Full Opinion

Filed 11/12/26 In re G.S. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re G.S. et al., 2d Juv. No. B353844 (Super. Ct. No. 23JD-00077) Persons Coming Under the (San Luis Obispo County) Juvenile Court Law. SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. J.G., Objector and Appellant. J.G. (mother) appeals after the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to G.S., J.S., Vie.S., and Vio.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26.)1 Mother contends the court improperly terminated parental rights because the beneficial parental bond exception applied. We will affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 22, 2023, the San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services (the Department) filed a section 300 petition regarding G.S. (born November 2015), J.S. (born January 2018), and twins Vie.S. and Vio.S. (born January 2020). The petition alleged that on March 20, 2023, mother was arrested for domestic violence, leaving the children without a caregiver. The children had chronic head lice since October 2022, and mother was aware of the condition. Mother disclosed a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and stated she was currently unmedicated. She reported a history of methamphetamine use as recently as November 2022 but denied current use. At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing in May 2023, the court found true the petition’s allegations and declared the minors under the jurisdiction of the court. The court ordered reunification services as to mother. In November 2023, the court placed G.S. and J.S. in mother’s care with family maintenance services. In March 2024, the court did the same with Vie.S. and Vio.S. In October 2024, the Department reported the children were doing well in mother’s care and appeared very comfortable with and affectionate toward her. In March 2025, appellant tested positive for MDMA, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. In May, mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. In August, the 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Department filed a petition asking the court to remove the children from the home. In September 2025, the court ordered the children detained. They were placed with their maternal grandmother out of county. In October, the court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. According to the February 2026 section 366.26 report, mother currently had phone calls or “FaceTimes” with the children three times per week. Mother had one four-hour, in- person visit with the children each month. According to an addendum report, on March 16, 2026, mother did not call in her designated window of time. After her attempt to speak with the children outside of that time window was rebuffed, mother called the police and asked them to conduct a welfare check on the children. Grandmother reported that the police “coming to the door caused fear, confusion, and anxiety in the children and they had trouble sleeping that night.” At the section 366.26 hearing, the court stated it would give “limited weight” to the addendum report and “otherwise allow it.” Mother called Social Worker Supervisor Valerie Amador, who testified the children have a close relationship with mother. Social Worker Kacey Cohen testified that the children enjoy visitation with mother. J.S., Vie.S., and Vio.S. all had close, positive relationships with mother, and G.S. had a “very close and positive relationship” with her. Cohen noted the children “had a lot of upheavals. And the ups and downs of lots of visits, lots of phone calls creates undue anxiety for the kids and causes behaviors and reignites their trauma responses.” Mother often called outside of the scheduled 3 timeframe, and late calls were disruptive. During the calls, the children became anxious, “hyper,” and vied for attention. After mother called the police in March 2026, 10-year-old G.S. called Cohen to report the incident. Vio.S. misbehaved at school shortly after the police call. J.S. had difficulty sleeping after the call. Cohen testified the children had an identifiable relationship with mother and would suffer some grief and loss if visitation were reduced or terminated. Cohen believed the benefits of adoption outweighed preservation of that bond. Mother testified the children were very excited to see her for visits. They continued to look to her for comfort, but she “ha[d] to initiate it . . . .” At the end of visits, some of the children would cry or become quiet, “like shelled.” In calls, G.S. was present and talking but “her focus isn’t mainly on [mother] at all times.” J.S. was the same. One of the twins (Vie.S. and Vio.S.) was more engaged during calls than the other. Mother was unaware that the children were very afraid when the police came to grandmother’s home. Mother last used methamphetamine two or three days before she testified. Mother was no longer taking mental health medications as prescribed by her psychiatrist. The CASA for G.S. testified that G.S. “does not want to go back to her mother’s care now.” Minors’ counsel argued that mother’s continued drug use and “violent interactions” had “diminished the emotional attachment that the children have to their mother” and that their bond to mother “seems more like a trauma bond.” Regarding the parental-benefit exception, the court agreed with minors’ counsel. The court determined that regular 4 visitation and contact had been satisfied. The court “thought mother testified honestly. . . . You testified to using. You testified to some violence within the home. You testified to some concerns about your phone contact with the children and how sometimes they didn’t want to engage you so much. You did those memory books because you have a sense that you maybe are not going to have those kids going forward. That’s how you presented to the Court.” “A big issue” for the court was the call to the police, “because the clear reaction of those children, based upon the consequences of that phone call, was a direct showing that while you have an attachment with your children, it is not the substantial positive attachment that the Court needs to see to where I can find the exception.” The court terminated parental rights. DISCUSSION Appellant argues “[i]nsubstantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the children did not have a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the mother.” (Bold omitted.) We disagree. “‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long- term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) 5 A parent invoking the parental-benefit exception has the burden of proof and must establish three prongs by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular visitation and contact” between the parent and child; (2) “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.); § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The inquiry’s focus is the child’s best interests. (Caden C., at p. 632.) We review the first two prongs for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) “In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’” (Id. at p. 640.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding as to the second Caden C. prong. Mother had difficulty calling the children within the designated timeframe, and her late calls were disruptive to their schedule. The calls prompted anxiety, argument, and the children “hitting one another.” While this behavior might suggest a connection with mother, it also illustrates the negative impact of their continued relationship with her. Mother conceded certain children displayed inattentiveness during the calls. 6 Mother’s call to the police further corroborates the juvenile court’s finding. The call upset the children. It induced G.S. to contact the social worker and apparently caused Vio.S. to misbehave at school and J.S. to have difficulty sleeping. Yet mother was unaware that her children were very afraid when the police came. Although the record contains evidence as to some positive aspects of mother’s relationship with her children, substantial evidence nonetheless supports the conclusion that the children lacked a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to mother such that continuing the relationship would benefit the children. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see also In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 322, fn. 10 [failure of proof as to any element of parental-benefit exception is fatal].) Mother argues the court erred in relying on the “single incident” of the police call “to negate the substantial, positive, emotional attachment the children had built with the mother and demonstrated throughout the dependency matter.” However, the court did not state it was relying solely on that incident, which it described as a “big issue . . . .” The court did not err in ascribing significant weight to a recent incident that negatively impacted the children. Mother also contends the court “erred in relying on [her] recent drug use, past domestic violence, and creation of memory books for the children in concluding [she] did not meet her burden without considering whether those facts had any negative effect on the parent-child relationship.” This contention misconstrues the court’s comments. The court highlighted those aspects of mother’s testimony as support for its finding that “mother testified honestly.” This finding was not error. 7 DISPOSITION The order terminating parental rights is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. CODY, P. J. We concur: YEGAN, J. BALTODANO, J. 8 Linda D. Hurst, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________ Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant J.G. (mother). Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, and Chelsea K. Kuhns, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services. 9