Trimbo v. SAL Asset Management CA4/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketG066137
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 Trimbo v. SAL Asset Management CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SHARON TRIMBO,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G066137
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2025-
01480153)
SAL ASSET MANAGEMENT,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lindsey E. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Gharibian Law, Art Gharibian, Alexander H. Feldman and Lilian
Avedian for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Beach Law Group, Paul D. Singer, Randy A. Merritt and Molly
M. Loy for Defendant and Appellant.
SAL Asset Management (SAL) appeals from an order denying its
motion to compel arbitration of elder abuse and negligence claims brought by
Josephine Lussier. The arbitration agreement was part of an agreement for
Lussier’s admission to a residential care facility, both of which were signed by
Lussier’s daughter, Sharon Trimbo, on Lussier’s behalf.
Although, as SAL strenuously argues, both federal and state
public policy favor arbitration of disputes, a party must have agreed to
arbitration before that party can be compelled to arbitrate. SAL did not meet
its burden of proving, through admissible evidence, that Lussier had agreed
to arbitrate this dispute because SAL did not properly authenticate a power
of attorney purportedly granting Trimbo the authority to sign those
agreements on Lussier’s behalf. We therefore affirm the order denying SAL’s
motion to compel arbitration.
FACTS
SAL owned Beach Terrace Assisted Living and Memory Care
(Beach Terrace), a residential care facility. Lussier was admitted to Beach
Terrace in October 2024. At the time of her admission, Lussier was 99 years
old, physically frail, and suffered from dementia.
The day before Lussier was admitted to Beach Terrace, Trimbo
met with a Beach Terrace employee who presented her with “a mountain of
paperwork to sign.” Included in the paperwork was a residence and care
agreement. Section XI.W of the residence and care agreement was an
agreement to arbitrate (the arbitration agreement) which provided in part:
“[B]y signing below, and in consideration of the parties’ mutual agreement to
arbitrate, the parties agree that if informal resolution is not possible, any and
all claims or disputes arising from or related to this [a]greement or to your
rights, obligations, care, or services at [Beach Terrace] shall be resolved by
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submission to neutral, binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal
Arbitration Act. Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act. This agreement to arbitrate applies
regardless of whether the claim is made against us, you, or any other
individual or entity, and it includes, without limitation, personal injury and
wrongful death claims.”
The arbitration agreement excluded unlawful detainer and small
claims court proceedings, as they “[were] summary proceedings that are more
efficient and swift[er] than arbitration.” The arbitration agreement also
provided, “By agreeing to arbitrate, the parties give up their constitutional
right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a judge or jury,
and instead accept the use of arbitration.” (Boldface omitted.)
At the end of the arbitration agreement, the following appears in
bold: “You further acknowledge that agreeing to arbitration is not a condition
of admission to Beach Terrace . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) Trimbo was told,
however, she had to sign the documents presented to her in order for Lussier
to be admitted to Beach Terrace. She felt rushed to sign the documents
because she was planning to move Lussier into Beach Terrace the next day.
Trimbo signed the documents at the places where the Beach Terrace
employee instructed her to sign. The Beach Terrace employee did not tell
Trimbo that signing the arbitration agreement was not a condition to
Lussier’s admission to Beach Terrace or that signing the agreement would
result in a waiver of Lussier’s constitutional right to a jury trial if Lussier
was harmed, neglected, or mistreated by the facility.
Trimbo signed the arbitration agreement on the signature line for
“Resident Representative’s (Responsible Party) Signature.” Trimbo also
signed the residence and care agreement in the signature block for
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“Representative/Responsible Party.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2025, Lussier, through her attorney-in-fact Trimbo, filed
a complaint against SAL for elder abuse and negligence/willful misconduct.1
The complaint alleged that while a resident at Beach Terrace, Lussier fell
while trying to walk from the bathroom to her bed and her throat and chin
became trapped between the bed’s side rail and mattress. The complaint
alleged Beach Terrace staff found Lussier hanging and struggling to breathe
but stood by and watched and did not try to extricate her. When paramedics
arrived, the complaint alleges they found Lussier, covered in ants, still
hanging by her throat from the bed rail.
SAL filed its motion to compel arbitration in September 2025. In
support of the motion, SAL submitted a declaration from James Kang, Beach
Terrace’s office manager, which attached a copy of the residence and care
agreement as an exhibit. Lussier filed opposition, which included a
declaration from her attorney and a declaration from Trimbo. Lussier argued,
among other things, SAL had submitted no evidence to establish Trimbo had
the authority to bind Lussier to the arbitration agreement. In reply, SAL
submitted a durable power of attorney for property management (the power
of attorney) purportedly signed by Lussier in February 2021.
The trial court denied SAL’s motion to compel arbitration. The
court found, “SAL ha[d] failed to meet its burden to establish through
admissible evidence that . . . Lussier agreed to arbitrate the dispute.” The
court declined to consider the power of attorney produced by SAL because it
1 Also named as a defendant was KLMH Enterprises, LLC doing
business as Beach Terrace Assisted Living and Memory Care, which is not
party to this appeal.
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first produced the power of attorney in reply papers. The court found, if it did
consider the power of attorney, SAL had failed to verify Trimbo’s signature
on the power of attorney and establish it was in effect and had been
presented to the Beach Terrace employee when Trimbo signed the residence
and care agreement. The court also found the arbitration agreement was both
substantively and procedurally unconscionable.
Lussier passed away after SAL filed its notice of appeal. We
granted Trimbo’s motion to substitute Trimbo, as successor in interest to
Lussier, as respondent in place of Lussier.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When, as here, the trial court denies a motion to compel
arbitration based on a finding that the moving party failed to carry its
ultimate burden of proving a binding agreement to arbitrate, the question for
the reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matter of law.
(Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 587
(Brockman).) Erroneous as a matter of law means the moving party’s
evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such a character and
weight as to compel a finding in the moving party’s favor. (Ibid.; Almanor
Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769.)
Unless the trial court made specific findings of fact in favor of the moving
party, the appellate court presumes the trial court found the moving party’s
evidence lacked weight and credibility sufficient to meet the burden of proof.
(Brockman, at p. 587.) The appellate court views the facts and resolves all
conflicts in the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and in support
of the order denying arbitration. (Ibid.)
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II.
SAL DID NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT BINDING ON LUSSIER
SAL challenges on several grounds the order denying its motion
to compel arbitration. SAL argues federal and state public policy favor
arbitration of disputes, the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
applies, SAL did not waive arbitration, and the arbitration agreement is
valid, binding, and not unconscionable. We need only address the trial court’s
finding that SAL had failed to meet its burden of proving Lussier agreed to
arbitrate the dispute.
As SAL argues, both federal and state public policy favor
arbitration of disputes. (Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown (2012) 565
U.S. 530, 533; Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou
SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 146.) But “[w]hile public
policy favors contractual arbitration of disputes, arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a controversy cannot be
compelled to do so.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 584–585; see
Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [“‘“a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit”’”], quoting
AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648.)
Thus, before a trial court may grant a motion to compel
arbitration, it must determine whether there is a binding agreement to
arbitrate the controversy. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp.
583–584.) “The trial court makes this determination using a summary
procedure in the manner ‘for the making and hearing of motions.’ [Citation.]
‘In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing
all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as
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oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final
determination.’” (Id. at p. 584.) The party moving for arbitration bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a valid
arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden
of proving by a preponderance any defense to arbitration. (Id. at p. 584.)
“‘Whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate is
determined under general California contract law.’ [Citation.] ‘Even when an
agreement provides that it is governed by the [Federal Arbitration Act],
courts must first apply state law principles in determining whether the
parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.’” (Brockman, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 584.)
The party moving for arbitration bears the initial burden of
producing prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
158, 165.) To meet that initial burden, SAL produced the residence and care
agreement, which includes the arbitration agreement. Trimbo argues, and
the trial court found, SAL did not meet this initial burden because the
residence and care agreement was not properly authenticated. The trial court
found Kang, who had submitted a declaration to authenticate the agreement,
did not have personal knowledge sufficient to authenticate the signatures.
But the moving party can attach a copy of the arbitration agreement to the
motion to compel arbitration (ibid.), and authentication of signatures is not
necessary at this stage (West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
985, 992).
An authentication problem does arise, however, with respect to
the power of attorney purporting to authorize Trimbo to sign the residence
and care agreement and the arbitration agreement on Lussier’s behalf. In
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opposing SAL’s motion to compel arbitration, Lussier argued SAL had failed
to establish Trimbo had the authority to bind Lussier to arbitration. In
response, SAL submitted with its reply papers the power of attorney as an
exhibit to the declaration of Randy Merritt, one of SAL’s attorneys. The trial
court found SAL should have submitted the power of attorney along with the
arbitration agreement but, in any case, SAL had not properly authenticated
Trimbo’s signature.2
“Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received
in evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a); see Continental Baking Co. v.
Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 525 [“Generally speaking, documents must be
authenticated in some fashion before they are admissible in evidence”].)
“‘Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence
claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means
provided by law.’” (People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 551, quoting
Evid. Code, § 1400.)
In Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo
World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 49 (Newport Harbor), a party
sought to authenticate documents attached as exhibits to a complaint
through a declaration from an attorney stating the attorney “‘personally
assembled the exhibits to the Third Amendment Complaint’” and “‘personally
know[s] that each of the exhibits attached to the Third Amended
Complaint . . . are true and correct copies of those documents.’” The Court of
2 SAL did not request a statement of decision. Thus, to the extent
the trial court’s minute order cannot be read to include an express finding
that the power of attorney was not authenticated, we would presume the
court impliedly made such a finding. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 227, 237.)
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Appeal concluded the declaration did not authenticate the exhibits because
“[t]he attorney does not declare that she prepared, is a party to, is the
custodian of records of, or otherwise has personal knowledge sufficient to
authenticate, the documents from which the copies were made.” (Id. at p. 50;
see San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State University Research
Foundation (2017) 13 Cal. App.5th 76, 108 [attorney’s declarations did not
establish a foundation based on personal knowledge for authenticating
attached documents]; The Luckman Partnership, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 30, 34 [counsel’s declaration stating counsel had
personal knowledge that documents were opposing party’s interrogatory
responses was sufficient authentication].)
SAL tried to authenticate the power of attorney through the
declaration from Merritt, who stated: “I am aware that on October 10, 2025,
in connection with [SAL]’s taking of the deposition of [Lussier]’s daughter,
Sharon Trimbo, [Lussier] produced an executed and notarized power of
attorney form in which [Lussier] granted all the powers set forth in section
4401 of the California Probate Code, dated February 23, 2021. I have
attached as Exhibit 1 to my declaration a true and correct copy of that signed
and notarized power of attorney form.” That part of Merritt’s declaration was
not based on personal knowledge. Being “aware” a document was produced at
a deposition is not the same as personal knowledge the document was indeed
produced. Merritt does not claim he was present at Trimbo’s deposition and
saw her produce the power of attorney. Merritt did not attach to his
declaration and authenticate relevant portions of the deposition transcript at
which Trimbo might have identified the power of attorney, confirmed her
signature on it, and testified it was in effect when she signed the residence
and care agreement. Declaring the document is a true and correct copy of an
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original is insufficient in itself to authenticate it. (Newport Harbor, supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at p. 50.)
In the respondent’s brief, Trimbo challenged Merritt’s declaration
and argued SAL did not authenticate the power of attorney. SAL did not
respond to that argument or address Merritt’s declaration but argued Kang’s
declaration authenticated the arbitration agreement.
Although Trimbo signed the residence and care agreement with
the notation “POA” (presumably meaning power of attorney) following her
name, she did not sign the arbitration agreement as “POA.” Further, the
notation POA does not indicate what kind of power of attorney Trimbo
purportedly had, which is important in determining whether she had the
requisite authority to sign either the arbitration agreement or the residence
and care agreement. (See Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024) 15
Cal.5th 939, 946–949.)
Applying the applicable standard of review, we conclude the trial
court’s finding that SAL failed to meet its burden of proving Lussier agreed to
arbitration was not erroneous as a matter of law. Because SAL failed to prove
Trimbo had authority to bind Lussier to the arbitration agreement, SAL did
not meet its “ultimate burden” of proving the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement. (West v. Solar Mosaic LLC, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
SERVINO, J.
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