In re M.E. CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledOctober 28, 2026
DocketB350499
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 10/28/26 In re M.E. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re M.E., a Person Coming B350499, B352095
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 24CCJP03450
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
H.E.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
H.E. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders finding
that placing his daughter, M.E., with him would be detrimental
to her safety, protection, or well-being. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Family History
Father and W.U. (mother) met in Venezuela in 2014. Their
daughter M.E. was born in December 2016. The family lived
together until the parents separated in 2018, when M.E. was
about 21 months old. Mother reported that father hit her, and
she has not seen him in person since. Mother began a
relationship with a new partner, Carlos M., around late 2020.
Father petitioned a Venezuelan court for visitation with
M.E. in 2023. Each parent claims the other did not attend the
hearing. Father last saw M.E. in March 2023. Since then, father
spoke to M.E. only twice before these dependency proceedings
began.
In 2023, mother, Carlos, and M.E. lived together in
Venezuela. Mother and M.E. immigrated to the United States
that spring. Shortly after, Carlos came to the United States and
again lived with mother and M.E. In June 2024, mother and
Carlos had a baby girl, C.M.
II. M.E.’s Report of Sexual Abuse
In October 2024, M.E. told an adult housemate that Carlos
sexually assaulted her several times. The housemate told
mother, who accused M.E. of lying. According to the housemate,
mother yelled at M.E., grabbed her by the arm, and threw her
into her room. The housemate called the police. They
interviewed M.E. and arrested Carlos.
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Carlos called mother from jail several times. He denied
abusing M.E. Mother told Carlos she would leave him if M.E.
was telling the truth. Mother said she was worried about paying
the rent and asked Carlos if he wanted to talk to M.E. Mother
put M.E. on the phone with Carlos. He told M.E. that he loves
her, she should forget what the family’s housemate “put in her
head,” and only she could get him out of jail. Afterward, mother
told Carlos she was praying for his release.
A social worker interviewed M.E. early the next morning.
The social worker noticed bruises on M.E.’s thighs. M.E. said her
mother whipped her with a belt for being late for school. M.E.
told the social worker she lied about Carlos’s sexual abuse but
could not explain why she lied.
The social worker also interviewed mother the day after
Carlos’s arrest. Mother said that, if M.E. was telling the truth,
she would accept it and keep Carlos away from her daughters.
She said M.E. told her that “she wants to die,” but M.E. “does it
often so [mother] did not think [M.E.] meant it.” Mother
elaborated that M.E. “often says she wants to die when she does
not get her way.” She said M.E. “has a history of lying and
misbehaving.” Mother admitted hitting M.E. with a belt.
Mother acknowledged she let Carlos speak to M.E. on the
phone; she saw nothing wrong with that. Mother also reported
telling M.E. that, because she accused Carlos of sexual abuse, he
would spend 25 years in prison and could not raise M.E.’s infant
sister. Mother further had M.E. speak to relatives in Venezuela,
who told M.E. she made “a mistake” in accusing Carlos of sexual
abuse. When the social worker asked mother how M.E. could
fabricate accurate details about male anatomy, mother said
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maybe M.E. “was having sex elsewhere.” She also reported she
caught M.E. watching pornography.
The social worker asked M.E. and mother about father.
Both answered that he lives in Venezuela and has no role in
M.E.’s life. Father later said mother called him in October 2024
to ask if he would take custody of M.E. in Venezuela because she
was misbehaving.
III. Dependency Proceedings Through Disposition
The Los Angeles County Department of Child and Family
Services (department) took M.E. and C.M. into immediate
temporary protective custody on October 29, 2024. The children
were placed with foster parents I.G. and S.F. On October 31,
2024, the department filed a dependency petition alleging M.E.
was subject to juvenile court jurisdiction under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (d).
(All statutory references are to this code.) The petition alleged
that Carlos repeatedly sexually abused M.E. and that mother
failed to protect M.E. from that abuse and emotionally abused
her by pressuring her to recant her allegations. It further alleged
mother physically abused M.E. by striking and throwing her.
Father first learned about M.E.’s report of sexual abuse in
December 2024. He remotely appeared in the proceedings, and
the court found him M.E.’s presumed father in January 2025.
The court ordered the department to assess whether father’s
home was a suitable placement for M.E. The court further
ordered father to have three video or phone visits per week,
starting with three monitored visits before beginning
unmonitored visits.
The department virtually assessed father’s home in
February 2025. Father lived in what he described as a “humble”
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one-bedroom house in Caracas, Venezuela with his wife and two
children. The bedroom had no doors. Inside were the adults’ bed,
the toddler’s bed, and a crib. The sole bathroom had only a toilet
and four buckets. Father explained they had no working shower
and used the buckets to bathe. He planned to renovate the house
or move soon.
Father and M.E. had their first video visit in February
2025. M.E. told a social worker she was happy to see and speak
to him again. She did not remember living with him and wanted
to return to her mother instead of living with him. The social
worker noted that, when discussing the possibility of returning to
Venezuela, M.E. “sounded stress[ed] and worried.”
Father missed several subsequent visits with M.E. They
had video calls scheduled every Saturday and Sunday at 5:00
p.m. They had five monitored video visits over the first two
weeks of visitation. Father called late for the next two scheduled
visits, so he only spoke with M.E. for five minutes. He missed the
next two visits entirely. He later explained he mistakenly called
too late because California (but not Venezuela) had changed to
daylight saving time.
Beginning in April 2025, M.E. did not want to talk to
father. She felt uncomfortable during some visits because her
half-sister interrupted and asked M.E. about her mother. She
told her caregiver she did not want anything to do with father
and already gave him plenty of opportunities to have a
relationship. A social worker had told father it was important
that he speak to M.E. somewhere private and without
distractions. M.E.’s caregiver, however, noted that father’s other
children continued to be present during the video calls.
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M.E. struggled throughout this period. She exhibited
suicidal ideation in December 2024 and January 2025. She had
frequent nightmares and tantrums. M.E. also engaged in
“inappropriate sexualized behavior.”
At the adjudication hearing in May 2025, the court
sustained the petition against mother. At the disposition
hearing, the court removed M.E. from mother. Father requested
custody. The court, however, found placing M.E. with father
would be detrimental to her safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being for several reasons. Placement with father
would disrupt M.E.’s strong bond with her younger sister, whom
she worried about and tried to protect. M.E. had “unaddressed
and unresolved mental problems” and had only made partial
progress. She also did not want to live with father, who
disappeared from her life years before she left Venezuela. Father
made little effort to maintain a relationship and could not explain
why he had not tried to do so.
The court ordered that M.E. remain with foster parents I.G.
and S.F. For father’s case plan, the court ordered conjoint
counseling with M.E., unlimited monitored visits, and referred
him for sexual abuse counseling.
IV. Proceedings Through Six-Month Review Hearing
Between the disposition and the six-month review hearing,
father faced obstacles in following his case plan. M.E.’s therapist
determined she was not ready for conjoint counseling. Father
could not find sexual abuse awareness counseling in his area. He
also missed more than a dozen visits. The visits sometimes
lasted only five minutes. One weekend, they had no visits
because M.E. did not want to talk.
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The department unsuccessfully tried to arrange an in-
person visit between M.E. and father. It sought assistance from
the Venezuelan consulate, which did not respond to phone calls or
emails.
M.E. continued to struggle with her symptoms and
behavior. She bit and fought with other children at daycare. Her
school frequently told her caregiver that M.E. was stealing from
other children. School staff were also concerned that M.E. had no
friends and did not get along with her peers. After one tantrum
at her foster home, I.G. told M.E. she could request a different
placement if she wanted. M.E. replied, “Over my dead body.” A
member of M.E.’s Child and Family Team believed her behavior
was regressing because she did not feel understood, heard, or
supported.
The court held the six-month status review hearing on
November 6, 2025. It found continued jurisdiction necessary and
placement with either parent would create a substantial risk of
detriment to M.E. The court found father had not made
substantial progress in his case plan because visitation was “a
key component” of his case plan, and he missed 14 visits. The
court, however, noted father could not feasibly access sexual
awareness counseling in Venezuela and that he did not
participate in conjoint therapy because M.E.’s therapist opined
she was not ready for that. Additionally, the court ordered the
department to continue trying to arrange in-person visits
between father and M.E.
V. Twelve-Month Review Hearing
On January 6, 2026, only two months after the six-month
review, the court held the twelve-month status review hearing.
The court again found placement with father in Venezuela would
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be detrimental to M.E. Father’s counsel argued that the court
could place M.E. with mother without finding any detriment in
placement with father. The court noted that father missed
numerous visits with M.E., had little relationship with her, and
M.E. “adamantly” did not want to live with him in Venezuela.
Moreover, though M.E. made only “slight progress” in therapy,
her therapist said mother was “a tremendous support” to her.
Placing M.E. with father would thus remove that support and
exacerbate M.E.’s symptoms.
The court found placement with mother would not create a
substantial risk of harm to M.E. The court ordered her returned
to mother, contingent on mother’s compliance with her case plan.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the disposition order and review
hearing orders must be reversed because there is no substantial
evidence supporting them. The department disputes father’s
substantive arguments and raises procedural arguments with
respect to the disposition order.
On November 6, 2025, and January 23, 2026, father filed
notices of appeal. The parties agree that with these notices,
father timely appealed the orders on the six-month and twelve-
month hearings. The department contends, however, that father
forfeited review of the May 8, 2025, disposition order.
The department first argues that father’s notices of appeal
do not indicate he appeals the May 8, 2025, order. Father’s first
notice of appeal states he appeals only from the six-month
hearing order dated November 6, 2025. His second notice of
appeal indicates he appeals only from the twelve-month hearing
order dated January 6, 2026. But in both notices of appeal, in the
section stating “[t]he order appealed from was made under” any
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of various statutes, he checked the box for “[o]ther appealable
orders relating to dependency” and listed numerous dates
including May 8, 2025, the date of the disposition. Father
contends his notices of appeal are sufficient to challenge the
disposition order.
The department also argues that, assuming father
appealed the disposition order, his appeal is untimely. Although
father concedes he did not file his notice of appeal within 60 days
of the disposition, he argues we should excuse his delay because
the court did not adequately advise him of his appellate rights.
(See In re A.O. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148.)
We need not resolve these disputes because we affirm the
disposition order on the merits.
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Disposition Order
When a child is removed from her custodial parent, the law
favors placement with a noncustodial, nonoffending parent.
(In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262 (Patrick S.).)
If the noncustodial parent wants custody, placement with that
parent is mandatory at disposition unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence (ibid.) “that placement with that parent
would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child” (§ 361.2, subd. (a)).
The court must consider “all relevant factors to determine if
the child will suffer net harm.” (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
38, 43 (A.C.).) Relevant factors include “[t]he absence of a
relationship between” the child and noncustodial parent (ibid.),
the child’s preference (ibid.), and “the emotional harm arising
from the loss of sibling relationships” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 (Luke M.)). The court may find
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placement detrimental regardless of whether the noncustodial
parent contributes to or bears any blame for it. (Ibid.)
Several opinions have reviewed detriment findings where
the noncustodial parent lived in another state. A distant
placement obstructing visitation (A.C., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
p. 45) or reunification with the custodial parent may support a
detriment finding (Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423)
but “is not, in itself sufficient” (In re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
197, 224, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized
by Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 378).
On appeal of the initial detriment finding, “[w]e review the
record in the light most favorable to the court’s order to
determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence
that placement would be detrimental to the child.” (Patrick S.,
supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.) “Clear and convincing
evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so
clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence in the record permitted a reasonable
trier of fact to find clear and convincing evidence that placing
M.E. with father would be detrimental to her emotional well-
being. She was already suffering emotionally. M.E. had suicidal
ideation, frequent nightmares and tantrums, and engaged in
inappropriate sexualized behavior. Placement with father would
have meant adding to the turmoil in her life by uprooting her and
sending her to live with a man she hardly knew.
As M.E. put it, she had already given father plenty of
opportunities to have a relationship. Father did not adequately
take advantage of those opportunities. He had only spoken to
M.E. twice over the year and a half before these proceedings
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began. Between the petition and disposition, father spoke to
M.E. about seven times, sometimes for only five minutes. He
called late for two visits and did not call at all for two others.
Furthermore, after a social worker told father to have the visits
in private without interruptions, he still allowed his other
children to be present during some visits.
The record also showed that placing M.E. with father in
Venezuela would present a great obstacle to M.E. maintaining a
relationship with her mother and sister. In A.C., one factor
supporting a detriment finding was that placement with the
noncustodial father would mean visits between mother and child
would “require flying across the country.” (A.C., supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 45.) Here, in-person visits would require flying
to another continent. A reasonable trier of fact would expect that
placement with father would make any future visits between
mother and M.E. rare, at best. It is irrelevant that father cannot
control these circumstances. (Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1425.) The court was required to consider if M.E. “will suffer
net harm” regardless of father’s responsibility for that harm.
(Ibid.)
Father relies primarily on Patrick S. and In re John M.
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564 (John M.). Both cases are
distinguishable. In neither case was there evidence that the
noncustodial parent missed scheduled visits. In John M., the
court “found [father] was not to blame” for the lack of contact
with his son. (John M., at p. 1571.) In Patrick S., the
noncustodial father went to great lengths to build a relationship
with the child. (Patrick S., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263.)
During the proceedings, they had frequent visits, including the
child staying with father for three weeks. (Id. at pp. 1257–1258.)
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Here, father had minimal contact with M.E. since he and mother
separated and, once proceedings began, did little more than have
short video calls with her—and he missed several of those visits.
In Patrick S. and John M., moreover, there was evidence
indicating the child was willing to stay with the noncustodial
parent. (Patrick S., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258; John M.,
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1570.) By contrast, M.E.
consistently and strongly resisted placement with father in
Venezuela. A social worker noted M.E. “sounded stress[ed] and
worried” at the prospect of living with father. Her therapist
found M.E. felt “voiceless because she is being encouraged to
speak up but feels” people ignored “that she does not want to go
back to Venezuela.”
A reasonable trier of fact could find this evidence clear and
convincing in showing M.E. was likely to suffer emotionally if
placed with her father against her wishes, far from her mother
and sister, and despite having little relationship or
communication with father. We affirm the court’s order finding
that, by clear and convincing evidence, placement with father at
disposition “would be detrimental” to M.E.’s “safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being” under section 361.2, subdivision
(a).
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Review Hearing
Orders
We also affirm the court’s detriment findings at the six-
and twelve-month review hearings. At status review hearings, “a
parent who is the subject of a detriment finding is presumptively
entitled to custody unless the [department] proves detriment.”
(In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1505, italics
omitted.) The court must find “by a preponderance of the
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evidence,” that placement with the parent “would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subds. (e)(1) &
(f)(1).) We review these detriment findings for substantial
evidence. (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021,
1034.)
At both review hearings, the record showed no more than
minimal improvement in the reasons for the detriment finding at
disposition. M.E. still needed significant services. She continued
to have nightmares, anxiety, and outbursts. One professional
involved in services for M.E. opined that her behavior regressed
because she did not feel understood, heard, or supported.
Placement with father in Venezuela still meant uprooting M.E.
and having her live on a different continent from her mother and
sister. The court could reasonably conclude it was vital to respect
M.E.’s wishes to stay in the United States and try to reunite with
mother.
Father had also made little progress in developing a
relationship with M.E. He missed over 15 visits between the
disposition and six-month review hearing. He had no in-person
visits, which were not feasible. The Venezuelan consulate did not
respond to the department’s requests for assistance in facilitating
in-person visits. Placement with father still risked profoundly
disrupting M.E.’s relationships with her mother and sister.
Under the applicable preponderance standard, at both
review hearings there was substantial evidence supporting the
court’s findings that placement with father would create a
substantial risk of detriment to M.E.’s emotional well-being.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s disposition and its orders at the six-
month and twelve-month review hearings are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
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