In re N.M. CA2/6

Filed 10/20/26 In re N.M. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re N.M., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B353906 Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 25JD-00022) Law. (San Luis Obispo County) SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.B., Defendant and Appellant. S.B. (mother) appeals from the orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to N.M. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She contends the juvenile court erred when it terminated her parental rights and failed to apply the parent-child beneficial relationship and sibling bond exception. We affirm. Facts and Procedural Background Mother has two children, N.M. (born August 2022) and Ivy B. (born February 2024).2 In January 2025, the San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services received a Suspected Child Abuse Report concerning the condition of mother’s home. According to the report, the floors were covered in trash and marijuana “blunts” within reach of the children. A social worker observed an “odor” of marijuana inside the home when mother opened the door. Mother refused to allow the social worker inside. When law enforcement arrived, mother was arrested. The social worker entered the home and observed piles of trash and other items strewn about the floor. The home had a strong odor of urine. N.M.’s diapers and wipes were on top of a pile of trash next to a dirty diaper that had been there so long the feces had dried. The social worker located N.M. in a crib wearing only a diaper and covered by a jacket as a blanket. She appeared malnourished and had a concerning rash. The department filed a petition pursuant to section 300, alleging mother’s substance abuse and the condition of her home. The petition also alleged mother left N.M. without support as mother remained incarcerated after her arrest. 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Only N.M. is at issue in this appeal. 2  Jurisdiction and Disposition In its jurisdiction and disposition reports, the department noted that mother identified two alleged fathers, E.M. and Matthew N. Although E.M. was listed on the birth certificate, DNA results showed he was not the biological father. When the department contacted Matthew N., he denied being N.M.’s father. The department recommended that N.M. be declared a dependent child and reunification services be offered to mother. In the social study/family assessment portion of the disposition report, the department noted that mother reported a history of mental health issues, including bipolar depression, PTSD, anxiety, and schizophrenia. Mother also reported that she had been psychiatrically hospitalized in the past and was taking medication for her mood and mental health issues. At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in March 2025, the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered reunification services for mother. Interim Review In June 2025, the department prepared a report for the three-month interim review hearing. The department reported that N.M had her pediatric evaluation and was assessed as having developmental delays in all areas. She also screened positive for autism. The department expressed concerns regarding mother’s lack of progress with her case plan. At the interim review hearing, the department noted that mother had started parenting classes and reported being in therapy. The juvenile court ordered mother to continue receiving reunification services. 3  Mother’s Section 388 Petition In September 2025, mother filed a petition requesting removal of the “randomized drug testing” requirement in her case plan “because she has [maintained] sobriety and stability.” She also requested “dismissal of the case due to civil rights violations and procedural misconduct,” family maintenance services, placement of N.M. with maternal grandmother, and removal of the current social worker due to “bias and misconduct.” The juvenile court denied the petition in its entirety. Six-Month Review In its status report for the September 2025 six-month review hearing, the department recommended reunification services for mother be terminated. The department reported that mother struggled to make progress with her case plan. She received three referrals for Drug and Alcohol Services (DAS) but had yet to get engaged with DAS. Mother completed her intake with Community Action Partnership of San Luis Obispo (CAPSLO) but “no-showed” five times for follow-up appointments. Mother had not attended any of N.M.’s appointments or services. Additionally, mother was no longer communicating with the social worker in any way and failed to attend scheduled appointments with the social worker’s supervisor. Mother continued to have supervised visits twice weekly for one hour each visit. Mother was often late and ended the visits early. She also had a “pattern” of calling and canceling visits after N.M. had already arrived at the visitation room. This caused N.M. to become very emotional and dysregulated for some time. The visits that mother did attend were reported as “positive.” 4  N.M. continued to have regular visits with her younger sister, Ivy, who had been placed with paternal relatives. The department reported that it took N.M. some time to realize who Ivy was at first, but N.M. eventually remembered her. N.M. had no issues when it was time to leave. In October 2025, the juvenile court conducted a contested six-month review hearing at which mother testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the section 366.26 hearing.3 Section 366.26 Hearing In its first amended report for the section 366.26 hearing, the department recommended parental rights be terminated with the permanent plan of adoption by the prospective adoptive parents with whom N.M. had been living since her removal from mother’s care. The department reported that N.M. had started occupational therapy, was attending a special preschool program five days per week, and had been participating in attachment and play therapy. Although N.M. still had moments of dysregulation, she was thriving with her caregivers, whom she called “mum” and “didi.” The court appointed special advocate (CASA) prepared a report and agreed with the department’s recommendation. The CASA noted that although mother loves N.M. very much, mother did not complete any of the items required in her case plan and visits were inconsistent. At the section 366.26 hearing, mother testified that she visited N.M. monthly. Visits “went well” and N.M. was “always 3 On October 24, 2025, mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. On December 11, 2025, this court completed the proceeding as a nonoperative writ. 5 usually happy.” N.M. sometimes cried when it was time to go home. Mother believed N.M. had a bond with mother because N.M. knows who mother is, hugs her, and listens to her. Mother believed terminating parental rights would be detrimental to N.M. because she would lose contact with her biological family. Mother explained that she was “always there” and N.M. “needs . . . consistency.” Mother also testified that N.M. typically calls her “mom.” The social worker testified that prior to the October 2025 hearing, mother only attended forty percent of her visits. Since then, mother visited N.M. regularly. Those visits went “okay.” N.M. took time to warm up to mother, was not upset when visits ended, and was “excited” to return to her caregivers. The social worker testified that she never heard N.M. call mother “mom,” and was not “strongly bonded” with mother. It was not unusual for N.M. to give hugs; she hugged the social worker too. The social worker further testified that N.M. and Ivy had lived together for approximately five months before they were removed from mother’s care. Since then, the siblings had maintained regular contact, with visits occurring at least twice per month. The social worker noted that a post-adoption agreement for ongoing visitation between the siblings was in progress. At the conclusion of the hearing, mother’s counsel argued N.M. was not adoptable because of her autism diagnosis. Mother’s counsel also argued that the parent-child bond exception and sibling bond exception applied. After considering the evidence, testimony, reports, and taking judicial notice of the file, the juvenile court found N.M. adoptable. The juvenile court 6 further found the parental-child and sibling bond exceptions did not apply and terminated parental rights. Discussion Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it terminated her parental rights and failed to apply the parental- child beneficial relationship and sibling bond exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), (v).) We disagree. Parental-Benefit Exception “ ‘At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long- term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224; In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-297.) If the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One exception to this rule is the parental-benefit exception, which allows the juvenile court to avoid termination if it “finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To avoid termination of parental rights under this exception, a parent must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three things: (1) regular visitation and contact with the child, (2) the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and (3) 7 termination of the attachment would be detrimental to the child. “When the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636-637 (Caden C.).) Our review of the juvenile court's ruling on whether the parental-benefit exception applies incorporates two standards of review. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641.) We apply the substantial evidence standard to the first two prongs of the exception and abuse of discretion to the third prong. (Ibid.) Mother contends she met the first element of regular and consistent visitation because she attended about 40 percent of her visits before the October 2025 hearing and 100 percent thereafter. The department disagrees and contends, “[o]n balance, this is not ‘consistent’ visitation.” In analyzing this factor, the trial court stated: “The evidence is clear that in the last six months [mother] was allowed one-hour visits. . . . Though there’s been some tardiness or leaving early, she did make herself present. In the prior time up until October, the evidence is clear that she exercised about 40 percent of those visits.” For purposes of our analysis, we will assume mother satisfied the first element. To establish the second element, the parent must show the child has a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The “focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the 8 “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother did not establish a substantial, positive, emotional attachment that implies N.M. would benefit from continuing the relationship. N.M. was just two years old when she was detained from mother’s care. By the time the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights, N.M. had lived with her current caregivers for more than one year. Although mother’s visits with N.M. were “positive,” mother had a pattern of canceling visits, which negatively affected N.M. and caused her to become very emotional and dysregulated. When visits did occur, it took N.M. time to warm up to mother, and N.M. was not upset when visits ended. Mother contends N.M.’s “autism characteristics played a role, requiring different factors for assessing [N.M.’s] bond” and that N.M. “might treat someone differently than a typically developing child.” But N.M. was capable of demonstrating a strong bond with her caregivers, whereas her visits with mother were described as merely “positive.” That N.M. enjoyed visiting with mother, that visits were appropriate, and that there were no safety concerns, does not show the kind of a substantial, positive, emotional attachment that establishes the exception to adoption. Accordingly, this element is not met. Mother’s failure to meet her evidentiary burden as to the prior element obviates the need to address whether terminating the parental relationship would be detrimental to N.M. even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. Nevertheless, we note that a detriment finding is based on the child’s best interest, and the juvenile court “must 9 decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632, 636.) Here, the juvenile court found it is in N.M.’s best interest to terminate the attachment in favor of a new, adoptive home, and there was no showing of detriment. To be sure, N.M.’s need for permanency and stability are paramount given her very young age, autism, and developmental delays. N.M.’s caregivers are willing and able to meet N.M.’s special needs. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to N.M. Sibling Bond Exception Another exception to the termination of parental rights is the sibling bond exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) In assessing whether this exception applies, a juvenile court must first determine “ ‘whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship. . . .’ ” (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173; In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952.) In making this determination, the juvenile court considers the nature and extent of the sibling relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same home, shared significant common experiences, and have existing close and strong bonds. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) If the juvenile court determines that terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, then court must “ ‘weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption.’ ” (D.O., supra, at pp. 173-174; § 366.26., subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Use of this exception 10 “ ‘will likely be rare,’ ” particularly when the children to be adopted are younger children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount. (D.O., supra, at p. 174; In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.) Here, N.M. and Ivy were very young and had only lived together for approximately five months before they were removed from mother’s care. At the first sibling visit, N.M. did not immediately realize who her sibling was but eventually “remembered” her. Since then, N.M.’s caregivers and Ivy’s birth family have facilitated visits for the children and are currently in the process of creating a formal agreement for continued visits after adoption. We conclude this is not one of those “rare” cases in which the sibling bond exception applies. Disposition The juvenile court’s orders (terminating parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption) are affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. YEGAN, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. BALTODANO, J. 11  Matthew G. Guerrero, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________ Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, Vince M. Uberti, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.