Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 Roberts v. Westbrook CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN KENT CHARLES ROBERTS, II, B338995 Petitioner, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STFL14520) v. JILEEN RENEE WESTBROOK, Respondent. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Reva Goetz, Temporary Judge.1 Affirmed. Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Claudia Ribet, Robert A. Roth; Pines Law Group and Cari M. Pines, for Petitioner. Summers, Levine, Gary J. Cohen and Jon S. Summers, for Respondent. __________________________ 1 Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21; California Rules of Court, rules 2.830 through 2.835; Superior Court of Los Angeles County Local Rule 2.24. Kent Charles Roberts, II (Rick) appeals from a family court judgment that included an order he pay spousal support to his former wife Jileen Renee Westbrook (Jill).2 After the parties agreed to a division of their sizable marital assets, the parties stipulated to a trial on the issue of spousal support before Judge Reva G. Goetz (Ret.), a privately compensated temporary judge. Rick contends Jill’s separate estate was sufficient to cover her monthly living expenses, and thus Jill was ineligible for support under Family Code section 4322,3 which provides that “no support shall be ordered” when there are no children and a party has a separate estate “sufficient for the party’s proper support.” Rick contends the judge erred in finding Rick should pay support because Jill’s separate estate was not sufficient to allow her to continue to save for retirement as the couple did during their marriage. Rick asserts “proper support” under section 4322 does not encompass savings as opposed to actual expenses. We conclude section 4322 does not prohibit consideration of history of reasonable savings as part of the marital standard of living when determining a party’s proper support. The private judge here did not abuse her discretion in taking into account Jill’s desire to continue saving in determining Jill’s separate estate was not sufficient to provide her proper support, and substantial evidence supports the amount of support awarded. We affirm. 2 We follow the convention of the parties and the trial court in referring to the parties by their first names. We mean no disrespect. 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Parties’ Marriage, Employment, and Divorce Rick and Jill married in 1992 and separated in 2021. They have three adult children. Jill has a Ph.D. in economics and worked as a college professor from 1993 until 2002. She stopped working around 2002 when pregnant with her youngest child. She was the primary caregiver for the three children. Except for a brief part- time job, Jill was out of the workforce for approximately 18 years. After the parties separated, Jill returned to full-time employment, making approximately $95,000 per year. By the time of trial, Jill’s gross annual income from employment and from interest on her investments was $196,356, or approximately $16,363 per month. Rick worked in finance throughout the marriage. From 1997 to 2011, he worked for an investment firm. During that period, the parties lived an upper-class lifestyle and accumulated approximately $8.5 million in assets. In 2011, Rick was terminated from the firm. He remained unemployed until April 2017, although he engaged in some trading activities during that period. During those years, the family paid their living expenses from the parties’ savings and income from Rick’s trading activities. In April 2017, Rick began working for another investment firm. His compensation was approximately $1.3 million in 2020 and $2.39 million in 2021. The parties accumulated substantial additional savings during the final three years of their marriage. At trial, Jill’s expert estimated the parties had been saving and investing at the rate of $38,545 per month. Rick’s forensic accountant excluded savings from her analysis. 3 Since January 2022, Rick had been a limited partner at Cercano Management, LLC, in Seattle, where he worked as an analyst and portfolio manager. At the time of trial, his annual income from employment and other sources was approximately $1,295,424, or $107,952 per month, and he was eligible to receive an annual bonus of up to $1 million. Both parties filed petitions for dissolution of their marriage in December 2021, and the actions were later consolidated. In April 2023, the family court entered a stipulated judgment terminating the parties’ marital status and resolving all property issues. The judgment awarded Jill retroactively modifiable temporary spousal support of $16,000 per month, beginning October 1, 2022, and reserved the issue of permanent spousal support. The parties stipulated that retired private judge Reva Goetz would determine that issue. B. The Spousal Support Rulings The parties litigated the issues of permanent spousal support and whether Jill’s temporary spousal support should be retroactively modified over four hearings in July, August, and September 2023. At the time of trial, Jill was 61 years old and Rick was 63; both were in good health. Rick argued section 43224 precluded an award of spousal support to Jill because she had a separate estate sufficient for her proper support. 4 Section 4322 provides: “[W]here there are no children, and a party has or acquires a separate estate, including income from employment, sufficient for the party’s proper support, no support shall be ordered or continued against the other party.” 4 After the private judge issued her final statement of decision, the parties filed objections to the decision, and in December 2023 the judge issued a ruling on those objections. The judge determined the parties had accumulated substantial savings that allowed them to maintain their upper- class lifestyle even during Rick’s period of unemployment, including paying for their home, horses, multiple country-club memberships, travel, and continued investments. The judge found that following the division of their marital assets, Rick and Jill each had separate assets worth approximately $8 million, approximately half of which consisted of retirement assets. Jill had nonretirement assets of $4,628,412 and retirement assets of $4,048,001. For purposes of determining her support needs, the judge reduced the amount of Jill’s available nonretirement assets by $1.25 million to account for her planned purchase of a $2 million home. The judge found that Jill’s expenses totaled $23,598 per month, excluding any contributions to savings. After taxes, Jill had approximately $11,413 per month in income from her employment and the imputed return on her nonretirement assets. She therefore had “a shortfall of $12,185 per month,” “[n]et of [t]axes and before [s]avings.” Factoring in a monthly amount of $19,272 for savings—representing half of what the couple had historically devoted to savings and investments—Jill’s monthly expenses totaled approximately $42,870. The judge recognized the permanent spousal support issue “turns on whether the marital standard of living included savings and investments.” The judge found that savings and investment activities were part of the couple’s “marital relationship and philosophy.” 5 The judge rejected Rick’s contention that Jill could provide for her proper support with her separate estate because “for Jill to provide herself with funds sufficient to allow her to save funds in the same manner that the parties did during the marriage she … is required to draw down from her retirement to provide her with the funds” to reinvest. Doing so, she would be “essentially borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.” The judge rejected Rick’s contention that Jill’s ability to draw down her assets necessarily meant she was ineligible for support. She explained: “The argument that Jill is not eligible for permanent spousal support because she has assets from which she can draw down enough funds to support her does not take into account her desire to continue working and save for retirement. While there may come a time when it is not necessary for her to save for retirement, at a healthy 61 years old, if Jill is to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed during marriage that time is not now. Including Jill’s income from the funds available to her in her non-retirement accounts and her salary, Jill’s income, excluding savings is insufficient for her to maintain the marital lifestyle NET of a savings and investments component and therefore does not provide ‘proper support’ by the amount of $12,185. Rick’s Exhibit … illustrates that if Jill were to draw [$23,9375] from her retirement funds on a monthly basis, after considering interest income earned from the balance of funds remaining in the account, she would have enough to support her purchase of investments for [274] months or [22] years and [10] months, or until she reaches the age of [84] years 5 The court inadvertently used the monthly withdrawal figures for Rick, instead of the figures for Jill. 6 old. At that time, the balance would be reduced to $0. Jill’s investment account, in theory, would grow by a corresponding amount based on her savings and investments. BUT that would not allow Jill to both cover her monthly expenses AND save for retirement as was done during the marriage because her income and investment earnings alone will not cover her monthly expenses.” The judge thus concluded the income from Jill’s separate estate was insufficient to provide her with proper support consistent with the marital lifestyle and that Rick had the ability to pay support. The judge ordered support consisting of a base amount of $13,000 per month, plus an Ostler/Smith6 award of 17.5 percent of Rick’s gross income exceeding $1 million per year, capped at $2 million in annual income. Rick’s maximum monthly support obligation was $27,583. The judge also retroactively increased Jill’s temporary spousal support from $16,000 per month for the period from October 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023, resulting in an arrearage of $20,561. The family court entered a judgment on the reserved issues, and Rick timely appealed.7 6 As authorized by In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33, the spousal support order includes a contingent support payment to Jill if Rick’s annual income exceeds $1 million. In that circumstance, Rick must pay Jill 17.5 percent of his income exceeding $1 million, subject to the stated cap. 7 “A temporary judge’s judgments are ‘ “appealable in the same manner as those rendered by a constitutional judge.” ’ ” (Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, 197.) We grant the parties’ joint 7 DISCUSSION A. Statutory Framework for Determining Spousal Support, Summary of Rick’s Contentions, and Standard of Review Sections 4300 through 4360 govern the award of spousal support. Section 4320 identifies the factors a court must consider in determining whether to award spousal support. Section 4321 gives courts discretion to “deny support to a party out of the separate property of the other party” when “the party has separate property, or is earning the party’s own livelihood, or there is community property … sufficient to give the party proper support.” Particularly at issue here, section 4322 prohibits awarding spousal support to a party where there are no minor children and the party has or acquires a separate estate that is “sufficient for the party’s proper support.” Under section 4322, the inquiry is “whether a particular estate is, or is not, reasonably capable of providing for a spouse’s proper support.” (In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 930 (Terry); see id. at p. 929 [application of section 4322 involves “a decision that an estate is adequate to meet the needs of a ... spouse without continued support”].) Section 4322 applies where, as here, the parties’ children have reached the age of majority. (See Dallman v. Dallman (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 729, 733 [construing the predecessor statute to § 4322].) The parties also agree that “assets acquired through the final division of community property should be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the [separate] estate for proper support.” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) In motion for judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts from the hearings before Judge Goetz. 8 determining whether a separate estate is sufficient, the court must consider retirement assets and their reasonable income potential. (See id. at pp. 929-932; see also In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 52.) Rick contends section 4322 prohibits any spousal support award here because, after division of the marital assets, Jill has a separate estate that is sufficient for her proper support. He argues the private judge erred by determining support for Jill was necessary only because the judge factored in Jill’s desire to continue to save large sums for retirement every month, when Jill already had substantial assets in retirement and non- retirement accounts. He contends “construing ‘proper support’ as including a savings component would contradict the central task that the structure of section 4322 lays out for courts—to measure whether a separate estate is sufficient, not whether a separate estate should be increased.” He further argues that savings, by definition, constitute funds beyond what is necessary for support. Although Rick does not challenge that in fashioning a support award under section 4320 courts may consider a spouse’s desire to continue the marital practice of contributing to savings and investments, he contends the analysis under section 4322 is “entirely independent” and “section 4320’s treatment of savings and investment is irrelevant to [a] section 4322 analysis.” In interpreting statutes, “ ‘ “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) “We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1037.) “The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity 9 in the statutory language. [Citation.] If, however, ‘the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, “ ‘ “courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.) “When code sections address the same matter or subject, ‘we must construe them together as one statute.’ ” (City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 722; see In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100 [“We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.”]; accord, In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 218, 231.) Spousal support is a “determination to be made by the trial court in each case before it, based upon the facts and equities of that case,” and is an issue that is “truly personal to the parties.” (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 481.) “ ‘Whether an estate is sufficient for one’s proper support is a fact question for the trial court.’ ” (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1489, fn. 15; accord, In re Marriage of McNaughton (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 845; Dallman v. Dallman, supra, 170 Cal.App.2d at p. 736 [“Because evidence must be taken so that the court may determine what amount is necessary for one’s proper support, the issue is one of fact.”].) “[I]t is essential that the trial court possess broad discretion in order to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by [the statutory scheme] with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before the court.” (Smith, at p. 481; accord, In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 454.) 10 “ ‘ “[T]he ultimate decision as to amount and duration of spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “ ‘Because trial courts have such broad discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders.’ ” ’ [Citation.] A lack of substantial evidence to support the court’s decision may constitute an abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Nelson (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 904, 914; accord, In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 454-455; In re Marriage of Alan Freeman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 406, 412.) “We must ‘ “uphold a ruling which a reasonable judge might have made, even though we would not have ruled the same and a contrary ruling would also be sustainable. We cannot substitute our own judgment.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Alan Freeman, at p. 412.)8 8 We reject Rick’s contention, based on Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 921, that a de novo standard of review applies. The court in Terry held the “question of whether a party’s separate estate is sufficient to meet the … section 4322 standard is a mixed question of fact and law, subject to de novo review.” The Terry court held the trial court must first establish the “historical facts” concerning the value and character of the spouse’s separate estate and the spouse’s support needs, and then apply those facts to the “legal standard of sufficiency,” making a “resulting determination as to whether that standard is met.” (Id. at p. 928.) However, we agree with the dissent in Terry that under section 4322, the “real issue” is whether “the supported spouse’s ‘separate estate’ has become ‘sufficient for [his or her] proper support,’ and he or she is, thus, no longer entitled to any support.” (Terry, at p. 937 (dis. opn. of Sepulveda, J.).) Relying on McNaughton, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 845, the dissent concluded, “This is a question of fact for the trial court [citation], 11 Accordingly, we review for substantial evidence the private judge’s factual finding that Jill’s separate estate was insufficient for her proper support, and we apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing her determination that spousal support should be awarded. The statutory meaning of the phrase “proper support,” however, is a question of law that we review de novo. (See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711; In re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.) B. Circumstances Courts Must Consider Under Section 4320 in Determining Spousal Support Among the factors courts must consider under section 4320 in determining spousal support are the “extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage,” the “ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support,” the “needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage,” the “obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party,” the “duration of the marriage,” the “age and health of the parties,” the “immediate and specific tax consequences to each party,” the “balance of the hardships to each party,” the “goal that the supported party shall be self- supporting within a reasonable period of time,” and “[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320, subject to review only to determine if there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding on the issue [citations]. In conducting such review, we must accept as true all evidence supporting the trial judge’s findings, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment.” (Terry, at p. 937 (dis. opn. of Sepulveda, J.).) 12 subds. (c)-(f), (h)-(l), (n).) “[T]he court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. To the contrary, the trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support.” (In re Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 595, 602.) “ ‘ “The first of the enumerated circumstances, the marital standard of living, is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Nelson, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 916.) The circumstances relevant to support include “ ‘ “practically everything which has a legitimate bearing upon the present and prospective matters relating to the lives of both parties,” ’ ” and those circumstances necessarily vary from case to case. (In re Marriage of Maher & Strawn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 356, 364; accord, In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 480.) Spousal support may provide financial assistance during a transition to self-support, address a disparity in the parties’ financial circumstances, or provide ongoing support where a spouse cannot generate sufficient income from employment or assets to meet reasonable living expenses. (Smith, at pp. 480-481; In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 23; In re Marriage of Kerr (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 87, 94; see also In re Marriage of Plescia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 252, 258 [“the sole purpose of permanent spousal support is to make an equitable apportionment between the parties”], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 185.) 13 C. A Couple’s History of Saving as Part of Their Marital Standard of Living Is Relevant in Determining Spousal Support Under Section 4320 Courts applying section 4320 have recognized that a couple’s history of saving during their marriage may be relevant to determining the appropriate level of support. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“a court is not limited by a supported spouse’s living expense needs when the parties’ marital standard of living included savings and investments”].) In In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1926, for example, the trial court awarded the wife $6,806 per month in temporary support even though it found her monthly living expenses, excluding savings, totaled only $2,600. (Id. at p. 1931.) The trial court reasoned that “ ‘the supported spouse should have the same opportunity ... to continue the lifestyle that had ... some discretionary income for purposes of investing, just as husband would have.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding it saw no reason the wife “should be deprived of her accustomed life-style just because it involved the purchase of stocks and bonds rather than fur coats.” (Id. at pp. 1932-1933, 1935.) Similarly, In re Marriage of Drapeau (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1086 recognized that “a rule prohibiting consideration of the parties’ marital savings history would penalize those who are prudent enough to save during marriage, and would conflict with sound public policy to encourage such savings.” The court concluded, “Based on the application of the relevant statutory criteria ... there is no policy reason to foreclose consideration of savings as an aspect of [the marital standard of living].” (Id. at p. 1097.) Responding to the argument that savings were not an 14 “expense” and therefore should not be considered in setting support, the court explained that savings may constitute “a form of deferred expenditures or planned future consumption.” (Ibid.) It noted that “it becomes difficult to make a principled distinction in this regard between a check written to an IRA (individual retirement account) and a mortgage payment.” (Ibid.) D. A Spouse’s Need To Continue Saving After Divorce May Be Considered in Determining The Spouse’s “Proper Support” Under Section 4322 Rick argues that even though a couple’s history of savings may be taken into account in determining spousal support under section 4320, the analysis under section 4322 regarding what is sufficient and proper support is separate and more limited, and may not factor in such a pattern of savings. However, section 4320 states that “[i]n ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all” of the circumstances listed under section 4320. “[T]his part” includes section 4322, as both sections 4320 and 4322 are found in “Part 3” of the division of the Family Code dealing with support. Accordingly, Rick is incorrect in arguing that section 4322 operates “[a]s a stand-alone statute,” “independently of section 4320.” Rather, section 4320 identifies the factors a court must consider in determining an appropriate amount of support; section 4322 then imposes a limitation on ordering any support where there are no children and the spouse seeking support has a separate estate sufficient for his or her proper support. These two provisions can operate together without contradiction: In sum, a court may determine the marital standard of living and other circumstances by applying the section 4320 factors and then decide whether a spouse’s separate estate is sufficient to meet that standard. (See 15 Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 6:978.7 [“§ 4322 does not elaborate on the term ‘proper support.’ No doubt, however, whether a separate estate is sufficient to provide ‘proper support’ is to be determined with reference to § 4320—the key factors being need (in relation to the marital standard of living) and ability to pay.”].) Rick suggests Terry, 80 Cal.App.4th 921 compels a different conclusion. In Terry the appellate court determined that “[d]enial of continued support is ... mandatory if the sufficiency [of the separate estate] threshold is met, irrespective of circumstances the court would otherwise consider under section 4320.” (Terry, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) However, as Jill points out, Terry “does not explain how to determine ‘if the sufficiency threshold is met’ when the trial court does not know what the needs of the supported spouse are.” In Terry, a prior proceeding had already determined the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking support to be between $10,000 and $12,000 per month after taxes. (Id. at p. 925.) Because that spouse had not appealed that determination, the Terry court used the same figure in deciding whether her separate estate had become sufficient to meet her needs. (Id. at p. 928.) The court therefore was not confronted with the threshold question presented here: how to determine a spouse’s “proper support” when the parties dispute what that support should include. Where, as here, the parties dispute the supported spouse’s needs, the court necessarily must determine those needs in accordance with the statutory scheme governing spousal support. That includes consideration of the factors set forth in section 4320. Of course, the court must assess a spouse’s needs consistent with the marital standard of living, including the need 16 for savings, and order reasonable support only to meet those needs. But nothing in section 4322 requires the court to determine a spouse’s needs under a different, artificially narrower standard. As discussed, the section 4320 factors allow consideration of contributions to savings as part of the marital standard of living. Further, although the phrase “proper support” is not defined in the Family Code,9 we reject Rick’s suggestion that a plan for reasonable savings can never be part of “proper support” and that “proper support” must instead mean “enough to provide only for a spouse’s immediate necessities.” Rather, the reasonable interpretation of “proper support” under section 4322 is the amount of support deemed necessary after consideration of the factors under section 4320. (See § 4320 [listing circumstances to consider “in ordering spousal support under this part”].) While “proper support” does not encompass an allowance for savings designed merely to accumulate wealth or that is disproportionate to the spouse’s reasonable needs, it may reasonably include a component for savings for retirement, emergencies, or other foreseeable future expenses, when such savings were part of the marital standard of living. 9 Although the parties discuss the legislative history of section 4322, they point to nothing helpful in determining the Legislature’s intended definition of “proper support” in section 4322. 17 E. It Was Not an Abuse of Discretion To Award Spousal Support to Jill Notwithstanding Section 4322 Given Jill had a separate estate consisting of approximately $8 million after dividing the marital assets, Rick argues requiring him to pay support that would include a savings component would merely allow Jill to accumulate more wealth for its own sake, in violation of section 4322. We agree that “proper support” does not mean a level of support to allow existing retirement or non-retirement assets to remain untouched until death. But nor does it mean a supported spouse is only entitled to support under section 4322 if the spouse will surely consume all available assets in his or her lifetime. Here, the private judge did not award Jill an amount of spousal support designed merely to accumulate wealth. Rather, she found that in addition to living an upper-class lifestyle, as part of their marital relationship and philosophy the parties saved or invested an average of $38,545 per month during their marriage. For now, the only way that Jill could save at the same (pro rata) rate as when she was married is “if she’s drawing down her retirement savings, and using those funds to make investments, essentially borrowing from Peter to pay Paul.” She would also incur capital gains taxes (but not penalties given her age) in making these withdrawals. The court concluded that “[w]hile there may come a time when it is not necessary for her to save for retirement, at a healthy 61 years old, if Jill is to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed during marriage that time is not now.” The judge found “the income from Jill’s separate estate is insufficient to provide Jill with proper support,” considering “the marital lifestyle she and Rick enjoyed.” 18 The private judge here relied on Rick’s forensic accountant’s projections that if Jill withdrew $23,937 per month from her retirement accounts, those accounts would be depleted by age 84, the life expectancy of a then-61-year-old female (according to the Social Security Administration). Rick failed to show that, without spousal support, Jill’s remaining assets would be sufficient to ensure all her needs would be met for the rest of her life, which could continue well past 84 years old. Substantial evidence supported the private judge’s factual finding that, taking into consideration the parties’ marital lifestyle, Jill needed spousal support to ensure she could meet her needs later in life. Because we cannot say “ ‘ “ ‘no judge reasonably could have made the same order,’ ” ’ ” we conclude the judge did not abuse its discretion in concluding Jill’s separate estate was insufficient to meet her proper support needs under section 4322. (In re Marriage of Maher & Strawn, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Jill is entitled to recover her costs on appeal. STONE, J. We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J. 19