In re M.R. CA1/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketA176807
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 In re M.R. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT, A176807
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Sonoma County Super. Ct.
v. No. 25JD00108)
S.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
S.R. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order summarily denying
her petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 388, subd. (a)) of prior
findings and orders in which the court denied Mother reunification services
with her daughter M.R. (Minor) and set a hearing under section 366.26.
Mother contends the court (1) erroneously considered an opposition to her
section 388 petition submitted by the Sonoma County Human Services
Department (Department) and (2) abused its discretion in finding Mother
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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failed to make a prima facie showing that warranted an evidentiary hearing
on her petition. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Background
As we recounted in S.R. v. Sonoma County Superior Court (Feb. 10,
2026, A174959) (nonpub. opn.), Mother has a long history of referrals to child
protective services and her children being in dependency due to her anger
management and mental health issues.2 Mother’s children include daughters
A.R. (born in 2010), M.S. (born in 2013), and Minor (born in 2022). From
2011 to 2025, there were 24 referrals to child welfare services regarding one
or more of A.R., M.S., and Minor.
In 2016, dependency cases for A.R. and M.S. were initiated in
Sacramento County, and Mother received 12 months of family reunification
services, including classes on parenting and anger management, individual
counseling, and substance abuse treatment. Mother failed to reunify with
her children, her services were terminated, and, in September 2017, a
juvenile court terminated her parental rights over A.R. and M.S.
In April and May 2025, the Department received reports that Mother
was neglecting and emotionally abusing Minor (then three years old). The
Department initiated a voluntary family preservation case for Mother and
Minor in June 2025. Mother’s participation was minimal.
2 Mother also has a long history of struggling with methamphetamine
use and a criminal history that includes convictions for infliction of corporal
injury on a cohabitant, DUIs, and disorderly conduct while under the
influence of drugs.
2
Current Dependency
On August 19, 2025, the Department filed a dependency petition on
behalf of Minor alleging failure to protect (§ 300, subd (b)(1)), serious
emotional damage (§ 300, subd. (c)), and abuse of sibling (§ 300, subd. (j)).
The Department recommended bypassing reunification services.
Following a contested hearing on jurisdiction and disposition, the
juvenile court made written findings and orders, which were filed November
15, 2025. The court found the allegations of the petition true and denied
Mother reunification services pursuant to the bypass provisions of section
361.5. The court bypassed services based on its findings that (1) prior
dependency cases resulted in termination of Mother’s parental rights of
Minor’s half-siblings A.R. and M.S. and (2) Mother failed to make reasonable
effort to treat the problems that led to their removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)
and (11).) The court set a hearing under section 366.26.
Mother filed a petition for extraordinary relief from the court’s orders
denying her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing,
which this court denied in February 2026.
Mother’s Section 388 Petition
On May 26, 2026, Mother filed a “Request to Change Court Order”
pursuant to section 388. She asked the juvenile court to change its orders
denying reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing by
entering a new order for six months of reunification services for Mother. She
asserted the following change of circumstance or new evidence: “Mother has
completed in-patient treatment, aftercare and continues to participate in
services,” and a “bonding study casts significant doubt on the agency’s
analysis presented at the disposition and relied upon by the court . . .
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specifically . . . the agency’s assessment that [Minor] appeared ‘in distress
around Mom and generally fearful.’ ”
The petition was supported by (1) Mother’s declaration, (2) documents
showing she completed residential substance use treatment, outpatient
services, a 20-hour course on “foundational digital skills for professional
growth,” and participated in other services, and (3) a bonding study.
In her declaration, Mother stated she had made a lot of progress in
services, continued to attend therapy, “attend[ed] weekly Anger
Management,” and maintained her sobriety. She acknowledged “the ultimate
conclusion of the bonding study” was that it would not be detrimental to
Minor to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but she declared, “I am asking
the court to consider the study in light of the incredibly limited time that I
have been allowed to see my daughter—based on CPS’s incorrect assumption
about my daughter’s relationship to me.” Mother stated that she believed
reunification would be in Minor’s best interest, and she knew Minor missed
her.
In the bonding study, the evaluators found the parent-child
relationship between Minor and Mother “appears to be relatively weak and
moderately positive” and, “at its current strength, discontinuing the
relationship . . . is not thought to be so detrimental as to outweigh the
security, finality, and sense of belonging that adoption would provide.” The
evaluators noted that Minor showed “physical affection and closeness with”
Mother, “suggest[ing] a moderately positive relationship,” but Minor “also
showed some physical affection and closeness with the evaluator, whom she
had just met for the first time (e.g., rushed up to hug the evaluator when she
entered to announce the end of the visit), as well as with [the foster
caregiver].”
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On June 5, 2026, the Department filed an opposition to Mother’s
section 388 petition. Arguing Mother failed to make a prima facie showing
(1) of a change of circumstances or new evidence and (2) that modification of
the prior order would be in the best interests of the minor child, the
Department asked the court to deny her section 388 petition without an
evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the Department argued, first, none of the
information provided in the section 388 petition “is new evidence nor shows
any changed circumstances, as mother’s history shows a pattern of her
engaging in and completing the same or similar services, but struggles to
apply what she has learned and falls back into old behaviors” and, second,
Mother failed to show that “delaying the minor’s permanency” to provide her
with reunification services was in Minor’s best interests.
On June 8, 2026, the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388
petition without an evidentiary hearing. The court found Mother’s “request
d[id] not state new evidence or a change of circumstances” and did “not
promote the best interest of the child.”
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Under section 388, a parent may petition to change or set aside a prior
order ‘upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.’ (§ 388, subd.
(a)(1); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a).) The juvenile court shall
order a hearing where ‘it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may
be promoted’ by the new order. (§ 388, subd. (d).) Thus, the parent must
sufficiently allege both a change in circumstances or new evidence and the
promotion of the child’s best interests.” (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1147, 1157, fn. omitted.)
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If a section 388 petition does not make a prima facie showing, the
juvenile court may summarily deny the petition without an evidentiary
hearing. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) “A ‘prima facie’
showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the
evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited.”
(In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) A prima facie showing is
not made “if the allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if
they were found to be true at a hearing. [Citations.] While the petition must
be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency [citations], the allegations
must nonetheless describe specifically how the petition will advance the
child’s best interests.” (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) “The
petition may not be conclusory.” (In re Anthony W., at p. 250.)
In determining whether a petition makes a prima facie showing, “the
court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.” (In
re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.)
A summary denial of a section 388 petition is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (In re K.L., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p, 62.)
B. The Department’s Opposition
Mother’s first contention is that the juvenile court erroneously
considered the Department’s response to her section 388 petition. The
Department responds that Mother has forfeited the issue. We conclude
Mother’s contention lacks merit in any event.
The juvenile court denied Mother’s petition on June 8, 2026. Three
days later, the court held a continued section 366.26 hearing. At the start of
the hearing, the Department attorney noted that Mother’s petition had been
“denied on its face” and stated that Mother “may ask for” “[t]he basis for [the
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court’s] decision,” but he “object[ed] to any arguments being made in regards
to granting that request.”
Mother’s attorney asked the court whether it “read and considered [the
Department’s] brief.” The court responded, “Thank you for your inquiry.
We’ll set the matter [the section 366.26 hearing] for a contest.” The parties
discussed availability and chose a hearing date. Mother’s attorney then
stated, “It seems that the Court is not going to respond to my inquiry?” The
court responded, “That’s correct. I am not.”
In arguing for forfeiture, the Department points out that Mother’s
attorney never specifically argued that the juvenile court should not consider
the Department’s opposition nor did she provide any legal authority on the
issue. Mother responds that she had no meaningful opportunity to object
because the juvenile court did not respond to her inquiry about whether it
considered the opposition. We see from the reporter’s transcript that
Mother’s attorney did have an opportunity to address the summary denial of
the section 388 petition at the hearing on June 11, 2026. Yet, she failed to
raise the issue of potential court error that she now makes on appeal; so the
juvenile court had no opportunity to respond. We agree with the Department
that Mother’s appellate claim has been forfeited under these circumstances.
(See In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754 [“An appellate court
ordinarily will not consider challenges based on procedural defects or
erroneous rulings where an objection could have been but was not made in
the trial court”; “The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to
bring errors to the attention of the juvenile court so that they may be
corrected”].)
In any event, Mother’s claim fails on the merits. She asserts the
juvenile court erred “by relying on the Department’s briefing,” but she cites
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no authority suggesting that an agency is not permitted to object to a section
388 petition on the ground the petition does not make a prima facie showing
or that a juvenile court may not consider an agency’s written opposition to a
section 388 petition at the prima facie stage. (Cf. In re G.B., supra, 227
Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 and fn. 5 [suggesting that hearing argument from
both parties on the issue helps the juvenile court make an informed decision
on whether a prima facie showing has been made by a section 388
petitioner].) In determining whether to order an evidentiary hearing, the
juvenile court must credit the evidence submitted in support of the petition
allegations (In re Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 593), but Mother
does not point to anything in the record showing the court in this case did not
credit her evidence. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the
juvenile court knew and followed the law. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10
Cal.5th 983, 1042; In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254.)
C. The Determination that Mother Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing
Next, Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
determining that she failed to make a prima facie showing for a change of
order. We find no abuse of discretion.
“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior
order. [Citation.] The change in circumstances must relate to the purpose of
the order and be such that the modification of the prior order is appropriate.
[Citations.] In other words, the problem that initially brought the child
within the dependency system must be removed or ameliorated. [Citations.]
The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of such significant
nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged
order.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.)
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In the present case, when the juvenile court denied Mother
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing, it cited Mother’s
“ ‘history and a pattern of screaming, cursing, and verbal rages documented
from 2004, 2013, and 2025’ ”; the fact that “ ‘after all of the classes that she
has taken, she is of the opinion that her conduct, her behavior, has no
negative affect on her child’ ”; Mother’s testimony, which showed “ ‘no insight
into how her behavior has [a]ffected her child’ ”; and the court’s
determination that Mother has “ ‘not responded to treatment’ ” and has “ ‘not
even recognized it as an issue.’ ”
Accepting the truth of her supporting evidence and allegations,
Mother’s section 388 petition does not demonstrate that she has ameliorated
the problem that brought Minor with the dependency system. Mother reports
that she is attending anger management, but she provides no evidence that
she is responding to treatment. Nor does she acknowledge in her declaration
that she has an anger management problem or that her rages affected
Minor.3 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Mother failed to make a prima facie showing of change of circumstance “of
such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the
challenged order.” (In re A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.)
Furthermore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
determining Mother failed to make a prima facie showing that her proposed
change in the court’s findings and orders would be in the best interest of
3 The Department points out that the bonding study shows that Mother
continues to deny the reasons for Minor’s removal. The bonding study
summarizes a clinical interview with Mother in which Mother downplayed
her behavior that led to Minor’s removal. She described one incident as
“ ‘venting,’ ” and she felt that her interactions with Minor “have been
‘twist[ed].’ ”
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Minor. Reunification services were properly bypassed for Mother, at which
point the focus of the dependency changed from family reunification to
Minor’s interest in permanence and stability. (In re G.B., supra, 227
Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.) Mother’s petition does not show that it would be in
Minor’s best interest to postpone permanency and stability so that Mother
can have six months of reunification services. Minor “should not be made to
wait indefinitely for mother to become an adequate parent.” (In re Anthony
W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 252 [“Mother made no showing how it would
be the children’s best interest to continue reunification services, to remove
them from their comfortable and secure placement to live with mother who
has a long history of drug addiction and a recurring pattern of domestic
violence in front of the children”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed.
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_________________________
Sweet, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A176807, Sonoma County Human Services Department v. S.R.
* Judge of the Marin County Superior Court assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution
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