In re X.C. CA1/3

Filed 10/23/26 In re X.C. CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE In re X.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent, A176403 v. (Sonoma County F.C., Super. Ct. No. 24JD00279) Defendant and Appellant. F.C. (Father), parent of minor X.C., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and placing X.C. for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26.) Father contends (1) the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) made active efforts to provide the parents with remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts had proven unsuccessful; and (2) the 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code. 1 court erred in concluding the beneficial relationship exception did not apply. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 30, 2024, the Department filed a petition alleging newborn X.C. was at substantial risk of physical and emotional harm due to substance abuse by C.O. (Mother) and Father’s failure to protect the minor (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (j)). The petition alleged that X.C. was born on December 23, 2024, with withdrawal symptoms and had to be hospitalized in the neonatal intensive care unit. Mother disclosed using fentanyl daily until she was four months pregnant. Father had recently tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. Both parents had prior child welfare and criminal histories. In initial interviews with the Department, Mother reported Indian2 heritage through the Salt River Pima Tribe and/or Paiute Tribe. Mother said she had begun methadone treatment three months prior to X.C.’s birth and had maintained sobriety. Father told the Department he was unaware Mother had tested positive for fentanyl in recent months, and he believed the results were fabricated. The parents declined to discuss a safety plan with the Department and attempted to leave the hospital against medical advice, prompting intervention from law enforcement. The Department obtained drug test results showing that Mother tested positive for fentanyl, methadone, and methadone metabolite on November 25 and December 2, 2024. Thereafter, she tested negative for fentanyl and positive for methadone and methadone metabolite on various dates in 2 We use the term “Indian” rather than others such as “Native American” or “American Indian” to mirror the statutory language of both federal and state law. (See In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1.) 2 December 2024 and January 2025. Father tested negative for substances in late January 2025. In its February 2025 jurisdiction and disposition report, the Department outlined the efforts and services it had provided to the family, including: meetings with the parents and service providers; individual in- person interviews with the parents; referrals for drug testing, substance abuse treatment through the Drug Abuse Alternatives Center (DAAC), therapy, and housing assistance with the Individual and Family Support Network (IFSN); contacts with extended family members for potential placements; transportation assistance (e.g., gas cards, mileage reimbursements, and bus passes); and communication with the Walker River Paiute Tribe. Regarding visitation, the Department reported that the parents attended all visits in the first month of the case, and that several paternal relatives had been approved to join the visits. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February 2025, the juvenile court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The court ordered family reunification services for both parents and a minimum of two two-hour visits per week. In its six-month review report, the Department recommended continuing family reunification services. According to the report, X.C. had been moved to the home of her adult brother, his wife, and their two children, but a water leak caused them to relocate to the home of the wife’s father. X.C. was returned to the resource family home after the adult brother and his wife became overwhelmed with their children being ill, living in an uninhabitable home, and the wife’s father not wanting any involvement with the Department. 3  The Department spoke with Mother’s therapist, who reported that their meetings had been “ ‘sporadic.’ ” Father cancelled the release of information but expressed willingness to engage in therapy services. The parents’ efforts to maintain sobriety took a turn after Mother tested positive for methamphetamines in February 2025 and Father tested positive for alcohol and amphetamines in April 2025. The Department corresponded with Redwood Toxicology and confirmed the accuracy of the results. Mother reported she had not returned to DAAC, and the Department provided her with contact information for various alternative inpatient resources. As of June 2025, Mother was “not engaged in any services but proposed entering inpatient treatment.” Regarding visitation, the Department reported that the parents were offered three lightly supervised visits a week. In May 2025, the visitation supervisor reported concerns that the parents had been canceling one visit per week since April 2025. Regarding housing assistance, the Department reported that Father had met with IFSN to inquire about housing assistance. It was further reported that during an IFSN housing assessment in July 2025, Father would not confirm or deny a history of violence, which was “worrisome due to the nature of [Father’s] criminal charges and IFSN’s intake process relying on transparency.” In July 2025, the juvenile court ordered the parents to provide a random drug and alcohol test, but they did not comply. They were again ordered to test after a judicial settlement conference in August 2025. Mother did not test. Father’s test results were negative, but had abnormal levels of creatine, which is common when a test sample has been diluted. In August 2025, the Department asked the parents if they would submit to a hair 4 follicle test as an alternative testing option, but the Department received no response. In September 2025, the Department inquired about an alternative location for drug testing, but Father “did not wish to engage in discussion about drug testing.” The DAAC reported to the social worker that it had reached out to Father on three occasions but he did not respond, and the Department submitted another DAAC referral. Father had been engaging in therapy with a LifeWorks therapist. As of July 2025, he had attended four of five sessions and was “ ‘processing trauma’ ” and “ ‘family dynamics.’ ” In addendum reports filed in September, October, and November 2025, the Department changed its recommendation to termination of family reunification services for both parents because they had not been compliant with drug testing and substance abuse treatment and were unresponsive to attempts to engage them in therapeutic housing services. Despite resubmitting DAAC referrals for the parents, the Department was informed by Center Point DAAC that the parents were called multiple times in July and August 2025, but neither came in for assessment. Between September and November 2025, the parents had missed multiple visits with the minor. In October 2025, the Department resubmitted an IFSN housing referral for both parents. In November 2025, the Department received a follow-up email regarding a resubmitted therapy referral for both parents stating they were unresponsive, and the Department updated the therapist with the parents’ last known number. At the contested six-month review hearing on December 1, 2025, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. The parents gave notice of their intent to file petitions for an extraordinary writ challenging the court’s order, but no 5 petitions were filed within the time permitted, and the writ proceeding was dismissed as abandoned. Following the termination of reunification services, the parents’ visits were reduced to one visit per week, several of which they missed. At the contested section 366.26 hearing on April 24, 2026, the juvenile court heard testimony from Father and from Richard England, the Department’s designated expert on the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). After testimony and argument, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that X.C. was likely to be adopted and that continued physical custody by the parents would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that X.C. is an Indian child; that notice was given in accordance with ICWA; and that active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family were made, but the efforts proved unsuccessful. The juvenile court also considered the beneficial relationship exception to terminating parental rights. The court found it “debatable” whether the parents had maintained regular visitation and contact, as the court could not determine the extent to which visits were missed because of financial difficulties. In any event, the court found that the remaining elements of the exception were not satisfied, as there was “not a substantial positive emotional attachment to the parents,” and “termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child.” Accordingly, the court terminated parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption. Father appealed. 6  DISCUSSION A. ICWA Father contends the juvenile court terminated parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that active efforts had been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts had proven unsuccessful.3 Additionally, Father contends the court improperly delegated its judicial authority to the Department’s designated ICWA expert. 1. Additional Facts In December 2024, Mother reported that she and X.C. were eligible for enrollment in the Salt River Pima Tribe and/or Paiute Tribe. These tribes had assisted Mother during a prior child welfare case in Marin County. Mother further stated at the detention hearing that she had previously lived on a reservation in Arizona, and that maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandmother were enrolled members of the Walker River Paiute Tribe. Following the detention hearing, the parents filed Judicial Council form ICWA-020, and the Department sent the mandatory ICWA-030 notices to the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community and Walker River Paiute Tribe. 3 Relatedly, Father contends an “active measure” the juvenile court should have employed to prevent the breakup of the family was to select, sua sponte, a permanent plan of legal guardianship rather than terminate parental rights. We agree with the Department that Father forfeited this contention by failing to raise it below, and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. (In re Jose C. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 147, 161.) Father’s reliance on In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692 and In re Nikki R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844 is unavailing because those cases held that issues concerning ICWA notice are not waived by a parent’s failure to raise them in the juvenile court. Here, the forfeited contention is not about the sufficiency of ICWA notice. 7  The Department then reviewed Mother’s prior child welfare case in Marin County and obtained the following ICWA information. A social worker spoke with a maternal grandmother, who stated that she was a registered member of the Paiute Tribe, and that maternal great-grandmother was a registered member of the Pima Salt River Tribe. Mother was not a member or eligible for enrollment in the Salt River Pima Tribe, but she and X.C. were eligible for membership in the Walker River Paiute Tribe. The Marin County juvenile court treated the case as an ICWA case. In January 2025, the Department utilized the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to contact the designated ICWA agent for the Walker River Paiute Tribe, Miranda Quintero. The Department also contacted paternal grandmother and paternal half-brother, both of whom stated there was no Indian heritage on Father’s side. The Walker River Paiute Tribe informed the Department that Mother and X.C. were not enrolled but were eligible for enrollment if not enrolled in another tribe. In a July 2025 status review report, the Department reported there was reason to believe ICWA applied because Mother was “ ‘in the process of completing the paperwork and was waiting for her social security card to complete enrollment.’ ” In September 2025, the Department recommended finding that ICWA applies, as Quintero confirmed that Mother was an enrolled member of the Walker River Paiute Tribe and minor was eligible for enrollment. On September 25, 2025, the juvenile court found that ICWA applied and that X.C. was an Indian child through the Walker River Paiute Tribe. In its October 2025 addendum report, the Department reported that Quintero expressed support for X.C. to stay in her placement due to her age (9 months) and attachment to the caregivers. Quintero confirmed there were 8 no tribal families or homes available in the Walker River Paiute Tribe at that time. Although a paternal aunt wanted to be considered for placement, Quintero did not believe it would be in X.C.’s best interest to “move the child out of the home” and be placed with a relative. In November 2025, the ICWA expert England provided a declaration stating in relevant part that active efforts had been made by the Department to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. England was hopeful that X.C. would be placed in a relative or tribal placement where she could be connected with family, extended family, and her tribal customs and culture. In its section 366.26 report, the Department reported that the Walker River Paiute Tribe remained “ ‘an interested party’ ” but would not be intervening in the case because it was a small tribe in Nevada and did not have resources to offer the parents. Quintero was not aware of any tribally- approved homes to consider for placement. In early January 2026, Quintero corresponded with Liz DeRouen from the Indian Child Family Preservation Program (ICFPP) to inquire about ICFPP’s offer of assistance to the Walker River Paiute Tribe in identifying any local tribal homes. DeRouen indicated there was a new tribal family that was in the home study process, but she would need to work directly with the Paiute Tribe to determine if it would approve a tribal customary adoption. In late January 2026, the Department followed up with DeRouen, who indicated ICFPP was interviewing the previously-mentioned family for another child but would consider them for X.C. if it did not work out. The social worker requested that DeRouen forward the home studies for any tribally-approved homes to Quintero, but no home studies had been received as of the Department’s March 2026 section 366.26 report. Meanwhile, X.C.’s foster 9 caregivers told Quintero they were willing to support X.C.’s heritage and planned to visit the tribe’s reservation. Quintero sent the caregivers books and resources about the tribe’s culture and language. The Department reported that X.C. had no preexisting family relationships, as she had entered foster care immediately after her birth. The adult brother and his family with whom X.C. had briefly stayed early in the proceedings “ha[d] not maintained contact with [X.C.]” At the parents’ request, the Department permitted X.C.’s paternal aunts and their children to be involved in the parents’ supervised visits, but “none of the relatives identified have attended a visit with [X.C.]” The Department also spoke with a paternal grandmother who was willing to take placement of the child, but the Department concluded her home was ineligible due to the criminal history of other family members living there. The maternal grandparents “were unable to have [X.C.] live with them.” A paternal cousin who lived out of the country was ruled out as a preferred placement option because “she was not Native and it would not be in the child’s best interests to leave her current placement due to her attachment there.” When the parents complained that the Department was not communicating with enough relatives, the social worker asked the parents to provide the contact information of any additional relatives they wanted the Department to consider, but the Department received no further relative information from them. Although Father claimed his sisters were not contacted, the social worker confirmed she had left them messages in February 2026, but neither had contacted her. In April 2026, England provided another declaration reiterating that active efforts had been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. England 10 believed that X.C.’s current foster placement was the most appropriate placement for her, and that deviating from it would not be in her best interest given the familiarity and stability she had established with her foster caregivers. To the best of his knowledge, England was not aware of any tribal or relative homes available for the minor. England was hopeful X.C. would continue to learn about her tribe and culture. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court qualified England as an expert witness for purposes of ICWA and received his declarations into evidence. England testified the parents had not completed services or remediated the issues that led to the dependency proceedings. Although visitation had been positive, and the parents loved the minor, they were not ready to have her in their custody. Meanwhile, X.C.’s basic needs were fully met in her foster home. England testified that under the child-rearing practices of X.C.’s tribe, children were viewed as sacred, protected, and prioritized as to their basic needs, and she was receiving that in the foster home. 2. Analysis ICWA was enacted to “protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Federal and state law allow a tribe to intervene in dependency proceedings involving an Indian child because the law presumes it is in the child’s best interests to retain tribal ties and heritage, and it is in the tribe’s interest to preserve future generations. (See § 224.4; In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 469.) Notice of all hearings that may culminate in, among other things, termination of parental rights and adoptive placement of an Indian child, shall be sent to “[a]ll tribes of which the child 11 may be a member or citizen, or eligible for membership or citizenship.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Where, as here, a dependency case involves a confirmed Indian child, parental rights may be terminated only if the juvenile court: “(1) Finds by clear and convincing evidence that active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family were made; and (2) makes a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of one or more ‘qualified expert witnesses’ as defined in . . . section 224.6 and Family Code section 177(a), that the continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.486(a)4; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(B)(i).) “In addition to any other required findings to place an Indian child with someone other than a parent or Indian custodian, or to terminate parental rights, the court must find that active efforts have been made . . . to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and must find that these efforts were unsuccessful. These active efforts must include affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite the child with his or her family, must be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case, and must be consistent with the requirements of . . . section 224.1(f).” (Rule 5.485(c); see § 224.1, subd. (f).) Pursuant to statute, “[w]hat constitutes active efforts shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis.” (§ 361.7, subd. (b).) Active efforts “may include, but are not limited to . . . : [¶] (1) Conducting a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the Indian child’s family, with a focus on safe reunification 4 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 12 as the most desirable goal. [¶] (2) Identifying appropriate services, . . . and helping the parents overcome barriers, including actively assisting the parents in obtaining those services. [¶] (3) Identifying, notifying, and inviting representatives of the Indian child’s tribe to participate in providing support and services to the Indian child’s family and in family team meetings, permanency planning, and resolution of placement issues. [¶] (4) Conducting or causing to be conducted a diligent search for the Indian child’s extended family members, and contacting and consulting with extended family members regarding possible placements and to provide family structure and support for the Indian child and the Indian child’s parents.” (§ 224.1, subd. (f).) Similarly, the Rules of Court provide that active efforts “must include pursuit of any steps necessary to secure tribal membership for a child if the child is eligible for membership in a given tribe, as well as attempts to use the available resources of extended family members, the tribe, tribal and other Indian social service agencies, and individual Indian caregivers.” (Rule 5.485(c)(3).) Importantly, “[t]he active efforts must be documented in detail in the record” and should be “made in a manner consistent with the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life of the Indian child’s tribe.” (Rule 5.485(c)(1)–(2).) We review the juvenile court’s active-efforts finding for substantial evidence, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the judgment and upholding the court’s findings unless it can be said that no rational factfinder could reach the same conclusion. (C.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 227, 238–239.) The Department concedes the juvenile court failed to make an express active-efforts finding but contends the error was harmless. We agree, as “ ‘it 13 is not reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of continued parental custody.’ ” (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218.) The record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Department identified the main concern preventing X.C. from being safely cared for by the parents—their unresolved substance abuse—and undertook active efforts to support the parents in overcoming this problem. The Department’s efforts included multiple referrals for substance abuse treatment through DAAC, drug testing, housing assistance, and therapy. The Department followed up with the parents on these referrals and monitored their progress and participation. When the parents’ engagement in services faltered, the Department offered alternatives, including a referral for inpatient services for Mother. When the parents failed to submit to court- ordered drug testing, the Department offered alternative testing options and locations. The record similarly confirms the Department’s active efforts had not proven successful due to the parents’ lack of progress and engagement. The Department, however, “was not required to, nor could it have, forced [the parents] to take the steps necessary to be able to safely parent” X.C. (In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645 (A.L.); see Letitia V. v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017 (Letitia V.) [parent’s noncooperation affects scope of active-efforts obligation].) The record also supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Department undertook active efforts to assess X.C.’s eligibility for membership in an Indian tribe, coordinate with Indian social service agencies, conduct a diligent search for extended family members as potential placements, and support regular visits between X.C. and her parents and other extended family members. (Rule 5.485(c); § 224.1, subd. (f).) The 14 Department reviewed Mother’s Marin County case file for further information relevant to ICWA; contacted the BIA, Quintero, and DeRouen from ICFPP; contacted extended family members on the paternal and maternal side; attempted placement of X.C. with her adult brother’s family; and maintained contact with Quintero regarding any available tribal placements for X.C. These active efforts were supported by the declarations and testimony of ICWA expert England that “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely” efforts had been “made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.” These efforts proved unsuccessful because no tribal or acceptable relative home was found to be available. Father contends the Department’s efforts were merely passive—e.g., “ ‘drawing up a reunification plan and requiring the “client” to use “his or her own resources to[] bring[] it to fruition.” ’ ” (In re Michael G. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 700, 713–714 (Michael G.) [citing commentary on federal ICWA].) We disagree. As discussed, the record demonstrates the Department provided the parents with multiple referrals and transportation assistance, maintained consistent contact with them throughout the proceedings, and offered various alternative options when their engagement in services faltered. These were active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family. (See In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1286–1287 [finding sufficient active efforts where agency referred mother to services for substance abuse, counseling, parenting, and housing, and provided monetary and transportation assistance].) Unlike the child welfare agency in Michael G., the Department did not leave the parents to continue the services at their own expense or fail to offer additional remedial services after an initial run was interrupted. (Michael G., at pp. 714–715.) 15  Father criticizes the Department for not considering the paternal aunts for placement. To the contrary, the record demonstrates the Department, at the parents’ request, made preliminary attempts to involve two paternal aunts in the case by inviting them to attend the parents’ supervised visits. Despite the invitation, neither attended a visit with X.C. Additionally, the Department considered one paternal aunt’s request for placement but ultimately concluded, drawing on Quintero’s opinion, that it was in X.C.’s best interest to remain with her foster caregiver. On this record, we have no difficulty concluding the Department made sufficient active efforts to explore a potential placement with a paternal aunt. Father further complains there were no “respite efforts to support the minor remaining placed with the minor’s adult brother or to attempt placement once the immediate exigencies had been addressed.” As discussed, the Department attempted to place X.C. with the adult brother’s family before extenuating circumstances (e.g., water leak, relocation, wife’s father’s unwillingness to be involved with the Department) made the arrangement too hard for the brother’s family. Father does not demonstrate these difficulties had resolved at any point during the case, and the Department could reasonably conclude otherwise, as the adult brother’s family “ha[d] not maintained contact with [X.C.]” after she was returned to her foster caregivers. We perceive no insufficiency of effort on this score. Father offers various suggestions as to what more the Department could have done for the family, such as attending visits when Mother refused to return the Department’s calls, and enrolling Mother into inpatient treatment when she dallied. But the active-efforts obligation requires “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts” (§ 224.1, subd. (f)), not every conceivable action. As recounted above, the Department offered the 16 parents suitable services to achieve the goals of their case plan, but the parents were often resistant, and their performance was inconsistent. On this record, we see no basis to find that the Department was required to do more. (A.L., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 645; Letitia V., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) Father’s contention that the juvenile court delegated judicial authority to ICWA expert England fares no better. Specifically, Father contends the court did not require England to provide evidence of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the child’s Indian tribe as required under section 224.6, subdivision (b)(2), and instead “delegated” power to the witness, who testified summarily and merely relied on the reports and opinions of the Department. We are not persuaded. An unlawful delegation of judicial power may occur where, for instance, a juvenile court gives complete discretion to a child welfare agency as to whether visitation will occur. (See In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48–49.) No such unlawful delegation appears here. The juvenile court was required to consider England’s expert testimony under section 224.6, subdivision (b), both as to whether the parents’ continued custody of X.C. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, and as to the prevailing social and cultural standards of X.C.’s tribe. Contrary to Father’s contention, England was specifically asked about the child-rearing practices of the Walker River Paiute Tribe and testified, “[i]n my communications and work with the tribe as their designated [qualified expert witness], I know that . . . children are viewed as sacred . . . within this tribe; and part of that is that they’re protected and prioritized, you know, their basic needs; and [X.C.] is getting that right now.” And in his first declaration, England similarly stated that with regard to the tribe’s child 17 rearing practices, “the children are revered, well-cared-for, and provided with their basic needs to ensure their safety, nurturing, and healthy development. Any circumstances that threaten a child’s health and safety necessitate immediate intervention and support.” We also reject Father’s speculative argument that England’s testimony “was not evidentiary in nature and only showed that he, like everyone else in the courtroom, had read the reports of the Department.” England swore under oath that his testimony about child-rearing practices of the Walker River Paiute Tribe was based on his “communications and work with the tribe” and his “extensive knowledge of the social and cultural standards of child-rearing practices of Indian Tribes.” That the juvenile court evidently credited England’s necessary testimony in no way demonstrates the court unlawfully delegated judicial power to the expert. B. Beneficial Parental Relationship At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court may order one of three alternative permanent plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted,5 the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption, subject to several statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) It is the parent’s burden to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of these statutory exceptions. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296–297.) At issue here is the beneficial relationship exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination 5 There was no dispute that X.C. was shown to be adoptable by clear and convincing evidence. 18 would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To establish this exception, a parent must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1) regular visitation and contact; (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child; and (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).) The first two elements are factual determinations reviewed for substantial evidence, while the third involves both factual determinations reviewed for substantial evidence, as well as the juvenile court’s weighing of the harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639–641.) Here, the juvenile court made no finding as to the first Caden C. element, concluding that while the parents had missed some visits, it was unclear whether this was due to financial difficulties. We therefore assume arguendo that the first element has been met and turn to focus on the second and third Caden C. elements. As to the second element, the juvenile court must determine whether there is a “ ‘significant, positive, emotional’ ” parent-child relationship that the child would benefit from continuing. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.) Here, “the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . . . [C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, 19 look to, or talk about their parents. [Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, even as courts must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) We first acknowledge that the record demonstrates the parents’ visits with X.C. were always positive, loving, and appropriate. Mother was described as being “in tune with” X.C., while Father was “in tune with the mother and help[ed] guide her when the visits [became] heavy.” The parents were routinely described as affectionate and attentive to X.C.’s needs and required no guidance on proper infant care. That said, we cannot conclude the juvenile court erred in deciding against the parents on the second Caden C. element. Parents “must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits” in order to carry their burden. (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) Notwithstanding the pleasant visits, the court could have taken into consideration that the parents and X.C. had never lived together, and that the visits were inconsistent over the course of the dependency proceedings and had never advanced beyond being supervised. There was also evidence that X.C. often looked to her foster caregivers for comfort, and that she “separate[d] easily from the birth parents and display[ed] readiness to return to her caregiver.” On this record, a reasonable court could conclude, based on substantial evidence, that the positive interactions during visits were insufficient to demonstrate the type of significant emotional attachment necessary to meet the beneficial relationship exception. (See In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 819 (Andrew M.) [no evidence that minor showed distress or was upset when separating from parents]; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1311– 1313, 1316 [minor never lived with mother and had no difficulty separating].) 20  For the third element of the beneficial relationship exception, the juvenile court must determine “whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.] That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ [Citation.] When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634, italics omitted.) We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding any harm from severing the parent-child relationship would not outweigh the security and stability of X.C.’s adoptive home. X.C. had spent nearly her entire life with her foster caregivers and developed a primary attachment to them; her needs were fully met in the foster caregivers’ home; her contacts and relationship with the parents were limited; and she displayed no difficulty separating from them during visits. (See Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 816 [record revealed “no particular need that can be met uniquely by the parents”].) Nor was ther