In re K.W. CA2/3

Filed 11/5/26 In re K.W. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE B356155 In re K.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02324A–B) C.W. et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Real Parties in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Petition denied.  Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Dominika Anna Campbell, Brian Dean; Law Office of Amy Einstein and Amy Eistein for Petitioner C.W. Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Nicole J. Johnson; Law Office of Jolene Metzger, Jolene Metzger and Melissa A. Chaitin for Petitioner M.F. No appearance for Respondent. Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai, for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. Children’s Law Center and Sarah Liebowitz, for Real Parties in Interest Khalil W. and Kyra W., minors. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ C.W. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ relief from juvenile court orders terminating her family reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider the implementation of a permanent plan of adoption for her minor children Khalil W. and Kyra W.1 Khalil’s father, M.F., joins mother’s petition. We reject mother’s arguments and deny the petition. 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We recite only those facts necessary to resolve this writ proceeding. I. Section 300 petition In July 2023, the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition pursuant to section 300 alleging that mother engaged in robbery and carjacking while Khalil was under her care, and that this conduct endangered the child and placed him at risk of serious physical harm and danger. At the July 2023 initial hearing, the juvenile court detained Khalil from mother’s care. Khalil was four years old at the time. The court sustained the petition in November 2023 and declared Khalil a dependent of the court. It ordered family reunification services for mother, including individual counseling and developmentally appropriate parenting classes. The court also found that M.F. was Khalil’s biological father. In March 2024, mother enrolled in individual counseling, and by April 8, 2024, she had completed four sessions. As of April 15, 2024, mother had completed 19 sessions of a 52-week court-ordered parenting course. A progress letter stated that mother had been absent frequently, but her attendance had recently become more consistent. Meanwhile, mother gave birth to another child, Kyra W., in December 2023. DCFS filed a section 300 petition as to Kyra, alleging that she was at risk of harm because mother exposed Kyra’s sibling, Khalil, to criminal acts. In April 2024, at the initial hearing, the juvenile court detained Kyra from mother. In May 2024, the court sustained the section 300 petition as to Kyra, and in June, it declared her a dependent of the court. 3 The court again ordered reunification services for mother, including parenting classes and individual counseling. It also ordered mother to complete random and on-demand drug testing upon reasonable suspicion. At the June 2024 six-month review hearing as to Khalil, the juvenile court determined mother’s progress was unsubstantial and it ordered continued family reunification services. By the end of July 2024, mother had completed 31 of 52 sessions in her court-ordered parenting class, which she was attending consistently. As of early September 2024, mother had completed 20 individual counseling sessions, exceeding the minimum of 16 sessions ordered by the court. In September 2024, the court held a combined 12-month review hearing for Khalil and progress hearing for Kyra. The court terminated placement orders as to both children, returned them to mother’s home under continued court jurisdiction, and ordered family maintenance services. As of November 13, 2024, mother had completed 44 sessions of her 52-session court-ordered parenting course, and she was on track to complete the course in January 2025. A progress letter commended mother’s consistent attendance and engagement in group discussions. However, mother missed six parenting classes over the following three months. As of February 11, 2025, the class manager was preparing to formally disenroll mother due to her inconsistent participation. II. Section 387 supplemental petition and section 342 subsequent petition In February 2025, DCFS received a report that mother had been arrested for robbery. In March 2025, DCFS filed a 4 supplemental petition for a more restrictive placement under section 387. The petition alleged that mother failed to comply with juvenile court orders and engaged in unlawful activities, and that her probation had been revoked. At the March 2025 initial hearing on the supplemental petition, the juvenile court ordered the children removed from mother’s home and physical custody. In June 2025, DCFS amended the section 387 petition to further allege that mother tested positive for cocaine in May 2025. DCFS also filed a subsequent petition under section 342. The section 342 petition alleged that mother had a history of substance abuse, that she was a current abuser of cocaine, and that she had tested positive for cocaine in May 2025.2 In July 2025, the superior court terminated mother’s probation and sentenced her to two years in prison. Mother told DCFS that she expected to serve approximately six months of her sentence. She expressed interest in receiving family reunification services. In August 2025, the juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition. It also sustained the section 342 petition, but amended the b-1 count to allege that mother was a recent, rather than current, cocaine abuser. The court found that the children continued to be dependents of the court and found by clear and convincing evidence that they would be at risk of harm if returned to mother’s home. The court ordered family reunification services for mother, including a 26-week parenting class, individual counseling, a full drug and alcohol program with 2 The section 342 petition also alleged that mother kept drugs and a firearm where the children could access them. This count was dismissed. 5 aftercare, and weekly random or on demand drug and alcohol testing.3 The court set a “.21E / 22” hearing for January 30, 2026. The notice that DCFS sent to mother described the hearing as a six-month review hearing. III. Six-month review hearing following sustained subsequent and supplemental petitions Mother was incarcerated at the Central California Women’s Facility in August 2025. There, she participated in parenting courses, substance abuse classes, and worked on her GED. On August 28, 2025, mother was transferred to the California Institution for Women (CIW). CIW provides over 140 rehabilitation services. In January 2026, a DCFS social worker contacted Family Services employee Centoria Walton at CIW. Walton reported that mother began participating in an adult education program in December 2025, and a substance abuse treatment group and two self-help groups in January 2026. Although CIW offered individual counseling, Walton said that mother was not enrolled in that program. The juvenile court held a hearing in January 2026, but continued the hearing to March 2026 for good cause because mother and father were both not physically present. At the March 2026 hearing, mother’s counsel requested a continuance due to mother’s absence. Counsel explained that mother was at a 3 Mother appealed from the orders sustaining the petitions brought under sections 342 and 387. We affirmed the orders. (In re K.W. (Apr. 17, 2026, B347999) [nonpub. opn.].) 6 meeting to discuss whether she could “transition into a program.” The court stated, “if there’s a parenting class available, that would be really helpful for [mother] to engage in.” The court continued the hearing to April 2026. Mother was not physically transported to court for the April 2026 hearing for unknown reasons. Her counsel requested a continuance to June 2026, which the court granted. The January, March, and April minute orders described the hearing as a section 366.21, subdivision (e) six-month review hearing. On May 20, 2026, mother informed a DCFS social worker that she had been transferred to the Los Angeles Centers for Alcohol and Drug Abuse Female Community Re-Entry Program (FCRP). The social worker contacted FCRP on May 22, 2026 and left a voicemail seeking to speak with mother’s counselor. The social worker left another message on June 1, 2026. According to a June 2026 letter from a FCRP counselor, mother was receiving individual counseling, and was expected to complete the following groups before her expected release date of September 28, 2026: “Women’s Journal, Seeking Safety, Responsible Thinking, Anger Management, Criminal Thinking, Mindfulness, Life Skills, Vocational as well as participating in Parenting via Partnership for Reentry Program.” In June and again in early July 2026, the juvenile court continued the hearing due to logistical difficulties communicating with father, who was incarcerated in Texas. The minute orders described the hearing as a section 366.21, subdivision (e) six- month review hearing. The hearing originally set for January 2026 was held on July 29, 2026. Although the hearing was scheduled as a section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing, DCFS argued that the 7 proceedings were “at least the .25 date because Khalil was initially removed in July of 2023,” or around three years prior to the hearing. DCFS asserted, “[t]his is not a time where the court can give further reunification services to the parents.” The juvenile court stated that the hearing was “not a true .21(e) hearing.” At the hearing, mother’s counsel asserted that mother had completed her case plan, including a 12-hour substance abuse recovery course, eight and a half hours of parenting classes, and eight hours of cognitive behavioral therapy. The juvenile court found that mother complied with her case plan. Mother also argued that DCFS failed to offer reasonable services, and asked the court to order a further six months of reunification services. The court rejected this argument, and found by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS provided mother with reasonable services. It further found that there was no substantial probability that the children would be returned to mother if the court continued offering reunification services. The court also stated: “Even if I had the legal ability to extend services, given the total[ity] of the circumstances in this case,” the court would not exercise discretion under section 352 to extend reunification services.4 The court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for November 18, 2026. Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ on August 27, 2026 challenging the juvenile court’s July 2026 orders. Khalil’s 4 Under section 352, the juvenile court has discretion to continue any hearing beyond the statutory time limit for good cause, if the continuance is not contrary to the interest of the minor. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) 8 father, M.F., joined mother’s petition but did not file a separate petition or brief. We issued an order to show cause why this court should not grant the petition. We also invited interested parties to file responsive briefs, and we received such briefs from DCFS and from the minors. DISCUSSION Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by terminating her reunification services. She specifically asserts that its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCFS provided reasonable services is unsupported by substantial evidence. Alternatively, mother contends that the court abused its discretion under section 352 when it declined to continue reunification services. Under either standard, we disagree and deny mother’s petition. I. Legal framework and standard of review “When a child has been removed from a parent’s custody, the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the reunification of the family.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624 (Michael G.).) The court must “hold periodic review hearings,” at six-month intervals, “to evaluate the status of reunification efforts and next appropriate steps.” (Id. at p. 625.) “Reunification services are ordinarily provided for a maximum of 18 months after a child has been removed from parental custody.” (Ibid.) Although the relevant hearing in this case occurred more than two years after the children were initially removed from mother’s custody, court orders described it as a section 366.21, subdivision (e) six-month review hearing. At such a hearing, the court “shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether 9 reasonable services” were offered to the parent. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8).) If the court finds that reasonable services were not offered, it must “extend[] reunification services for an additional six months rather than proceed to the final stage of dependency proceedings, permanency planning” under section 366.26. (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625; § 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)5 We would review a finding that reasonable services were offered for substantial evidence. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012 (Conservatorship of O.B.).) Mother appears to argue that the hearing was appropriately calendared as a six-month review hearing because it was originally scheduled six months out from the disposition of the subsequent and supplemental petitions under sections 342 and 387. However, a new reunification period does not commence when a subsequent or supplemental petition is sustained. (K.R. v. Superior Court (Oct. 12, 2026, D088471) ___Cal.App.5th___ [2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 643, at *12]; In re Barbara P. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 926, 934.) Accordingly, DCFS argued below, and the children argue on appeal, that the relevant hearing was 5 Section 366.21, subdivision (e)(3) applies only to children who were under the age of three at the time of initial removal. Ordinarily a parent is entitled to 12 months of reunification services for a child older than three at the time of initial removal, and here, Khalil was four when he was first removed from mother’s physical custody. However, Khalil and Kyra were returned to mother in September 2024 and removed, together, in March 2025. For a sibling group that was removed together and includes at least one child who was under three at the time of initial removal, “the court applies the shortened six-month ‘child welfare services’ presumption to all members of the ‘sibling group.’ (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).)” (In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636, 642.) 10 effectively a section 366.25 hearing, i.e., the hearing that “shall occur within 24 months after the date the child was originally removed from the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.25, subd. (a)(1); cf. Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1509 [because of continuances, “the 12–month hearing became the 18-month permanency review hearing”], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504.) Indeed, Khalil was originally removed from mother’s physical custody three years before the July 2026 hearing, and Kyra was initially removed 27 months before that hearing. The juvenile court appeared to agree with DCFS, noting, for example, that the proceeding was not a “true” section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing. If the relevant proceeding was a 24-month hearing, a different standard applies. Generally, “the law sets a presumptive 18-month limit on reunification services.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 627.) Accordingly, at the 24-month hearing, a parent who was denied reasonable services in the prior period is not entitled to additional reunification services. (§ 366.25.) Such a parent may, however, “seek a discretionary continuance of the section 366.26 hearing and an extension of reunification services under section 352.” (Michael G., at p. 635.) Because both children were initially removed from mother’s custody at least two years prior to the relevant hearing, we agree that the relevant hearing should be treated as a 24-month hearing. Thus, even if mother received inadequate reunification services in the prior period, she was not entitled to additional services, and any extension of such services was at the juvenile 11 court’s discretion. (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 635; § 352.) However, because the trial court’s decision to terminate mother’s reunification services was premised at least in part on a finding that she received reasonable services in the prior period, we will also assess whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence. II. Substantial evidence supports a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCFS provided reasonable reunification services Mother first argues that the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS provided or offered reasonable services is unsupported by substantial evidence. We conclude that substantial evidence supports this finding, even under the clear and convincing standard. “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206 (E.E.).) 12  The relevant period ran from August 2025, when the juvenile court sustained the section 387 supplemental petition and the section 342 subsequent petition, and the July 2026 hearing, when it terminated mother’s reunification services. Mother was incarcerated during the entire period, which likely impacted her ability to participate in services. However, DCFS confirmed that mother received relevant services at three separate facilities during the period. Specifically, in August 2025, mother was incarcerated at the Central California Women’s Facility, where she participated in parenting courses, substance abuse classes, and worked on her GED. In late August, mother was transferred to the CIW, a facility that offers more than 140 rehabilitation services. There, she participated in an adult education program, a substance abuse treatment group, and two self-help groups. Mother also had the opportunity to participate in individual counseling while at CIW, but she was not enrolled in that program as of January 2026. And in May 2026, mother transferred to FCRP, where she participated in individual counseling and group sessions on topics including anger management and criminal thinking. At FCRP, she also participated in “Parenting via Partnership for Reentry Program.” In short, mother participated in numerous services, including several programs that were tailored to the criminal conduct and drug use that led to dependency jurisdiction. (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345 (Amanda H.).) We conclude that the record “contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable” that mother was offered and received reasonable reunification services. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–1012.) 13  Mother argues that the reasonable services finding should be reversed because DCFS provided no evidence that it maintained adequate contact with mother and her service providers during the relevant timeframe. Mother notes, for example, that DCFS contacted mother only five times during this period, and that the communications focused on visitation rather than mother’s progress with services. While we agree that DCFS should communicate with a parent and service providers, the purpose of these contacts is to ensure that the parent is able to participate in reasonable services. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) Here, there is no dispute that mother was offered and participated in appropriate services, nor any indication that she had difficulty complying with her case plan. Perhaps if mother’s progress was lacking, or if she was unable to engage in any particular program, we might conclude that DCFS’s contacts with mother were inadequate. But under the circumstances, those communications were sufficient to ensure that mother was engaging with services. The evidence supports a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCFS provided reasonable services. Mother similarly contends that DCFS did not effectively communicate with her service providers. She asserts that “it was the social worker’s job to maintain adequate contact with the service providers and accurately to inform the juvenile court and mother of the sufficiency of the enrolled programs to meet the case plan’s requirements.” (Amanda H., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) We find Amanda H. distinguishable on this point. In that case, around the six-month hearing, a DCFS social worker informed the court and the parties that the appellant mother was enrolled in all court-ordered programs. This included domestic 14 violence counseling, which was intended to address “the fundamental problem that led to the children’s detention.” (Id. at p. 1343, 1347.) The social worker apparently never asked mother’s service provider whether mother was actually enrolled in domestic violence counseling. (Id. at p. 1344.) Just before the 12-month hearing, the social worker discovered that mother was not, in fact, enrolled in this required program. (Ibid.) At the 12- month hearing, the social worker recommended terminating mother’s reunification services because mother failed to comply with her case plan. (Ibid.) The juvenile court agreed and terminated mother’s services. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that the social worker’s conduct “not only failed to demonstrate a good faith effort to implement a family reunification plan, but it also may have thwarted mother’s ability adequately to address, before the 12-month hearing, the fundamental problem that led to the children’s detention: domestic violence.” (Id. at p. 1347.) Unlike the parent in Amanda H., mother has not identified any course or program relevant to case issues that she was unable to complete, let alone any failure that stemmed from DCFS’s conduct. To the contrary—at the hearing mother argued, and the juvenile court concluded, that mother was fully compliant with her case plan. And as we have discussed, the programs in which mother participated during the relevant period were tailored to the issues that led to DCFS oversight. On these facts, mother has not demonstrated that the reasonable services finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. (E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) Mother also argues that her services were unreasonable because she was not offered any parenting program specifically 15 tailored to Kyra’s special needs. In notes describing an April 2026 visit between Kyra and mother, a DCFS social worker noted that mother “appears to not fully understand Kyra’s autism” because mother believed Kyra’s “functional freezes” were caused by asthma or coughing. Mother argues that the April 2026 visit should have led DCFS to recommend or coordinate a special- needs parenting program. To support this point, mother again cites Amanda H., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344. But Amanda H. is distinguishable for essentially the same reasons we have already discussed. There, the social worker failed to reasonably communicate with the mother and her service provider. As a direct result, the mother did not know that she was not enrolled in court-ordered domestic violence counseling, which was intended to address the issues that led to dependency jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1344, 1347.) In contrast, here, mother’s ability to understand Kyra’s special needs was not an issue that led to dependency jurisdiction. Nor did the juvenile court discuss that issue as a basis for its decision. Accordingly, the fact that DCFS did not offer services tailored to parenting Kyra’s special needs does not mean that the services offered were unreasonable. Perhaps mother would have benefitted from an additional parenting course. However, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.]” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) Substantial evidence supports that this threshold was met here, even under the heightened clear and convincing standard. 16 III. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to continue the 366.26 hearing Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by declining to continue the matter and order a further six months of reunification services. The juvenile court “may continue any hearing under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held” for good cause, if the continuance would not be contrary to the minors’ interests. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) “We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘Discretion is abused when a decision is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.Y. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1056.) We find no abuse of discretion. Mother’s argument is essentially premised on her assertion that she did not receive reasonable services in the prior period. She reiterates the same arguments we have previously addressed: that DCFS failed to adequately communicate with mother and her service providers, and that it failed to offer a parenting class specific to autistic children. Yet, as we have discussed, despite these supposed failures, mother was offered services that were reasonably targeted to the issues that led to dependency jurisdiction, and she participated in those services. Additionally, the court may only grant a section 352 continuance if doing so would not be contrary to the minors’ interests. “In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary 17 placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) We reiterate that Khalil was initially removed from mother’s physical custody three years prior to the relevant hearing, and Kyra was removed more than two years before that hearing. Both children were far past the 18-month threshold by which time “the law ordinarily requires the court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan for the child’s care.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 620.) Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. 18  DISPOSITION The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith upon the date of its filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS HANASONO, J. We concur: ADAMS, P. J. GIZA, J. 19