Arora v. Arora

Filed 9/28/26 Certified for Publication 10/22/26 (order attached) COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA NEHA ARORA, D086321 Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 22FL006985C) v. GAUTAM ARORA, Respondent. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed. Antonyan Miranda, Anthony J. Boucek and Justin Prybutok for Appellant. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall and Megan E. Dawson for Respondent.  INTRODUCTION In this marital dissolution proceeding, Neha Arora (Wife) appeals the trial court’s order awarding Gautam Arora (Husband) sanctions in the form of attorney fees and costs under section 271, subdivision (a) of the Family Code.1 The court’s award was predicated, in large part, on Wife’s conduct in pursuing contempt proceedings earlier in the litigation that delayed settlement and increased litigation costs. Wife did not prevail in those contempt proceedings. On appeal, Wife contends that the unilateral fee provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a), which prohibits an award of attorney fees to prevailing contemners in contempt proceedings, barred Husband’s request for attorney fees related to the contempt proceedings under Family Code section 271. Wife alternatively claims Husband untimely filed his request 338 days after entry of the order dismissing contempt, and that the request was inconsistent with the timelines for claiming attorney fees under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b).2 We affirm. Family Code section 271 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) serve separate public policy purposes, do not irreconcilably conflict, and can be concurrently applied in furtherance of each provision’s aim. Additionally, the order dismissing Wife’s contempt was not, under the circumstances of this case, a final “judgment” within the meaning of rule 3.1702(b) and cannot be used to measure the timeliness of Husband’s motion. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 2 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In June 2022, Husband and Wife filed cross petitions for dissolution of marriage and dueling requests for domestic violence restraining orders (DVTROs). The court granted a DVTRO in favor of Wife the same day. At a July 2023 hearing, the court entered a permanent restraining order for Wife and also considered multiple allegations that Husband had violated the DVTRO. The court entered its statement of decision about two months later. Three days after entry of the decision, Wife filed an order to show cause and an affidavit of contempt, alleging the same violations of the DVTRO the court had previously heard. After a trial, the court ultimately found Husband not guilty of contempt. Wife moved for sanctions and sought a subpoena for Husband’s communications related to one of the alleged DVTRO violations. In January 2025, Husband moved for sanctions under section 271 for “no less than $200,000,” noting he had incurred “a significant amount of attorney’s fees and costs because of [Wife’s] insistence on re-litigating the same issues, multiple times.” Husband’s affidavit in support detailed fees to defend against the contempt action and for litigating Wife’s request for the subpoena and for monetary sanctions, for a total of $157,723 in fees.3 Wife responded that Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) barred Husband from recovering any attorney fees in connection with the contempt proceeding because only the “ ‘party initiating the contempt proceeding’ is entitled to any award of fees.” Alternatively, Wife argued the request was untimely under rule 3.1702(b). 3 Husband also attached his attorney’s declaration, indicating that the cost of litigating the request for fees under section 271 would be no less than $21,028. 3  At the hearing, the trial court rejected the claim that Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) barred Husband’s request for sanctions. The court stated, while Husband’s argument “may be related to the contempt,” the court was not “reward[ing] [attorney costs and fees] . . . related to . . . fighting back the contempt,” but by “look[ing] at the broader picture” under Family Code section 271. The court entered an order awarding Husband $50,000 under section 271 “for conduct which has impeded resolution of issues in the case, including the bringing of the contempt action”—namely, the court had already made findings on the violations of the DVTRO. The court deemed the contempt action an attempt to put Wife in “a better position vis a vis the custody litigation” and also noted her subpoena caused both sides further fees, “fanned the flames of litigation,” and did not yield probative evidence. The court additionally determined that Husband’s request was not time-barred by rule 3.1702(b). DISCUSSION I. The Unilateral Fee Provision of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1218, Subdivision (a) Does Not Bar an Award of Attorney Fees as Sanctions Under Family Code Section 271. We first address Wife’s contention that the trial court erred by imposing sanctions under Family Code section 271 comprised of contempt- related attorney fees and costs. Wife maintains that Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) is a “unilateral fee provision” that prohibits any award of attorney fees to a prevailing contemner in a contempt action and 4 Husband is thereby precluded from recovering those same fees as a sanction under Family Code section 271.4 “Although a trial court’s ruling on the propriety of an attorney fees award is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, ‘the determination of whether the trial court had the statutory authority to make such an award is a question of law that we review de novo.’ ” (George v. Shams-Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, 138.) Such is the case here, given Wife’s argument that Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) bars Family Code section 271 sanctions tethered to contempt proceedings. “ ‘ “Under well-established rules of statutory construction, we must ascertain the intent of the drafters so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” ’ ” (Gamo v. Merrell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 656, 663 (Gamo).) “ ‘ “Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we first examine the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context.” ’ ” (Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 404, 412 (Cathy’s Creations, Inc.).) When we are called upon to construe two potentially inconsistent provisions, “our goal is to harmonize the law [citation] and avoid an interpretation that requires one statute to be ignored.” (Chatsky & Associates v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 4 We decline Husband’s invitation to conclude the award was supported by non-contempt related attorney’s fees and costs—including costs to litigate the section 271 motion—such that we need not consider Wife’s arguments. The trial court’s order awarded sanctions premised on Wife’s conduct and Husband has cited no authority to support that a section 271 award necessarily includes the costs and fees related to bringing the request for order. Absent citation to persuasive authority, this argument is forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 (Badie).) 5 873, 876.) “We presume that the Legislature, when enacting a statute, was aware of existing related laws and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules.” (Stone Street Capital, LLC, v. California State Lottery Com. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 118.) “We will only find an implied repeal ‘ “ ‘ “when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are ‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Gamo, at p. 663.) A. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1218, Subdivision (a) Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) states, “Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court or judge shall determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged, and if it be adjudged that the person is guilty of the contempt, a fine may be imposed on the person not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), payable to the court, or the person may be imprisoned not exceeding five days, or both. In addition, a person who is subject to a court order as a party to the action, or any agent of this person, who is adjudged guilty of contempt for violating that court order may be ordered to pay to the party initiating the contempt proceeding the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by this party in connection with the contempt proceeding.” (Italics added.) The italicized text of this provision contains a “unilateral fee provision.” Because there is no reference in Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) to fees and costs for prevailing contemners, it is evident that the Legislature sought to make attorney fees and costs available only to prevailing complainants. (See Wood v. Santa Monica Escrow Co. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189 [a unilateral fee provision exists when there is “no reciprocal provision for a prevailing defendant”].) Such provisions “reflect the 6 Legislature’s considered judgment that prevailing defendants[, or here prevailing contemners,] should not receive fees,” (Cathy’s Creations, Inc., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 413) and are “ ‘ “a deliberate stratagem for advancing some public purpose,” ’ ” (D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake School (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 836, 865). Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a)’s creation of a one- way attorney’s fees provision favoring prevailing complainants reflects an intentional policy of encouraging parties who are subject to court orders to widely and effectively enforce such judicial decrees, thereby encouraging compliance with court orders. (Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1125 [noting legislative history that unilateral fee provision of Code Civ. Proc., § 1218, subd. (a) was implemented to encourage enforcement of court orders, and compliance with the same, “by imposing an additional cost for noncompliance”].) As this Division has explained, “[b]ecause of the substantial cost of initiating and prosecuting a contempt proceeding, a private party would be economically discouraged from prosecuting a contempt proceeding were there no possibility of recovering attorney fees and costs.” (Goold v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a) thus authorizes a trial court to “award a complainant reasonable attorney fees and costs against a contemner in all cases, including violations of Family Code orders.” (Goold, at p. 10.) B. Section 271 Section 271, subdivision (a) provides, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where 7 possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction.” It is well settled that the “purpose of the statute is ‘ “ ‘to promote settlement and to encourage cooperation which will reduce the cost of litigation.’ ” ’ ” (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152.) Because the statute is aimed more broadly at obstreperous conduct that frustrates settlement in family law litigation and increases litigation costs, sanctionable conduct includes, but is not limited to, frivolous conduct or delay tactics. (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1318; In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 (Freeman).) “ ‘Family law litigants who flout that policy by engaging in conduct that increases litigation costs are subject to the imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs as a sanction.’ ” (In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1100.) C. Analysis Having reviewed the text and purpose of Family Code section 271 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a), we turn now to the interplay between these sections. And, for reasons we will explain, we conclude that no irreconcilable conflict exists between these statutes: the two provisions can be harmonized and can operate concurrently in furtherance of their separate purposes.5 5 Both parties discuss Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, as they did below, but we find that case to be of no utility. While the family court in Parker awarded section 271 sanctions that were tethered to contempt proceedings (Parker, at pp. 1175–1176), Parker did not involve either of the legal issues raised here. 8  For purposes of our analysis, we find instructive the court’s decision in Gamo, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th 656, where a division of this court considered whether a unilateral fee provision in the elder abuse statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a), awarding attorney fees only to prevailing plaintiffs, preempted an award of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 (cost-of-proof fees), allowable when a party fails to admit a request that the serving party later proves as true. After examining the public policy in support of each statute, the court reasoned that no irreconcilable conflict existed between the provisions because cost-of-proof fees “do not reward a party for prevailing on a claim.” (Gamo, at p. 667.) The court explained, “Because cost-of-proof fees neither reward the prevailing party nor punish a losing party in a lawsuit, they do not interfere with unilateral fee provisions. Rather, these two types of provisions can be enforced concurrently. The unilateral fee provision in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 15657.5, subdivision (a) encourages plaintiffs to bring financial elder abuse claims . . . . [And,] [o]nce such a claim is filed, cost-of-proof fees encourage both parties to narrow the issues for trial to avoid wasting the time and resources of the court and the parties.” (Gamo, at p. 668.) Given that the two statutes serve entirely different purposes, the court concluded that the “abstract potential for cost-of-proof fees would [not] have any material effect on a plaintiff’s desire to bring a financial elder abuse claim.” (Ibid.) Like the cost-of-proof fees in Gamo, Family Code section 271 sanctions do not reward a party for prevailing at any stage of a family law litigation. As noted, they are intended to encourage efficiency in family matters by punishing bad faith behavior through application of sanctions for such conduct. In contrast, the unilateral fee provision of Code of Civil Procedure 9 section 1218, subdivision (a) functions to reward prevailing complainants for winning a contempt claim and protects them from having to pay attorney fees to the contemner if they do not prevail. Because Family Code section 271 does not award fees to contemners for prevailing in a contempt action, there is simply no direct, irreconcilable conflict between Family Code section 271 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. (Compare, e.g., Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 147 [direct conflict existed between a contractual clause awarding defendant attorney fees for prevailing on a Cartwright Act claim and the unilateral fee provision of the Cartwright Act, which preclude attorney fees to prevailing defendants]; Cathy’s Creations, Inc., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 413–414 [direct conflict existed between private attorney general fee statute, which awards prevailing party fees, and unilateral fee provision in the provisional relief section of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, which awards prevailing party fees only to the government].) Because Family Code section 271 sanctions are entirely unrelated to whether a party prevails, and neither rewards a prevailing party nor punishes a losing party, they do not interfere with the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a)’s unilateral fee provision. Instead, each provision can be applied concurrently and may potentially come into play at different stages of the often-protracted litigation in family law cases, much like the statutes at issue in Gamo. Once a dissolution of marriage petition is filed, as in this case, the parties are bound to abide by all court orders entered on issues of distribution of marital property and, if applicable, child custody or visitation. Failure to abide by court orders could subject the non-compliant party to contempt proceedings, triggering the unilateral fee provision if the moving complainant prevails. In addition, each 10 party’s conduct during the course of litigation until “rendition of judgment” is relevant for purposes of Family Code section 271 sanctions. (Rule 3.1702(b).) If a party’s conduct operates to prevent settlement or cooperation or increase litigation costs, the opposing party may file a notice for sanctions under Family Code section 271. Under these circumstances, it is entirely possible that a party could pursue and win a contempt action in the context of family law litigation, entitling the prevailing complainant to fees, yet still be subject to sanctions under section 271 later in the suit related to those very same contempt proceedings. The result, in such a scenario, is not judicial imposition of reciprocal fees for the contempt action, but a furthering of the public policy of each statute: only a prevailing complainant may recover costs for prosecuting a contempt—they are still protected if their claim fails—but that complainant may be subject to some level of sanctions if the pursuit was made in bad faith. Wife maintains that awarding attorney fees and costs related to contempt proceedings in the context of a Family Code section 271 motion, is effectively a prevailing party award contrary to the unilateral fee provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a). But, as we have explained, Family Code section 271 sanctions cannot be characterized in this manner because they are not awarded when a contemner prevails in a contempt proceeding. Rather, they are awarded when the offending party exhibits obstreperous conduct that frustrates settlement and increases litigation costs. As in Gamo, the “abstract potential” for Family Code section 271 sanctions is unlikely to “have any material effect” on a complainant’s willingness to bring a contempt action given the unilateral fee provision of 11 Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a). (Gamo, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 668.) In sum, there is no irreconcilable conflict between Family Code section 271 and the unilateral fee provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, subdivision (a). As described, the statutes serve different purposes and can be applied concurrently without affecting the public policy of either provision. (See Gamo, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 666–668; Richmond Compassionate Care Collective v. 7 Stars Holistic Foundation (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 38, 45– 48 [allowing attorney fees for anti-SLAPP motion neither conflicted, nor abrogated purpose, of Cartwright Act’s unilateral fee provision].)6 II. Husband’s Motion for Sanctions Under Section 271 Was Not Untimely Under Rule 3.1702(b) Rule 3.1702 generally establishes the timelines for claiming attorney fees that may be awarded by statute or contract in all civil cases. The rule applies when the “court determines entitlement to the fees, the amount of the fees, or both.” (Rule 3.1702(a).) Rule 3.1702(b) applies to fees incurred before judgment. It provides, “A notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court--including attorney’s fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court--must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108.” (Rule 3.1702(b).) 6 Wife adds that an award of sanctions under section 271 is also contrary to the legislative intent of section 6344, requiring mandatory fees for a prevailing party. Wife, however, does not explain how the alleged competing policies of sections 271 and 6344 require reversal. We deem this argument forfeited. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784–785.) 12  In turn, under rule 8.104, a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after service (whether by the superior court clerk or by a party) of a notice of entry of judgment. (Rule 8.104(a)(1)(A)–(B).) If there is no notice, the notice of appeal must be filed within “180 days after entry of judgment.” (Rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).) Rule 8.108 pertains to extensions of the time to file an appeal, which are not applicable to this case.7 Wife, here, treats the order dismissing contempt as a “judgment” from which the deadline of rule 3.1702(b) is measured. And, because Husband’s notice of motion for fees under section 271 was filed 338 days after entry of the order dismissing contempt, it was untimely under rule 3.1702(b) and rule 8.104. Resolution of this claim, thus, turns on whether the order dismissing the contempt was a “judgment” within the meaning of rule 3.1702(b). This is a question of law we review de novo. (Joseph v. San Francisco Housing Authority (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 78, 81 [proper interpretation and application of a court rule is reviewed de novo].) The First District has already construed the meaning of “judgment” as used in rule 3.1702. (See Crespin v. Shewry (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 259; Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 (Carpenter).) The court, relying on the text of the rule and its drafting history, determined that “judgment” refers not to any prejudgment order that 7 These timing requirements of rule 3.1702 are applicable to family law cases involving requests for attorney fees under section 271. (Freeman, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 7 [rejecting argument that former rule 870.2 (now renumbered rule 3.1702) did not apply to family law cases and § 271 motions].) 13 might be appealable, but to the final judgment at the conclusion of the litigation. (Carpenter, at p. 468.) The order dismissing Wife’s contempt affidavit on February 28, 2024, was not a final “judgment” within the meaning of rule 3.1702(b). The order dismissing contempt did not determine all the issues or resolve the litigation between the parties. (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304 [“ ‘A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties . . . .’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 577, italics added.) . . . ‘ “when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.” ’ ”].) Instead, after the court dismissed the contempt hearing, the parties continued to litigate matters related to child custody and visitation. According to the register of actions, these matters appear to have been finally resolved upon entry of a judgment, after a hearing, on November 26, 2024. Wife, nonetheless, maintains that the contempt proceedings were a “separate parallel civil proceeding” culminating in a separate judgment. But this position ignores that the contempt proceedings were inseparable from the family law proceedings: Wife filed the contempt affidavit in the context of ongoing family law litigation related to custody and visitation, allegedly to hold Husband in contempt for violating the related DVTRO, and used the contempt proceeding in hopes of gaining a more advantageous outcome in her favor. Under these circumstances, the order dismissing contempt cannot reasonably be characterized as a final judgment that disposed of all issues between the parties. To agree with Wife would result in the type of piecemeal litigation that the drafters of rule 3.1702 sought to avoid. (See Carpenter, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 465–466.) We accordingly reject 14 Wife’s claim that the section 271 motion for fees was untimely under rule 3.1702.8 DISPOSTION The order is affirmed. Husband is awarded costs on appeal. BERMÚDEZ, J. WE CONCUR: CASTILLO, Acting P. J. RUBIN, J. 8 Wife also contends the trial court erred by concluding that rule 3.1702 “did not apply” to the contempt order based on its reasoning that contempt proceedings are criminal, not civil, cases. We need not resolve this question because, under the circumstances of this case, the order dismissing the contempt was not a “judgment” within the meaning of rule 3.1702. 15 Filed 10/22/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA NEHA ARORA, D086321 Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 22FL006985C) v. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION GAUTAM ARORA, Respondent. THE COURT: The opinion in this case filed September 28, 2026 was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and  ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports” appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports. CASTILLO, Acting P. J. Copies to: All parties 2