P.A. v. Superior Court CA1/3

Filed 11/10/26 P.A. v. Superior Court CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE P.A., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, A177373 Respondent; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY (Contra Costa County CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES Super. Ct. No. J2600275) BUREAU et al., Real Parties in Interest. P.A. seeks extraordinary writ relief from a juvenile court order setting a permanency planning hearing for his daughter, O.A. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; undesignated statutory references are to this code.) He contends the court erroneously failed to conduct a guardian ad litem hearing and requests a stay of all proceedings. We deny his writ petition and stay request. 1  BACKGROUND On May 12, 2026,1 the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (county) filed a petition alleging O.A. fell within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (§ 300, subd. (j).) It alleged P.A. failed to reunify with three of O.A.’s siblings due to his untreated mental health issues, substance use, and criminal lifestyle. It also alleged N.B. — O.A.’s mother — failed to reunify with another child in part because she was unable to protect that child from P.A.’s mental health issues. On May 10, the county detained O.A. — then two days old — due to N.B.’s attempt to leave the hospital with her against medical advice; history of drug use; testing positive for amphetamine during the pregnancy; and previous termination of parental rights regarding another child. The county filed a detention and jurisdiction report on May 13. It noted a prior juvenile court had found P.A. had a history of “mental and emotional problems including suicidal ideation and involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.” It also noted a prior court found N.B. failed to protect a child from P.A.’s mental health problems. On May 13, the juvenile court held a detention hearing. P.A. was “combative and screaming,” and the court excluded him from the proceedings. It then appointed an attorney for him. His attorney told the court P.A. wanted to represent himself, but the court denied the request. The court asked the attorney if she was “able to have a rational discussion” with P.A., and she said no. She also told the court she thought he might have had a guardian ad litem in a prior juvenile case. The court noted that “based on the information in here . . . father has a significant mental health history,” and that “based on the [c]ourt’s observations of [him] here today plus what 1 Unless otherwise noted, all dates refer to 2026. 2 transpired in the other dependency proceeding I think it may be likely that a [guardian ad litem] would be necessary.” But it noted, “since [I] cannot engage with him on a level of obtaining his consent or making the necessary findings, I cannot appoint a [guardian ad litem] here today. But that’s an issue that should be addressed hopefully when [he] is calm enough and able to comport himself in such a way to participate meaningfully in these proceedings.” It ordered O.A. detained, in part because releasing her to N.B. “would also expose the child to [P.A.].” It denied visitation to P.A. because of “how he comported himself here today.” Given his behavior, it “would really be a risky proposition for everyone involved.” On May 21, the juvenile court held another hearing. P.A. appeared with his attorney and apologized for his behavior. He was “cooperative and calm.” He denied the allegations, requested presumed father status, and answered the court’s questions about his Indian and Native Alaskan heritage. The court ordered him to have a minimum of two hours of supervised visitation each week but ordered that “if [he] is at anytime combative, not cooperative, and demonstrates a sort of behavior that he demonstrated in this courtroom, all visits are suspended pending return to court. That is completely unsafe and unacceptable and certainly in the presence of an infant child.” No one raised the issue of a guardian ad litem. On June 11, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction hearing. Before the hearing, P.A. tried to file 61 pages on his own behalf, including a request to represent himself. During the hearing, he became disruptive, and the court repeatedly told him to be quiet. It questioned him to ascertain his capacity to effectively represent himself. It inquired about statements in his papers — “ ‘[c]hildren are the blood of their parents, but the father and mother are not the blood of the children,’ ” and the “ ‘law holds him excused 3 who chose that his blood should be redeemed on any terms.’ ” He said the statements were definitions in Black’s Law Dictionary, “a settled maximum,” “due process of law,” and fundamental laws of jurisprudence. When the court asked if he understood why he was in court, he said a trial “[f]or our child,” and “somebody forged a signature to get a medical release.” He also said the court “benefit[s] off of us, the people” because “if you take my child, then you adopt it, you make money off of it.” The court asked him to explain how it makes money off adopting children, and he responded, “[t]itle 42, payments of states.” “You all get money from [t]itle 42.” The court concluded P.A. did not have the capacity to represent himself and noted its concerns about his ability to assist his attorney. At that point, P.A. told the court to “[h]ave a good day” and left the courtroom. After P.A. absented himself, the juvenile court and P.A.’s attorney discussed appointing a guardian ad litem. The court stated it had “great concerns about his ability to assist [his attorney] in this matter” but had “not had the opportunity to conduct an in-camera hearing on the issue.” His attorney stated she had spoken with P.A. about a guardian ad litem, and he was “very opposed to it.” “[H]e didn’t want a guardian ad litem making decisions for him.” The court responded, “I realize that he may not consent, but as we all know, the law is such that the [c]ourt can appoint one without the consent of the party depending on the findings to be made. And my observations thus far cause me great concern.” His attorney asked the court to appoint one for P.A., and the court set the matter for a guardian ad litem hearing on June 17. It also continued the jurisdiction hearing to July 2 and July 23. P.A. did not return to court. The juvenile court held the jurisdiction hearing on July 2 and 23 without P.A. — sustaining the county’s 4 allegations — and it conducted a disposition hearing in his absence on August 20. Despite its concerns about P.A.’s mental health, it stated “the [c]ourt has been unable to really inquire whether or not a guardian ad litem is needed. [P.A.] continues to either come into the courtroom and then leave or behave in a way that he’s asked to leave or simply not show up. And the [c]ourt doesn’t believe it can appropriately appoint a guardian ad litem without conducting a hearing with [P.A.] to assess whether or not he is currently competent or is willing and would consent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem.” Ultimately, the court ordered no services to either parent given “the complete and utter lack of engagement by the parents or any evidence presented here that would weigh in favor of offering services to the parents.” It set a permanency hearing for December 17. DISCUSSION P.A. contends the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a guardian ad litem hearing during the times he appeared in court. We disagree. “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910.) “The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case.” (Ibid.) “The effect of the guardian ad litem’s appointment is to transfer direction and control of the litigation from the parent to the guardian ad litem.” (Ibid.) “Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing at which the parent has an opportunity to be heard.” (Ibid.) “The court or counsel should explain to the parent the purpose of the guardian ad litem and the grounds for believing that the parent is mentally incompetent.” (Ibid.) “If the parent consents to the appointment, the 5 parent’s due process rights are satisfied.” (Ibid.) “A parent who does not consent must be given an opportunity to persuade the court that appointment of a guardian ad litem is not required, and the juvenile court should make an inquiry sufficient to satisfy itself that the parent is, or is not, competent.” (Id. at pp. 910–911.) “If the court appoints a guardian ad litem without the parent’s consent, the record must contain substantial evidence of the parent’s incompetence.” (Id. at p. 911.) A juvenile court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem on its own motion. (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 672.) We review a juvenile court’s failure to act, sua sponte, to determine whether a guardian ad litem should have been appointed for abuse of discretion. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) A court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) On this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion by not holding a guardian ad litem hearing during P.A.’s court appearances. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.) On the first occasion, he “came into the courtroom combative and screaming,” and the court excluded him. There was no opportunity to conduct a guardian ad litem inquiry. On the second occasion — his first while represented — he was “cooperative and calm,” and he apologized for his prior behavior. He denied the county’s allegations, requested presumed father status, and answered questions about his Indian and Native Alaskan heritage. No one raised the guardian ad litem issue and, given his behavior, the court could reasonably have concluded such an inquiry was unnecessary. (Ibid.) On the third occasion, P.A. acted erratically. He tried to file documents on his own behalf — including a request to represent himself — just before the hearing. When the court tried to ascertain his capacity to represent himself, he 6 became disruptive and made little sense when responding to questions. When the court concluded he could not represent himself, he absented himself. Again, there was no opportunity to conduct a guardian ad litem inquiry. At that point, the court set a hearing on the issue, but P.A. did not reappear. The court could not appoint a guardian ad litem in P.A.’s absence, especially given evidence that he opposed such an appointment. (In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 910–911.) Given P.A.’s conduct, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a guardian ad litem hearing. DISPOSITION P.A.’s petition for extraordinary writ relief is denied on the merits. His request for a stay is also denied. Because the section 366.26 hearing is set for December 17, 2026, our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) 7  _________________________ RODRÍGUEZ, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ TUCHER, P. J. _________________________ FUJISAKI, J. A177373; P.A. v. Superior Court 8