Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 In re Z.W. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re Z.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E088342 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2400098) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v. A.W. et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina K. Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed. 1 Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Arlene A. Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Anderias W. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Arlene A. (Mother) and Anderias W. (Father) (collectively, the parents) appeal following the termination of their parental rights over daughter Z.W. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply. The parents contend conditional reversal is required because the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) failed to inquire of all reasonably available extended family members, as required under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b).1 We affirm. We conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply. 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 BACKGROUND A. Family History Mother was born and raised in the Philippines. She came to the United States with her family when she was 16. Father was born in Indonesia. He was adopted by extended relatives in Indonesia at age 9 and came to the United States with his adoptive family at age 11. Mother and Father were married in 2014 and divorced in 2020 or 2021. Z.W. was born in 2016. B. The Referrals and Underlying Proceedings On December 6, 2023, Mother left seven-year-old Z.W. at home by herself when she went to work. Father requested a welfare check, and when a sheriff’s deputy responded around 8:30 p.m., Z.W. was at home alone. The deputy attempted to contact Mother but was unable to reach her. The deputy reported the incident to the Department. About a week later, the Department received a second referral that raised concerns about Mother’s mental health and alleged the parents constantly fought and yelled in Z.W.’s presence. During the course of the investigation, Z.W. reported that she had witnessed verbal and physical arguments between her parents, and both parents acknowledged they had a history of engaging in domestic violence. Between January 2023 and February 2024, law enforcement responded to the family home 11 times in response to “domestic violence disturbing the peace” calls. 3 The Department sought and obtained a protective custody warrant on March 8, 2024. Z.W. was placed with paternal aunt Zenia B. and her husband Brendon S. On March 12, 2024, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging failure to protect based on the parents having engaged in domestic violence in the presence of Z.W.; Mother having left Z.W. at home alone without appropriate care or supervision; and Mother having exhibited signs of unresolved mental health issues. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) The Department later filed an amended petition that removed the allegations regarding Mother’s mental health and leaving Z.W. at home alone. The court sustained the amended petition on April 26, 2024, and granted reunification services to both parents. Z.W. remained placed with the paternal aunt Zenia B. and paternal uncle Brendon S. Following an unsuccessful period of family reunification services, on April 6, 2026, the court terminated parental rights as to both parents and approved the permanent plan of adoption. Each parent timely filed a notice of appeal. C. Proceedings Related to ICWA 1. Inquiries Made Both parents denied having any Native American ancestry on their ICWA-020 forms and when questioned by the social worker on six separate occasions between December 2023 and December 2025. Both parents also denied having Native American ancestry when questioned by the court at the detention hearing in March 2024, at a 4 hearing in October 2024 ahead of the six-month status review hearing, and at a hearing in January 2026 ahead of the selection and implementation hearing. As for other relatives, paternal aunt Zenia B. and paternal uncle Brendon S. denied having any Native American ancestry when questioned by the Department in March 2024, and maternal great-aunt Remedios R. denied having Native American ancestry when questioned by the court at hearings she attended in March 2024 and October 2024.2 There were additional extended relatives identified in the Department’s reports, including the maternal grandparents, maternal great-aunt Susan A., and paternal grandmother Lenny B., although there is no indication that the Department contacted any of these relatives to conduct an ICWA inquiry. 2. The Court’s Findings At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on April 26, 2024, the court adopted the recommended finding that the Department had conducted an adequate investigation and ICWA did not apply. Thereafter, at each status review hearing the court either expressly found or adopted the recommended finding that ICWA did not apply. On January 6, 2026, the court conducted its final inquiry of the parents and found that no new information had been provided to suggest that ICWA applied. The written order issued by the court on April 7, 2026, after the selection and implementation hearing included a finding that ICWA did not apply. 2 The maternal great-aunt’s name was transcribed as Ramidia R. at the March 2024 hearing and Remedios R. at the October 2024 hearing. We assume both references are to the same person. 5 DISCUSSION ICWA is a federal law that “establishes minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129 (Dezi C.); 25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.) The issue of whether ICWA applies turns on whether the child is an “Indian child” as defined under the statute. (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1129.) To be an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA, a child must be either (1) a member or citizen of a federally recognized Indian tribe or (2) eligible for membership or citizenship in such a tribe and the biological child of a member or citizen. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), (8); § 224.1, subds. (a)(4), (b)(1).) Because it is not typically self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, federal and state law both mandate certain inquiries to be made in each case. (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741, overruled on other grounds in Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18.) Federal regulations require the juvenile court to ask each participant at the commencement of a dependency proceeding “whether there is a ‘reason to know’ that the child is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., at p. 1130; see id. at p. 1129; 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2026).) California law “codifies and expands” this duty of inquiry. (Dezi C., at p. 1131.) Under California law, the juvenile court and the child protective agency have “an affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire whether a child who is the subject of a dependency proceeding is, or may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) For children like Z.W. who are placed into the temporary custody of the county welfare department, the Department’s initial duty to inquire “includes, but is not limited 6 to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 277.) For its part, the juvenile court is required to ask “each party” and “all other interested persons present” at their first appearance in court “whether they know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) If the initial inquiry provides a “ ‘reason to believe’ ” the child is an Indian child, then “further inquiry” is required, as statutorily defined in section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2). (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1132-1133.) When there is a “reason to know” the child is an Indian child, then formal ICWA notices must be sent to the relevant tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (f); § 224.3, subds. (a), (b); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133.) Conversely, when the child protective agency has exercised due diligence and conducted a proper and adequate inquiry, yet there is no reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court may find that the agency has complied with its duty of inquiry and that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A); Dezi C., at p. 1134.) “A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply implies ‘that social workers [have] fulfilled their duty of inquiry.’ ” (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) We will 7 uphold the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply so long as the court’s conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence and documentation in the record. (Ibid.; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).) “ ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101-1102; Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) When there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply, then “there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the other hand, if the inquiry [was] inadequate, conditional reversal is required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141.) The “operative concept” underlying the inquiry requirements of section 224.2 is that “ ‘those people who are reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) “The agency’s inquiry must extend far enough to reasonably ensure that if there is information the child is or may be an Indian child, that information is gathered.” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 604.) “[F]airly read, [section 224.2] requires an initial inquiry that is adequate to reach a reliable conclusion about the applicability of ICWA.” (Dezi C., at p. 1153, conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) 8 The parents raise a valid claim that there were reasonably available extended family members the Department could have contacted to inquire about Z.W.’s potential Indian ancestry, including the maternal grandparents, maternal great-aunt Susan A., and paternal grandmother Lenny B. The record reflects the Department had contact information available for each of these relatives and could have inquired of them. The question we are presented with is whether the failure to inquire of these relatives requires conditional reversal. We conclude that under the unique circumstances of this case it does not. Although we do not condone the Department’s failure to inquire of these relatives, ultimately, the inquiry the Department conducted extended far enough to provide the juvenile court with the information it needed to reach a reliable conclusion that ICWA did not apply. This case presents the unique circumstance where both parents were born abroad—Mother in the Philippines and Father in Indonesia—and there was no indication in the record that either parent had any familial connection to a federally recognized tribe within the United States. (See In re A.C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 282, 286 [“ICWA appl[ies] only to federally recognized tribes”]; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), (8); § 224.1, subds. (a)(4), (b)(1).) Both parents repeatedly denied having any Native American ancestry, and at least one additional relative on each side confirmed their denials—paternal aunt Zenia B. and maternal great-aunt Remedios R. To conditionally reverse and remand for the Department to inquire of the identified relatives would only serve to prolong permanency for Z.W. and is not something we are willing to require on this record when the inquiry undertaken was 9 “adequate to reach a reliable conclusion” that ICWA did not apply. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1153, conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) When, as here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding that an adequate inquiry was conducted and ICWA does not apply, then conditional reversal is not required “even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141.) We therefore conclude conditional reversal is not required. DISPOSITION The order terminating parental rights is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ P. J. We concur: MILLER _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ J. CODRINGTON _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ J. 10