In re C.Y. CA2/8

Filed 10/28/26 In re C.Y. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT In re C.Y., a Person Coming B355652 Under the Juvenile Court Law. ______________________________ (Los Angeles County LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP01109) DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.Y., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed. Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica J. Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________  Mother K.Y. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights over her child C.Y. Mother’s sole dispute is with the adequacy of the investigation, preceding the termination of her rights, into whether C.Y. is an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and its California analog. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) made an adequate inquiry. We therefore affirm. I. DCFS initiated dependency proceedings to protect C.Y. following a March 2023 referral. The ICWA-010 Indian Child Inquiry Attachment, dated March 31, states that based on discussions with mother and maternal grandmother, C.Y. “is or may be a member of or eligible for membership in a tribe,” but “the family is not registered with a tribe and does not know which tribe they may be associated with.” The ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status, dated April 3, reports mother’s assertion that she is “or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe,” but the tribe was unknown and maternal grandmother could provide more information. Later in April of 2023, a social worker interviewed mother about her Indian heritage. The social worker summarized the interview: “[M]other stated she has Muscogee (Creek) ancestry but didn’t know if the lineage was traced on her mother’s side of the family or her father’s. She stated she didn’t know if anyone was registered with the tribe and suggested the [social worker] interview the [maternal grandmother] for additional information. The mother offered no additional relatives to interview for further information, as to the family’s ICWA status.” 2  Around this time, a social worker interviewed the maternal grandmother. The social worker summarized that interview as well: Maternal grandmother “stated there is Creek lineage traced on her side of the family. Reportedly, [her] father’s mother . . . was affiliated with the tribe, but there is no reason to believe she was a registered member. The [maternal grandmother] stated she had no knowledge of anyone being enrolled in the tribe, and reported there are no other family members who could provide additional information regarding the matter.” Alleged father D.M.’s whereabouts were at first unknown, so he could not provide information about Indian ancestry when the dependency case began. When DCFS located D.M., he denied Indian ancestry “for himself, child [C.Y.], or the paternal family.” C.Y.’s lack of Indian status through the alleged father’s family is not disputed in this appeal. In May of 2023, DCFS mailed ICWA-030 notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior, and to several Creek tribes: the Creek-Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town, the Creek-Kialegee Tribal Town, the Creek-Muscogee Creek Nation, the Creek-Poarch Band of Creek Indians, the Creek-Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, and the Sioux-Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. The ICWA-030 notices included, amongst other information, mother’s name, date of birth, and birthplace; alleged father D.M.’s name; maternal grandmother’s name, date of birth, and birthplace; maternal grandfather’s name and possible birthplace; maternal great-grandmother’s name, date of birth, and birthplace; and maternal great-grandfather’s name, date of birth, and birthplace. 3  The Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, and Kialegee Tribal Town all responded that C.Y. was not an Indian child. At the May 26, 2023 combined adjudication and disposition hearings, the juvenile court, with no objections from mother, found it had no reason to know ICWA applied. In short, the court concluded DCFS “has made active efforts to identify whether or not” ICWA applies and “sent appropriate notices, and the responses received indicate the children are not eligible.” Two years later, on May 30, 2025, DCFS told the juvenile court it had “continued ICWA inquiry throughout the duration of the case and [had] continued to interview parents and known and available relatives about the family’s Indian ancestry.” But DCFS stated there had “been no new information obtained.” Rather, mother and maternal grandmother had continued to report Creek heritage but were unaware of any tribal membership. The court, on several occasions, had reiterated its finding that ICWA did not apply. As mother points out, at various points during the dependency proceeding, DCFS was aware of other maternal relatives. While preparing a detention report, DCFS requested and included police call logs associated with the maternal grandmother’s home. Those logs showed someone at that address being identified as “grandfather.” In fact, maternal grandmother’s father, the maternal great- grandfather, R.L, lived in a back house on maternal grandmother’s property. A CWS/CMS check was conducted regarding R.L. but it does not appear DCFS spoke to R.L. in 4 connection with this proceeding. R.L. was listed on the ICWA- 030 tribal notices. Back in May of 2023, DCFS submitted a “last minute information” and attached a psychological evaluation report regarding C.Y.’s half-sibling, K.W. This evaluation report, from 2018, notes K.W. then lived with two maternal uncles. The report also relays mother’s disclosure that K.W. has three maternal cousins and one maternal uncle diagnosed with autism and three maternal cousins and a maternal great-great-aunt diagnosed with schizophrenia. Around April and May of 2025, DCFS lost track of mother and was investigating her whereabouts. A DCFS investigator encountered a man named Ju.D. who said he was mother’s brother. The investigator did not report asking Ju.D. about Indian ancestry. Ju.D was married to a woman named A.W. While still investigating mother’s whereabouts, DCFS made a call and fortuitously reached mother, who mentioned she had to leave her cousin’s home. On June 25, 2026, the juvenile court held a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. The court found C.Y. adoptable, declined to apply any statutory exception to adoptability, terminated parental rights, and identified adoption as the permanent plan. Mother timely appealed. II. Mother contends DCFS did not comply with its ongoing initial duty of inquiry when it failed to collect information regarding C.Y.’s Indian ancestry from six maternal cousins, two maternal uncles, maternal aunt, maternal great aunt, and a maternal great grandfather. 5  “ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal standards a state court must follow before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287.) In general, both ICWA and the Welfare and Institutions Code define an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (b)(1).) DCFS, along with the juvenile courts, have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).) “[DCFS]’s duty arises when a report of abuse or neglect is made and/or when the county takes the child into its temporary custody.” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099 (Kenneth D.).) “This initial inquiry ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ ” (In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 799–800 (C.R.).) An extended family member is an adult who is a “ ‘grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1132 (Dezi C.), quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); accord, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c).) 6  “When the agency has ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see also rule 5.481(a)(4).) The required further inquiry includes (1) interviewing the parents and extended family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1132–1133, fn. omitted.) A reason to believe arises when there is “information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian tribe.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) If there is reason to know a child is an Indian child, other steps follow. (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133.) The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 800; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) “We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence.” (C.R., at p. 800 [noting the Supreme Court has not fully addressed this matter].) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact- specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141, quoting [citation].) “ ‘On a well-developed record, the 7 court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.) Here, the juvenile court’s “no ICWA” finding was supported and within its discretion. First, DCFS gathered significant information from mother and maternal grandmother and it explored their claims of Creek ancestry divorced of current tribal affiliation. Mother and maternal grandmother were open about their Creek heritage and facilitated tribal inquiries, which DCFS made. Maternal grandmother reported there were no other family members who could provide additional ancestry information. Maternal grandmother offered a helpful generational perspective. (See In re C.L. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 70 (C.L.).) Although there were maternal cousins and aunts mentioned in the DCFS record, there is no evidence they were adults or were contacted, or available to be contacted, in connection with the dependency proceeding. While DCFS did speak to maternal uncle Ju.D. and did not ask him about Indian ancestry, it was maternal grandmother, the uncle’s mother, who had superior information. It was not reversible error for DCFS, under these circumstances, to inquire no further of these relatives. (C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70 [the mother there did “not suggest that interviewing the maternal uncle could potentially have filled a gap in the information DCFS already had” and the court “could reasonably consider the responses of mother, the maternal grandmother, and the maternal great uncle, as well as the absence of any indication the maternal uncle 8 would have more information than his own mother (the maternal grandmother) as to whether the children are or may be Indian children”]; C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 802 [“The court also reasonably could find mother’s sister (maternal aunt) would not have had any more information about the family’s potential Indian ancestry than their own mother (maternal grandmother) had” and there were no “other maternal relatives who would have information about the family’s possible Indian ancestry superior to maternal grandmother’s knowledge;” DCFS “ ‘is not required to “cast about” for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads’ ”].) Given maternal grandmother’s knowledge and cooperation and her statement that no other relatives had additional Indian ancestry information, and also observing the notices to and responses from the tribes, a similar conclusion applies as to the maternal great-grandfather R.L. He was listed on the tribal notices and DCFS did not otherwise have reason to speak with him. We also note great-grandparents are not included on ICWA’s list of extended relatives. (See In re Allison B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 214, 220, disapproved on other grounds in Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1107 and Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18 [“Even ICWA’s broad definition of ‘extended family member,’ however, does not include great- grandparents”]; In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053 [same].) Mother, meanwhile, has not argued that any specific uncontacted relative would be reasonably likely to have relevant information about C.Y.’s tribal membership. Rather, she argues there were simply too many uncontacted relatives. But DCFS need not contact “every possible extended family member” to 9 accomplish a reasonable inquiry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; see id. at p. 1167 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.) [emphasizing this point]; see C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th 53, 68; compare In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 381, and In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 718–721, with In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76.) “On a well-developed record,” as here, “the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent.” (K.G., at p. 384 [finding inquiry adequate though DCFS did not contact a maternal great-grandfather, along with other relatives].) Ultimately, reliable information about C.Y.’s possible tribal affiliation through her mother’s lineage was obtained, tribes were notified, and tribal ineligibility was sufficiently established. (See C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.) Mother briefly argues, without citation to authority, that the ICWA inquiry was tainted because DCFS failed to file, in court, its notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). It is not clear what harm mother claims in light of the evidence that notice was prepared for and sent to the BIA. But even assuming notice was entirely lacking, that would not be reversible error given C.Y.’s Creek ancestry was known and the Creek tribes were contacted. (In re H.M. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1184 [DCFS’s “duty of further inquiry did not require it to contact the BIA because it did not need assistance identifying name or contact information for the tribes”].) Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court permissibly determined ICWA did not govern C.Y.’s dependency proceedings. 10  DISPOSITION We affirm the order of the juvenile court. SCHERB, J. We concur: WILEY, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J. 11