Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 Trimbo v. SAL Asset Management CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE SHARON TRIMBO, Plaintiff and Respondent, G066137 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2025- 01480153) SAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lindsey E. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed. Gharibian Law, Art Gharibian, Alexander H. Feldman and Lilian Avedian for Plaintiff and Respondent. Beach Law Group, Paul D. Singer, Randy A. Merritt and Molly M. Loy for Defendant and Appellant. SAL Asset Management (SAL) appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of elder abuse and negligence claims brought by Josephine Lussier. The arbitration agreement was part of an agreement for Lussier’s admission to a residential care facility, both of which were signed by Lussier’s daughter, Sharon Trimbo, on Lussier’s behalf. Although, as SAL strenuously argues, both federal and state public policy favor arbitration of disputes, a party must have agreed to arbitration before that party can be compelled to arbitrate. SAL did not meet its burden of proving, through admissible evidence, that Lussier had agreed to arbitrate this dispute because SAL did not properly authenticate a power of attorney purportedly granting Trimbo the authority to sign those agreements on Lussier’s behalf. We therefore affirm the order denying SAL’s motion to compel arbitration. FACTS SAL owned Beach Terrace Assisted Living and Memory Care (Beach Terrace), a residential care facility. Lussier was admitted to Beach Terrace in October 2024. At the time of her admission, Lussier was 99 years old, physically frail, and suffered from dementia. The day before Lussier was admitted to Beach Terrace, Trimbo met with a Beach Terrace employee who presented her with “a mountain of paperwork to sign.” Included in the paperwork was a residence and care agreement. Section XI.W of the residence and care agreement was an agreement to arbitrate (the arbitration agreement) which provided in part: “[B]y signing below, and in consideration of the parties’ mutual agreement to arbitrate, the parties agree that if informal resolution is not possible, any and all claims or disputes arising from or related to this [a]greement or to your rights, obligations, care, or services at [Beach Terrace] shall be resolved by 2 submission to neutral, binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. This agreement to arbitrate applies regardless of whether the claim is made against us, you, or any other individual or entity, and it includes, without limitation, personal injury and wrongful death claims.” The arbitration agreement excluded unlawful detainer and small claims court proceedings, as they “[were] summary proceedings that are more efficient and swift[er] than arbitration.” The arbitration agreement also provided, “By agreeing to arbitrate, the parties give up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a judge or jury, and instead accept the use of arbitration.” (Boldface omitted.) At the end of the arbitration agreement, the following appears in bold: “You further acknowledge that agreeing to arbitration is not a condition of admission to Beach Terrace . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) Trimbo was told, however, she had to sign the documents presented to her in order for Lussier to be admitted to Beach Terrace. She felt rushed to sign the documents because she was planning to move Lussier into Beach Terrace the next day. Trimbo signed the documents at the places where the Beach Terrace employee instructed her to sign. The Beach Terrace employee did not tell Trimbo that signing the arbitration agreement was not a condition to Lussier’s admission to Beach Terrace or that signing the agreement would result in a waiver of Lussier’s constitutional right to a jury trial if Lussier was harmed, neglected, or mistreated by the facility. Trimbo signed the arbitration agreement on the signature line for “Resident Representative’s (Responsible Party) Signature.” Trimbo also signed the residence and care agreement in the signature block for 3 “Representative/Responsible Party.” PROCEDURAL HISTORY In May 2025, Lussier, through her attorney-in-fact Trimbo, filed a complaint against SAL for elder abuse and negligence/willful misconduct.1 The complaint alleged that while a resident at Beach Terrace, Lussier fell while trying to walk from the bathroom to her bed and her throat and chin became trapped between the bed’s side rail and mattress. The complaint alleged Beach Terrace staff found Lussier hanging and struggling to breathe but stood by and watched and did not try to extricate her. When paramedics arrived, the complaint alleges they found Lussier, covered in ants, still hanging by her throat from the bed rail. SAL filed its motion to compel arbitration in September 2025. In support of the motion, SAL submitted a declaration from James Kang, Beach Terrace’s office manager, which attached a copy of the residence and care agreement as an exhibit. Lussier filed opposition, which included a declaration from her attorney and a declaration from Trimbo. Lussier argued, among other things, SAL had submitted no evidence to establish Trimbo had the authority to bind Lussier to the arbitration agreement. In reply, SAL submitted a durable power of attorney for property management (the power of attorney) purportedly signed by Lussier in February 2021. The trial court denied SAL’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found, “SAL ha[d] failed to meet its burden to establish through admissible evidence that . . . Lussier agreed to arbitrate the dispute.” The court declined to consider the power of attorney produced by SAL because it 1 Also named as a defendant was KLMH Enterprises, LLC doing business as Beach Terrace Assisted Living and Memory Care, which is not party to this appeal. 4 first produced the power of attorney in reply papers. The court found, if it did consider the power of attorney, SAL had failed to verify Trimbo’s signature on the power of attorney and establish it was in effect and had been presented to the Beach Terrace employee when Trimbo signed the residence and care agreement. The court also found the arbitration agreement was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. Lussier passed away after SAL filed its notice of appeal. We granted Trimbo’s motion to substitute Trimbo, as successor in interest to Lussier, as respondent in place of Lussier. DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OF REVIEW When, as here, the trial court denies a motion to compel arbitration based on a finding that the moving party failed to carry its ultimate burden of proving a binding agreement to arbitrate, the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 587 (Brockman).) Erroneous as a matter of law means the moving party’s evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such a character and weight as to compel a finding in the moving party’s favor. (Ibid.; Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769.) Unless the trial court made specific findings of fact in favor of the moving party, the appellate court presumes the trial court found the moving party’s evidence lacked weight and credibility sufficient to meet the burden of proof. (Brockman, at p. 587.) The appellate court views the facts and resolves all conflicts in the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the order denying arbitration. (Ibid.) 5 II. SAL DID NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BINDING ON LUSSIER SAL challenges on several grounds the order denying its motion to compel arbitration. SAL argues federal and state public policy favor arbitration of disputes, the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) applies, SAL did not waive arbitration, and the arbitration agreement is valid, binding, and not unconscionable. We need only address the trial court’s finding that SAL had failed to meet its burden of proving Lussier agreed to arbitrate the dispute. As SAL argues, both federal and state public policy favor arbitration of disputes. (Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown (2012) 565 U.S. 530, 533; Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 146.) But “[w]hile public policy favors contractual arbitration of disputes, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to do so.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 584–585; see Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [“‘“a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit”’”], quoting AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648.) Thus, before a trial court may grant a motion to compel arbitration, it must determine whether there is a binding agreement to arbitrate the controversy. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 583–584.) “The trial court makes this determination using a summary procedure in the manner ‘for the making and hearing of motions.’ [Citation.] ‘In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as 6 oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.’” (Id. at p. 584.) The party moving for arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance any defense to arbitration. (Id. at p. 584.) “‘Whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate is determined under general California contract law.’ [Citation.] ‘Even when an agreement provides that it is governed by the [Federal Arbitration Act], courts must first apply state law principles in determining whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.’” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 584.) The party moving for arbitration bears the initial burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) To meet that initial burden, SAL produced the residence and care agreement, which includes the arbitration agreement. Trimbo argues, and the trial court found, SAL did not meet this initial burden because the residence and care agreement was not properly authenticated. The trial court found Kang, who had submitted a declaration to authenticate the agreement, did not have personal knowledge sufficient to authenticate the signatures. But the moving party can attach a copy of the arbitration agreement to the motion to compel arbitration (ibid.), and authentication of signatures is not necessary at this stage (West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 985, 992). An authentication problem does arise, however, with respect to the power of attorney purporting to authorize Trimbo to sign the residence and care agreement and the arbitration agreement on Lussier’s behalf. In 7 opposing SAL’s motion to compel arbitration, Lussier argued SAL had failed to establish Trimbo had the authority to bind Lussier to arbitration. In response, SAL submitted with its reply papers the power of attorney as an exhibit to the declaration of Randy Merritt, one of SAL’s attorneys. The trial court found SAL should have submitted the power of attorney along with the arbitration agreement but, in any case, SAL had not properly authenticated Trimbo’s signature.2 “Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a); see Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 525 [“Generally speaking, documents must be authenticated in some fashion before they are admissible in evidence”].) “‘Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.’” (People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 551, quoting Evid. Code, § 1400.) In Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 49 (Newport Harbor), a party sought to authenticate documents attached as exhibits to a complaint through a declaration from an attorney stating the attorney “‘personally assembled the exhibits to the Third Amendment Complaint’” and “‘personally know[s] that each of the exhibits attached to the Third Amended Complaint . . . are true and correct copies of those documents.’” The Court of 2 SAL did not request a statement of decision. Thus, to the extent the trial court’s minute order cannot be read to include an express finding that the power of attorney was not authenticated, we would presume the court impliedly made such a finding. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 237.) 8 Appeal concluded the declaration did not authenticate the exhibits because “[t]he attorney does not declare that she prepared, is a party to, is the custodian of records of, or otherwise has personal knowledge sufficient to authenticate, the documents from which the copies were made.” (Id. at p. 50; see San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal. App.5th 76, 108 [attorney’s declarations did not establish a foundation based on personal knowledge for authenticating attached documents]; The Luckman Partnership, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 30, 34 [counsel’s declaration stating counsel had personal knowledge that documents were opposing party’s interrogatory responses was sufficient authentication].) SAL tried to authenticate the power of attorney through the declaration from Merritt, who stated: “I am aware that on October 10, 2025, in connection with [SAL]’s taking of the deposition of [Lussier]’s daughter, Sharon Trimbo, [Lussier] produced an executed and notarized power of attorney form in which [Lussier] granted all the powers set forth in section 4401 of the California Probate Code, dated February 23, 2021. I have attached as Exhibit 1 to my declaration a true and correct copy of that signed and notarized power of attorney form.” That part of Merritt’s declaration was not based on personal knowledge. Being “aware” a document was produced at a deposition is not the same as personal knowledge the document was indeed produced. Merritt does not claim he was present at Trimbo’s deposition and saw her produce the power of attorney. Merritt did not attach to his declaration and authenticate relevant portions of the deposition transcript at which Trimbo might have identified the power of attorney, confirmed her signature on it, and testified it was in effect when she signed the residence and care agreement. Declaring the document is a true and correct copy of an 9 original is insufficient in itself to authenticate it. (Newport Harbor, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) In the respondent’s brief, Trimbo challenged Merritt’s declaration and argued SAL did not authenticate the power of attorney. SAL did not respond to that argument or address Merritt’s declaration but argued Kang’s declaration authenticated the arbitration agreement. Although Trimbo signed the residence and care agreement with the notation “POA” (presumably meaning power of attorney) following her name, she did not sign the arbitration agreement as “POA.” Further, the notation POA does not indicate what kind of power of attorney Trimbo purportedly had, which is important in determining whether she had the requisite authority to sign either the arbitration agreement or the residence and care agreement. (See Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939, 946–949.) Applying the applicable standard of review, we conclude the trial court’s finding that SAL failed to meet its burden of proving Lussier agreed to arbitration was not erroneous as a matter of law. Because SAL failed to prove Trimbo had authority to bind Lussier to the arbitration agreement, SAL did not meet its “ultimate burden” of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. (West v. Solar Mosaic LLC, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) 10 DISPOSITION The order denying the petition to compel arbitration is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal. MOTOIKE, P. J. WE CONCUR: SCOTT, J. SERVINO, J. 11