K.L. v. Super Ct. CA4/2

Filed 11/2/26 K.L. v. Super Ct. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO K.L., Petitioner, E088981 v. (Super.Ct.No. J302935) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Michelle Lauron, Judge. Petition denied. Scott Bowen, and Juvenile Court Attorneys of San Bernardino, LLP, for Petitioner. Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and David R. Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 1  K.L. (Mother) seeks an extraordinary writ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to set aside the juvenile court’s order terminating her reunification services with her infant son, B.B. (Minor), and setting a permanent plan selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (.26 hearing). (All further statutory references are to this code.) Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that returning Minor to her custody would be detrimental and that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS or the Department) provided reasonable services. Mother also contends the court abused its discretion in reducing her visitation pending the .26 hearing. As we explain, Mother’s contentions are without merit, and we therefore deny Mother’s writ petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In November 2024, Mother and a maternal aunt brought Minor to the emergency room with what medical staff described as a “profound” hematoma and abrasions on the side of his head. Mother had severe bruising to both of her eyes. She and Minor suffered their injuries two days earlier. Mother said she had been in an argument with the child’s father, G.B. (Father), when she tripped with Minor in her arms and fell to the ground, losing consciousness. Mother claimed she reported the incident to the sheriff’s department the day it occurred, but no report was found. Mother departed the hospital against medical advice immediately after a doctor examined Minor, before x-rays or a CT scan could be performed. Minor was three months old at the time. 2  Departmental inquiry uncovered an active warrant for Mother for driving under the influence of drugs. Her criminal history included another warrant for battery, and Father had active warrants for attempted murder, domestic violence, and criminal threats. Family members reported concern for Minor’s safety based on domestic violence in the home, including another recent incident in which Mother was injured. Mother admitted in text messages to a friend that she had a restraining order against Father and she told the friend that if she were found with Father, “[Minor] will get taken.” Mother also told her friend that Father kicked Minor in the head while she held him, and he kicked her in the ribs, knocked her down, and tried to stab her. Mother thought the relationship could recover if Father “went to therapy.” Mother refused housing with relatives conditioned on leaving Father. Mother was located by deputies at the paternal grandparents’ home the same day she had been to the emergency room with Minor. Mother told the deputies that, two days earlier, she tripped on a toy while running from Father when he forced his way into the home. Scans at the hospital disclosed Minor suffered a skull fracture; Minor was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit. The skull fracture was underneath the large hematoma on Minor’s head. Elevated liver enzymes indicated possible abdominal trauma. Minor had bruising to his left knee, left shoulder, and left ear, and torn connective tissue in his mouth. Minor was placed in a full body cast to avoid injuring himself when moving his body. 3  CFS obtained a detention warrant and filed a dependency petition seeking the juvenile court’s protection for Minor based on physical abuse, domestic violence, and both parents’ unresolved substance abuse. (§ 366, subds. (a), (b), (e).) The petition alleged Mother’s failure to rehabilitate from substance abuse “place[s] [Minor] at risk for abuse and neglect” by “impair[ing] her ability to provide appropriate care and supervision for [him].” CFS continued its investigation in advance of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Mother said in an interview that Minor received his injuries from Father “stomping and kicking” her while Mother was on the ground. Father denied the abuse, claiming Minor was injured in a fall while in Mother’s care. Mother was 23 years old when Minor was detained. She had been smoking marijuana for 10 years, beginning at age 13. She told the social worker in December 2024 that, after Minor was detained, she enrolled in a treatment program. She reported to the social worker that, after joining the program, she had “been clean for three weeks.” The next month, a January 2025 progress report from Mother’s substance abuse program indicated she had tested positive for marijuana use seven times since entering the program and that she did not have a clean test until early January 2025. Her next three tests in January 2025 were negative. Mother’s reunification case plan included outpatient substance abuse treatment, domestic violence classes, parenting education, individual therapy, and random drug testing. 4  Medical reports submitted before the jurisdiction hearing summarized Minor’s injuries as acute closed head trauma that included a displaced skull fracture, acute abdominal trauma indicative of “abusive squeezing,” oral trauma, and injuries to his left upper and lower extremities. The court noted that Minor’s injuries included two broken ribs and torn frenulum connective tissue in his mouth, “which can be caused by shoving something in[], such as a baby bottle.” The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true, including dependency jurisdiction based on Mother’s unresolved history of substance abuse. The court ordered reunification services for Mother and denied them for Father given the severity of the physical abuse. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(5) & (6).) In August 2025, CFS’s report for the six-month review hearing recommended that Mother “needs to complete the remainder of her services to address her history of substance abuse and domestic violence to demonstrate she can provide adequate care for [Minor].” The report observed that due to Minor’s infancy, Mother’s reunification period would typically be limited to another six months. Mother missed four random drug tests for the Department in the review period before the six-month review hearing. In her case plan, she agreed that “[a]ny missed or diluted test will be considered a positive test.” Mother had negative drug tests through her substance abuse program on or near the four dates she missed for random Department testing. Mother had negative tests on 10 other dates between late February 2025 and the review hearing in late August 2025. Mother tested positive for amphetamines on April 4, 2025. 5  Mother requested, and her social worker provided, a gas card for Mother to attend the six-month review hearing on August 25, 2025. Among other findings, the juvenile court found at the hearing that the Department had provided reasonable services through that date. The court continued reunification services for Mother for another six months. For the 12-month review hearing, the Department initially recommended extending Mother’s reunification services for another six months. Mother had completed four of 12 domestic violence classes and four of eight individual therapy sessions, with reports from both programs showing progress. Mother had transitioned in her substance abuse program from outpatient services to recovery services, and was reported to be “doing well,” including by engaging with her peers. During the review period, Mother tested negative for drugs or alcohol 13 times through her substance abuse program. In random Departmental testing, Mother tested negative seven times, but she missed 10 tests, including in late December 2025 before the early January 2026 review hearing. Mother’s cue color on call-in for random testing was brown; Mother said she believed her testing color was red and she claimed she called the testing service three times to determine if her color had changed from red. Mother reported that her weekly visits with Minor had been “going well.” Mother generally missed the first and last half hour of each visit. Her visitation order provided for at least three hours per week with Minor, and the foster parent who monitored visits made Minor available for a total of four hours: two hours twice a week at CFS’s Yucca Valley office. 6  The juvenile court continued the 12-month review hearing scheduled for January 9, 2026, when the Department changed its recommendation from continuing reunification services to terminating them, based on the latest missed drug test in late December 2025 and Mother’s still incomplete case plan. Before continuing the hearing on January 9, the court at the hearing ordered Mother to test that day. At the new hearing date on January 23, 2026, the court again continued the hearing to late February 2026. Mother tested negative on January 9, January 12, and January 23, with test results pending from January 29, as of the February 27, 2026 hearing date. Mother falsified her test result for her January 29 testing date. She altered the date of a previous negative test and resubmitted it as a new test result. Neither the court nor the Department were aware of the false test result at the rescheduled 12-month review. At the hearing, the Department reverted to its original recommendation that the court continue Mother’s reunification services for another review period. In addition to three January 2026 negative test results (not including the later falsified January 29th test), Mother represented that she had three domestic violence prevention sessions left to attend, she would soon complete individual counseling, and she had transitioned to after- care in her substance abuse program. The court adopted CFS’s recommendation, extending Mother’s reunification period to the 18-month mark. The court expanded Mother’s visitation to three hours twice a week and also found CFS provided reasonable reunification services through the 12-month review period. 7  Mother completed most of the components of her case plan by the 18-month review hearing, except substance abuse testing. She continued to miss testing dates in the final review period—as many as seven, with only one explained. She failed to test on January 29, February 5, February 26, March 3, April 2, June 5, and July 2. Mother told the social worker regarding the missed April 2 test that she was denied testing when she arrived, but Mother refused the worker’s request for details, including the test location. Mother said she had a negative test result for the missing March 3 date, which the worker later verified. Mother admitted she falsified the January 29 negative test result, but only after the social worker checked Mother’s submitted result against the test site’s receipt, which confirmed Mother missed her test that day. The social worker also discovered Mother lied about not being able to test on the missed February 5 date because she was hospitalized. Mother’s last test before the July 7 contested 18-month review hearing was a negative test on May 27, 2026. Mother continued to miss tests as the 18-month review approached: she failed to appear for tests on June 5 and on July 2, just before the hearing date. The social worker’s primary concern in recommending termination of reunification services was Mother’s poor record of missing random drug tests. The continual failure to test meant Mother “has not removed the threat of substance abuse”; moreover, Mother had “exhausted the statutory time frame [for] reunification.” 8  In addition to the missed tests, the social worker’s report noted Mother’s pattern of cancelling visits with Minor or leaving them early, including regularly by an hour or more, which Mother minimized as “10-15 minutes early.” Mother’s explanations included telling the visitation monitor she could not make the February 5 visit because she was traveling, while she told the social worker she was at the hospital, which was untrue. Mother testified at the contested hearing. She testified that she falsified the January 29 test result “out of fear” and that she missed the February 5 test date not because she was in the hospital or traveling, as she had previously said, but because she was working and “had to make money.” She testified she confused the dates she was hospitalized: it had been December 5, not February 5. Mother testified she missed her February 26 test because she hung up the phone too quickly, before hearing that her assigned color for random testing was called. She also missed tests because she did not know her color for the randomized call-in tests. Mother testified she sometimes could not test in her hometown of Yucca Valley and would have to go to San Bernardino, “hours” away, but she was hindered by lack of transportation. She said she communicated the problem to CFS in March or April of 2026, but “nothing” was done to assist her. She acknowledged she received bus passes before she obtained a car in early April. She also said she “got, like, two gas cards.” She explained her recent missed visitation was due to her work schedule or medical issues. 9  The social worker testified Mother was provided with transportation assistance that included bus passes and, on the few times she requested them, gas cards. When Mother’s counsel asked the social worker if she were aware Mother had “transportation issues” affecting her visitation, the worker responded that Mother made no such complaints. To the contrary, the worker expressed concern that Mother provided inconsistent reasons to CFS and to Minor’s caretaker regarding leaving visits early, sometimes telling one “she’s going to work” while blaming in statements to the other, variously, the visitation “schedule, location, being bored, . . . just different conflicting statements.” The social worker testified the Department’s principal concern was Mother’s missed tests, inconsistent testing, and the falsification of her testing record and reasons why she missed tests. These factors raised concerns about Mother’s truthfulness and her drug sobriety, and, in turn, Minor’s safety. The worker noted, for instance, that “it looks like Mother chooses to go [to testing on dates] when she knows quite well her color was not called,” consistent with hiding drug use. The worker acknowledged that a few dates initially listed as no-shows turned out subsequently to have negative test results or Mother had a valid reason for not taking a test, such as testing positive for Covid. On other dates Mother claimed to have tested, she did not furnish promised documentation or tell the social worker where she tested. In an updated report provided to the court between hearing dates, social workers summarized that they confirmed with Mother’s Yucca Valley testing site that Mother 10 missed 21 tests at the site, dating back to the beginning of the case in November 2024. She had 14 negative tests there. She tested positive for amphetamines on April 4, 2025. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that returning Minor to Mother’s custody would create substantial detriment to Minor. The court noted “how [Mother] performed on her program is obviously relevant to that consideration, whether there’s going to be a risk to the child.” The court commended Mother for “progress in several aspects of her program.” The court found Mother’s missed tests “very concerning,” noting the standard warning to her and parents in dependency proceedings that “a missed test is considered a positive test.” While the court observed “it would be different if it was a few missed tests,” Mother’s 21 missed tests at her Yucca Valley location, out of approximately 35 testing opportunities there, meant that she “chose not to test for one reason or another” approximately “two-thirds of the time.” The court analogized that if Mother had missed that much of her domestic violence program or her individual counseling, it would show detriment by indicating “she didn’t benefit from that part of the program.” “In fact,” the court observed, “those services would have been terminated for lack of participation.” The court found the missed tests “telling” because they represented multiple opportunities “to succeed or to fail,” particularly because the court, in extending services to 18 months, had overruled CFS’s concern about “all of the missed tests,” as discussed “abundantly” at the last review. Mother to that point had missed 14 random tests at the Yucca Valley facility and then missed “seven more times.” The court noted that the 11 concern in requiring the tests was “can [Mother] maintain sobriety,” to “make sure that the child is going to be safe and well-cared for.” The missed tests indicated to the court “lack of . . . awareness” of the importance of “every aspect of this case plan,” including “how important it is for a child to have a safe environment, including one where the parent will comply with what they have to do. It shows a lot to this Court.” The court added as “very concerning” that Mother “has been untruthful in many ways.” The court found the forged test result “extremely problematic” because “you go from a lie [about whether or why a test was missed], which was already bad,” to “outright forgery” perpetrated “on CFS” and the court. While Mother said she did it “out of fear,” the court noted Mother continued to miss tests in the new and final review period, lending support to the inference that Mother actually feared “maybe that was [going to be] a positive test”—to be concealed by skipping it and fabricating evidence. The court noted other grounds on which Mother lacked credibility. These included saying that she had “transportation issues” requiring her “to leave [visits] 20 minutes earlier in order to get a bus,” which the court ordinarily would be “very sympathetic to that.” But the court found Mother “actually left the visits 45 minute[s early], came an hour late, left one hour early.” The court concluded Mother’s visits “were inconsistent at best.” The court also questioned Mother’s truthfulness regarding difficulties in testing or in transportation to visits. The court observed that Mother “indicated that she was not currently working, so I don’t know . . . why there were missed tests and missed visits in the last few months . . . .” Additionally, Mother never 12 complained of transportation problems for her parenting classes or “things of that nature,” but only as to testing in her hearing testimony. The court noted further that after 18 months of reunification services, Mother’s visits remained supervised, making Minor’s return to Mother’s custody unlikely even if services could be extended. The juvenile court found Minor could not be safely returned to Mother’s custody at the 18-month review and that the Department had provided reasonable reunification services. The court terminated Mother’s court-ordered reunification services and set a .26 hearing for December 2026. The court reduced Mother’s visitation with Minor in anticipation of the .26 hearing, but doubled the Department’s recommendation of one visit a month for two hours, to two hours twice a month. Also over the Department’s objection, the court authorized a bonding study for Mother and Minor. DISCUSSION Mother contends the juvenile court erred: (1) in finding a risk of detriment if Minor were returned to her physical custody at the 18-month review hearing, (2) in finding the Department provided reasonable reunification services and in not extending services, and (3) in reducing her visitation before the pending .26 hearing. We address each of these contentions in turn. A. Risk of Detriment “The Legislature has determined the juvenile court may generally offer family reunification services for a maximum period of 18 months. [Citations.] At the 18-month permanency review hearing the juvenile court must order a child returned to a parent’s 13 custody unless it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child will create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being.” (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864, fn. omitted (Georgeanne G.); see § 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]he risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400, italics omitted.) “We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for substantial evidence.” (Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864.) “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Mother misplaces reliance on Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322 (Jennifer A.) to argue that her missed tests and credibility concerns did not establish risk of harm to Minor. Mother says of Jennifer A. that the reviewing court “granted writ relief because technical noncompliance with testing did not, in context, constitute substantial evidence of detriment.” 14  Context, however, makes all the difference. In Jennifer A., the children were removed from the mother’s custody because she left them alone on one occasion when she had to go to work; the father had not yet arrived home by the time she had to leave because his car broke down. (Jennifer A., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1343-1344.) The mother missed nine of 95 twice-weekly drug testing obligations, was unable to void once, had diluted specimens five times (after being told to drink “a lot” of fluids to be able to void for the tests), and she tested positive for marijuana once, with no prior substance abuse history. (Id. at pp. 1330, 1333-1334, 1343.) Mother admitted and regretted her marijuana use the time she tested positive. (Id. at p. 1339.) The reviewing court found no evidence linking the mother’s single use of marijuana to her parenting skills or judgment where she was cooperative with the social worker and her case plan, had progressed to a trial period of custody with her children with no noted concerns, and otherwise displayed appropriate parenting and good judgment. (Id. at pp. 1346-1347.) Mother’s conduct here stands in marked contrast where she missed two-thirds of her random tests, falsified evidence and demonstrably lied about missed tests, was not credible about missing or substantially curtailed visits, and never progressed to unmonitored visitation or home visits. The juvenile court reasonably could regard Mother’s credibility and character as paramount concerns to ensure Minor’s safety, given the grievous harm he suffered from her prior lapses in judgment. The court had also extended reunification services at the 12-month review hearing so that Mother could demonstrate reliable compliance with random testing, but she did not do so. 15  Mother argues her missed tests did not “establish what the result of an unperformed laboratory test would have been,” but the pattern, timing, and pervasiveness of Mother’s missed tests supported an inference she was hiding drug use. Mother would not meet with the social worker at home, only over the telephone, she had a pervasive, 10-year history of marijuana use dating back to when she was 13 years old, her arrest warrant history included driving under the influence of drugs, she tested positive for amphetamines, and there was evidence she attempted with a prior caretaker—a relative— to purchase cocaine. Mother knew a missed test constituted a positive test under her case plan, but skipped them anyway, supporting the conclusion those tests would have been positive had she taken them. On appeal, we “must be ever mindful of the fact that it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) The juvenile court is “the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses; we are not.” (Id. at pp. 1371-1372.) Mother argues she substantially completed her case plan, but “simply complying with the reunification plan by attending the required therapy sessions and visiting the children is to be considered by the court; but it is not determinative. The court must also consider the parents’ progress and their capacity to meet the objectives of the plan; otherwise the reasons for removing the children out-of-home will not have been ameliorated.” (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143.) The question remains 16 “whether the counseling, therapy or parenting classes are doing any good.” (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.) Mother continually demonstrated she could not be counted on to comply with an essential component of her case plan, despite reminders from the Department and extensions by the juvenile court. Nor did she consistently visit Minor, establish she was free of her lengthy history of substance abuse, or provide any evidence she could safely and protectively parent him if he were returned home. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s detriment finding. B. Reasonable Services At the 18-month review hearing, “[t]he court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) “The court shall not order that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 be held unless there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(C)(iii).) “The . . . reasonableness of the [Department’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.” (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence. (In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061-1062.) “In reviewing the reasonableness of the 17 services provided, [an appellate] court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) Since Mother bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal, she must show that the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) Mother contends the Department “did not adequately address the known transportation and testing barriers.” (Boldface and capitalization removed.) Mother relies on her testimony that she informed the Department in “March or April” about testing difficulty at her Yucca Valley site, requiring her to go to San Bernardino. Mother also says she told the social worker the visitation schedule did not work for her, but no change was made because of the monitor’s schedule. Mother claims the juvenile court should have extended her reunification services to 24 months under section 366.22, subdivision (b)(2)(A), which opens reunification services for another six months when reasonable services have not been provided. These contentions are answered by Mother’s poor credibility. As to visits, the social worker testified Mother’s excuses for missed or shortened visits were contradictory and did not involve transportation, and the juvenile court found Mother’s scheduling claim unpersuasive. In particular, the court noted that Mother “was not currently working, so I don’t know . . . why there were missed tests and missed visits in the last 18 few months.” Additionally, the court found generally that Mother’s irregular and “spotty” visits weren’t satisfactorily explained, indicating the court rejected Mother’s claim of a scheduling conflict and her other excuses. As to testing, we similarly must presume the court credited the social worker’s testimony that she addressed the transportation issue Mother raised, which only involved gas cards, not a lack of nearby random testing. Moreover, we note that the 21 missed tests the juvenile court faulted Mother for were at her hometown Yucca Valley testing site, not elsewhere, as reflected in the social workers’ supplemental report. Consequently, Mother does not meet her burden to establish the juvenile court erred in finding the Department’s visitation and testing services were reasonable. C. Reduced Visitation Section 366.21, subdivision (h), requires the juvenile court to continue visitation pending a .26 permanent plan selection and implementation hearing, unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child. The statute does not require maintaining the frequency of visitation provided in the reunification period. (§ 366.21, subd. (h).) Once reunification services are terminated, the focus shifts to providing dependent children with stable, permanent homes. (Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145.) Parental interests, including in visitation, are “no longer ‘paramount,’ ” but instead wane in favor of permanency and stability. (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090.) 19  Mother argues that the Department’s rationale for reducing visitation because reunification services ended and the focus shifted to permanency “falls with the termination order.” Mother states: “If this Court directs a new review hearing and the juvenile court orders additional services, the visitation reduction should likewise be vacated . . . .” This conditional argument fails because no new review hearing is required, given that Mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s detriment and reasonable services findings are without merit. Moreover, with the shift in focus to planning for permanency, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s partial reduction in visitation. DISPOSITION Mother’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS LEE J. We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. RAPHAEL J. 20