Gillespie v. Superior Court CA4/1

Filed 11/4/26 Gillespie v. Superior Court CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GILLESPIE, D088222 Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. SCD307508) v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on petition for writ of mandate challenging an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Melinda Lasater, Judge. Relief denied. Jo E. Super, Chief Deputy, Office of the Primary Public Defender and Katie A. Nagler, Deputy Public Defender for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent.  Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Linh Lam, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Valerie Ryan, Assistant Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Reilly McFadden, Deputy District Attorney for Real Party in Interest. INTRODUCTION Crystal Gillespie seeks writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying her application for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code1 section 1001.36. The trial court determined Gillespie was ineligible for diversion and did not reach the question whether she is suitable for diversion. The court found that Gillespie suffered from three diagnosed mental disorders but ruled she was ineligible on the grounds that none of the disorders was a significant “motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor” to her involvement in the grand theft she was alleged to have committed. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) Gillespie contends the trial court erred by relying on expert opinion testimony that should not have been considered because it was based on reasoning that was “assisted” by “unreliable and unverifiable” artificial intelligence (AI). She contends the court also applied the wrong legal standard when assessing eligibility, and that its findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We decline to disturb the court’s credibility finding that the expert’s use of AI had no impact on the independence of the expert opinion, and we conclude the court applied the correct legal standard when it assessed Gillespie’s eligibility for diversion. While the evidence presents a close case, we also conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Gillespie’s mental disorders were not a significant factor in the commission of the charged grand theft. Gillespie’s request for relief is therefore denied. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Grand Theft Charge In April 2025, as captured by video surveillance, Gillespie and two other individuals spent about 50 minutes selecting merchandise from a Marshalls store and loading it into shopping carts. Loss prevention officers called law enforcement after observing the group leave the store and load the items into a U‑Haul truck. The police located the U‑Haul truck traveling on a nearby street and tried to initiate a traffic stop. The driver refused to pull over and led the officers on a 15‑minute, nine‑mile, high-speed chase. When the truck finally stopped, the driver fled on foot and Gillespie was found hiding in the cargo area. The police recovered $1,673 worth of Marshalls merchandise and a blue Marshalls shopping cart in the back of the truck. According to the police report and the testimony at the subsequent preliminary hearing, “a glass pipe with a bulbous end and burnt residue” was found under the driver’s seat. When Gillespie was arrested, she claimed she never went inside the Marshalls and was in the back of the U-Haul truck fixing her bike. But when confronted with the video surveillance footage, Gillespie admitted to going inside the Marshalls. The San Diego District Attorney filed a complaint charging Gillespie with grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) while acting in concert with two or more people (§ 12022.65, subd. (a)), and alleging that she had a prior strike 3 conviction (§ 667, subds. (b) through (i)). Gillespie was held to answer on the charge and all allegations. II. Motion for Pretrial Mental Health Diversion In January 2026, Gillespie filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. She asserted she had been diagnosed with three qualifying mental disorders and the disorders played a significant role in her commission of the charged grand theft.2 She submitted a report from Dr. Lauren Vickerman, forensic psychologist. Vickerman reviewed the felony complaint, the police reports, and Gillespie’s medical records from mental health care she received from May 2021 to November 2022, and conducted an 85-minute clinical interview of Gillespie. The People opposed mental health diversion. They conceded Gillespie had been diagnosed with three qualifying mental disorders that satisfied the requirements of section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1), specifically bipolar I disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and methamphetamine use disorder. 2 Section 1001.36, subdivision (b), sets forth two requirements for a defendant to be eligible for mental health diversion. First, the defendant must have been “diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the disorder must have been “a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) “If the defendant satisfies the statutory eligibility requirements, the court must next consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion under the four criteria set forth in section 1001.36, subdivision (c), all of which must be met.” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679 (Gomez).) Here, as noted, the trial court based its ruling on a finding that Gillespie was ineligible for diversion and did not reach the question of suitability. We therefore limit our discussion of the evidence and the parties’ contentions relevant to the eligibility requirements only. 4 They conceded the diagnoses triggered a presumption under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), that her mental disorders were “a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that [they were] not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to [her] involvement in the alleged offense.” To rebut the presumption of a causal nexus, the prosecution relied on a report from its own mental health expert, Dr. Nicole Friedman. A. Dr. Lauren Vickerman’s Report Vickerman diagnosed Gillespie with severe bipolar I disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and severe methamphetamine use disorder. She provided the following opinions about Gillespie’s symptoms and the connection between her mental disorders and the charged offenses. Gillespie “present[ed] with a significant history of mood dysregulation consistent with bipolar I disorder,” and her “manic and depressive symptoms have resulted in significant functional impairment including legal issues, increased substance use, interpersonal issues, and difficulties with housing and employment.” Her generalized anxiety disorder created heightened anxiety, difficulty asserting boundaries, and increased susceptibility to peer pressure. And her severe methamphetamine use disorder was characterized by “[e]vidence of psychological dependence, tolerance, and withdrawal,” as well as “significant life impairment.” Vickerman explained that “the substance use disorder has contributed to episodes of impaired judgment, impulsivity, and behavioral disinhibition, particularly during periods of acute intoxication.” Gillespie’s methamphetamine use disorder was in early remission at the time of Vickerman’s diagnosis. Gillespie reported she first used methamphetamine at age 15, but “discontinued use at age 22 upon becoming 5 pregnant and remained abstinent for approximately 4.5 years.” But then, a few years before she committed the instant offense, she relocated to San Diego and experienced a “a severe return of problematic methamphetamine use.” She became homeless and lost custody of her son, and “her continuous use persiste[d] until . . . [her] arrest served as a significant wake-up call and motivator for change.” She reported that she had obtained stable housing and remained abstinent since her arrest. Vickerman’s written report included a detailed history of Gillespie’s mental health background as recorded in medical records from the Areta Crowell Center, where she was treated from May 2021 to November 2022. Significant here, the records document a manic episode and a psychiatric hospitalization in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Gillespie “was removed from her . . . hotel through the Welfare to Work program in August [2021] following a manic episode.” And in February 2022, she was reported to have “had a significant emotional episode, resulting in a [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 psychiatric hold[3] at Sharp Grossmont [Hospital].” 3 “When a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to themselves, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, professional person in charge of a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, member of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, designated members of a mobile crisis team, or professional person designated by the county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment in a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment and approved by the State Department of Health Care Services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150.) 6  During her interview with Vickerman, Gillespie also described a history of “multiple psychiatric hospitalizations under [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 . . . occurring frequently between 2013 and 2018.” She described a history of manic episodes, and “reported that during manic episodes, she engaged in problematic behaviors including excessive spending, hypersexual activity, and going days without sleep.” When Vickerman asked Gillespie about the charged offense, she stated her motivation was “feeling anxiety and a desire to be accepted by the group.” Gillespie explained “feeling pressure to be accepted by the group she was with, despite not getting along well in that social circle. [She] stated she was not taking her prescribed psychiatric medication at the time of the alleged incident.” She said she was “ ‘not typically a thief,’ ” and acknowledged her decision to participate was “ ‘not a wise decision in the first place.’ ” In terms of her bipolar diagnosis, Gillespie reported she was “experiencing a ‘low’ mood at the time of the offense. She also reported that she was ‘very high on meth’ at the time of the incident and was using methamphetamine daily.” She attributed her actions to wanting acceptance and suppressing her anxiety, and said “her decision[-]making would have been different if she had been sober, and she had difficulty setting boundaries when not sober.” Vickerman characterized Gillespie as “a fair historian” who “demonstrated fair insight.” Vickerman concluded that Gillespie’s untreated severe mental illness, active substance abuse, and environmental stressors (including homelessness and lack of social support) “directly contributed to . . . [her] involvement in theft, evasion, and related offenses,” and “[t]he nexus between her psychiatric and substance use disorders and the alleged criminal behavior is supported by her clinical presentation, self-report, and the circumstances of the offense.” 7  Addressing the psychiatric symptoms Gillespie experienced from bipolar I disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, Vickerman noted that she was not taking her prescribed medicine when the charged offense was committed and opined that this resulted in uncontrolled symptoms. She explained, “Research indicates that bipolar I disorder is associated with elevated impulsivity and impaired decision-making and risk-taking, even outside of manic phases[;] while bipolar depression commonly involves hypersomnolence and marked social withdrawal that further interfere with everyday functioning. Comorbid generalized anxiety disorder is also linked with greater symptom severity, poorer psychosocial functioning, and executive-function deficits, including inattention and decision-making, which together can further compromise risk assessment and judgment when mood symptoms are untreated. . . . Gillespie described being in a ‘low’ at the time, with symptoms consistent with a depressive episode. Her generalized anxiety disorder contributed to heightened anxiety, difficulty asserting boundaries, and increased susceptibility to peer pressure. [She] reported feeling pressure to be accepted by peers, and this, in combination with her anxiety and substance use, increased her likelihood of participating in the offense.” (Italics added.) As to Gillespie’s methamphetamine use, Vickerman explained that “Gillespie was actively using methamphetamine daily and reported being ‘very high on meth’ during the offense. Acute intoxication with methamphetamine is associated with significant impairment in judgment, impulse control, and decision-making. Her severe methamphetamine use disorder contributed to risky, impulsive behavior and poor decision-making at the time of the incident.” Vickerman’s report noted that drug paraphernalia 8 had been found by police officers in the U-Haul when they searched it after Gillespie was arrested. Gillespie filed a supplemental expert report by Vickerman. Vickerman updated her original report after reviewing additional police reports and the preliminary hearing transcript, which both recounted that Gillespie initially lied to police about her involvement in the theft. In her supplemental report, Vickerman acknowledged Gillespie’s description of events during the clinical interview differed in some respects from the account reflected in the preliminary hearing but maintained there was a nexus between Gillespie’s mental health diagnoses and the alleged offense. B. Dr. Nicole Friedman’s Report Friedman’s assessment of Gillespie was based on the arrest report, the complaint and charging documents, Gillespie’s motion for diversion and supplemental filing, including both of Vickerman’s expert opinion reports, and the People’s opposition. Friedman did not interview Gillespie, but she reviewed two short surveillance videos of the alleged offense (each 30 seconds or less in length). Important here, Friedman disclosed in her report that she had used AI to help generate the report. Friedman stated, “AI was used to help organize timeline and symptoms and[/]or behaviors to demonstrate the nexus.” Friedman’s report included a section that briefly addressed Gillespie’s medical records and pre-offense mental health history. In that section, Friedman incorrectly reported that, prior to the date of the offense, Gillespie’s medical records contained “[n]o documentation” of an acute psychiatric hospitalization, manic episode, psychotic symptoms, or severe functional decompensation. 9  Friedman agreed with Vickerman that Gillespie’s diagnosed mental disorders “are clinically associated with impaired judgment, increased impulsivity, and heightened susceptibility to environmental influence.” But she disagreed with Vickerman’s opinion that the disorders were motivating, causal, or contributing factors in the charged conduct. Addressing the psychiatric symptoms Gillespie experienced from bipolar I disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, Friedman opined: “While [Gillespie’s] diagnoses are associated with impaired judgment, increased impulsivity, and susceptibility to environmental influence, the available records do not identify objective evidence of psychiatric symptoms present at or near the time of the offense. The offense conduct of entering the store with co-defendants, participating in the coordinated collection and transport of merchandise, and being found inside the U-Haul [truck] was characterized by organized, goal directed, and collaborative actions, as well as subsequent organized and strategic post-offense behavior, including denial and alternative explanation. These behaviors reflect intact executive functioning and reality testing. There is no documentation of acute psychiatric decompensation, such as mania, psychosis, or severe anxiety, temporally linked to the offense.” Friedman further explained: “The available records do not identify objective evidence of psychiatric symptoms present at or near the time of the offense, and the behavior described includes coordinated, goal-directed actions, and subsequent strategic reasoning which reflects intact executive functioning and reality testing. At the same time, such organization is not, in itself, inconsistent with psychiatric impairment, as individuals with these conditions may exhibit disinhibition, reward driven decision[-]making, and susceptibility to co-defendant influence without overt disorganization. 10 However, in the absence of documented symptom expression temporally linked to the offense, and given the presence of organized, purposeful behavior, there is clear and convincing evidence that[ ] Gillespie’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” As to Gillespie’s methamphetamine use, Friedman did not credit Gillespie’s report that she was “ ‘very high on meth’ ” during the offense. Her specific reason for not crediting Gillespie was a lack of evidence in the record to corroborate her “self-report.” Friedman explained, “while . . . Vickerman reports that . . . Gillespie endorsed methamphetamine use . . . at the time of the offense, this self-report is not independently corroborated in the contemporaneous records[;] nor does the available evidence demonstrate observable impairment consistent with substance intoxication . . . during the commission of the offense.” Friedman did not acknowledge or address the drug paraphernalia that had been found by police officers under the driver’s seat in the U-Haul truck. III. Trial Court’s Denial Order At the diversion hearing in March 2026, the trial court received both expert reports into evidence, overruling Gillespie’s objection to the admission of Friedman’s report based on her use of AI. Defense counsel asserted the report was unreliable and should be excluded because the prosecution would be unable to establish that Friedman’s reliance on AI satisfied the 11 Kelly/Frye4 test for the admission of evidence that is based upon the application of a new scientific technique. The court rejected the contention, stating that use of AI was “very common” and “just because something involves AI” does not mean “that automatically, there’s a problem with it.” The court interpreted Friedman’s report to disclose that AI was used to develop a timeline and said the defense would be entitled at the hearing to probe further about Friedman’s use of AI to arrive at her opinion.5 Friedman, but not Vickerman testified at the hearing. She confirmed her opinion that Gillespie’s mental disorders did not play a role in her commission of the charged offense. Friedman explained the symptoms of people with bipolar I disorder and generalized anxiety disorder in an acute phase of the illness can overwhelm their decision-making ability. But in her view, when not experiencing an acute phase of the illnesses, someone with Gillespie’s diagnoses has “the ability to think calmly, understand consequences, [and] be more grounded in reality.” Friedman explained that people with bipolar I disorder can have “a manic phase, . . . racing thoughts, impulsivity, reckless behavior” and 4 People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly); Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013. The test requires “a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community.” (Kelly, at p. 30.) 5 Gillespie asserted Friedman’s report should be excluded for a second reason. She claimed Friedman violated her privacy rights by putting her medical records “in the public sphere . . . without a court order” when she disclosed their content to the AI platform that she used. Gillespie did not renew this objection to the report in her petition for writ of mandate, and so, we do not address it. 12 psychosis can be a part of that where the person would experience “things that make them not grounded within reality, such as hallucinations or paranoia. Sometimes people can have an overwhelming sense of panic or anxiety” that impact their decision-making. She explained generalized anxiety disorder “could lead to paranoia, so interpreting the world where it always is feeling like a frightening place” and that “fear . . . could lead to . . . panic attacks for someone with generalized anxiety disorder, and that would be more of that physiological response that’s accompanying the cognition.” Friedman opined that Gillespie’s observable behavior on the video surveillance footage “looked pretty goal-directed” and “demonstrate[d] intact cognitive functioning” that was inconsistent with manic impulsivity or psychosis. She explained, “It appears that the individuals understood what they were doing at the time and at that store and loading things into the U- Haul [truck], and that [Gillespie] was participating in a group activity where everyone was behaving in the same manner.” The video showed “there was a strategy or reasoning behind what it was that she was doing.” The offense was not committed “in a state of disorganized behavior[;] it was more planful. . . . And it [was] strategic . . . as opposed to not being that way[.] [¶] And there was coordination. . . . [T]here were other people involved doing the same things that she was partaking in at that time. So it didn’t have, if you will, that impulsive, chaotic type of sense that might be when someone is an acute, manic state.” Friedman acknowledged that “[i]t looked like people were hurrying” on the video footage, which would be consistent with someone experiencing an episode of bipolar I disorder or generalized anxiety disorder. But, she explained, hurrying was also consistent with the need to act speedily to complete the theft before being detected. She further explained, “[I]f someone 13 is . . . in a manic state, it might appear to have some organization to it, but you’ll also see traits of it being . . . impulsive, erratic, [and] disorganized.” Friedman also found it significant that Gillespie cooperated with police when she was arrested and initially lied to them about her involvement in the charged theft offense. She testified this behavior “shows a level of reasoning and understanding . . . that there was some wrongdoing.” Friedman’s review of the record furthermore did not uncover evidence that would lead her to a contrary conclusion. For example, she stated the police report of statements Gillespie made after her arrest did not show she was “out of touch with reality.” In her view, “there was no documentation showing her behavior was not goal-oriented.” Addressing Gillespie’s severe methamphetamine use disorder, Friedman explained the symptomology includes a “strong desire to continue with the substance or having the substance, heightened physiological response that looks similar to or can be similar to these anxious disorders that we were just discussing. It can also heighten or accelerate . . . some of th[e] symptomatology [of bipolar I disorder] where someone can be on methamphetamine, and it can look like they’re having a manic type of episode with that impulsive behavior, reckless behavior, the racing thoughts. But if we take them off the methamphetamine and they have time where they’re no longer using, all of that subsides.” Friedman opined that nothing in “any of the reports or material [she] reviewed . . . appeared to show that . . . Gillespie was having an episode of methamphetamine use disorder” at the time of the charged offense. She also saw no evidence of “substance- induced psychosis or hallucinations.” Friedman acknowledged she “did read in . . . Vickerman’s report that . . . Gillespie had reported that she had been very high on 14 meth[amphetamine]” at the time of the charged offense. But Friedman did not credit Gillespie’s claim that she was under the influence of methamphetamine because she did not find evidence in the record to corroborate it. Friedman acknowledged that “people can function high on methamphetamine” without showing “signs and symptoms.” But she expected that any use of methamphetamine by Gillespie during the charged offense would have “perhaps” been corroborated “visually with the video,” or would have been recorded in the police reports. She explained, “[T]here weren’t statements that [Gillespie] made to the police at the time explaining her behavior or what her own internal experience was.” As for her use of AI, Friedman testified she uses ChatGPT under a business associate agreement, meaning it prevents the inputs from becoming part of the training model. She uses ChatGPT as “a thought partner . . . particularly, in regard to the legal questions at hand.” She also uses it to “rewrite” and “polish” her sentences. She could not provide her ChatGPT inputs for the case because she deletes “everything” after she uses it. When asked specifically if she prompted ChatGPT with any questions about the potential nexus between Gillespie’s diagnoses and the charged offense, Friedman remembered that she asked, “What would be, maybe, considered nexus or causal effect.” But she repeatedly denied using ChatGPT “to come up with an opinion.” She explained, “I used it more as an organizational tool; not as something to opine or come up with my conclusions.” On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed to the statement in Friedman’s written report that Gillespie’s medical records contained “ ‘no documentation of acute psychiatric hospitalization.’ ” Friedman admitted the statement was inaccurate and said that she left the information out of the notes she provided to ChatGPT, but considered it when formulating her 15 opinion. To further impeach Friedman’s testimony, the defense presented testimony from another expert, Kevin Diosdado, who ran Friedman’s report through an AI detection program. Diosdado testified the AI program detected the nexus section of Friedman’s report was “98 percent AI.” At the end of the hearing, the trial court found Gillespie ineligible for diversion. The court explained it had relied upon and was persuaded by Friedman’s expert opinion including her opinion that Gillespie’s statement to Vickerman that she was under the influence of methamphetamine when the charged offense was committed was uncorroborated and should not be credited. In the court’s words, “I don’t think that everything that somebody does . . . who has a mental health condition is caused by that mental health condition.” As for Friedman’s use of AI, the court found, “there was nothing in . . . Friedman’s testimony that led me to believe that the opinions that she gave and the reasons she gave for those opinions were impacted in any way by the AI.”6 DISCUSSION In May 2026, Gillespie filed a petition in this court seeking a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of mental health diversion and we issued an order to show cause. Gillespie contends the trial court erred when it denied her motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that none of her mental disorders was a significant “motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor” with respect to her involvement in the charged grand theft. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) We disagree and conclude substantial 6 Gillespie filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied for lack of changed circumstances. 16 evidence supports the court’s finding that the People satisfied their burden of proof. I. No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting Friedman’s Expert Opinion Gillespie first contends Friedman’s expert opinion should have been excluded from evidence because of the way she used AI when preparing it. In her view, Friedman’s testimony established that (1) she used AI to “formulate her opinions,” (2) her use of AI constituted a novel scientific technique within the meaning of Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, and (3) “[b]ecause [her] underlying methodology could not be tested, reproduced, or meaningfully scrutinized, the resulting opinions lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible under Evidence Code sections 801 and 802.” Although we share Gillespie’s concerns about Friedman’s reported use of AI, we must defer to the trial court’s credibility findings and consequently find no error on that basis. Our review is for abuse of discretion. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 (Sargon).) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.) Evidence Code section 801 provides that, “[i]f a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates.” (Italics added.) Evidence Code 17 section 802 provides that “[a] witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state . . . the reasons for his opinion and the matter . . . upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion. The court in its discretion may require that a witness before testifying in the form of an opinion be first examined concerning the matter upon which his opinion is based.” (Italics added.) Based on these two provisions of the Evidence Code, our high court has concluded that trial courts must exclude “expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772; see also id. at pp. 769–772.) When deciding whether expert testimony is inadmissible under these two provisions, a trial court “must simply determine whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or whether that opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture. The court does not resolve scientific controversies. Rather, it conducts a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to ‘determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other information cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that the expert’s general theory or technique is valid.’ ” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) The court’s goal “ ‘is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’ ” (Ibid.) When assessing the underlying reliability of a novel scientific technique, in particular, the proponent must demonstrate “general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community.” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.) 18  We agree with Gillespie in principle that the use of AI by a forensic psychologist to generate an expert opinion, at present, would constitute a novel scientific technique. Any such opinion, therefore, would be inadmissible absent an adequate foundation demonstrating the reliability of the psychologist’s methodology, including the “general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community.” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.) But Friedman testified repeatedly that she used ChatGPT “as an organization tool,” and did not use it to generate her opinion. She testified that ChatGPT “was not something that [she] used as creating [or] relying on to come up with an opinion.” She explained, “My opinion relies on the totality of the records that I reviewed, which includes . . . Vickerman’s report, that includes the video, that includes understanding what the Penal Code [says]. So it’s not just what . . . what ChatGPT might have told me.” The trial court accepted Friedman’s explanation as true and we are required to defer to the court’s credibility findings. Thus, we must conclude Friedman’s expert opinion was not inadmissible on the ground that it was based on a novel, unestablished scientific technique. This is because, according to her testimony, she used it to help organize and focus her thoughts but then independently analyzed the evidence and drew her own conclusions. (Cf. People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 159–160 [the use of a “computerized fingerprint matching program” to identify a suspect was not a novel scientific technique for purposes of Kelly/Frye when fingerprint analysts independently confirmed the match by conducting a standard visual comparison; People v. Johnson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1143–1151 [the use of database searches to identify a potential DNA match was not a novel technique for purposes of Kelly/Frye analysis when standard DNA testing was independently conducted to confirm the match].) 19  Pointing to evidence from which a reasonable factfinder might question Friedman’s representation that she conducted an independent analysis, Gillespie’s argues that Friedman delegated critical components of her forensic analysis to ChatGPT in a way that compromised her independence. She contends this evidence “established that [Friedman’s] use of ChatGPT extended well beyond clerical organization and into substantive legal and psychological analysis central to the court’s eligibility determination.” Specifically, Friedman testified she used ChatGPT as a “thought partner.” She posed legal questions about the Penal Code to help her understand the relevant provisions, and she asked it to answer the central question critical to her analysis: “What would be, maybe, considered nexus or causal effect.” Despite claiming an independent review, she also failed to notice that her written report, drafted with ChatGPT’s assistance, inaccurately stated that Gillespie’s medical records contained “[n]o documentation” of an acute psychiatric hospitalization, manic episode, psychotic symptoms, or severe functional decompensation—a glaring error. We agree this evidence is troubling and of the type that might lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Friedman’s opinion was not independent, as she claimed, but rather based on an unproven and unreliable delegation of her analysis to ChatGPT. But the trial court drew a different conclusion. When asked what she meant by a “thought partner,” Friedman analogized her use of ChatGPT to using a colleague as a sounding board but ultimately coming to her own conclusion as to her opinion. The trial court credited this account and additionally analogized her use of ChatGPT to the use of an intern and research attorneys by a partner at a law firm. The court explained, “there was nothing in Dr. Friedman’s testimony that led me to believe that the opinions that she gave and the reasons she gave for those opinions were 20 impacted in any way by . . . AI. So there are times when you think through something[;] she called it a thought partner. But it’s a matter of processing. . . . [I]n the end, you step back and make your own decision. And it seemed to me that’s exactly what she was doing. And she supported it in her testimony, and she supported it in her report too.” “It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness credibility.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Applying these principles, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s credibility finding, and so, we are compelled to conclude there was no abuse of discretion. II. The Record Contained Substantial Evidence Sufficient to Rebut the Presumption of a Nexus Between the Charged Offense and Gillespie’s Mental Disorders The prosecution conceded Gillespie suffered from the three qualifying diagnoses. Therefore, by statute, a causal link between Gillespie’s diagnoses and the charged grand theft is presumed under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), unless it is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” Gillespie contends the trial court erroneously relied on 21 the absence of evidence to purportedly establish, by clear and convincing evi