Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 Tarin v. Super. Ct. CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE NAFISA TARIN, Petitioner, A175073 v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF (Contra Costa County CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Super. Ct. No. C23-00683) Respondent; RADC ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest. The original plaintiff in this case, Kasim Tarin (Kasim),1 filed a complaint alleging a claim against employer RADC Enterprises, Inc. (RADC), under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Private Attorneys General Act or the Act; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)2 as well as other Labor Code 1 The record is inconsistent as to the original plaintiff’s name. His operative first amended complaint listed his name as “Tarin Kasim,” but later documents filed by his counsel refer to him as “Kasim Tarin.” To avoid confusion with his successor in interest, Nafisa Tarin, we refer to the original plaintiff as “Kasim” and to his successor as “Tarin.” The record is also inconsistent as to the spelling of his successor’s first name, but “Nafisa” is used in the vast majority of references in the record, so we use it for purposes of this opinion. 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. 1 claims. After Kasim died, the trial court permitted his daughter, Nafisa Tarin (Tarin), to continue the other Labor Code claims as successor in interest, but the court concluded that she lacked standing to substitute in for purposes of the Private Attorneys General Act claim because she had never been an employee of RADC. Subsequently, the trial court denied Tarin’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to substitute in a former RADC employee as named plaintiff for purposes of the Private Attorneys General Act claim. The court reasoned that the Act’s standing and administrative exhaustion requirements preclude substitution of another plaintiff. Tarin seeks review of that decision in this petition for a writ of mandate. We hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Private Attorneys General Act precludes substitution in the circumstances here. BACKGROUND A. To strengthen enforcement of the Labor Code, the Private Attorneys General Act authorized aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties, acting as private attorneys general on behalf of the state. (See § 2699; Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116 (Adolph); see also Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 681.) An employee who sues under the Act functions as an agent of the state—the real party in interest— and may seek any civil penalties that the state can seek. (Adolph, at pp. 1116–1117; see also Turrieta, at pp. 681–682.) The benefits of the Act are intended “ ‘primarily to benefit the general public,’ ” not the employee who brings the action. (Adolph, at p. 1116.) To have standing to bring an action as an “aggrieved employee,” under the version of the Act effective at the time Kasim filed his operative Private Attorneys General Act 2 complaint on June 1, 2023,3 the plaintiff must have been employed by the employer and suffered at least one Labor Code violation by the employer. (See § 2699, former subd. (c); Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1116, 1120–1121.) Before an aggrieved employee may “commence” a lawsuit under the Act, the employee must first exhaust the claims by providing written notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (Agency) and to the employer of the specific Labor Code provisions allegedly violated, and the facts and theories supporting the alleged violations. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A).) After providing such notice, the aggrieved employee “may commence a civil action pursuant to Section 2699” if the Agency does not respond within 65 calendar days (or responds indicating the Agency does not plan to investigate the alleged violations). (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2)(A).) The purpose of the requirement is to allow the Agency to determine whether to 3 After Kasim filed his Private Attorneys General Act action, the Legislature passed amendments to the Act generally applicable to actions filed on or after June 19, 2024. (See Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1 [enacting Assem. Bill No. 2288 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), eff. July 1, 2024]; Stats. 2024, ch. 45, § 1 [enacting Sen. Bill No. 92 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), eff. July 1, 2024]; Stats. 2025, ch. 67, §§ 134–135 [enacting Assem. Bill No. 1170 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2026]; see also § 2699.5, subd. (b).) Among other changes, the amendments changed the definition of “aggrieved employee” for some purposes to “a person employed by the alleged violator who ‘personally suffered each of the violations alleged’ during a specified timeframe.” (See Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1040, 1076, fn. 19, citing § 2699, subd. (c)(1).) In addition, under the new law, the portion of the recovery paid to aggrieved employees has been increased from 25 to 35 percent. (See Stone, at p. 1076 & fn. 19, citing § 2699, subd. (m).) Here, there is no dispute that Kasim’s Private Attorneys General Act action is governed by the former version of section 2699 because it was filed before the effective date of the amendments. 3 allocate its limited resources to investigating the claims or, instead, allow the employee to proceed on the Agency’s behalf. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117.) Claims under the Act are subject to a one-year statute of limitations period under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a), which is tolled for up to 65 days during the Agency review period. (See Lab Code., § 2699.3, former subd. (d); LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1184–1185; see also Lab. Code, § 2699.3, subd. (e).) B. Kasim notified the Agency on March 24, 2023 that he was pursuing a representative Private Attorneys General Act claim against RADC. On June 1, 2023, he added his representative claim under the Act to an existing lawsuit by filing a first amended complaint. His representative claim alleged that he was an aggrieved employee under Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (c), and that RADC violated its duties to him and other aggrieved employees with respect to the provision of meal periods and rest breaks, payment of overtime and minimum wages, payment of wages in a timely fashion, payment of wages during and upon termination, provision of wage statements, provision of sick leave, and reimbursement of necessary work- related expenses. His complaint also alleged class-based claims under the Labor Code (Lab. Code, §§ 201–204, 226, 226.7, 1194, 2802) and unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). As to those claims, Kasim sought to represent a class of RADC employees who worked in California during the period from October 1, 2018 to the present. After Kasim died in January 2025, the trial court granted Tarin’s request to substitute in as Kasim’s successor in interest for purposes of the class action claims. Immediately after the court denied her substitution request as to the representative Private Attorneys General Act claim, Tarin filed an unopposed 4 motion for leave to file an amended complaint that would substitute Monica Praster in as named plaintiff in place of Karim. Tarin’s proposed amendments sought to insert Praster’s name as named plaintiff, without changing the factual basis or legal theories in the operative complaint. In an accompanying declaration, Praster asserted that she had worked for RADC for three years, from 2021 until May 2024. Simultaneously, Praster filed a motion to intervene in the case as named plaintiff for the representative Private Attorneys General Act claim, which RADC opposed. Prior to moving to intervene, Praster had notified the Agency of her representative claim under the Act on February 10, 2025. Praster was also the plaintiff in a separate Private Attorneys General Act lawsuit against RADC, filed in April 2025. The trial court denied the motions by both Tarin and Praster.4 DISCUSSION A. A writ of mandate is appropriate in all cases in which there is otherwise no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 686.) Although mandamus review is not available to compel an exercise of discretion, it is appropriate to correct an abuse of discretion, as Tarin contends occurred here. (See Gomez, at p. 686; see also Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 164 (Peterson) [issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant leave to amend the complaint]; Figueroa v. Northridge Hospital Medical Center (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 10, 13 (Figueroa) 4 Praster has separately appealed from the trial court’s denial of her intervention motion, which is not at issue in Tarin’s writ petition. 5 [explaining that mandamus review is available to challenge denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint].) Absent writ review, Tarin would have to wait to obtain review on appeal from a final judgment. (See Figueroa, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 12 [explaining that denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint is nonappealable unless all issues in the case have been resolved].) The delay would result in piecemeal litigation of the underlying Labor Code violations and the Private Attorneys General Act claim and an inefficient use of the court’s and the parties’ resources. (Cf. Peterson, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 164 [“ ‘mandamus will lie when it appears that the trial court has deprived a party of an opportunity to plead his cause of action or defense, and when extraordinary relief may prevent a needless and expensive trial and reversal’ ”].) RADC contends that because Praster has a separate Private Attorneys General Act action pending, she would have an adequate remedy if denied writ review. However, RADC does not explain how Praster’s separate litigation provides a remedy for Tarin, the petitioner in this writ proceeding. We therefore conclude that writ review is appropriate. B. Tarin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her leave to amend her complaint to substitute in Praster as the named plaintiff. We agree. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party.” Although leave to amend rests in the trial court’s discretion, the “courts liberally allow amendments for the purpose of permitting plaintiffs who lack or have lost standing to substitute as plaintiffs the true real parties in interest,” as long as the defendant is not 6 prejudiced. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 131, 135– 136 (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights); see also Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 243 (Branick); Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 294, 305–306 (Demetriades).) Amendment should be freely allowed, “ ‘particularly when the only change is a substitution of parties without alteration of the substantive grounds of the suit.’ ” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1006–1007 (Cloud).) When the “mere addition of a party plaintiff d[oes] not alter the general set of facts originally alleged,” the “defendants [a]re not prejudiced and no reasonable purpose would [be] served” by refusing the amendment. (Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 160 (Citizens Assn.).) For purposes of the statute of limitations, an amendment will “relate[] back” to, or be deemed filed as of the date of, the original complaint where the amended complaint “ ‘(1) rest[s] on the same general set of facts, (2) involve[s] the same injury, and (3) refer[s] to the same instrumentality, as the original one.’ ” (Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 244.) An amendment to substitute a party is ordinarily entitled to relation-back effect “so long as recovery is sought on the same general set of facts as those alleged in the original complaint.” (Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006, citing Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600.) The requirement that recovery in the amended complaint be sought based on the same general set of facts fulfills the “the main policy of the statute of limitations,” which is “to put defendants on notice of the need to defend against a claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits.” (Citizens Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 160.) 7 Here, Tarin proposed to amend the complaint solely to substitute in Praster as named plaintiff for the representative claim under the Act. The proposed amendments would not have prejudiced RADC because they would not have changed the factual allegations against which RADC would have to defend.5 (See Citizens Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 160.) The trial court erred in denying leave to amend under these circumstances. Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights is instructive. In that case, the original plaintiff, a foundation, lost standing when the standing requirements for actions under the unfair competition law were modified subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) The foundation “sought to add a plaintiff . . . who [wa]s allegedly a member of the group of injured persons whom the [foundation] originally sought to represent, and who allege[d] the same misconduct originally alleged by the” foundation. (Id. at p. 136.) The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend, because “[a]mendments of this kind are liberally permitted, and there was no reason to prohibit the amendment in this case.” (Ibid.; see also Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011 [holding that where the plaintiff lacked standing to sue, the trial court should have granted leave to amend the complaint].) The same is true here. RADC argues that the trial court correctly concluded that leave to amend was inappropriate because the Act’s standing and exhaustion requirements preclude substitution of an aggrieved employee and application of the relation back doctrine. The trial 5 RADC does not contend that allowing substitution would have delayed the trial date or added to the burdens of discovery. (See Demetriades, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 306 [explaining that in considering whether to grant leave to amend a complaint to substitute a party, the court may consider whether the substitution would prejudice the defendant, such as by delaying trial or increasing discovery burdens].) 8 court reasoned that Praster could not be an “ ‘aggrieved employee’ ” under section 2699, subdivision (c)(1), for purposes of substitution where she was not employed by RADC in 2018, the beginning of the class period for the Labor Code claims, and where her administrative notice was not “contemporaneous” with Kasim’s. That conclusion was legally erroneous. As alleged, Praster was plainly an aggrieved employee under section 2699, former subdivision (c). She was employed by RADC from 2021 to May 2024, and Tarin’s proposed amendment alleges that Praster suffered the same violations asserted by Kasim. (See § 2699, former subd. (c).) As a result, Praster has standing to pursue an action under the Act. (See Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.) For the same reason, we reject RADC’s contention that allowing substitution here would equate to an improper “assign[ment]” of Kasim’s claim. (See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 [holding that a Private Attorneys General Act cause of action is not assignable].) The proposed amendment relies on Praster’s standing as an aggrieved employee in her own right, rather than any assignment of Kasim’s interest. The fact that Praster was not an RADC employee in 2018, at the beginning of the class period for Kasim’s class-based claims, matters not. Kasim’s Private Attorneys General Act claim was not a class claim, as his complaint expressly stated. (See Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 975 [holding that representative Private Attorneys General Act actions need not satisfy class action requirements]; see also Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, 607.) Given that the limitations period for claims under the Act is one year (see Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a); Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117), the relevant time frame for Kasim’s Private Attorneys General Act action began the year before he filed his administrative notice 9 and first amended complaint, in 2022—when Praster was employed by RADC. The trial court also reasoned that Praster could not have been an aggrieved employee because her administrative notice was not filed until February 2025, nearly two years after Kasim filed his March 24, 2023 notice. Yet the definition of “aggrieved employee” in section 2699 makes no reference to an administrative exhaustion requirement. (See § 2699, subd. (c)(1); § 2699, former subd. (c).) Moreover, section 2699.3, which contains the exhaustion requirement, sets forth requirements for an “aggrieved employee” to commence a civil action—making clear that whether an employee is “aggrieved” is separate from whether the employee has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. Further, exhaustion is a precondition to the commencement of the action. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The exhaustion provision imposes no requirement that an aggrieved employee wishing to continue an action, already commenced, must file a new notice. (See ibid.; see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1150 [“By its express language, section 2699.3 governs only the commencement of actions under the [Private Attorneys General Act], not the continuation of actions or the filing of amended complaints in actions that were [already] pending”], disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8.) As a result, the timing of Praster’s administrative notice did not impact her standing to substitute in as named plaintiff. Our conclusion is consistent with Hutcheson v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932, 941 (Hutcheson), which held that nothing in the Act precludes substitution and application of the relation back doctrine even where the proposed substitute’s administrative notice is filed subsequent to the date of the original plaintiff’s notice. In that case, because the original named plaintiff, Van Steenhuyse, no longer wished to continue 10 with the suit, Hutcheson sought to replace Van Steenhuyse as the named plaintiff. (Id. at p. 937 & fn. 2.) The parties stipulated to the filing of an amended complaint adding Hutcheson and removing Van Steenhuyse as the named plaintiff, but the employer argued that Hutcheson could not benefit from the earlier complaint and administrative notice filed by Van Steenhuyse based on the relation back doctrine. (Id. at pp. 938, 940–945.) After reviewing the statutory requirements for standing, exhaustion, and the limitations period, the court disagreed, concluding that “nothing in the [Act] prohibits” Hutcheson from taking over Van Steenhuyse’s action. (Id. at pp. 941, 939.) At the time Van Steenhuyse filed his original complaint, Hutcheson met the standing requirements for an aggrieved employee because he was an employee of the defendant employer and the alleged violations had been committed against him. (Id. at p. 941.) Further, although Hutcheson could not himself have filed suit at the time of Van Steenhuyse’s original complaint because he had not yet submitted his administrative notice, he fulfilled the exhaustion requirement four months later, before he sought to substitute in for Van Steenhuyse. (Id. at p. 941.) As a result, “Hutcheson met th[e] [notice] requirement before he became a plaintiff in his own suit, and before he became a plaintiff in the suit that Van Steenhuyse had filed.” (Ibid.) The court saw “no bar to Van Steenhuyse, who acts as the proxy of the [Agency], substituting a qualified plaintiff to take his place as the [Agency]'s proxy.” (Ibid.) Hutcheson further explained that its conclusion was consistent with the Legislature’s objective of strengthening the enforcement of the Labor Code. (Hutcheson, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.) Precluding substitution would allow the employer to “avoid[] potential liability for civil penalties over some period of time, simply because Van Steenhuyse relinquished his role as a representative plaintiff,” which would weaken enforcement of the Act. (Id. at p. 944.) The court’s 11 holding was also consistent with the goals of the administrative exhaustion requirement. (Id. at p. 943.) Both purposes of the requirement—allowing the Agency to decide whether to investigate a claim, and giving the employer an opportunity to submit a response to the Agency—were met when Van Steenhuyse submitted his notice. (Ibid.) In addition, allowing Hutcheson to substitute in based on Van Steenhuyse’s administrative notice “would not grant the [Agency] or Hutcheson or any other aggrieved employees the potential for any more than they had under Van Steenhuyse’s original complaint.” (Id. at p. 944.) As a result, Hutcheson’s amended complaint, substituting Hutcheson in and removing Van Steenhuyse as named plaintiff, could relate back to the date of Van Steenhuyse’s original complaint. (Id. at p. 945.) Under Hutcheson, the Private Attorneys General Act does not preclude substitution of a named plaintiff who qualifies as an “aggrieved employee,” even though the substitute plaintiff’s administrative notice was filed subsequently to the original plaintiff’s notice. (Hutcheson, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 941– 942.) Here, as in Hutcheson, the proposed substitute, Praster, was an aggrieved employee at the time the original complaint was filed because she was employed by the defendant employer and had suffered an alleged violation. (See § 2699, former subd. (c); Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1114.) The original plaintiff, Kasim, satisfied the administrative notice requirement before filing suit, which served to notify both the Agency and RADC. Although Praster did not submit her own administrative notice until February 10, 2025, nearly two years after Kasim’s notice, she met the exhaustion requirement well before Tarin sought leave to amend the complaint for substitution purposes. Notably, RADC does not contend that Praster’s substitution would change the period for which damages are recoverable for purposes of Kasim’s action. Praster’s substitution would not enlarge the issues in Kasim’s original complaint, but instead would continue 12 the representative action that Kasim had commenced. (See Hutcheson, at p. 944.) Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 782, relied upon by the trial court and by RADC, does not compel a contrary result. In Hargrove, Cornell sought leave to replace Hargrove as the named plaintiff in a representative Private Attorneys General Act action after Hargrove died. (Id. at p. 786.) The court recognized that under some circumstances, “a [Private Attorneys General Act] complaint may be amended to provide for the substitution of another person as the representative plaintiff in the action,” and an amended Private Attorneys General Act complaint may relate back to the original complaint. (Id. at pp. 789–790.) The court held, however, that substitution and relation back were improper in that case because at the time that Hargrove’s original complaint was filed, Cornell was not an aggrieved employee. (Id. at pp. 791–793.) Cornell’s employment with the defendant employer did not start until four years after Hargrove’s employment had ended, so the two never worked for the defendant employer at the same time. (Id. at pp. 787, 793.) Under those circumstances, Hargrove concluded that Cornell could not benefit from Hargrove’s earlier administrative notice under the relation back doctrine. (Id. at p. 792.) Here, unlike in Hargrove, Praster was an aggrieved employee at the time Kasim’s Private Attorneys General Act complaint was filed as well as at the time that he submitted his administrative notice, and her employment predated the beginning of the limitations period in 2022. As in Hutcheson, the Act’s statutory requirements do not preclude Praster’s substitution as the named plaintiff in place of Karim in his representative action. Finally, RADC argues that allowing substitution in the circumstances here would circumvent the amendments to the Act enacted after Kasim filed suit, because Praster’s separate Private 13 Attorneys General Act action is subject to the amendments. RADC asserts generally that subsequent reforms narrowed standing requirements, reformed penalty structures, expanded employer’s cure rights, and granted trial courts broader authority to manage representative claims. RADC has not pointed, however, to any specific difference that would affect the litigation and cause it prejudice. Ultimately, once Kasim filed his Private Attorneys General Act action, RADC was faced with defending against a representative claim that was subject to the pre-2024 statutory scheme and reached violations from 2022 forward. Nothing about Tarin’s proposed substitution of Praster would alter that. In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Tarin leave to amend the complaint to substitute Praster as named plaintiff in the representative Private Attorneys General Act action. DISPOSITION Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent trial court to grant leave to amend the complaint. Tarin is awarded her costs in this writ proceeding. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).) BURNS, J. WE CONCUR: SIMONS, Acting P. J. CHOU, J. Tarin v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (A175073) 14