Marriage of C.S. and B.W. CA6

Filed 11/9/26 Marriage of C.S. and B.W. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT In re the Marriage of C.S. and B.W. H053455 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 22FL00816) C.S., Appellant, v. B.W., Respondent. In this marital dissolution action, C.S. (mother), representing herself, appeals from the trial court’s findings and order after evidentiary hearing denying her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against B.W. (father) and entering orders for joint physical and legal custody of the parties’ two minor children.1 Mother challenges both decisions as 1 Because this case involves proceedings under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), we identify the parties by their initials to safeguard the privacy interests of protected persons. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), (11).) All further unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code and unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court. legally erroneous and tainted by improper findings and procedures. Having carefully considered the entirety of the record on appeal, we are not persuaded by mother’s contentions of error. We affirm the order granting joint custody and denying renewal of the DVRO. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Initial Custody and DVRO Proceedings Father and mother married in 2018 and separated in 2022. They have two minor children, born in June 2020 and August 2021, who at the time the parties separated were ages two and less than one year old. Father moved out of the family home in March 2022. Initially after separation, mother and father agreed to a visitation schedule that provided father with 49 hours of daytime visits with the children (consisting of three days a week from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., and one day a week from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.) at the family home. According to father, this allowed him to be present when the children woke up, to spend much of the day with them on the property where they continued to reside with mother, and for mother to breastfeed the children when desired. In August 2022, mother filed the petition for dissolution, requested sole legal and physical custody of the children, and proposed that father have visitation for six hours per week (Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.). Approximately one week later, mother filed a request for DVRO. Mother alleged that, although she had initially accommodated father’s visits with the children at her home, she had more recently requested that visitation occur elsewhere (at a park) because father would show up “unannounced and uninvited” at the property (which was remote, with “sporadic” cellular service), had become “physically intimidating,” and would make “demands and threats and refuse[] to leave until” mother called the 2 police. Mother stated that father, having arrived at the home at the time previously set for his visitation, reacted angrily and refused her proposal to reset the visitation hours and location, resulting in a physical confrontation in front of the children. Mother also described incidents in which she alleged that father was physically and verbally abusive. She stated that he had grabbed and wrenched her wrist during a disagreement over his failure to properly secure one of the children in the stroller, called her “a ‘fucking asshole’ ” in front of the children, moved intimidatingly toward her as she was in a vulnerable position breastfeeding both children, and hovered near her as she tried to make breakfast in their small kitchen, repeatedly blocking her path out. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Father filed separate responses to the petition for dissolution and request for DVRO. Father asserted that mother was using the restraining order process in an attempt “to ‘gain the upper hand’ ” with respect to the divorce and custody of the children, acknowledged that “neither of us behaved as well as we could,” and suggested they would both benefit from a “mutual non-CLETS civil restraining order” and coparenting education. Father denied that he had physically or verbally abused or threatened mother. Following a hearing on the DVRO request in which both parties were represented by counsel, the trial court found that “a violation of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act ha[d] occurred and that [father] has been occasionally physically abusive in touching [mother] against or without her permission or consent.” The court also found evidence of verbal abuse. On September 2, 2022, the court imposed a DVRO against father for a period of two years with supervised visitation “at mother’s discretion as to frequency, 3 duration, and level of supervision” and referred the parties to family court services for custody mediation. The court advised, “This is not about bad people. You’re two good people in this case trying to raise two precious toddlers with different views on how that should happen. [¶] And I would encourage you to find a way to co-parent in a healthy way.” The parties participated in “child custody recommend[ed] counseling” through family court services but did not reach an agreement regarding custody and visitation. In late October 2022, the trial court issued orders adopting the custody counseling recommendations, awarding mother sole legal and physical custody and establishing visitation for father of up to 12 hours per week, with one weekly visit professionally supervised and the other visits supervised by an adult jointly selected by mother and father. The DVRO and supervised visitation schedule remained in place while the parties litigated issues related to the dissolution, including child support, property, and custody modifications. In September 2023, the trial court modified father’s visitation to add six hours per week of unsupervised visits and ruled, following a hearing, that father had rebutted the presumption under section 3044 related to child custody and domestic violence findings. The court found that father, as the restrained party, had complied with the terms and conditions of the DVRO and “ha[d] not committed any further acts of domestic violence.” Family court services thereafter submitted updated recommendations, which summarized both parties’ conduct and concerns about custody, and included the observations of the professional visit monitor. The trial court adopted those recommendations, giving father shared joint legal custody of the children (while mother retained sole physical custody) and increasing father’s visitation time to a total of 18 hours per week. This change 4 eliminated professionally supervised visitation but required “another adult to be present” for longer visits when both children were present. At a hearing in March 2024, to ease the burden on court resources, the parties agreed to use a parent coordinator. The trial court ordered additional modifications to father’s visitation, to occur after another 45 days, extending the number of father’s visitation hours. These changes included overnight visits from Friday morning to Saturday morning, supervised by the children’s paternal grandmother or another agreed-upon adult. In May 2024, mother began representing herself. Father filed a motion to modify the parenting plan to eliminate the requirement that he have a second adult present for the weekly overnight visit. Father also requested that the trial court adopt an order appointing the parenting coordinator that he and mother had previously agreed to appoint (noting mother had not yet completed the intake process to confirm the parent coordinator’s appointment). Prior to the June 2024 hearing on father’s motion, mother filed an ex parte motion requesting sole legal and physical custody and professionally supervised visits for father and alleging disclosures by the children that appeared to indicate potential physical and/or sexual abuse by father. The Santa Cruz Department of Family and Children’s Services (department) undertook a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation and drafted a safety plan for the children (safety plan). Father filed a responsive declaration denying any physical violence or inappropriate behavior with the children and noting that mother’s ex parte request came “less than two weeks before we are due back in court for a review of [the parties’] parenting plan and on [father’s] request for an increased timeshare.” 5  The trial court issued temporary emergency orders for mother and father to “follow the CPS safety plan and directives” and requiring visitation to be “non-professionally supervised . . . pending the outcome of their investigation.” At the June 2024 hearing, the court ordered the safety plan to remain in effect until completion of the department’s investigation, and that if the allegations were deemed unfounded or inconclusive, the parties would revert to the prior timeshare order. The court also ordered mother to complete the intake process for the parenting coordinator. In early August 2024, the parents stipulated to appoint the agreed- upon parent coordinator, who recommended a professional custody evaluation pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. Father informed the trial court that the department had concluded its investigation and found the abuse allegations unsubstantiated.2 Father asked the court to remove the supervision requirement for overnight visits. Mother responded with concerns about the children having regressive and more challenging behaviors. Mother attributed the children’s behaviors to a lack of supervision in visits with father and asked the trial court to modify the time share to daytime visits only, or, alternatively, to retain supervision for overnight visits. After a hearing (in which mother was represented by limited scope counsel), the court modified the parenting time share to allow father unsupervised overnight visits with the children and set a review hearing for December 2024. On August 29, 2024, mother filed a request to renew the DVRO (which was set to expire on September 1) under section 6345. Mother stated in her 2 Mother disputed father’s characterization of the CPS investigation and stated in her declaration that the department had found the allegations “ ‘inconclusive.’ ” 6 supporting declaration that she remained fearful of future abuse if the DVRO lapsed because of “all the original reasons and additional issues that have developed since.” She asserted, “[father] is angry and blames me for our custody situation, a CPS investigation, and boundaries the court has seen fit to impose. [Father] is ignoring boundaries and refusing to reduce contact, while focusing his anger and frustration at me and the [children].” Father opposed the DVRO renewal request. In October 2024, with the DVRO renewal request pending, mother filed an ex parte motion for temporary emergency custody and visitation orders because of renewed concerns about abuse of the children. The trial court temporarily suspended father’s visitation and ordered the parties to comply with the department’s investigation and any safety plan, if issued. Meanwhile, the parties stipulated to a child custody evaluation by Dr. Elizabeth Lee, including psychological testing as deemed appropriate by Dr. Lee. On October 24, 2024, the trial court ordered a “full custody evaluation” by Dr. Lee under the statutory authority of section 3111, as agreed to by the parties. The court continued the setting of a hearing on the DVRO renewal request pending the custody evaluation. At a hearing in November 2024, the trial court ordered that it would hear mother’s DVRO renewal motion after receipt of the child custody evaluation. The court reinstated father’s visitation after receiving an update from the department on the CPS investigation finding the abuse allegations unfounded. B. Hearing on Custody Evaluation and DVRO Renewal In February 2025,3 Dr. Lee submitted her confidential custody evaluation report (custody report) to the court. Based on her observations, 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2025. 7 interviews, and the psychological testing she conducted, Dr. Lee recommended in the report that mother and father share joint legal and physical custody of the children following a “ ‘223’ schedule, which would divide custody evenly” on a repeating, fortnightly schedule. After the filing of the custody report, father filed witness disclosures identifying Dr. Lee as an expert witness. On February 27, mother filed a substitution of counsel, representing herself, followed by an ex parte request to reschedule the evidentiary hearing. In an accompanying declaration, mother explained that she was substituting her counsel because her former attorney had not filed any paperwork for the upcoming hearing, and “[g]iven the complexity and importance” of the custody report’s findings, mother required additional time to review it, consult with new legal counsel, and prepare responses or objections. Mother also withdrew from the parent coordination process and informed the parent coordinator that she was “actively pursuing a licensing board complaint” against her. The trial court denied mother’s request for a continuance of the hearing, and the evidentiary hearing proceeded over the course of six days between March 4 and April 14. On March 4, mother filed a request to disqualify the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. Mother orally renewed her request for continuance, arguing her former counsel had failed to file “motions and paperwork” after receipt of the custody report, and mother needed time to orient herself in the case. The trial court struck the disqualification request on grounds that it was untimely, unverified, and the facts provided were not under penalty of perjury. The court nevertheless granted mother a seven-day continuance and directed her to provide any pretrial filings a day in advance of the continued hearing. 8  Mother filed motions in limine seeking to exclude Dr. Lee’s custody report and testimony and challenging various elements of the report as noncompliant with procedural and substantive rules. At the hearing on March 11, the trial court denied mother’s motions but indicated that it would permit her to object to the report and to Dr. Lee’s testimony as the evidence unfolded at trial. Dr. Lee testified under subpoena. Dr. Lee clarified that she was not testifying about whether domestic violence previously occurred in the case because there had been a “finding of domestic violence.” Dr. Lee also clarified that offering an opinion on renewal of the DVRO was not the topic of her report. Over mother’s objection that the document was “full of hearsay” and “slanderous,” the trial court admitted the custody report into evidence. Prior to the next hearing, mother filed additional objections and briefing challenging the custody report recommendations and in support of her five-year DVRO renewal request. Mother also filed a written report by her retained expert witness, Dr. Catherine Barrett. The trial court noted the submission of the expert report and other filings were untimely but permitted them on the ground that “procedural due process necessitates that they be considered.” During Dr. Lee’s continued testimony, she opined that mother might be “more likely” to see an unintended gesture or vocal intonation as threatening, but this potential for “overreactivity” “does not negate the previous finding of domestic violence.” In mother’s cross-examination of Dr. Lee, despite an admonition by the court that mother “might be opening a door” and noting it had “not heard an opinion from Dr. Lee” on the question of DVRO renewal, mother sought to elicit Dr. Lee’s purported opinion about renewal of the DVRO and the merits of the original DVRO. In response to mother’s cross- 9 examination, Dr. Lee denied she was “suggesting that the [c]ourt made a mistake in issuing the restraining order.” Dr. Lee opined that both parents have strengths and weaknesses, and the children would benefit from time with both. She recommended a balanced time share so that the children would not experience long periods of time without contact with either parent. Dr. Lee acknowledged that she had received a call from father prior to being retained in which he asked if she was available for an evaluation and she quoted a fee retainer. Dr. Lee also recalled that mother’s and father’s parent coordinator contacted her and told her that she was working on a case and wanted Dr. Lee “to look at it.” The trial court additionally heard testimony from mother’s expert witness, Dr. Barrett, the children’s former therapist, Craig Clark, mother’s sister, E.S., and mother’s father. The court did not permit testimony from another witness, Rob Markel, whom mother sought to introduce to testify about “safety concerns that he witnessed on the property in 2022.” The court found the proffered testimony “cumulative” because the court “ha[s] heard a lot about safety concerns” “in detail.” Dr. Barrett testified as an expert witness on forensic analysis of Dr. Lee’s report. Dr. Barrett observed that there were problematic statements and representations in the custody report that, in her experience, suggested ethical violations (utilizing statements of mother’s two older children without evidence of their informed consent), incomplete analysis (such as relying on a single psychological test, rather than an array of complementary tests) and anchoring bias (presenting father’s narrative as truth rather than going back and forth between the histories and narratives of both parties). Dr. Barrett opined that Dr. Lee’s custody evaluation did not meet the standard of care because it “did not objectively include information that was relevant of [sic] 10 both parties,” exhibited “anchoring bias,” lacked a “comprehensive assessment of domestic violence,” and relied on collateral documents and third party statements “to fit the narrative” that had been set for mother. Mother testified that since the issuance of the original DVRO in September 2022, father has engaged in “continued violations and behaviors that have maintained or escalated [her] fear” for her safety and the safety of the children. Mother described numerous incidents of inadequate supervision by father of the children in the year and months leading up to the original DVRO, times that father tried to “snatch one or both of the children” from her arms, and incidents in which he entered her living space without her consent and would stand in her way and refuse to leave when asked or otherwise violate the boundaries that she tried to set. She further testified that since the DVRO, father has shown “a clear and ongoing pattern of disregard for court orders, emotional and physical intimidation and concerning treatment of [their] children.” Mother recounted incidents in which she alleged that father escalated physically or approached in an intimidating manner during custody exchanges and described sexualized behaviors the children had exhibited that made mother “very, very concerned.” Mother stated that she remains fearful of father and for the emotional and physical safety of the children. Father testified regarding the parenting conflicts he and mother experienced and the way in which the parenting coordinator tried to work with them. During her cross-examination of father, mother sought to elicit father’s testimony about the original DVRO, including his subjective beliefs about whether he was “wrongly accused” of the acts outlined in the original DVRO request, and whether the DVRO was “unjustified and unneeded.” 11 Father replied affirmatively that he believed the original restraining order was unjustified and testified that he was not a threat to mother. Father called a rebuttal witness, Mary Sullivan-White. Sullivan-White testified regarding an incident in March at the CVS in Felton where she was employed. Sullivan-White heard mother yelling at father about child support money that he owed her and observed her advancing on him, while the children stood by. Sullivan-White saw father backing away as mother moved toward him and testified that mother did not appear to be afraid as she approached father. In her closing argument, mother emphasized that the DVRO was a final judgment that cannot be relitigated in this proceeding. Mother argued that, given father’s continued violations of the DVRO and lack of insight or remorse, a reasonable person in her position would be afraid of future abuse for herself and the children. Mother testified about the fear and concern she had for the children based on their disclosures to her “about their father,” asserted that she has striven not to jump to conclusions, and argued that Dr. Lee’s custody report should be “struck entirely” as biased, ethically compromised, and lacking in forensic integrity. C. Ruling and Statement of Decision On April 24, the trial court read its ruling on the record and indicated that a statement of decision would be forthcoming. Neither party filed a request for statement of decision specifying the controverted issues for the court to address. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (a).) On May 27, the court issued a written statement of decision.4 4 Mother filed her appeal from the statement of decision, which she characterizes in her opening appellate brief as the trial court’s judgment and order. It is unclear from the record on appeal whether the court subsequently 12  As to renewal of the DVRO, the trial court expressly found that mother’s allegations concerning father’s behaviors (i.e., appearing from a hidden location, silently walking up to her, staring at her, making aggressive motions, and calling her names) were not credible. Specifically, the court found that mother’s “asserted apprehension of future abuse [was not] that of a reasonable person under similar circumstances.” The court further found that the testimony of the CVS employee regarding mother’s conduct during a recent custody exchange “undermined [mother]’s claim” that her fear of father “was either actual or reasonable.” While the court found evidence of the children exhibiting inappropriate, sexualized behaviors “credible and corroborated,” it determined that mother’s attempts to attribute that conduct to father was “not credible,” as further evidenced by “[a]pproximately five” CPS investigations and the fact that one of the incidents occurred in mother’s home and involved the children gaining access to a massage tool kept by mother. Applying its findings to the factors that courts consider for DVRO renewal, the trial court found that (1) the initial DVRO “centered around parenting issues, [father]’s living conditions and attentiveness to the children, as opposed to acts of violence,” (2) since the DVRO, father had significantly improved his living environment and the space available for children, making “it easier for him to parent,” and had improved his attentiveness of the children and appropriately corrected or redirected them, entered a formal findings and order after hearing, though a proposed findings and order was submitted by father’s counsel. We exercise our discretion to treat the court’s statement of decision as an appealable order and, for simplicity, hereafter refer to the statement of decision as the “order.” (See Schwan v. Permann (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 678, 682, fn. 2; Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Community College District (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1192.) 13 and (3) the seriousness and degree of risk was not a threat of physical violence, while the burden on father as the restrained party was “significant.” The court concluded that mother did not establish that she has a reasonable apprehension of future harm, that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear repetition of the abuse if the order were to expire, or that it is more probable than not that a sufficient risk of future abuse warrants a judicial finding that her apprehension is genuine and reasonable. The court denied mother’s request to renew the DVRO. As to custody of the children, the trial court ruled that mother and father would share joint legal and physical custody on the 2-2-3 schedule recommended by the custody report. The court found father’s testimony “more credible” than that of mother and found that he “answered questions in a direct fashion” and “was not evasive.” It further found the neutrally appointed Dr. Lee’s expert testimony credible, and the court “relied heavily” on her custody report. The court observed that the testimony of mother’s expert, Dr. Barrett, was “interesting and informative” but “did not effectively refute the testimony of Dr. Lee or undermine its basis.” The court also took judicial notice of the order on rebuttal of the presumption under section 3044. Applying its findings to the factors under section 3011, subdivision (a), for determining best interest of the child in dissolution proceedings, the trial court ordered the 2-2-3 time share on an alternating schedule and outlined a detailed parenting plan for the time and location of exchanges, vacation and holidays, and therapy and coparenting classes (ordering mother to take a 10- week coparenting class). The court ordered mother and father to engage in civil and respectful communication, and prohibited substance use during parenting time. At a separate hearing, the court denied mother’s request to disqualify Dr. Lee. 14  II. DISCUSSION Mother raises multiple challenges to the trial court’s order. She contends the court misapplied the legal standard for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order under section 6345 and Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Ritchie) and impermissibly minimized and recharacterized the previously adjudicated DVRO. Mother also maintains that procedural failings related to the custody report undermined Dr. Lee’s neutrality and produced a defective report. In addition, mother asserts that the court abused its discretion by admitting late-disclosed testimony, excluding corroborative evidence, and denying her a continuance. Father disputes each claim. A. General Principles of Appellate Review “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson), citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 (S.C.).) When an appellant asserts a point on appeal “ ‘but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862), this court may treat the point as forfeited. We are not required to search the record for error ourselves (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246), and “[w]e are 15 not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 (Falcone & Fyke).) B. Renewal of Domestic Violence Restraining Order 1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, “a court may issue a restraining order to prevent domestic violence or abuse if the party seeking the order ‘shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ ” (Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 367.) “ ‘[A]buse’ ” means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, committing sexual assault, placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another, or engaging in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to section 6320. (§ 6203, subd. (a).) Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault. (Id., subd. (b).) It may extend to “disturbing the peace of the other party” (§ 6320, subd. (a)), referring “to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id., subd. (c).) Section 6345, subdivision (a) provides that a DVRO, which may have an initial duration of not more than five years, “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order.” The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO, first articulated in Ritchie, “is whether the protected party entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 179 (Michael M.).) In other words, “in contested cases, a court is only justified in ordering an extension of such an order where it finds to do so will advance the legislative purpose of preventing future abuse. This means it 16 must find evidence there is some reasonable risk, at least, such abuse will occur sometime in the future if the protective order is not renewed.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.) We generally review an order granting or denying a request to renew a DVRO for abuse of discretion. (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.) We review a trial court’s factual findings underlying the decision for substantial evidence. (Bailey v. Murray (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677, 684.) Whether the court applied the correct legal standard in exercising its discretion is a question of law that we review de novo. (Ibid.) “If the court’s decision to deny a renewal request is influenced by an erroneous understanding of the law, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law.” (Michael M., at p. 179.) 2. Analysis Mother contends that, while the trial court in this case accurately stated the governing law, it failed to apply it in denying her request for renewal of the DVRO. Mother maintains that the court focused on factors more relevant to the custody determination than the DVRO, including father’s “asserted compliance with the DVRO,” “perceived improvements in [] parenting and living circumstances,” and the “absence of new incidents,” and impermissibly recharacterized the original DVRO as based upon parenting issues rather than acts of violence. She asserts that the court ignored evidence bearing on her reasonable apprehension and improperly weighed the purported burden on father in denying mother’s renewal request. As Mother’s arguments are closely interwoven, we address them together. Beginning with the applicable law, there is no dispute that the trial court cited the correct legal standard for renewal of the DVRO. The court recognized that standard to be “whether the protected party entertains a 17 reasonable apprehension of future abuse” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179), or, stated differently, whether “ ‘a reasonable person, in the petitioner’s circumstances, would fear repetition of the abuse if the order expired.’ ” (G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 421 (G.G.).) Although mother asserts that the court failed to apply this standard in denying the renewal request, we do not agree. The record reflects that the trial court properly considered those factors that California courts typically address in ascertaining whether the protected party has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. First, the court “should consider the evidence and findings on which the initial DVRO was based.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.) These underlying findings and evidence are relevant to “appraising the risk of future abuse should the existing order expire.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) Mother argues that the trial court misapplied this step by improperly reframing the original DVRO as being centered around parenting issues and father’s living conditions and inattentiveness to the children—drawing on the issues addressed in Dr. Lee’s custody report—as opposed to the acts of physical and verbal abuse that underlay the DVRO. However, the record amply supports the court’s observations in this case, which followed its detailed consideration of “the DVRO, its evidence, the minutes, the order[,] and the parties’ testimony about it.” The court unequivocally accepted and restated the prior findings, namely, that “[father] ha[d] been physically abusive in touching [mother] without [mother]’s consent and [father] ha[d] been verbally abusive to [mother].” In describing the DVRO as being “centered around” coparenting challenges and concerns about father’s living conditions and attentiveness, the court did not reframe, recharacterize, or minimize the prior DVRO 18 findings, or the facts and circumstances that led to those findings. Rather, the court recognized the context in which the physical and verbal abuse took place, which the record shows happened at mother’s home, as the two parties were attempting to negotiate visitation and custody exchanges following their recent separation, and arose in connection with father’s failure to safely supervise and secure the children, who were, respectively, a young toddler and a baby. The judge’s comments following issuance of the original DVRO reaffirmed that the findings of domestic violence did not stem from willful violence but from “two good people . . . trying to raise two precious toddlers with different views on how that should happen.” The trial court’s identification of this context in reviewing the basis for the initial DVRO is relevant to the task of ascertaining the protected party’s reasonable apprehension of future abuse, including in relation to the second and third factors considered by courts—whether there have been “ ‘any significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order’ ” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180, quoting Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291) and “ ‘the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order imposes on the restrained person’ ” (Michael M., at p. 180). The question of burden on the restrained party “ ‘may or may not’ be relevant, depending on whether there is a risk of physical abuse” (G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 422), since the protected party’s physical security takes precedence over any burdens imposed by renewal. (Ibid., citing Ritchie, at pp. 1291–1292.) Mother mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings on these factors as having downgraded the prior findings of physical violence and mother’s perceived risk of future abuse. She argues that by citing the third factor and 19 finding that the “DVRO has posed a significant burden on [father],” the court improperly discounted the prior DVRO finding of physical abuse and recast the DVRO as involving “lesser forms” of abuse. These arguments fail to recognize the nature of the original DVRO finding as to physical abuse, which was that father “ha[d] been occasionally physically abusive in touching [mother] against or without her permission or consent” and that there was also “evidence of verbal abuse.” The instances of physical abuse described in the original petition and supporting the DVRO findings each arose from an instance in which father had failed to assure safe placement of a child in the bassinet or in the stroller, and had reacted to mother’s intervention by grabbing her wrist, or grabbing for the child, and an instance in which he stood in the middle of the kitchen and refused to move, blocking her way as she tried to work around him. These findings of physical (and verbal) abuse were serious enough to justify imposition of the two-year DVRO. Nevertheless, a court is not “prohibited from looking behind the [original DVRO] order itself when evaluating whether that order, often three years old, should be extended another three years or even, . . . permanently.” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) On the contrary, the court “should consider the evidence and findings on which the original DVRO was based, which will often be enough in themselves to support a renewal.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 181.) The abusive incidents that gave rise to the DVRO in this case are not acts of such extreme or intentional physical violence as would support a conclusion, without more, that a continuing apprehension of future abuse is objectively reasonable. We recognize that this is not true in all cases, where the nature of physical violence threatened or perpetrated “could reasonably be expected to give rise to a long-lasting fear of the perpetrator that could 20 continue for many years.” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 181 [reversing the denial of the DVRO renewal request based on facts including a “particularly disturbing” violation of the restraining order where the defendant threw the victim to the floor multiple times while she held their newborn baby, strangling her, and placing a knife to her throat].) We also recognize that a history of physical violence is not required for renewal, and “ ‘[t]he key consideration for the court is not the type or timing of abuse, but whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future abuse.’ ” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180; see G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 425 [clarifying that just as the “original order could be issued based on reasonable fear of nonphysical abuse, . . . it can be renewed on the same basis”]; id. at p. 426 [noting that the element of physical violence is considered only under the third Ritchie factor “as a potential limitation on the evidence offered in opposition to renewal”].) Several facto