Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 In re M.R. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re M.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, A176807 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. v. No. 25JD00108) S.R., Defendant and Appellant. S.R. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order summarily denying her petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 388, subd. (a)) of prior findings and orders in which the court denied Mother reunification services with her daughter M.R. (Minor) and set a hearing under section 366.26. Mother contends the court (1) erroneously considered an opposition to her section 388 petition submitted by the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) and (2) abused its discretion in finding Mother 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 1 failed to make a prima facie showing that warranted an evidentiary hearing on her petition. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Background As we recounted in S.R. v. Sonoma County Superior Court (Feb. 10, 2026, A174959) (nonpub. opn.), Mother has a long history of referrals to child protective services and her children being in dependency due to her anger management and mental health issues.2 Mother’s children include daughters A.R. (born in 2010), M.S. (born in 2013), and Minor (born in 2022). From 2011 to 2025, there were 24 referrals to child welfare services regarding one or more of A.R., M.S., and Minor. In 2016, dependency cases for A.R. and M.S. were initiated in Sacramento County, and Mother received 12 months of family reunification services, including classes on parenting and anger management, individual counseling, and substance abuse treatment. Mother failed to reunify with her children, her services were terminated, and, in September 2017, a juvenile court terminated her parental rights over A.R. and M.S. In April and May 2025, the Department received reports that Mother was neglecting and emotionally abusing Minor (then three years old). The Department initiated a voluntary family preservation case for Mother and Minor in June 2025. Mother’s participation was minimal. 2 Mother also has a long history of struggling with methamphetamine use and a criminal history that includes convictions for infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, DUIs, and disorderly conduct while under the influence of drugs. 2 Current Dependency On August 19, 2025, the Department filed a dependency petition on behalf of Minor alleging failure to protect (§ 300, subd (b)(1)), serious emotional damage (§ 300, subd. (c)), and abuse of sibling (§ 300, subd. (j)). The Department recommended bypassing reunification services. Following a contested hearing on jurisdiction and disposition, the juvenile court made written findings and orders, which were filed November 15, 2025. The court found the allegations of the petition true and denied Mother reunification services pursuant to the bypass provisions of section 361.5. The court bypassed services based on its findings that (1) prior dependency cases resulted in termination of Mother’s parental rights of Minor’s half-siblings A.R. and M.S. and (2) Mother failed to make reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to their removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10) and (11).) The court set a hearing under section 366.26. Mother filed a petition for extraordinary relief from the court’s orders denying her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing, which this court denied in February 2026. Mother’s Section 388 Petition On May 26, 2026, Mother filed a “Request to Change Court Order” pursuant to section 388. She asked the juvenile court to change its orders denying reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing by entering a new order for six months of reunification services for Mother. She asserted the following change of circumstance or new evidence: “Mother has completed in-patient treatment, aftercare and continues to participate in services,” and a “bonding study casts significant doubt on the agency’s analysis presented at the disposition and relied upon by the court . . . 3 specifically . . . the agency’s assessment that [Minor] appeared ‘in distress around Mom and generally fearful.’ ” The petition was supported by (1) Mother’s declaration, (2) documents showing she completed residential substance use treatment, outpatient services, a 20-hour course on “foundational digital skills for professional growth,” and participated in other services, and (3) a bonding study. In her declaration, Mother stated she had made a lot of progress in services, continued to attend therapy, “attend[ed] weekly Anger Management,” and maintained her sobriety. She acknowledged “the ultimate conclusion of the bonding study” was that it would not be detrimental to Minor to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but she declared, “I am asking the court to consider the study in light of the incredibly limited time that I have been allowed to see my daughter—based on CPS’s incorrect assumption about my daughter’s relationship to me.” Mother stated that she believed reunification would be in Minor’s best interest, and she knew Minor missed her. In the bonding study, the evaluators found the parent-child relationship between Minor and Mother “appears to be relatively weak and moderately positive” and, “at its current strength, discontinuing the relationship . . . is not thought to be so detrimental as to outweigh the security, finality, and sense of belonging that adoption would provide.” The evaluators noted that Minor showed “physical affection and closeness with” Mother, “suggest[ing] a moderately positive relationship,” but Minor “also showed some physical affection and closeness with the evaluator, whom she had just met for the first time (e.g., rushed up to hug the evaluator when she entered to announce the end of the visit), as well as with [the foster caregiver].” 4 On June 5, 2026, the Department filed an opposition to Mother’s section 388 petition. Arguing Mother failed to make a prima facie showing (1) of a change of circumstances or new evidence and (2) that modification of the prior order would be in the best interests of the minor child, the Department asked the court to deny her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the Department argued, first, none of the information provided in the section 388 petition “is new evidence nor shows any changed circumstances, as mother’s history shows a pattern of her engaging in and completing the same or similar services, but struggles to apply what she has learned and falls back into old behaviors” and, second, Mother failed to show that “delaying the minor’s permanency” to provide her with reunification services was in Minor’s best interests. On June 8, 2026, the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. The court found Mother’s “request d[id] not state new evidence or a change of circumstances” and did “not promote the best interest of the child.” DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “Under section 388, a parent may petition to change or set aside a prior order ‘upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.’ (§ 388, subd. (a)(1); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a).) The juvenile court shall order a hearing where ‘it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted’ by the new order. (§ 388, subd. (d).) Thus, the parent must sufficiently allege both a change in circumstances or new evidence and the promotion of the child’s best interests.” (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157, fn. omitted.) 5 If a section 388 petition does not make a prima facie showing, the juvenile court may summarily deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) “A ‘prima facie’ showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) A prima facie showing is not made “if the allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if they were found to be true at a hearing. [Citations.] While the petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency [citations], the allegations must nonetheless describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.” (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) “The petition may not be conclusory.” (In re Anthony W., at p. 250.) In determining whether a petition makes a prima facie showing, “the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.” (In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.) A summary denial of a section 388 petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p, 62.) B. The Department’s Opposition Mother’s first contention is that the juvenile court erroneously considered the Department’s response to her section 388 petition. The Department responds that Mother has forfeited the issue. We conclude Mother’s contention lacks merit in any event. The juvenile court denied Mother’s petition on June 8, 2026. Three days later, the court held a continued section 366.26 hearing. At the start of the hearing, the Department attorney noted that Mother’s petition had been “denied on its face” and stated that Mother “may ask for” “[t]he basis for [the 6 court’s] decision,” but he “object[ed] to any arguments being made in regards to granting that request.” Mother’s attorney asked the court whether it “read and considered [the Department’s] brief.” The court responded, “Thank you for your inquiry. We’ll set the matter [the section 366.26 hearing] for a contest.” The parties discussed availability and chose a hearing date. Mother’s attorney then stated, “It seems that the Court is not going to respond to my inquiry?” The court responded, “That’s correct. I am not.” In arguing for forfeiture, the Department points out that Mother’s attorney never specifically argued that the juvenile court should not consider the Department’s opposition nor did she provide any legal authority on the issue. Mother responds that she had no meaningful opportunity to object because the juvenile court did not respond to her inquiry about whether it considered the opposition. We see from the reporter’s transcript that Mother’s attorney did have an opportunity to address the summary denial of the section 388 petition at the hearing on June 11, 2026. Yet, she failed to raise the issue of potential court error that she now makes on appeal; so the juvenile court had no opportunity to respond. We agree with the Department that Mother’s appellate claim has been forfeited under these circumstances. (See In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754 [“An appellate court ordinarily will not consider challenges based on procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”; “The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the juvenile court so that they may be corrected”].) In any event, Mother’s claim fails on the merits. She asserts the juvenile court erred “by relying on the Department’s briefing,” but she cites 7 no authority suggesting that an agency is not permitted to object to a section 388 petition on the ground the petition does not make a prima facie showing or that a juvenile court may not consider an agency’s written opposition to a section 388 petition at the prima facie stage. (Cf. In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 and fn. 5 [suggesting that hearing argument from both parties on the issue helps the juvenile court make an informed decision on whether a prima facie showing has been made by a section 388 petitioner].) In determining whether to order an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court must credit the evidence submitted in support of the petition allegations (In re Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 593), but Mother does not point to anything in the record showing the court in this case did not credit her evidence. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the juvenile court knew and followed the law. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254.) C. The Determination that Mother Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing Next, Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that she failed to make a prima facie showing for a change of order. We find no abuse of discretion. “Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order. [Citation.] The change in circumstances must relate to the purpose of the order and be such that the modification of the prior order is appropriate. [Citations.] In other words, the problem that initially brought the child within the dependency system must be removed or ameliorated. [Citations.] The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged order.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) 8 In the present case, when the juvenile court denied Mother reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing, it cited Mother’s “ ‘history and a pattern of screaming, cursing, and verbal rages documented from 2004, 2013, and 2025’ ”; the fact that “ ‘after all of the classes that she has taken, she is of the opinion that her conduct, her behavior, has no negative affect on her child’ ”; Mother’s testimony, which showed “ ‘no insight into how her behavior has [a]ffected her child’ ”; and the court’s determination that Mother has “ ‘not responded to treatment’ ” and has “ ‘not even recognized it as an issue.’ ” Accepting the truth of her supporting evidence and allegations, Mother’s section 388 petition does not demonstrate that she has ameliorated the problem that brought Minor with the dependency system. Mother reports that she is attending anger management, but she provides no evidence that she is responding to treatment. Nor does she acknowledge in her declaration that she has an anger management problem or that her rages affected Minor.3 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mother failed to make a prima facie showing of change of circumstance “of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged order.” (In re A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) Furthermore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mother failed to make a prima facie showing that her proposed change in the court’s findings and orders would be in the best interest of 3 The Department points out that the bonding study shows that Mother continues to deny the reasons for Minor’s removal. The bonding study summarizes a clinical interview with Mother in which Mother downplayed her behavior that led to Minor’s removal. She described one incident as “ ‘venting,’ ” and she felt that her interactions with Minor “have been ‘twist[ed].’ ” 9 Minor. Reunification services were properly bypassed for Mother, at which point the focus of the dependency changed from family reunification to Minor’s interest in permanence and stability. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.) Mother’s petition does not show that it would be in Minor’s best interest to postpone permanency and stability so that Mother can have six months of reunification services. Minor “should not be made to wait indefinitely for mother to become an adequate parent.” (In re Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 252 [“Mother made no showing how it would be the children’s best interest to continue reunification services, to remove them from their comfortable and secure placement to live with mother who has a long history of drug addiction and a recurring pattern of domestic violence in front of the children”].) DISPOSITION The order denying Mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed. 10 _________________________ Sweet, J.* WE CONCUR: _________________________ Richman, Acting P. J. _________________________ Desautels, J. A176807, Sonoma County Human Services Department v. S.R. * Judge of the Marin County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution 11