Roberts v. Westbrook CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketB338995
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 Roberts v. Westbrook CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
KENT CHARLES ROBERTS, II, B338995
Petitioner, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STFL14520)
v.
JILEEN RENEE WESTBROOK,
Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Reva Goetz, Temporary Judge.1 Affirmed.
Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Claudia Ribet, Robert
A. Roth; Pines Law Group and Cari M. Pines, for Petitioner.
Summers, Levine, Gary J. Cohen and Jon S. Summers, for
Respondent.
__________________________
1 Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21;
California Rules of Court, rules 2.830 through 2.835; Superior
Court of Los Angeles County Local Rule 2.24.
Kent Charles Roberts, II (Rick) appeals from a family court
judgment that included an order he pay spousal support to his
former wife Jileen Renee Westbrook (Jill).2 After the parties
agreed to a division of their sizable marital assets, the parties
stipulated to a trial on the issue of spousal support before Judge
Reva G. Goetz (Ret.), a privately compensated temporary judge.
Rick contends Jill’s separate estate was sufficient to cover her
monthly living expenses, and thus Jill was ineligible for support
under Family Code section 4322,3 which provides that “no
support shall be ordered” when there are no children and a party
has a separate estate “sufficient for the party’s proper support.”
Rick contends the judge erred in finding Rick should pay support
because Jill’s separate estate was not sufficient to allow her to
continue to save for retirement as the couple did during their
marriage. Rick asserts “proper support” under section 4322 does
not encompass savings as opposed to actual expenses.
We conclude section 4322 does not prohibit consideration of
history of reasonable savings as part of the marital standard of
living when determining a party’s proper support. The private
judge here did not abuse her discretion in taking into account
Jill’s desire to continue saving in determining Jill’s separate
estate was not sufficient to provide her proper support, and
substantial evidence supports the amount of support awarded.
We affirm.
2 We follow the convention of the parties and the trial court
in referring to the parties by their first names. We mean no
disrespect.
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties’ Marriage, Employment, and Divorce
Rick and Jill married in 1992 and separated in 2021. They
have three adult children.
Jill has a Ph.D. in economics and worked as a college
professor from 1993 until 2002. She stopped working around
2002 when pregnant with her youngest child. She was the
primary caregiver for the three children. Except for a brief part-
time job, Jill was out of the workforce for approximately 18 years.
After the parties separated, Jill returned to full-time
employment, making approximately $95,000 per year. By the
time of trial, Jill’s gross annual income from employment and
from interest on her investments was $196,356, or approximately
$16,363 per month.
Rick worked in finance throughout the marriage. From
1997 to 2011, he worked for an investment firm. During that
period, the parties lived an upper-class lifestyle and accumulated
approximately $8.5 million in assets. In 2011, Rick was
terminated from the firm. He remained unemployed until April
2017, although he engaged in some trading activities during that
period. During those years, the family paid their living expenses
from the parties’ savings and income from Rick’s trading
activities.
In April 2017, Rick began working for another investment
firm. His compensation was approximately $1.3 million in 2020
and $2.39 million in 2021. The parties accumulated substantial
additional savings during the final three years of their marriage.
At trial, Jill’s expert estimated the parties had been saving and
investing at the rate of $38,545 per month. Rick’s forensic
accountant excluded savings from her analysis.
3
Since January 2022, Rick had been a limited partner at
Cercano Management, LLC, in Seattle, where he worked as an
analyst and portfolio manager. At the time of trial, his annual
income from employment and other sources was approximately
$1,295,424, or $107,952 per month, and he was eligible to receive
an annual bonus of up to $1 million.
Both parties filed petitions for dissolution of their marriage
in December 2021, and the actions were later consolidated.
In April 2023, the family court entered a stipulated
judgment terminating the parties’ marital status and resolving
all property issues. The judgment awarded Jill retroactively
modifiable temporary spousal support of $16,000 per month,
beginning October 1, 2022, and reserved the issue of permanent
spousal support. The parties stipulated that retired private
judge Reva Goetz would determine that issue.
B. The Spousal Support Rulings
The parties litigated the issues of permanent spousal
support and whether Jill’s temporary spousal support should be
retroactively modified over four hearings in July, August, and
September 2023. At the time of trial, Jill was 61 years old and
Rick was 63; both were in good health. Rick argued section 43224
precluded an award of spousal support to Jill because she had a
separate estate sufficient for her proper support.
4 Section 4322 provides: “[W]here there are no children, and
a party has or acquires a separate estate, including income from
employment, sufficient for the party’s proper support, no support
shall be ordered or continued against the other party.”
4
After the private judge issued her final statement of
decision, the parties filed objections to the decision, and in
December 2023 the judge issued a ruling on those objections.
The judge determined the parties had accumulated
substantial savings that allowed them to maintain their upper-
class lifestyle even during Rick’s period of unemployment,
including paying for their home, horses, multiple country-club
memberships, travel, and continued investments. The judge
found that following the division of their marital assets, Rick and
Jill each had separate assets worth approximately $8 million,
approximately half of which consisted of retirement assets. Jill
had nonretirement assets of $4,628,412 and retirement assets of
$4,048,001. For purposes of determining her support needs, the
judge reduced the amount of Jill’s available nonretirement assets
by $1.25 million to account for her planned purchase of a $2
million home. The judge found that Jill’s expenses totaled
$23,598 per month, excluding any contributions to savings. After
taxes, Jill had approximately $11,413 per month in income from
her employment and the imputed return on her nonretirement
assets. She therefore had “a shortfall of $12,185 per month,”
“[n]et of [t]axes and before [s]avings.” Factoring in a monthly
amount of $19,272 for savings—representing half of what the
couple had historically devoted to savings and investments—Jill’s
monthly expenses totaled approximately $42,870.
The judge recognized the permanent spousal support issue
“turns on whether the marital standard of living included savings
and investments.” The judge found that savings and investment
activities were part of the couple’s “marital relationship and
philosophy.”
5
The judge rejected Rick’s contention that Jill could provide
for her proper support with her separate estate because “for Jill
to provide herself with funds sufficient to allow her to save funds
in the same manner that the parties did during the marriage she
… is required to draw down from her retirement to provide her
with the funds” to reinvest. Doing so, she would be “essentially
borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.”
The judge rejected Rick’s contention that Jill’s ability to
draw down her assets necessarily meant she was ineligible for
support. She explained: “The argument that Jill is not eligible
for permanent spousal support because she has assets from
which she can draw down enough funds to support her does not
take into account her desire to continue working and save for
retirement. While there may come a time when it is not
necessary for her to save for retirement, at a healthy 61 years
old, if Jill is to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed during marriage
that time is not now. Including Jill’s income from the funds
available to her in her non-retirement accounts and her salary,
Jill’s income, excluding savings is insufficient for her to maintain
the marital lifestyle NET of a savings and investments
component and therefore does not provide ‘proper support’ by the
amount of $12,185. Rick’s Exhibit … illustrates that if Jill were
to draw [$23,9375] from her retirement funds on a monthly basis,
after considering interest income earned from the balance of
funds remaining in the account, she would have enough to
support her purchase of investments for [274] months or [22]
years and [10] months, or until she reaches the age of [84] years
5 The court inadvertently used the monthly withdrawal
figures for Rick, instead of the figures for Jill.
6
old. At that time, the balance would be reduced to $0. Jill’s
investment account, in theory, would grow by a corresponding
amount based on her savings and investments. BUT that would
not allow Jill to both cover her monthly expenses AND save for
retirement as was done during the marriage because her income
and investment earnings alone will not cover her monthly
expenses.”
The judge thus concluded the income from Jill’s separate
estate was insufficient to provide her with proper support
consistent with the marital lifestyle and that Rick had the ability
to pay support. The judge ordered support consisting of a base
amount of $13,000 per month, plus an Ostler/Smith6 award of
17.5 percent of Rick’s gross income exceeding $1 million per year,
capped at $2 million in annual income. Rick’s maximum monthly
support obligation was $27,583. The judge also retroactively
increased Jill’s temporary spousal support from $16,000 per
month for the period from October 1, 2022, through July 31,
2023, resulting in an arrearage of $20,561.
The family court entered a judgment on the reserved
issues, and Rick timely appealed.7
6 As authorized by In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 33, the spousal support order includes a
contingent support payment to Jill if Rick’s annual income
exceeds $1 million. In that circumstance, Rick must pay Jill 17.5
percent of his income exceeding $1 million, subject to the stated
cap.
7 “A temporary judge’s judgments are ‘ “appealable in the
same manner as those rendered by a constitutional judge.” ’ ”
(Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc.
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, 197.) We grant the parties’ joint
7
DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Framework for Determining Spousal Support,
Summary of Rick’s Contentions, and Standard of Review
Sections 4300 through 4360 govern the award of spousal
support. Section 4320 identifies the factors a court must consider
in determining whether to award spousal support. Section 4321
gives courts discretion to “deny support to a party out of the
separate property of the other party” when “the party has
separate property, or is earning the party’s own livelihood, or
there is community property … sufficient to give the party proper
support.” Particularly at issue here, section 4322 prohibits
awarding spousal support to a party where there are no minor
children and the party has or acquires a separate estate that is
“sufficient for the party’s proper support.” Under section 4322,
the inquiry is “whether a particular estate is, or is not,
reasonably capable of providing for a spouse’s proper support.”
(In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 930 (Terry);
see id. at p. 929 [application of section 4322 involves “a decision
that an estate is adequate to meet the needs of a ... spouse
without continued support”].)
Section 4322 applies where, as here, the parties’ children
have reached the age of majority. (See Dallman v. Dallman
(1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 729, 733 [construing the predecessor
statute to § 4322].) The parties also agree that “assets acquired
through the final division of community property should be
considered in assessing the sufficiency of the [separate] estate for
proper support.” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) In
motion for judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts from the
hearings before Judge Goetz.
8
determining whether a separate estate is sufficient, the court
must consider retirement assets and their reasonable income
potential. (See id. at pp. 929-932; see also In re Marriage of
Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 52.)
Rick contends section 4322 prohibits any spousal support
award here because, after division of the marital assets, Jill has a
separate estate that is sufficient for her proper support. He
argues the private judge erred by determining support for Jill
was necessary only because the judge factored in Jill’s desire to
continue to save large sums for retirement every month, when
Jill already had substantial assets in retirement and non-
retirement accounts. He contends “construing ‘proper support’ as
including a savings component would contradict the central task
that the structure of section 4322 lays out for courts—to measure
whether a separate estate is sufficient, not whether a separate
estate should be increased.” He further argues that savings, by
definition, constitute funds beyond what is necessary for support.
Although Rick does not challenge that in fashioning a support
award under section 4320 courts may consider a spouse’s desire
to continue the marital practice of contributing to savings and
investments, he contends the analysis under section 4322 is
“entirely independent” and “section 4320’s treatment of savings
and investment is irrelevant to [a] section 4322 analysis.”
In interpreting statutes, “ ‘ “our fundamental task is ‘to
ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the
purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013)
56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) “We consider first the words of a statute, as
the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Tuolumne Jobs
& Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th
1029, 1037.) “The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity
9
in the statutory language. [Citation.] If, however, ‘the statutory
language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation,
“ ‘ “courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the
purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative
history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the
statute.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.)
“When code sections address the same matter or subject, ‘we
must construe them together as one statute.’ ” (City of Alhambra
v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 722; see In re
C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100 [“We harmonize the various parts
of the enactment by considering them in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole.”]; accord, In re Marriage of
Pearson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 218, 231.)
Spousal support is a “determination to be made by the trial
court in each case before it, based upon the facts and equities of
that case,” and is an issue that is “truly personal to the parties.”
(In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 481.)
“ ‘Whether an estate is sufficient for one’s proper support is a fact
question for the trial court.’ ” (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1489, fn. 15; accord, In re Marriage of
McNaughton (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 845; Dallman v. Dallman,
supra, 170 Cal.App.2d at p. 736 [“Because evidence must be
taken so that the court may determine what amount is necessary
for one’s proper support, the issue is one of fact.”].) “[I]t is
essential that the trial court possess broad discretion in order to
fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by [the
statutory scheme] with the goal of accomplishing substantial
justice for the parties in the case before the court.” (Smith, at
p. 481; accord, In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437,
454.)
10
“ ‘ “[T]he ultimate decision as to amount and duration of
spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] “ ‘Because trial courts have such broad
discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial
restraint in reviewing these orders.’ ” ’ [Citation.] A lack of
substantial evidence to support the court’s decision may
constitute an abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Nelson
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 904, 914; accord, In re Marriage of
Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 454-455; In re Marriage of Alan
Freeman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 406, 412.) “We must ‘ “uphold a
ruling which a reasonable judge might have made, even though
we would not have ruled the same and a contrary ruling would
also be sustainable. We cannot substitute our own judgment.” ’ ”
(In re Marriage of Alan Freeman, at p. 412.)8
8 We reject Rick’s contention, based on Terry, supra,
80 Cal.App.4th 921, that a de novo standard of review applies.
The court in Terry held the “question of whether a party’s
separate estate is sufficient to meet the … section 4322 standard
is a mixed question of fact and law, subject to de novo review.”
The Terry court held the trial court must first establish the
“historical facts” concerning the value and character of the
spouse’s separate estate and the spouse’s support needs, and then
apply those facts to the “legal standard of sufficiency,” making a
“resulting determination as to whether that standard is met.”
(Id. at p. 928.) However, we agree with the dissent in Terry that
under section 4322, the “real issue” is whether “the supported
spouse’s ‘separate estate’ has become ‘sufficient for [his or her]
proper support,’ and he or she is, thus, no longer entitled to any
support.” (Terry, at p. 937 (dis. opn. of Sepulveda, J.).) Relying
on McNaughton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 845, the dissent
concluded, “This is a question of fact for the trial court [citation],
11
Accordingly, we review for substantial evidence the private
judge’s factual finding that Jill’s separate estate was insufficient
for her proper support, and we apply an abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing her determination that spousal support
should be awarded. The statutory meaning of the phrase “proper
support,” however, is a question of law that we review de novo.
(See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711; In
re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.)
B. Circumstances Courts Must Consider Under Section 4320 in
Determining Spousal Support
Among the factors courts must consider under section 4320
in determining spousal support are the “extent to which the
earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the
standard of living established during the marriage,” the “ability
of the supporting party to pay spousal support,” the “needs of
each party based on the standard of living established during the
marriage,” the “obligations and assets, including the separate
property, of each party,” the “duration of the marriage,” the “age
and health of the parties,” the “immediate and specific tax
consequences to each party,” the “balance of the hardships to
each party,” the “goal that the supported party shall be self-
supporting within a reasonable period of time,” and “[a]ny other
factors the court determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320,
subject to review only to determine if there was substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s finding on the issue
[citations]. In conducting such review, we must accept as true all
evidence supporting the trial judge’s findings, resolve all conflicts
in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and indulge in all
legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment.”
(Terry, at p. 937 (dis. opn. of Sepulveda, J.).)
12
subds. (c)-(f), (h)-(l), (n).) “[T]he court does not have discretion to
ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. To
the contrary, the trial judge must both recognize and apply each
applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support.” (In re
Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 595, 602.) “ ‘ “The
first of the enumerated circumstances, the marital standard of
living, is relevant as a reference point against which the other
statutory factors are to be weighed.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Nelson,
supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 916.)
The circumstances relevant to support include
“ ‘ “practically everything which has a legitimate bearing upon
the present and prospective matters relating to the lives of both
parties,” ’ ” and those circumstances necessarily vary from case to
case. (In re Marriage of Maher & Strawn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
356, 364; accord, In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d
at p. 480.) Spousal support may provide financial assistance
during a transition to self-support, address a disparity in the
parties’ financial circumstances, or provide ongoing support
where a spouse cannot generate sufficient income from
employment or assets to meet reasonable living expenses.
(Smith, at pp. 480-481; In re Marriage of Ficke (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 10, 23; In re Marriage of Kerr (1999)
77 Cal.App.4th 87, 94; see also In re Marriage of Plescia (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 252, 258 [“the sole purpose of permanent spousal
support is to make an equitable apportionment between the
parties”], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In
re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 185.)
13
C. A Couple’s History of Saving as Part of Their Marital
Standard of Living Is Relevant in Determining Spousal
Support Under Section 4320
Courts applying section 4320 have recognized that a
couple’s history of saving during their marriage may be relevant
to determining the appropriate level of support. (See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“a
court is not limited by a supported spouse’s living expense needs
when the parties’ marital standard of living included savings and
investments”].) In In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th
1926, for example, the trial court awarded the wife $6,806 per
month in temporary support even though it found her monthly
living expenses, excluding savings, totaled only $2,600. (Id. at
p. 1931.) The trial court reasoned that “ ‘the supported spouse
should have the same opportunity ... to continue the lifestyle that
had ... some discretionary income for purposes of investing, just
as husband would have.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed,
concluding it saw no reason the wife “should be deprived of her
accustomed life-style just because it involved the purchase of
stocks and bonds rather than fur coats.” (Id. at pp. 1932-1933,
1935.)
Similarly, In re Marriage of Drapeau (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
1086 recognized that “a rule prohibiting consideration of the
parties’ marital savings history would penalize those who are
prudent enough to save during marriage, and would conflict with
sound public policy to encourage such savings.” The court
concluded, “Based on the application of the relevant statutory
criteria ... there is no policy reason to foreclose consideration of
savings as an aspect of [the marital standard of living].” (Id. at
p. 1097.) Responding to the argument that savings were not an
14
“expense” and therefore should not be considered in setting
support, the court explained that savings may constitute “a form
of deferred expenditures or planned future consumption.” (Ibid.)
It noted that “it becomes difficult to make a principled distinction
in this regard between a check written to an IRA (individual
retirement account) and a mortgage payment.” (Ibid.)
D. A Spouse’s Need To Continue Saving After Divorce May Be
Considered in Determining The Spouse’s “Proper Support”
Under Section 4322
Rick argues that even though a couple’s history of savings
may be taken into account in determining spousal support under
section 4320, the analysis under section 4322 regarding what is
sufficient and proper support is separate and more limited, and
may not factor in such a pattern of savings. However, section
4320 states that “[i]n ordering spousal support under this part,
the court shall consider all” of the circumstances listed under
section 4320. “[T]his part” includes section 4322, as both sections
4320 and 4322 are found in “Part 3” of the division of the Family
Code dealing with support. Accordingly, Rick is incorrect in
arguing that section 4322 operates “[a]s a stand-alone statute,”
“independently of section 4320.” Rather, section 4320 identifies
the factors a court must consider in determining an appropriate
amount of support; section 4322 then imposes a limitation on
ordering any support where there are no children and the spouse
seeking support has a separate estate sufficient for his or her
proper support. These two provisions can operate together
without contradiction: In sum, a court may determine the
marital standard of living and other circumstances by applying
the section 4320 factors and then decide whether a spouse’s
separate estate is sufficient to meet that standard. (See
15
Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter
Group 2026) ¶ 6:978.7 [“§ 4322 does not elaborate on the term
‘proper support.’ No doubt, however, whether a separate estate is
sufficient to provide ‘proper support’ is to be determined with
reference to § 4320—the key factors being need (in relation to the
marital standard of living) and ability to pay.”].)
Rick suggests Terry, 80 Cal.App.4th 921 compels a different
conclusion. In Terry the appellate court determined that “[d]enial
of continued support is ... mandatory if the sufficiency [of the
separate estate] threshold is met, irrespective of circumstances
the court would otherwise consider under section 4320.” (Terry,
supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) However, as Jill points out,
Terry “does not explain how to determine ‘if the sufficiency
threshold is met’ when the trial court does not know what the
needs of the supported spouse are.” In Terry, a prior proceeding
had already determined the reasonable needs of the spouse
seeking support to be between $10,000 and $12,000 per month
after taxes. (Id. at p. 925.) Because that spouse had not
appealed that determination, the Terry court used the same
figure in deciding whether her separate estate had become
sufficient to meet her needs. (Id. at p. 928.) The court therefore
was not confronted with the threshold question presented here:
how to determine a spouse’s “proper support” when the parties
dispute what that support should include.
Where, as here, the parties dispute the supported spouse’s
needs, the court necessarily must determine those needs in
accordance with the statutory scheme governing spousal support.
That includes consideration of the factors set forth in section
4320. Of course, the court must assess a spouse’s needs
consistent with the marital standard of living, including the need
16
for savings, and order reasonable support only to meet those
needs. But nothing in section 4322 requires the court to
determine a spouse’s needs under a different, artificially
narrower standard. As discussed, the section 4320 factors allow
consideration of contributions to savings as part of the marital
standard of living.
Further, although the phrase “proper support” is not
defined in the Family Code,9 we reject Rick’s suggestion that a
plan for reasonable savings can never be part of “proper support”
and that “proper support” must instead mean “enough to provide
only for a spouse’s immediate necessities.” Rather, the
reasonable interpretation of “proper support” under section 4322
is the amount of support deemed necessary after consideration of
the factors under section 4320. (See § 4320 [listing circumstances
to consider “in ordering spousal support under this part”].) While
“proper support” does not encompass an allowance for savings
designed merely to accumulate wealth or that is disproportionate
to the spouse’s reasonable needs, it may reasonably include a
component for savings for retirement, emergencies, or other
foreseeable future expenses, when such savings were part of the
marital standard of living.
9 Although the parties discuss the legislative history of
section 4322, they point to nothing helpful in determining the
Legislature’s intended definition of “proper support” in section
4322.
17
E. It Was Not an Abuse of Discretion To Award Spousal
Support to Jill Notwithstanding Section 4322
Given Jill had a separate estate consisting of
approximately $8 million after dividing the marital assets, Rick
argues requiring him to pay support that would include a savings
component would merely allow Jill to accumulate more wealth for
its own sake, in violation of section 4322. We agree that “proper
support” does not mean a level of support to allow existing
retirement or non-retirement assets to remain untouched until
death. But nor does it mean a supported spouse is only entitled
to support under section 4322 if the spouse will surely consume
all available assets in his or her lifetime.
Here, the private judge did not award Jill an amount of
spousal support designed merely to accumulate wealth. Rather,
she found that in addition to living an upper-class lifestyle, as
part of their marital relationship and philosophy the parties
saved or invested an average of $38,545 per month during their
marriage. For now, the only way that Jill could save at the same
(pro rata) rate as when she was married is “if she’s drawing down
her retirement savings, and using those funds to make
investments, essentially borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.” She
would also incur capital gains taxes (but not penalties given her
age) in making these withdrawals. The court concluded that
“[w]hile there may come a time when it is not necessary for her to
save for retirement, at a healthy 61 years old, if Jill is to
maintain the lifestyle enjoyed during marriage that time is not
now.” The judge found “the income from Jill’s separate estate is
insufficient to provide Jill with proper support,” considering “the
marital lifestyle she and Rick enjoyed.”
18
The private judge here relied on Rick’s forensic
accountant’s projections that if Jill withdrew $23,937 per month
from her retirement accounts, those accounts would be depleted
by age 84, the life expectancy of a then-61-year-old female
(according to the Social Security Administration). Rick failed to
show that, without spousal support, Jill’s remaining assets would
be sufficient to ensure all her needs would be met for the rest of
her life, which could continue well past 84 years old. Substantial
evidence supported the private judge’s factual finding that,
taking into consideration the parties’ marital lifestyle, Jill needed
spousal support to ensure she could meet her needs later in life.
Because we cannot say “ ‘ “ ‘no judge reasonably could have made
the same order,’ ” ’ ” we conclude the judge did not abuse its
discretion in concluding Jill’s separate estate was insufficient to
meet her proper support needs under section 4322. (In re
Marriage of Maher & Strawn, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Jill is entitled to recover her
costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J.
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