In re Ethan E. CA2/7

Filed 10/23/26 In re Ethan E. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN In re Ethan E., a Person Coming B354119 Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County Super. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Ct. No. 23CCJP03168A) AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. N.E., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Syna N. Dennis, Judge. Affirmed. Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ___________________  N.E. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 terminating her parental rights and identifying adoption as the permanent plan for her son Ethan E. (born August 2013). She argues the court erred in determining Ethan was adoptable, because there are legal impediments to his adoption by the two paternal aunts who were designated as his prospective adoptive parents. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mother and Carlos M. are Ethan’s parents. Carlos, who is currently serving an 11-year prison sentence, has not appealed the termination of his parental rights. In August 2023 the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) received a referral alleging that Mother was neglecting and physically and emotionally abusing Ethan. The referral stated that Mother hit Ethan with objects, cursed at him and told him he was useless, did not feed him, and did not enroll him in school. Ethan expressed a desire to commit suicide if he stayed in Mother’s care and stated he never wanted to see Mother again. The referral also stated Mother was using a drug that was “messing with her head a lot.” The juvenile court authorized the Department to remove Ethan from Mother’s custody. The Department placed Ethan with his paternal aunts, M.C. and P.S. M.C. is married; P.S. is 1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 not. Both reside with M.C.’s husband. Ethan has stayed with his aunts throughout the proceedings. The Department filed a section 300 petition on Ethan’s behalf alleging Ethan had suffered serious physical harm and emotional damage, or was at substantial risk of suffering such harm, based on Mother’s (1) physical abuse of Ethan; (2) mental and emotional problems, which endangered Ethan’s physical safety; (3) creation of an endangering home environment in which Mother failed to provide adequate food and left Ethan home alone and unsupervised; and (4) emotional abuse, which resulted in Ethan having suicidal ideations. In December 2023 the court sustained the petition and removed Ethan from the custody of both parents. The court granted Mother reunification services and visitation and ordered her to complete a case plan that included counseling, mental health treatment, and related programs. At the 12-month review hearing, the court found that Mother had not participated in any aspect of her case plan and had not visited Ethan since the beginning of the case. The court terminated her reunification services. Ethan continued to live with M.C. and P.S., who met his medical, therapeutic, educational, and social needs, and provided him with love, support, and a stable home. Ethan was happy, had friends, participated in extracurricular activities and hobbies, and progressed from being two grade levels behind at school to making the honor roll. He had addressed his trauma in therapy, was able to express his emotions, and had a healthy attachment to his aunts, who expressed a desire to adopt him. The Department assessed that M.C. and P.S. were capable of meeting Ethan’s needs, understood the legal and financial 3 rights and responsibilities of adoption, and were committed to adopting him if parental rights were terminated. Ethan was looking forward to being adopted by his paternal aunts. The Department reported that “[a]ll adoption readiness tasks have been completed and there are no impediments to the adoption.” The Department recommended that the juvenile court designate adoption as the permanent plan for Ethan, find that no statutory exception to adoption applied, and terminate parental rights. In April 2026 the juvenile court held a section 366.26 hearing. The Department’s counsel asked the court to terminate Mother’s and Carlos’s parental rights. Ethan’s counsel joined in the request, stating that Ethan was living with his paternal aunts, who wanted to adopt him, that Ethan wanted to be adopted, and that no exception to adoption applied. Mother’s counsel asked the court to consider an alternative permanent plan of legal guardianship or long-term foster care. She also stated that, if the court terminated parental rights, it would be “over [Mother’s] objection.” Counsel did not specify the grounds for the objection or argue that any legal impediment prevented M.C. and P.S. from adopting Ethan. Father submitted on the recommendation for M.C. and P.S. to adopt Ethan. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Ethan was adoptable, that there were no legal impediments to his adoption, that no statutory exception to adoption applied, and that terminating parental rights would not be detrimental to him. Based on those findings, the court terminated all parental rights as to Ethan and transferred his care, custody, and control to the Department for adoptive planning and placement. The court also designated P.S. and M.C. as Ethan’s prospective adoptive parents. 4  Mother timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child. Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53; In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 814 [“ ‘When a child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over less secure and stable permanent plans.’ ”].) In order for the juvenile court to implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Jose C. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 147, 158.) “The ‘likely to be adopted’ standard is a low threshold.” (In re J.W. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 263, 267.) A child is considered “generally adoptable” when the child’s age, physical condition and emotional state would not make it difficult to find an adoptive family. (See In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 493-494; In re Terrance B. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 965, 974.) The “issue of adoptability ‘focuses on the minor.’ ” (In re Jose C., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 158; accord, In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) “There are unusual cases where a child, due to severe physical or mental needs, may be deemed adoptable based solely on the fact that a particular family wants to adopt the child (specific adoptability)…. In those circumstances, instead of focusing on the child’s characteristics, the court must determine whether there is a legal impediment to 5 adoption.” (In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 802 fn. 5; accord In re J.W., at pp. 267-268 [“ ‘When a child is deemed adoptable only because a particular caretaker is willing to adopt, the analysis shifts from evaluating the characteristics of the child to whether there is any legal impediment to the prospective adoptive parent’s adoption and whether he or she is able to meet the needs of the child.’ ”]; In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1231-1232 [“If the child is considered generally adoptable, [the courts] do not examine the suitability of the prospective adoptive home. [Citation.] When the child is deemed adoptable based solely on a particular family’s willingness to adopt the child, the trial court must determine whether there is a legal impediment to adoption.”].) We review an adoptability finding for substantial evidence. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154; see Mary C., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 803 [“Our review is for substantial evidence to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the child is] ‘ “likely to be adopted” ’ within a reasonable time.”].) The “question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true…. [I]n making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996.) 6 B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s Implied Finding That Ethan Was Generally Adoptable Mother contends that Ethan is not generally adoptable, relying almost exclusively on his age, which was 12 at the time Mother submitted her opening brief. She asserts that because Ethan was not generally adoptable, the juvenile court was required to examine whether there were legal impediments to his adoption by his prospective adoptive parents, i.e., his paternal aunts. She identifies several alleged impediments, including that there is no evidence M.C.’s husband consented to the adoption and that “there is no provision in the law that allows persons [like M.C. and P.S.] who cannot form a lawful union with each other—marriage/domestic partnership—to jointly adopt a child.” “Having not raised the legal impediment question in the trial court, mother failed to properly preserve for appellate purposes her claim of trial court error.” (In re G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552, 563-564.) In any event, because there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s implied finding that Ethan is generally adoptable, we need not examine whether there are legal impediments to adoption specifically by his prospective adoptive parents. (In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1231-1232.) Mother concedes “that Ethan is in good physical and emotion[al] health.” At the time of the section 366.26 hearing he was happy, had friends, participated in extracurricular activities and hobbies, and was on the honor roll at school. Ethan had worked through his trauma, was able to express his emotions, and had a healthy bond with his aunts. His physical and emotional health supported the determination by clear and convincing evidence that he was generally adoptable. (See In re 7 Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 592 [substantial evidence of general adoptability where child was “healthy, happy, attractive,” affectionate with his caregiver, developmentally on track, and aggressive and defiant behaviors had “significantly diminished” in the care of a stable caregiver]; In re Jose C., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 158-159 [substantial evidence an 11-year- old was generally adoptable where he had been in foster parent’s care for three years, during which he “progressed to the point where he has not had any behavioral issues in school and he no longer requires individual therapeutic services”]; In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1651 [substantial evidence children were generally adoptable based in part on “their good physical and emotional health, progress in therapy, intellectual and academic growth, and ability to develop interpersonal relationships”].) Mother suggests that Ethan is not generally adoptable due to his age and contends the law “clearly recognizes that children over seven are difficult to place.” She relies on section 366.26, subdivision (c)(2)(B)(3), which provides that where a dependent child “has a probability for adoption but is difficult to place for adoption and there is no identified or available prospective adoptive parent, the court may identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and, without terminating parental rights, order that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family for the child.” The provision further states “a child may only be found to be difficult to place for adoption if there is no identified or available prospective adoptive parent for the child because of the child’s membership in a sibling group, the presence of a diagnosed medical, physical, or mental handicap, or the child is seven years of age or older.” (§ 366.26, 8 subd. (c)(2)(B)(3), italics added.) Under this provision, a child aged seven or older may be found “difficult to place for adoption” only if no prospective adoptive parent has been identified. (Ibid.) That is not the case for Ethan, whose paternal aunts have been designated as his prospective adoptive parents. Thus, the provision is inapplicable, and it did not require the court to find Ethan was not generally adoptable merely because he was 12 years old. Moreover, Ethan’s age was merely one factor for the court to consider in determining his general adoptability, along with the other positive indicators of Ethan’s physical and emotional health that made him an attractive candidate for adoption. We cannot reweigh the evidence and the factors to determine whether Ethan was generally adoptable. (See In re G.M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 564 [mother “would have us rather reweigh other evidence in the record and draw unreasonable inferences against the judgment and in her favor. This we cannot and will not do.”].) Mother also ignores the fact that, after Ethan was placed with M.C. and P.S., he lived with them continuously for nearly three years, and they were committed to adopting him. “Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650; accord, In re Mary C., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 9 pp. 803-804.) The juvenile court could conclude from Ethan’s successful placement with his aunts that if they did not adopt him, another family would, particularly given they were his very first placement. Substantial evidence demonstrated Ethan is generally adoptable. Accordingly, we need not consider Mother’s contentions about possible legal impediments to adoption by the aunts. (See In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061 [where a child is generally adoptable, “the suitability of the prospective adoptive family does not constitute a legal impediment to adoption and is irrelevant to the issue of whether a child is likely to be adopted”].) DISPOSITION The order terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan is affirmed. STONE, J. We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J. 10