Rodriguez v. Rodriguez CA5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketF090787
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
VICKY RODRIGUEZ et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, F090787
v. (Super. Ct. No. BFL-22-002210)
ROSEANNA RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant. OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Raymonda B.
Marquez, Judge.
Roseanna Rodriguez, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Braun Gosling and Sam Van Eerden for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
This is a sanctions matter that stems from a family law dispute between appellant
Roseanna Rodriguez, in propria persona, and respondents Daniel Rodriguez, Sr., and
Vicky Rodriguez 1 (collectively, Rodriguezes). The trial court sanctioned Roseanna $390
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (c)
(section 2031.300(c)), 2 sanctioned Roseanna $1,145.50 pursuant to Family Code
section 271, subdivision (a) 3 (section 271(a)), and sanctioned Roseanna $3,377.25 a
second time under section 271(a). Roseanna contends on appeal that the court abused its
discretion by imposing the three sanctions. We affirm the court’s award of sanctions for
$390 and $1,145.50 but vacate and remand the $3,377.25 sanction award.
BACKGROUND
In 2022, the Rodriguezes initiated proceedings under section 3102 to obtain
visitation rights to Roseanna’s minor daughter, A.R. Following a mediation, the trial
court granted the Rodriguezes visitation rights to A.R. Roseanna subsequently has made
various challenges and objections to continued visitation.
On March 18, 2025, Roseanna filed a motion to compel pursuant to “Code of Civil
Procedure §§ 2030.010 et seq.” The motion sought an order compelling the Rodriguezes
to produce financial documents and tax records relating to various claims that the
Rodriguezes were making as part of the visitation proceeding.
On March 28, 2025, the Rodriguezes filed a two-page declaration in opposition to
Roseanna’s motion. The declaration claimed the motion to compel was defective on its
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to Vicky Rodriguez and Roseanna
Rodriguez by their first names in order to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
2 The statutory basis for the $390 sanction is unclear. The motion for which Roseanna was
sanctioned was itself ambiguous, and in opposing that motion, the Rodriguezes requested
sanctions under both Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290 and 2031.300. Because the
result does not change (see Damak v. Superior Court (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 792, 800 (Damak)
[noting that Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290, subdivision (c) and section 2031.300(c)
contain materially similar language]), and because the motion for which Roseanna was
sanctioned sought the production of documents, we view the statutory basis for the $390 sanction
as section 2031.300(c). (See Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.)
3 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Family Code.
2.
face because the motion failed to allege that any discovery had been propounded or that
the Rodriguezes had failed to respond to discovery as required by statute. The
declaration also requested sanctions under section 2031.300(c).
On July 11, 2025, the trial court held a hearing and addressed Roseanna’s motion
to compel and the Rodriguezes’ request for sanctions (the July 11 hearing). The court
denied Roseanna’s motion, granted the Rodriguezes’ request, and sanctioned Roseanna
$390.
On July 17, 2025, Roseanna filed a request to vacate the $390 sanction. Roseanna
argued that she was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the sanctions request
due to late mail service by the Rodriguezes, she had made several good faith attempts to
meet and confer regarding discovery disputes that were not reciprocated, her actions were
substantially justified, and the sanction was unjust. Roseanna claimed that an attached
exhibit demonstrated she did not actually receive the opposition and request for sanctions
until July 10, 2025.
Also on July 17, 2025, Roseanna filed a motion for the Rodriguezes to pay her
$15,000 in need-based attorney fees. Although not stated on the face of the motion,
which was comprised of several Judicial Council of California forms, the basis for
Roseanna’s fee motion was section 2030. As part of her fee motion, Roseanna filed an
income and expense declaration dated July 13, 2025. The income and expense
declaration indicated in part that Roseanna was an unemployed student who had $3,350
in monthly expenses and $3,550 in monthly income.
On August 6, 2025, Roseanna filed a request to stay enforcement of the $390
sanctions order.
On August 21, 2025, the Rodriguezes filed a 33-page opposition to Roseanna’s
request for attorney fees and costs. The Rodriguezes’ opposition in part argued that
section 2030 did not apply to this case and that efforts had been made prior to filing the
opposition to convince Roseanna to withdraw her motion. The opposition requested
$3,376.65 as a sanction under section 271(a). The amount of sanctions requested was
3.
supported by a declaration from the Rodriguezes’ counsel. Counsel’s declaration
explained he had been practicing since 2012, billed at a rate of $395 per hour, and had
spent 8.55 hours preparing the opposition, which included review, drafting, research, and
document preparation.
On September 8, 2025, Roseanna filed a request to withdraw her motion for
attorney fees.
On September 17, 2025, the Rodriguezes filed an opposition to Roseanna’s
motions to vacate and stay. The opposition in part noted that the Rodriguezes had agreed
to a $25 per month payment plan that had been proposed by Roseanna, but Roseanna had
withdrawn from the agreement. The opposition requested sanctions under section 271(a)
in the amount of $1,145.50 for the legal expenses incurred in filing the opposition. The
sanctions requested were supported by a declaration from the Rodriguezes’ counsel.
On September 30, 2025, Roseanna filed a reply declaration in support of her
various motions. In part, the reply declaration addressed her current financial condition
and stated that she could not pay the sanctions requested by the Rodriguezes.
On October 2, 2025, a hearing was held on Roseanna’s motions to vacate and stay
(the October 2 hearing). The trial court denied Roseanna’s motions, awarded the
Rodriguezes an additional $1,145.50 in sanctions under section 271(a), and imposed a
combined sanction of $1,535.50 to be paid at a rate of $25 per month beginning in
January 2026. After the court awarded additional sanctions, Roseanna requested to
withdraw her motion for attorney fees and costs. The court accepted Roseanna’s request
and dismissed her motion for fees but set a hearing for later in October on the
Rodriguezes’ related request for sanctions.
On October 15, 2025, Roseanna filed a supplemental declaration in opposition to
the Rodriguezes’ request for sanctions under section 271.
On October 31, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the Rodriguezes’ request for
additional sanctions relating to Roseanna’s motion for attorney fees (the October 31
4.
hearing). The court granted the Rodriguezes’ request and sanctioned Roseanna $3,377.25
under section 271(a).
Roseanna filed a notice of appeal on November 19, 2025, that challenged the
imposition of the three sanction awards.
DISCUSSION
I. FIRST SANCTION AWARD—$390
A. Parties’ Arguments
Roseanna contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the $390
sanction. First, Roseanna avers the court improperly ignored her objection that she
received untimely notice of the sanctions request, which prevented her from filing an
opposition and preparing an adequate defense. Second, Roseanna argues that there was
an inadequate foundation for the amount imposed because no documentary evidence or
billing records established what work was performed, whether the work was reasonably
necessary, or what portion of the work was attributable to sanctionable conduct. Third,
Roseanna claims that her actions were substantially justified, and that the imposition of a
sanction would be unjust, because the documents that she was seeking to discover were
tied to disputed factual and financial claims and because she had unsuccessfully
attempted to meet and confer with the Rodriguezes regarding the discovery dispute.
The Rodriguezes contend that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The
Rodriguezes argue that Roseanna’s motion to compel was properly denied because
Roseanna did not propound any discovery. For this reason, the Rodriguezes also argue
that the record does not show Roseanna acted with substantial justification. The
Rodriguezes aver that the amount of sanctions was based on their counsel’s
representations of the work he performed in opposing Roseanna’s motion.
B. Additional Background
At the July 11 hearing, the trial court denied the motion to compel because it was
improperly calendared and because the evidence did not show that Roseanna had
“complied with the requirements of seeking discovery.” As to the latter point, the court
5.
explained there was “no evidence that [Roseanna] sent a formal written request for
information or the production of documents to the [Rodriguezes or their] counsel. There
is no indication that she made any effort to procure or to obtain the discovery.” The court
also noted that, notwithstanding the fact that Roseanna was self-represented, she was still
required to follow all applicable requirements pertaining to discovery.
After denying Roseanna’s motion, the trial court addressed the Rodriguezes’
request for sanctions. Roseanna explained in part that she did not receive the
Rodriguezes’ opposition and request for sanctions until after March 28, 2025, which was
“past the date deadline” and prevented her from filing a response. Roseanna argued that
the Rodriguezes intentionally ensured that she did not receive the opposition and request
for sanctions until after March 28 to prevent her from replying. Roseanna asserted that
she did in fact attempt to file a reply, “but it was blocked because it went past the date
deadline.” Roseanna believed that she was not given sufficient notice of the request for
sanctions or time to respond.
The trial court asked Roseanna what her response to the sanctions request would
be. Roseanna responded that the request was filed in bad faith and the Rodriguezes made
false assertions. Roseanna also said that she had suffered a due process violation because
the opposition and request was filed on March 28, but was not received until after the
deadline, which cut off her ability to file a formal response.
The trial court was not persuaded that Roseanna did not have time to respond to
the opposition and request for sanctions. The court found that Roseanna’s explanations
did not address the prior finding that she had failed to comply with proper discovery
processes. The court faulted Roseanna for not serving a discovery request and instead
moving straight to a motion to compel. Because the motion to compel was without basis,
the court found the Rodriguezes had incurred an unnecessary legal expense.
The court asked the Rodriguezes’ counsel how much it had cost to prepare and file
the opposition and request for sanctions. The Rodriguezes’ counsel replied he had spent
6.
two hours preparing the opposition and request for sanctions and charged $395 per hour,
for a total of $790. After hearing the figures, the court sanctioned Roseanna $390.
C. Legal Standard
California law mandates the imposition of monetary sanctions in part against any
party who unsuccessfully makes a motion to compel a response to a document production
request, unless that party acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make
the imposition of a sanction unjust. (§ 2031.300(c); Damak, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 800, 804.) A “substantial justification” is a justification that is “clearly reasonable
and well grounded in both law and fact; the party attempting to avoid being sanctioned
has the burden to prove that it acted with substantial justification.” (Atlas v. Davidyan
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1096 (Atlas).)
Sanctions under section 2031.300(c) are to be imposed pursuant to chapter 7 of the
Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010–2023.050; hereafter chapter 7)
(§ 2031.300(c); Damak, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) Chapter 7 authorizes the
imposition of sanctions “after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after
opportunity for hearing ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a); Agnone v. Agnone
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 758, 763; see Sole Energy Co. v. Hodges (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
199, 207 [applying former Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subd. (b)].) A “court denies due
process by sanctioning a party or an attorney who lacked notice of efforts to seek the
sanction.” (London v. Dri-Honing Corp. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 999, 1008; see also
Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 57, 82 [“At its core,
due process entitles a person to notice and the opportunity to be heard before a neutral
decision maker.”].)
Trial courts enjoy broad discretion both in deciding whether to impose sanctions
and in setting the amount of monetary sanctions. (Morales v. City and County of San
Francisco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 43, 49 (Morales).) However, the amount of sanctions
may not exceed “ ‘the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone
as a result of’ the discovery misconduct.” (City of Los Angeles v.
7.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 75.) Trial courts must consider
evidence that discloses the nature and extent of counsel’s services in order to determine
what amount of fees were reasonably incurred due to the discovery misconduct. (See In
re Marriage of Duris & Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 515.)
The propriety of a discovery sanction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which
may occur when the sanction order is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bounds of
reason. (Atlas, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095.) Factual findings are reviewed for
substantial evidence, which includes resolving any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the
trial court’s decision. (Morales, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 49.)
D. Analysis
The prerequisites for sanctions under section 2031.300(c) were met in this case.
First, Roseanne’s motion to compel was denied. (See § 2031.300(c); see also Damak,
supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) Second, we detect no substantial justification for
filing the motion to compel. (See § 2031.300(c); see also Damak, at p. 800.) A motion
to compel a discovery response must be based on a party’s failure to answer a formal
discovery request within the time set by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300 [“If a party
to whom a demand … is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules
shall apply” (italics added)]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.260, subd. (a) [providing
for a 30-day deadline to respond to a request for production].) However, Roseanna did
not propound any formal discovery requests on the Rodriguezes. 4 In the absence of a
formal discovery request, there was no obligation for the Rodriguezes to produce
anything, a set time period to produce anything, or a justification for Roseanna to file the
motion to compel. (See § 2031.300(c); Atlas, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.)
4 Roseanna’s opening brief states that she did propound discovery on the Rodriguezes.
However, the portion of the record that Roseanna cites is not a request for production or any
other type of discovery. Moreover, Roseanna did not argue before the trial court that she had in
fact propounded discovery on the Rodriguezes, which forfeits the argument on appeal. (Jogani
v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 839, 878, fn. 18 (Jogani); In re Marriage of Rangell
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1223 (Rangell).)
8.
Roseanna contends that it would be unjust to sanction her because the record
shows that she attempted to meet and confer with the Rodriguezes’ counsel. We are not
convinced for several reasons. First, the evidence she cites is part of an email dated
June 29, 2025, from her to the Rodriguezes’ counsel. The words of the email and the
contents of an attachment are not visible, although the attached document is entitled
“Meet and Confer.” Because only the title of an attachment is visible, the content and
thus the significance of the email cannot be determined. Second, the email postdates both
the motion to compel and the Rodriguezes’ opposition and request for sanctions by
months. Any meet and confer efforts at a minimum should have predated the
Rodriguezes’ opposition, if not Roseanna’s motion. Third, Roseanna did not raise any
meet and confer arguments in opposition to the sanctions request. By failing to raise the
issue to the trial court, Roseanna forfeited the argument on appeal. (Jogani, supra, 118
Cal.App.5th at pp. 839, 878, fn. 18; Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1223.) Finally,
in the absence of a formal discovery request sent to the Rodriguezes’ counsel, there was
no basis to meet and confer regarding a motion to compel. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2031.300.)
Roseanna also claims that her due process rights were violated. We cannot agree.
A request for sanctions can be made as part of an opposition to a motion to compel
(Dalessandro v. Mitchell (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1092–1093), as was done here.
The proof of service shows that the Rodriguezes served the opposition and request for
sanctions on March 28, 2025, via United States mail. Although Roseanna has not
identified when she actually received the opposition, the proof of service indicates that
the opposition and request for sanctions was mailed from a Bakersfield address to a
Bakersfield address. Based on the proof of service, Roseanna should have received the
opposition and request within several days of March 28, 2025, at the latest. Because the
hearing on the motion to compel was held on July 11, 2025, Roseanna had over three
months to review and prepare to oppose the request for sanctions. Despite her
representations to the trial court, Roseanna cites no evidence in the record that supports
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her assertion that filing and serving the opposition on March 28, 2025, was late,
improper, or somehow prevented her from filing a formal response. 5 Accordingly, there
is no reasonable basis to conclude that Roseanna received inadequate notice.
In terms of an opportunity to be heard, the trial court asked for and received
Roseanna’s response to the sanctions request. The court heard Roseanna’s arguments,
informed Roseanna when she was addressing an immaterial issue, and gave Roseanna the
opportunity to make all relevant arguments regarding sanctions. We detect no limitations
imposed by the court on Roseanna that improperly limited her right to be heard.
Accordingly, Roseanna was provided a sufficient opportunity to be heard for purposes of
due process. (Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619, 631–632 [“When
sanctions are at issue, due process can be satisfied if the court gives a clear warning
identifying the anticipated grounds for the sanctions or if those grounds are identified by
the opposing party, and the court provides counsel with an opportunity to respond at least
orally”])
Finally, Roseanna argues that there was an insufficient basis for the amount of
sanctions imposed. Again, we disagree. The trial court had before it the two-page
opposition and was told by counsel that he spent two hours crafting the opposition at a
rate of $395 per hour. The amount awarded was less than half of the requested amount
and represented slightly less than one hour’s worth of work. The opposition would have
obviously taken at least around one hour to prepare. Given the nature and length of the
opposition, the court was well within its discretion to accept the representations of
5 Roseanna’s motion to vacate the $390 sanction asserted that she did not actually receive
the Rodriguezes’ opposition and request for sanctions until July 10, 2025, one day before the
July 11 hearing. In support of this assertion, she cited to an exhibit A, which was purported to be
a proof of delivery from the United States Postal Service. However, Exhibit A was actually an
email chain between Roseanna and the Rodriguezes’ counsel, not a postal service document.
Roseanna presents no evidence that she received notice of the sanctions request on July 10, 2025.
10.
counsel and award just under one hour’s worth of attorney fees as a sanction. 6 (Cf. In re
Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 870 (Keech) [“ ‘[W]hen the trial court is
informed of the extent and nature of the services rendered, it may rely on its own
experience and knowledge in determining their reasonable value’ ” (italics omitted)];
In re Marriage of Munguia (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 853, 863 (Munguia) [same].)
In sum, we conclude that the trial court acted within its broad discretion by
sanctioning Roseanna $390 pursuant to section 2031.300(c). (Morales, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 49; Atlas, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095.)
II. SECOND SANCTION AWARD—$1,145.50
A. Parties’ Arguments
Roseanna contends that the additional $1,145.50 in sanctions was an abuse of
discretion. Roseanna argues that she properly sought relief from the original sanction on
the bases that she could not afford to pay the sanction and that the court had made
procedural and factual errors. Roseanna claims that because her request for relief from
the sanction was reasonable, the trial court should not have awarded sanctions under
section 271(a). Roseanna also avers that the court did not properly consider her financial
condition, and the amount of the sanction would cause an unreasonable financial burden.
The Rodriguezes contend that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
sanctioning Roseanna. The Rodriguezes point out that the court found Roseanna’s
testimony generally to be not credible. In light of that finding, the Rodriguezes argue the
court correctly determined that Roseanna had the ability to pay sanctions based on access
to excess income. The Rodriguezes also maintain in part that Roseanna engaged in
unnecessary and costly litigation by failing to honor a previously agreed $25 per month
payment plan that had been proposed by Roseanna herself.
6 Roseanna argues that the Rodriguezes did not submit billing records from counsel,
despite her request at the hearing that he do so. However, contrary to Roseanna’s representation,
the record does not reflect she requested that any documents be produced to support counsel’s
assertions.
11.
B. Additional Background
August 2025 Correspondences
On August 11, 2025, Roseanna sent the Rodriguezes’ counsel an email that
proposed three options for dealing with the $390 sanction in order to avoid further
expenses and motion practice.
On August 12, 2025, the Rodriguezes’ counsel replied to Roseanna and accepted
the second proposed option. The second option permitted Roseanna to pay the $390 over
time by paying $25 per month beginning on September 1, 2025.
On August 25, 2025, Roseanna sent the Rodriguezes’ counsel an email in which
she said that she could no longer agree to pay the $390 at a rate of $25 per month. The
email explained that Roseanna had a negative bank balance, was an unemployed full-time
student and caregiver, and had recently filed for bankruptcy. Roseanna requested that the
Rodriguezes either withdraw the sanctions request or stipulate to a stay until the trial
court ruled on her pending motions for relief.
October 2 Hearing
At the October 2 hearing, the trial court considered Roseanna’s motion to vacate
and motion to stay. In the first part of the hearing, the parties addressed Roseanna’s
motion to stay. The court took testimony from Roseanna regarding her financial
condition and employment status. Part of Roseanna’s testimony addressed a bank record
from Chase Bank dated August 25, 2025. The record indicated deposits of $4,750.25,
withdrawals of $5,582.64, and a negative $902.34 balance. A significant portion of the
hearing involved Roseanna addressing text messages she sent to Vicky, which indicated
that while Vicky was watching A.R., Roseanna was meeting with clients and making
money through an LLC that she owned. Roseanna explained that she meant she was
meeting with potential clients, but none of the potential clients ever turned into paying
clients and she did not in fact make any money. Roseanna also explained that she could
not operate the LLC because of complex licensing requirements and she could not devote
12.
sufficient time to the LLC. After hearing Roseanna’s testimony, the court denied the
motion to stay.
The trial court next addressed the motion to vacate. Roseanna in part represented
that she would be willing to pay the $390 sanction at a rate of $25 per month as part of a
payment plan that would begin in January 2026. Roseanna reiterated that she would be
unable to pay more than $25 per month because that would be “really hard” on her. The
Rodriguezes’ counsel agreed that such a plan would be acceptable
The Rodriguezes then moved into evidence the email from Roseanna in which she
included a $25 per month payment plan as one potential option for dealing with the $390
sanction. Roseanna responded to the email by explaining, as the due date approached,
she did not have adequate funds to pay the first installment. Roseanna gave no further
testimony.
The Rodriguezes’ counsel closed by arguing that sanctions were appropriate in
part because they had previously agreed to Roseanna’s proposal of a $25 monthly
payment plan and it should not have taken a motion, an opposition, and a hearing to again
reach the same plan. The Rodriguezes’ counsel also argued that Roseanna’s financial
declaration revealed that Roseanna had sufficient excess income to be able to pay any
sanctions at a rate of $25 per month. Counsel also stated it was understood that any
additional sanctions would be part of the $25 per month payment plan.
At the conclusion of the Rodriguezes’ argument, the trial court admitted as its own
exhibit Roseanna’s August 25 bank record and issued a ruling. The court denied
Roseanna’s motion to vacate and imposed sanctions on Roseanna under section 271(a).
The court found Roseanna’s testimony to be inconsistent and not credible, particularly
with respect to Roseanna’s explanations for the text messages relating to making money
that she had sent to Vicky. The court then explained:
“[I]n her [income and expense declaration of July 13, 2025], that
taking in the unemployment compensation and the survivor benefits that
[Roseanna’s] total monthly income that she has acknowledged as $3,550 a
month, and that her actual expenses equate to $3,350.
13.
“So the court can see clearly how [the Rodriguezes’ counsel] is
arguing that by her own testimony that’s through the income and expense
declaration [Roseanna] can afford the $25 a month.
“Additionally, the [c]ourt finds that in the [c]ourt’s Exhibit 1 that
there is an indication that she deposited $4,750.25 which exceeds the
income of $3,550. Without explanation of where that extra money comes
from, that’s an extra $1,200. And so the [c]ourt believes that the evidence
shows that [Roseanna] according to her testimony has access to income.
And I think the reasonable conclusion is that that comes from her clients
when she’s working to make money as she stated in the [text message]
exhibits [to Vicky Rodriguez].
“So the [c]ourt finds that not only can [Roseanna] afford to pay the
sanctions of $390, the [c]ourt finds that it is appropriate and will impose a
further sanction for the same reasons as it relates to the cost of the
[Rodriguezes] to respond to these requests for order. And the amount that
is requested set forth in the responsive declaration filed September 17,
2025, is set forth [in the declaration of the Rodriguezes’ counsel] wherein
he indicates that he spent 2.9 hours, in other words, less than three hours
preparing responses for the sum total with his hourly rate being $395 of
$1,145.50. So that amount plus the [$]390, the [c]ourt finds is a total [of]
$1,535.50. That will be paid at a rate of $25 [per month.]”
C. Legal Standard
Section 271(a) attempts to impose a “ ‘ “minimum level of professionalism and
cooperation” ’ ” between litigants in a family law dispute. (In re Marriage of Martinez &
Camou (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 822, 828.) Section 271(a) authorizes the court to impose
“attorney’s fees and costs” against a party who engages in “conduct [that] frustrates the
policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the
cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.”
(§ 271(a); In re Marriage of Hoch (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 80, 95 (Hoch).) Trial courts
have broad discretion to award sanctions under section 271. (In re Marriage of Falcone
& Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 995 (Falcone & Fyke); Robert J. v. Catherine D.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1520.) Because attorney fees under section 271(a) are a
sanction for violating the important public policy of curbing obstreperous litigation and
encouraging both cooperation between litigants and settlement in family law matters,
courts consider the sanctioned party’s conduct and may impose the sanction irrespective
14.
of any actual injury to or financial need of the non-sanctioned party. (See § 271(a);
Hoch, at p. 95; Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1218–1219; Sagonowsky v. Kekoa
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152 (Sagonowsky.) The amount of attorney fees and costs
imposed is based on the extent that the sanctioned party’s improper conduct caused the
non-sanctioned party to incur attorney fees and costs. (Sagonowsky, at pp. 1152, 1156–
1157; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1318 (Tharp).)
Attorney fees awarded as a sanction cannot impose an unreasonable financial
burden on the sanctioned party. (§ 271(a); Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1219.)
The unreasonable financial burden consideration “addresses the concern that a party
should not use [funds] necessary for their basic needs to pay sanctions ….” (In re
Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 218, 233.) In determining whether an award
would impose an unreasonable financial burden, courts must take into consideration all
evidence concerning the sanctioned party’s income, assets, and liabilities. (Rangell, at
p. 1219; Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 995; see § 271(a).) “[T]he party
who wishes to contest their ability to pay any sanctions award (both at trial and on
appeal) bears the burden to submit evidence or a current income and expense declaration
in opposition to the sanctions request and to present their inability to pay argument at the
trial court level, with reference to that evidence.” (Rangell, at p. 1223.)
A trial court’s decision to either grant or deny attorney fees and costs as a sanction
under section 271(a) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Hoch, supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at p. 95; Tharp, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316.) Among other ways, a
court may abuse its discretion if there is an absence of substantial evidence that supports
its determinations (In re Marriage of Nelson (2015) 115 Cal.App.5th 904, 914 (Nelson)),
the court makes an improper legal assumption (In re Marriage of Mullonkal &
Kodiyamplakkil (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 604, 618 (Mullonkal)), or, in some cases, the
court fails to consider relevant evidence (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 514
(Ashby)). An abuse of discretion may also occur if, “considering all the evidence viewed
most favorably in support of the order and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor,
15.
no judge could reasonably make the order.” (Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1218;
Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152.) The findings of fact that form the basis of
the trial court’s section 271(a) decisions are reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard of review. (Rangell, at p. 1218; Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at
p. 995.) Appellate courts view the evidence most favorably to the court’s order and
indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s order. (In re Marriage of
Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626, 652 (Sorge); see also Nelson, at p. 914.) Appellate
courts do not reweigh the trial court’s credibility determinations. (Nelson, at p. 914; In re
Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175.) Finally, under the doctrine of
implied findings, appellate courts infer the trial court made every factual finding
necessary to support its decision. (In re Marriage of Destiny & Justin C. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 763, 769 (Destiny).)
D. Analysis
The evidence shows that after filing the motions to vacate and stay, Roseanna sent
the Rodriguezes a proposal with three options for dealing with the $390 sanction. The
day after the proposal was sent, the Rodriguezes sent Roseanna an acceptance that chose
the $25 per month payment plan beginning on September 1, 2025. Before the first
payment was due, however, Roseanna withdrew from the agreement. Roseanna
explained she was having financial hardship and proposed either withdrawing the
sanction or staying the sanction. Unsurprisingly, the Rodriguezes rejected the two
proposed options and filed their opposition. At the hearing, when given the opportunity
to address sanctions, Roseanna stated she was willing and able to pay the $390 sanction
at a rate of $25 per month beginning in January 2026. After the Rodriguezes informed
the trial court of the previous payment plan and that the payment plan remained
acceptable, the court adopted the $25 monthly payment plan. In short, the evidence
demonstrates that Roseanna’s conduct caused the Rodriguezes to file an opposition and
participate in a hearing which ultimately resulted in Roseanna agreeing to the same basic
16.
payment plan that she had previously proposed and that the Rodriguezes had previously
accepted.
Considering that the Rodriguezes accepted the same basic payment plan twice, it
is extremely likely that the Rodriguezes would have accepted a later payment date for the
first installment before filing an opposition. Instead of attempting to modify the $25
payment plan or modify the start date, Roseanna suggested two options that were unlikely
to succeed. Particularly since Roseanna suggested and accepted the same basic plan
twice, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that such conduct did not
encourage settlement or reduce litigation costs, rather, it encouraged litigation and caused
unnecessary expense. (See § 271(a); Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1218–1219;
Destiny, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 769; Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152;
Sorge, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 652.) Accordingly, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that Roseanna engaged in obstreperous
conduct that frustrated the policies embodied within section 271(a). 7 (See Rangell, at
p. 1219; Destiny, at p. 769; Sagonowsky, at p. 1152; Sorge, at p. 652.)
With respect to an unreasonable financial burden, Roseanna affirmatively stated at
the October 2 hearing that she could make monthly payments of $25 per month, but no
more than $25, beginning in January 2026. Roseanna did not argue that she could only
pay $390 at $25 per month, nor did she object or argue that paying more than a total of
$390 at a rate of $25 per month would cause an unreasonable financial burden. Without
more, there is no basis for us to conclude that paying an additional $1,145.50 at the same
rate of $25 per month would cause an undue burden. Whether the total paid is $390 or
$1,535.50, there is still only a $25 monthly payment. Additionally, at least in terms of
7 Roseanna contends that she was sanctioned for seeking relief from the $390 sanction.
We do not read the record in this way. (See Nelson, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 914; Sorge,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 652.) Considering the facts presented and the arguments of
counsel, Roseanna was sanctioned for: (a) proposing a payment plan that was accepted prior to
any opposition being filed, (b) withdrawing from the plan, and then (c) once again agreeing to
the same payment plan after the Rodriguezes incurred legal fees for filing an opposition and
attending a hearing.
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the income and expense declaration, Roseanna had an excess income of $200 per month.
She also had at least one month in which an additional unexplained deposit of $1,200
(net) was made, which suggests that Roseanna at times had access to more than $3,550
per month and thus, at times could have more than $200 in excess income. In light of
Roseanna’s affirmative representation about what she could pay, as well as the applicable
income and expense declaration, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that paying the additional $1,145.50 sanction at a rate of $25 per month would not cause
an unreasonable financial burden. (See Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1219; Sorge,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 652.)
In sum, given the trial court’s broad discretion (Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 995), and considering the above evidence, we cannot conclude that no
judge would have sanctioned Roseanna $1,145.50 under section 271(a) (Rangell, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1218). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning
Roseanna. (Hoch, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 95; Rangell, at p. 1218.)
III. THIRD SANCTION AWARD—$3,377.25
A. Parties’ Arguments
Roseanna contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding an
additional $