Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 Marriage of Aye CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of DION AYE and AMBER AYE. DION AYE, F090709 Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FL-17928) v. AMBER AYE, OPINION Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Hallie Gorman Campbell, Judge. Amber Aye, in pro. per., for Appellant. Dion Aye, in pro. per., for Respondent. -ooOoo- Appellant Amber Aye purports to appeal from three post-judgment orders in a child custody dispute with Respondent Dion Aye. Amber 1 asserts the trial court failed to 1 We use the Ayes’ first names for clarity. We intend no disrespect. consider a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) in another county when awarding custody to Dion; the initial ex parte custody order was issued without due process; and the court failed to analyze the factors relating to transfer of venue, which she argues favored the superior court in her county. Dion argues the appeal should be dismissed as untimely and as taken from interlocutory orders; he otherwise disputes Amber’s contentions. The appeal is dismissed as taken from a nonappealable order and for lack of jurisdiction. BACKGROUND The parties’ marriage was dissolved by judgment in Tuolumne County Superior Court on December 20, 2023. In October 2024, a DVRO against Dion was entered in Placer County. On November 8, 2024, the court ordered joint legal custody of the couple’s two children, with primary physical custody for Dion during the school year and visitation for Amber every other weekend. 2 Neither party appealed this order. On February 27, 2025,3 Dion filed an ex parte request for a temporary emergency order (TEO), seeking sole legal custody and supervised visitation for Amber. He alleged that during Amber’s visit with the children the previous weekend, she took them to urgent care and made “wild, and blatantly untrue, accusations” about ongoing abuse 2 The court’s custody order is contained in the record before us. On October 28, 2026, Dion requested augmentation of the record to include the court’s minute order from the November 2024 hearing. This request is denied. The advisory comment to Rule 8.155(a) of the California Rules of Court states that a request to augment may be denied if the request is not “made within a reasonable time.” Rule 1(b) of the Local Rules for the Fifth District Court of Appeal states that a respondent should request augmentation “within 30 days of the filing of appellant’s opening brief,” and “[t]hereafter, motions to augment will not be granted except upon a showing of good cause for the delay.” Amber submitted her opening brief on April 3, 2026, and so Dion’s October 2026 request to augment is untimely. Dion states he believed the superior court would transmit the entire record on appeal. However, he had access to the clerk’s transcript before filing his respondent’s brief and could have so moved earlier in this appeal. Thus, we find no good cause to augment the record. 3 All further dates refer to the year 2025 unless otherwise stated. 2. (similar to previous allegations for which she had been admonished). Dion requested the court revisit custody and adopt the Custody Evaluator’s August 2024 recommendations limiting Amber’s custody further. The court denied the request without prejudice, noting the Evaluator listed multiple options and informing Dion it was unclear exactly what he wanted. Dion amended his request on March 10, again seeking sole physical and legal custody, with Amber’s visitation subject to supervision at her cost every other Sunday for four hours. The court granted temporary custody to Dion in a TEO on March 11. Dion served the order on Amber on March 17. Amber (through counsel) requested reconsideration. At a March 28 hearing, the court kept the TEO in place, expressing concern Amber may be “speaking to the children about abuse as well as interrogating [them].” Dion requested Amber undergo a psychological evaluation before custody was finally resolved, and after consulting with her counsel, Amber agreed. The court continued the matter “for therapist and counseling reviews.” On May 23 and June 13, the court extended the TEO to await receipt of Amber’s evaluation; these orders were not served on Amber. On July 30, Dion requested a change of venue to Santa Clara County where he and the children reside. He indicated Amber was attempting to secure a change of venue and change in custody by filing a motion in Placer County where she resided. Dion stated the Placer County Superior Court recently transferred a pending child support enforcement proceeding (with the exception of arrears) to Santa Clara County, and the DVRO was set to expire on September 18. Amber responded (in pro. per.), stating “all open matters[,] including the DVRO renewal, TRO hearing, child support enforcement, and custody modification[,] are properly scheduled in Placer County.” On August 29, the court held a hearing where the parties discussed the proceedings in Placer County; the court denied Dion’s request for change of venue. On September 10, the court issued findings and an order after hearing, briefly stating “Tuolumne County shall retain jurisdiction over the child custody and visitation issues.” 3. On September 16, Amber submitted a declaration to the trial court (in pro. per.) “re: compliance with court-ordered psychological evaluation and request for immediate restoration of custody”; there is no notice of a hearing in the appellate record. On November 4, Amber filed a notice of appeal, citing the “amended order after hearing of May 23” but attaching the court minutes from March 28 and June 13 findings and order after hearing. On November 13, Amber filed an amended notice of appeal, citing only the June 13 findings and order after hearing. DISCUSSION Because it affects this court’s jurisdiction, we begin and end with an analysis of Dion’s jurisdictional contentions, including the timeliness of the appeal, the interlocutory nature of the trial court’s custody 2025 orders, and the deficiencies in Amber’s notice of appeal. (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377 [reminding that the right to appeal is strictly statutory, and a judgment or order is not appealable unless made so by statute]; Code Civ. Proc., § 904 .1, subd. (a) 4 [listing the appealable orders and judgments in civil cases other than limited civil cases].) Timeliness of the Appeal Dion first contends the appeal should be dismissed because Amber failed to timely file her notice of appeal. He is incorrect. Rule 8.104(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court 5 governs the time to appeal in civil cases. It states: “[A] notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: “(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; 4 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 5 Undesignated rule citations are to the California Rules of Court. 4. “(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or “(C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” Amber’s amended notice of appeal states she is appealing the June 13 findings and order after hearing. There is no indication in the record that this order or a notice of entry of order was served on her, either by the court or Dion, and so her appeal is subject to the 180-day deadline. (See In re Marriage of Lin (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 471, 475‒476 [noting that where the clerk and parties did not serve an order per rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) or (B), “the shorter 60-day filing period therefore [did] not come into play.”].) Though Amber’s appeal is dismissed for other reasons, as explained below, her amended notice of appeal was filed November 13, well within the 180-day period for appealing that order. (Rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).) Appealability of Temporary Child Custody Order Despite a timely filing of the notice of appeal, Amber’s appeal of the June 13 order must be dismissed because that order is not an appealable order. (Canandaigua Wine Co., Inc. v. County of Madera (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 298, 302 [“The existence of an appealable order or judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal[, and so] if the order or judgment is not appealable, the appeal must be dismissed.”].) Generally, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory judgment or order. (Barton v. Ahmanson Developments, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1360; § 904.1.) While there is a recognized exception to this rule for collateral orders, this exception “applies only if the matter is severable from the general subject of the litigation, and then only if a decision thereon determines finally the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, leaving no further judicial acts to be done by the court in regard to that matter.” (In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 735 (Van Sickle).) The collateral order exception has not been applied to temporary child custody orders, and courts have 5. found no subsection of section 904.1 granting such a right. (Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1089–1090 (Smith) [“ ‘[T]he lack of any statute giving a litigant the right to appeal from a temporary custody order forecloses the claim that such orders are appealable.’ ”] (citing § 904.1, subd. (a)).) Here, it is clear the June 13 order is intended to be a temporary order. The March 2025 order was labeled a “Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Order” and required immediate service on Amber for a March 28th hearing. The court held a full hearing on March 28 but kept the modified custody order in place, explicitly referring to it as a “Temporary Emergency Order.” At the hearing, the court expressed concern as to Amber’s actions with the children, and after Amber agreed to undergo a psychological examination, the court continued the matter “for therapist and counseling reviews.” On May 23, the court extended the TEO to await receipt of Amber’s evaluation, finding a May 13 submission insufficient and stating that Amber “can file with the Court when the psychological evaluation has been completed in order to evaluate supervised vs. unsupervised visitation.” The June 13th order indicates the matter was continued for an “OSC hearing regarding counselor review.” The record indicates Amber did not submit any other evaluations to the trial court, though she did submit a declaration and supplemental doctor’s letter on September 16 regarding the May 13 submission; there is no notice of a hearing included. Thus, it appears the matter of modified custody was still outstanding at the time Amber filed her notice of appeal in November 2025. (Van Sickle, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 735; see In re Marriage of Olson (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1462 [“In this case, Christopher did not appeal from a court order finally approving or denying a modification of custody, but rather from an order that the parties attend a parenting plan assessment. This order was ‘preparatory to [a] later proceeding[ ]’ and therefore not appealable.”].) Given that the trial court’s June 13 ruling continued to contemplate a final order on custody once Amber completed her agreed-upon psychological evaluation, we find the 6. order is temporary in nature and not appealable. (Smith, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090.) Scope of the Notice of Appeal Though the court has determined the June 13 order is not appealable, there is one final matter to resolve. In Amber’s opening brief, she asserts she “filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the May 29, 2025, June 13, 2025, and September 10, 2025 orders.” Despite this statement and arguments in the brief, we find the other matters—namely the arguments concerning the trial court’s venue determinations—outside of the scope of the November 12 amended notice of appeal. The notice of appeal defines the scope of an appeal by identifying the “particular judgment or order” that is being appealed. (Rule 8.100(a)(2).) When a notice of appeal specifically describes the order being appealed, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing that order. (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.”].) We cannot liberally construe the notice to apply to a different, omitted order. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 76.) Here, Amber’s amended notice of appeal explicitly cited the June 13 findings and order after hearing, and does not make mention of, cite, or otherwise attach the court’s September 10 order regarding Dion’s motion to change venue. Further, even if Amber’s original notice of appeal had not been superseded, 6 it also omitted any mention of the September 10 order. As to the May 29 findings and order after the May 23 hearing, it was cited in the original notice of appeal, but this notice was superseded by Amber’s amended notice (and even were it not, the order was temporary in nature and superseded by the court’s June 13 order). Because this court’s jurisdiction on appeal is limited to the 6 (See People v. Mack (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 574, 578 [an amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading].) 7. order identified in the notice of appeal—the June 13 order—we lack jurisdiction to entertain Amber’s challenge to other orders. (Rule 8.100(a)(2).) DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. Dion shall recover his costs on appeal not subject to Amber’s fee waiver. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.26(e), 8.278(a)(1) & (2).) SNAUFFER, J. WE CONCUR: FRANSON, Acting P. J. HARRELL, J. 8.