Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 In re E.A. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re E.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D088329 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. NJ16017) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.T., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Alejandro Morales, Judge. Affirmed. Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy County Counsel, Katie Abajian, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Appellant. INTRODUCTION B.T. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 petition and terminating parental rights over her son, E.A. She asserts the juvenile court erred in (1) finding no changed circumstances and denying her section 388 petition, and (2) declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree with Mother’s contentions and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In October 2024, the child abuse hotline received a report that Mother and E.A. tested positive for amphetamines at E.A.’s birth. Mother started using methamphetamine when she was 15 or 16 years old. Although she had several periods of sobriety, Mother admitted using methamphetamine daily before her pregnancy. Mother stopped using it for three or four months during her pregnancy but relapsed the month before giving birth. Shortly after the court removed E.A. under a protective custody warrant, Mother entered inpatient substance abuse treatment. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother’s drug use had caused or placed E.A. at risk of suffering serious physical harm. In December 2024, the juvenile court sustained the petition and detained E.A. In early January 2025, Mother overdosed on fentanyl at her inpatient treatment facility. Later that month, the juvenile court placed E.A. in a licensed foster home and ordered reunification services and supervised visitation. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 In early March 2025, Mother tested positive for an unprescribed medication at her inpatient treatment facility. After leaving that facility, she enrolled in outpatient treatment where she tested positive for illicit substances three times in June. The program discharged her in July. Despite multiple attempts, the social worker could not reach Mother in July or August and her visits with E.A. became sporadic. At the contested six- month review hearing in early September, the juvenile court terminated reunification services, ordered supervised visitation, and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. E.A. remained in the foster home where he had been placed in October 2024. Although he had numerous medical issues, he was cognitively on track and attached to his caregivers. In March 2026, Mother contacted the social worker and reported that she had been living at a rehabilitation center in Mexico for one month and was required to remain in the program for six months. She began virtual visits with E.A. the following month. Although she missed two visits because of internet connectivity issues, she attended the next five scheduled visits. In late May 2026, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking E.A.’s return to her care or reinstatement of reunification services. The court set an evidentiary hearing to coincide with the section 366.26 hearing. At the combined hearing in early June 2026, the court considered Mother’s section 388 petition, the Agency’s reports, and testimony from the director of the Mexico treatment facility. The juvenile court denied the petition, finding Mother had not demonstrated a change in circumstances because she was still participating in the treatment program. It also found the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply because Mother did not establish regular and consistent visitation or a substantial emotional attachment between herself and E.A. 3 DISCUSSION I. No Error in Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition A. Legal Principles After reunification services are terminated, the juvenile court’s focus shifts to the child’s need for permanency and stability. The parent bears the burden under section 388 of showing changed circumstances to reopen reunification. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304, 309 (Marilyn H.).) Section 388 thus provides an “escape mechanism” for the court to consider new information before selecting a permanent plan for the child. (Ibid.) To prevail, the petitioning parent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence both new evidence or a change of circumstances and that the proposed modification would serve the child’s best interests. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.) A parent seeking reinstatement of reunification services or the child’s return must therefore show that changes since termination of services are substantial enough to outweigh the prior findings and make reunification in the child’s best interests. (Id. at p. 848.) In deciding whether the petition makes the required showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.) We review a modification petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 (Stephanie M.).) A proper exercise of discretion must be guided by legal principles, grounded in reasoned judgment (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 15), consistent with the law’s purpose of achieving substantial justice (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 4 1066). When the facts support multiple inferences, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (Stephanie M., at p. 319.) B. Analysis The juvenile court acknowledged Mother’s exceptional progress in her current program but noted that she had not yet completed it and her previous periods of sobriety had been followed by a relapse. Although it recognized that Mother’s circumstances were changing, it found she had not established a material change in circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. The court further found the requested modification would not serve E.A.’s best interests because it would not promote his need for stability and permanency. It terminated reunification services in early September 2025. Mother contends her enrollment in a six-month inpatient treatment program in February 2026, negative drug tests at intake, four months of sobriety, and emergence as a trusted leader in the program establish changed circumstances. She argues the court failed to liberally construe the evidence in her favor, applied the wrong legal test, and abused its discretion by treating the length of her sobriety as “categorically disqualifying.” Mother’s argument conflates the standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing with the standard for prevailing on the modification petition. When deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, the court must liberally construe the evidence in favor of granting a hearing. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 304.) Consistent with Marilyn H., the juvenile court applied this standard when it set Mother’s petition for an evidentiary hearing. But Mother cites no authority requiring the court to apply the same liberal construction standard when considering whether the evidence established a sufficient change in circumstances and whether the 5 requested modification would promote E.A.’s need for permanency and stability. Nor did the court err by describing Mother’s circumstances as not changed but changing. “ ‘Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order.’ ” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120.) The change supporting a section 388 petition must be material. (Ibid.) Although circumstances that are changing have necessarily changed to some extent, the critical question is whether the change is sufficiently material to warrant modification. The court’s reference to changing circumstances simply describes the distinction between material changes and those that are not. (Id. at p. 121, fn.3.) Mother has an 11-year history of drug abuse. Her longest period of sobriety was two and a half years, when she was incarcerated for transporting methamphetamine across the border. She resumed using methamphetamine upon her release. Although she stopped using it during her pregnancy, she relapsed the month before giving birth. Her history during these dependency proceedings reflects the same recurring pattern— Mother enters treatment and achieves periods of sobriety under supervision, only to relapse. Against this backdrop, the juvenile court reasonably concluded Mother’s four months of sobriety in a facility where residents have no access to the outside did not establish a material change warranting modification of its prior order. (E.g, In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423–424 [father’s seven months of sobriety, “while commendable, was nothing new,” given his lengthy history of drug use and recurring relapses following periods of sobriety].) The juvenile court also reasonably concluded that reinstating reunification services or returning E.A. to Mother would not serve his best 6 interests. After reunification services are terminated, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Instead, “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability,’ ” and a rebuttable presumption arises that continued foster care is in the child’s best interests. (Ibid.) Mother relied entirely on the “loving bond” between herself and E.A. to argue modification would serve his best interests. The section 388 petition and its supporting evidence must demonstrate how the proposed modification would tangibly benefit the child. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 252.) A child “should not be made to wait indefinitely for mother to become an adequate parent.” (Ibid.) At the time of the hearing, E.A. was 20 months old and had spent his entire life outside of Mother’s care. He had lived with loving caretakers who were prospective adoptive parents since his release from the hospital. Mother’s recent progress toward sobriety is commendable, but her ability to maintain long-term sobriety and provide a safe, stable home remained unproven. She did not establish removing E.A. from his current placement and returning him to her care, or providing additional reunification services, would advance his need for permanence and stability. On this record, the juvenile court reasonably concluded Mother had not rebutted the presumption that E.A.’s interest in stability outweighed her interest in reunification. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) 7 II. No Error in Finding the Parental-Benefit Exception Did Not Apply A. Legal Principles A permanency planning hearing is intended “to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker.” (In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 742.) The Legislature favors adoption when possible. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Once the juvenile court finds a child adoptable, the parent bears the burden of proving that an exception to termination of parental rights applies. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343.) Because a section 366.26 hearing follows repeated findings that the parent cannot meet the child’s needs, “it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350, disapproved on another ground by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636, fn. 5 (Caden C.).) One exception to the preference for adoption is the parental-benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To establish this exception, a parent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the parent had regularly visited and contacted the child; (2) the child has a substantial, positive emotional attachment to the parent; and (3) terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefits of an adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) In assessing the parent-child relationship, the court considers “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 8 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) If the benefits of a stable, permanent adoptive home outweigh the harm the child would suffer from losing the parent-child relationship, the court should order adoption. (Caden C., at p. 634.) We review the juvenile court’s findings on regular visitation and the existence of a beneficial parental relationship for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts,’ ” and we uphold the court’s findings even if substantial evidence supports a contrary conclusion. (Id. at p. 640.) When a parent challenges a finding that they failed to carry their burden of proof, we ask whether the evidence compels a finding in the parent’s favor as a matter of law. (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647, disapproved on other ground by Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637, fn. 6.) The question is whether the evidence was “ ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ ” and “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because of the parent-child relationship is a discretionary determination reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Caden C., at p. 640.) Reversal is warranted only when the court makes an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd decision. (Id. at p. 641.) B. Analysis The juvenile court found Mother had not satisfied the first prong because her visits were sporadic, she had gone a significant period without contact with E.A., and she had completed only seven virtual visits after 9 reestablishing contact with the Agency. Mother concedes that her drug addiction resulted in a six-month gap in visitation. She argues the court committed legal error by treating that gap as disqualifying despite her seven virtual visits, which she contends established consistent visitation. We are not persuaded. The first prong requires a parent to maintain “regular visitation and contact with the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In Caden C., the Supreme Court explained the question is whether the parent’s visits were consistent, considering the extent of visitation permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Because the child’s best interests remain paramount, a parent should not be punished or rewarded based on the extent of visitation. (Ibid.) Mother initially received structured unsupervised visits at her inpatient treatment facility. In January 2025, following her fentanyl overdose at the facility, the court returned her to liberal supervised visitation. After Mother was discharged from outpatient treatment in July 2025, the social worker made multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact her in July or August, and her visitation with E.A. became sporadic. E.A.’s caretaker offered to adjust her schedule and reschedule visits flexibly to help Mother maintain regular contact with her son. Mother last visited E.A. in mid-September 2025. She then disappeared and had no contact with the Agency until March 2026, when she reported that she was living at a rehabilitation center in Mexico. The facility permitted Mother to participate in virtual visits, and its director explained the visits could be scheduled flexibly and that staff would arrange for Mother “to be pulled out of whatever program she was in to attend” a virtual visit. 10 Mother subsequently attended seven weekly virtual visits and missed two visits because of internet connectivity issues. This record does not establish consistent visitation to the extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Substantial evidence therefore supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother failed to satisfy the first prong. Mother argues the court improperly emphasized her earlier sporadic visits and subsequent six-month gap rather than her more recent consistent virtual visits. But she cites no authority limiting the court’s consideration to recent visitation, and we reject it. (See In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [significant lapses in visitation fatally undermines any attempt to finding beneficial parental relationship exception]; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554 [visitation consistent near the section 366.26 hearing, but sporadic overall, is insufficient to meet the first prong of the beneficial relationship exception].) We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s finding that Mother failed to establish regular visitation and contact. Mother’s inconsistent visitation alone defeats her claim to the parental- benefit exception. Because all three elements must be established, her failure to prove the first prong is dispositive, and we need not address the remaining elements. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 322, fn. 10.) Nevertheless, even if we considered the other two prongs, we would affirm the juvenile court’s ruling. The second prong required Mother to establish that E.A. had a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to her. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) A “significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 11 p. 575.) The juvenile court found no substantial positive emotional attachment because E.A. had spent his entire life outside of Mother’s care and her lack of visitation had prevented her from developing such an attachment with him. Mother contends the record contradicts that finding because E.A. repeated her words and actions, including saying “I love you” and returning her blown kisses. During one visit, E.A. made a sad face and appeared to want to be held. Mother became tearful and told him she loved him, and E.A. responded “ ‘I love you.’ ” Mother overlooks the evidence explaining E.A.’s behavior. During one virtual visit, E.A.’s speech therapist explained that E.A. repeats what others say because of echolalia and does not understand the meaning of the words. Moreover, the visit summaries show that, during four visits, the caregiver or foster sibling prompted E.A. to repeat Mother’s words. During the visit where E.A. made a sad face, the caregiver explained he made that expression when he wanted to be held. Given that E.A. had spent his entire life outside of Mother’s care, the affectionate interactions during the seven virtual visits do not compel a finding that he had developed a substantial emotional attachment to her. Because Mother failed to establish the first two prongs, the juvenile court did not address the third. Even assuming Mother satisfied the first two prongs, the benefits of a stable, permanent home offered by E.A.’s caregivers and prospective adoptive parents support the court’s conclusion that Mother had not established the “ ‘exceptional circumstances’ ” necessary to invoke the parental-benefit exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the exception. 12 DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed. DO, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: KELETY, J. CASTILLO, J. 13