influence. (See In re
E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [“‘[P]ast violent behavior in a
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relationship is “the best predictor of future violence”’”], disapproved on
another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7;
In re John M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 [a single incident of domestic
violence may be sufficient to support a jurisdictional finding under § 300,
subd. (b)], disapproved on another ground in R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp.
628–629.)
The record also suggests that father was able to avoid further violent
confrontations with mother by abandoning his visitation rights. But once the
juvenile court placed the children with father and awarded mother visitation,
father could no longer simply avoid interacting with mother. As there was
ongoing evidence of hostility between mother and the paternal family, the
juvenile court could reasonably conclude the children were at risk of harm if
the parents did not both learn how to co-parent without resorting to violence.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J. DAUM, J.
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