Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 Gemigniani v. B-B Barry CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE STACI GEMIGNIANI, B350208 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 24SMCV02486) B-B BARRY, LP, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION Defendant and Appellant. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] It is ordered that the opinion filed on November 10, 2026, is modified as follows: On the caption page listing Caldwell Law Firm and Larry J. Caldwell as counsel “for Defendant and Appellant” replace with “for Plaintiff and Respondent.” On the caption page listing Schumann Arevalo, Eric Arevalo, Jeffrey P. Cunningham and Michelle L. Arevalo as counsel “for Plaintiff and Respondent” replace with “for Defendant and Appellant.” Reversing both paragraphs to read: Schumann Arevalo, Eric Arevalo, Jeffrey P. Cunningham and Michelle L. Arevalo for Defendant and Appellant. Caldwell Law Firm and Larry J. Caldwell for Plaintiff and Respondent. There is no change in judgment. ____________________________________________________________ HOFFSTADT, P. J. MOOR, J. KIM, J. 2 Filed 11/10/26 Gemigniani v. B-B Barry CA2/5 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE STACI GEMIGNIANI, B350208 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. v. No. 24SMCV02486) B-B BARRY, LP, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed. Caldwell Law Firm and Larry J. Caldwell for Defendant and Appellant. Schumann Arevalo, Eric Arevalo, Jeffrey P. Cunningham and Michelle L. Arevalo for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________ Appellant and defendant landlord B-B Barry, LP (B-B Barry), appeals from an order denying a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.15 (the anti-SLAPP statute) entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent tenant Staci Gemigniani in this malicious prosecution action.1 On appeal, B-B Barry contends Gemigniani failed to show a probability of prevailing because there was no evidence to show the underlying unlawful detainer action was brought without probable cause, with malice, and terminated in her favor. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish the requisite minimal merit as to each element of malicious prosecution. Therefore, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Unlawful Detainer Actions In 2009, Gemigniani began leasing a rent-controlled apartment on Barry Avenue in Los Angeles. Ownership of the property was transferred to B-B Barry in 2016. In March 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the County of Los Angeles enacted a Covid-19 Tenant Protections Resolution (the rent moratorium), providing tenant protections that applied to Gemigniani’s unit. Beginning in September 2021, Gemigniani 1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated. 2 failed to make rent payments under her lease. She made no rent payments in 2022. The rent moratorium was to expire on March 31, 2023. Tenants were required to resume making rent payments after April 1, 2023, but income qualified residential tenants who had notified their landlord of their inability to pay rent had 12 months to repay the past due rent. In February 2023, Gemigniani provided three money orders to the property management company totaling $2,149. Each stated “February 2023 rent” or “February rent” in the memo line. In a letter to the property management company dated February 2, 2023, however, Gemigniani stated she was unable to pay rent for February and March 2023. She requested that the three money orders, which she identified by number, be applied in full to the rent due following the end of the Covid tenant protections, which was April 1, 2023. Gemigniani paid the full amount of her monthly rent in May 2023 and in June 2023. On June 5, 2023, a Covid-19 rent relief program notified Gemigniani that her application for rental assistance was preliminarily approved to cover rent due from August 2021 through February 2022, in the amount of $15,043. The notice stated the funds would be disbursed to Gemigniani within 10 to 14 business days, and then she was required to remit the funds to her landlord within 15 days after receipt. B-B Barry learned that same day that Gemigniani was preliminarily approved to receive housing assistance from the program. On June 19, 2023, B-B Barry served Gemigniani with a 3- day notice to pay rent or quit. The notice listed delinquent monthly rent payments of $2,149 beginning from July 2022, 3 through April 2023, with the exception of February 2023. The months listed in the 3-day notice were outside the period to be covered by the relief program. The total amount due was stated to be $19,341. In July 2023, B-B Barry filed an unlawful detainer action against Gemigniani based on the 3-day notice. On October 11, 2023, B-B Barry dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice. On November 2, 2023, B-B Barry served Gemigniani with a new 3-day notice to pay rent or quit. The notice listed delinquent monthly payments beginning in July 2023, through November 2023, for a total amount due of $10,745. On November 13, 2023, B-B Barry filed a second unlawful detainer action against Gemigniani, which the parties settled. B. Malicious Prosecution Action On October 14, 2024, Gemigniani filed the operative amended complaint for malicious prosecution against several defendants, including B-B Barry, based on the July 2023 unlawful detainer action. Among other allegations, Gemigniani alleged the July 2023 action was based on past due rent of $19,341, for the months from July 2022 to April 2023, but at the time the action was filed, it was unlawful for residential landlords to evict tenants based on rent owed for those months. The defendants had actual knowledge that the 3-day notice and the July 2023 action were unlawful but prosecuted the meritless action to intimidate Gemigniani into giving up her tenancy and possession of the rent-controlled apartment, which the defendants planned to re-rent to a new tenant at a higher rate. 4 After the July 2023 action was filed, a representative of the Los Angeles Housing Department (LAHD) contacted B-B Barry and told them the July 2023 action was unlawful. The defendants caused the July 2023 action to be dismissed, which was a termination in favor of Gemigniani. C. Anti-SLAPP Motion In July 2025, B-B Barry filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing that Gemigniani could not make a sufficient factual showing that the underlying July 2023 action was brought without probable cause, with malice, and terminated in her favor. B-B Barry submitted the declaration of Gary Steinhardt, who is a consultant for the property management company for the property. He was aware of the rent moratorium that applied to Gemigniani. B-B Barry believed Gemigniani’s continued failure to pay rent after the rent moratorium expired on March 31, 2023, provided reasonable grounds to move forward with the eviction process. When Gemigniani had not remitted funds received from the rent relief program to B-B Barry by July 2023, B-B Barry reported her to the program and moved forward with the July 2023 action. During the litigation of the July 2023 action, B-B Barry learned several of the dates included in the complaint for which Gemigniani had failed to pay rent were still protected by the rent moratorium. In an abundance of caution and not intending to violate any tenant protections that might be applicable, B-B Barry dismissed the July 2023 action. B-B Barry dismissed the action after it learned there was a technical error in the July 5 2023 action as a result of including dates that may have continued to be protected by the rent relief ordinances. When Gemigniani continued to fail to pay rent, B-B Barry filed the second unlawful detainer action. Steinhardt declared that B-B Barry did not file the July 2023 action with malicious intent or to inflict emotional distress, nor was it part of a scheme to unlawfully evict Gemigniani to install a new tenant at a higher rent. B-B Barry’s sole purpose was to recover funds from Gemigniani that it believed it had reasonable grounds to seek at the time of filing. D. Opposition to Anti-SLAPP Motion Gemigniani filed an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. She argued B-B Barry’s voluntary dismissal of the July 2023 action, which was not the result of a settlement, was sufficient evidence of termination on the merits in her favor. B-B Barry was presumed to know the applicable law precluding filing of the July 2023 action, and the property was professionally managed by a sophisticated property management company, so it was malicious to file an action that any reasonable person would know was prohibited by the applicable ordinances. Moreover, the 3-day notice stated Gemigniani had not paid rent for April 2023, when B-B Barry knew rent was received for April 2023, and B-B Barry knew Gemigniani had applied for additional COVID emergency relief benefits. Gemigniani provided her declaration stating that she paid rent for April 2023 through the money orders that she mailed with a letter explaining the payment was for April 2023. Before June 2023, she told B-B Barry that she had applied for additional 6 COVID emergency rental assistance. After B-B Barry filed the July 2023 action, Gemigniani filed a complaint for violation of the rent stabilization ordinance with LAHD. In response, LAHD sent a letter explaining that the July 2023 unlawful detainer action violated three existing ordinances. After receiving information from LAHD, B-B Barry dismissed the July 2023 unlawful detainer action. Gemigniani received approximately $15,000 in COVID emergency relief benefits from the rent relief program, but after B-B Barry filed the July 2023 action, Gemigniani believed she could use the funds to relocate rather than remit them to B-B Barry, and in the settlement of the second unlawful detainer action, B-B Barry agreed she could retain the funds. Gemigniani provided copies of the three money orders, totaling $2,149, and her February 2, 2023 letter to the property manager explaining the money orders should be applied to the April 2023 rent. She also submitted LAHD’s letter explaining the violations of applicable tenant protections ordinances. E. Reply and Trial Court Ruling B-B Barry filed a reply arguing Gemigniani had misapplied the burden for an anti-SLAPP motion and failed to show a reasonable probability of prevailing. A hearing was held on the anti-SLAPP motion on September 4, 2025. B-B Barry argued there was no showing of malice. The trial court noted B-B Barry’s own evidence showed a rent moratorium was in effect, so a trier of fact could find it was not a tenable action to bring under a reasonably objective standard. B-B Barry responded that although the rent 7 moratorium was set to expire on March 31, 2023, and Gemigniani claimed to have paid her April 2023 rent, copies of the money orders that Gemigniani submitted showed she had given instructions to apply the funds to the February 2023 rent, not April 2023. The payments were applied to Gemigniani’s February 2023 rent as stated on the money orders. When the rent moratorium expired, and Gemigniani failed to pay rent in April 2023, B-B Barry moved forward with the July 2023 unlawful detainer action, which included the April 2023 rent that was not protected. Any landlord would have had a reasonable belief that there were reasonable grounds to bring the July 2023 action when Gemigniani was $20,000 in arrears and had failed to pay her April 2023 rent obligation after the Covid-related rent protections expired. B-B Barry admitted that the July 2023 action sought some rent payments that could not be collected until February 2024, but argued Gemigniani’s failure to pay rent for April 2023, after expiration of the protections, gave B-B Barry a tenable basis to move forward with the action. No malice was shown, B-B Barry argued, because it was not attempting to use the judicial system for anything other than to enforce a legitimate right to payment. B-B Barry also admitted that it dismissed the July 2023 action after learning several months later that some of the months in the action were still covered by Covid rent protections. The trial court noted that landlords often have discretion to apply payments to arrears, but the inclusion in the 3-day notice and the July 2023 action of rent payments that B-B Barry was precluded from recovering made the July 2023 action untenable. The 3-day notice overstated the rent, so the 3-day notice was void. B-B Barry argued that because one of the rent payments 8 sought in the July 2023 action was not covered by the rent moratorium, the action was not untenable. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The court found Gemigniani’s evidence that B-B Barry voluntarily dismissed the underlying July 2023 action was sufficient to infer termination in her favor, and in addition, there was evidence that B-B Barry would not have succeeded in the underlying action. The court found Gemigniani’s evidence showed she paid rent for April 2023, which B-B Barry had alleged that she failed to pay. It was undisputed the Covid-19 rent moratorium prevented rent collection for the period from July 2022 through January 2023 until February 2024. Gemigniani’s evidence showed her rent for February and March 2023 was also in forbearance until February 2024. B-B Barry’s evidence confirmed that B-B Barry knew, prior to filing the July 2023 action, that the applicable Covid-19 rent moratorium expired March 2023. B-B Barry filed a second unlawful detainer action based on unpaid rent in later months, which did not include the months alleged in the July 2023 action. The trial court concluded a reasonable trier of fact could find B-B Barry did not have legally tenable grounds to believe it could maintain a suit against Gemigniani for rent collection from July 2022 through April 2023. The court found, therefore, a prima facie case of malicious prosecution had been demonstrated. B-B Barry filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. 9 DISCUSSION A. Statutory Scheme and Standard of Review “[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883– 884 (Wilson).) To accomplish this purpose, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a claim against a person “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Courts apply a two-step analysis to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1011 (Bonni).) In the first step, the court determines whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity. (Id. at p. 1009.) “The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1009.) If the complaint seeks relief based on allegations arising from protected activity, the court turns to the second step of the analysis. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) In the second step, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally 10 sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Ibid.) “[A] plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater).) In the second step, without weighing evidence or resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court determines “whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral, supra, at p. 396.) “ ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 385.) “If not, the claim is stricken.” (Id. at p. 396.) On appeal, we review an order granting or denying an anti- SLAPP motion de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) “We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Ibid.) Considering the pleadings and the affidavits concerning the facts, we accept the plaintiffs’ submissions as true “and consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) B. Probability of Prevailing on Malicious Prosecution It is undisputed that the malicious prosecution action was based on protected activity, shifting the burden to Gemignaini to demonstrate that the claim was supported by sufficient prima facie evidence to sustain a favorable judgment if her evidence was 11 credited. To prove a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show the underlying action was (1) initiated or continued without probable cause, (2) prosecuted with malice, and (3) terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. (Lanz v. Goldstone (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 441, 458.) B-B Barry contends Gemignaini failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet her burden as to any element of malicious prosecution. We disagree. 1. Lack of Probable Cause B-B Barry contends Gemigniani failed to show that it had no probable cause to bring the July 2023 action because Covid- related protections for tenants expired in March 2023 and Gemigniani failed to pay rent in April 2023, so B-B Barry had probable cause to bring the July 2023 action based on the rent owed for April 2023. This analysis is incorrect. “ ‘An action is deemed to have been pursued without probable cause if it was not legally tenable when viewed in an objective manner as of the time the action was initiated or while it was being prosecuted.’ (Sycamore Ridge [Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385,] 1402.) ‘Only those actions that “ ‘any reasonable attorney would agree [are] totally and completely without merit’ ” may form the basis for a malicious prosecution suit.’ (Wilson [v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811,] 817.)” (Olivares v. Pineda (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 343, 355 (Olivares).) Due to the summary nature of unlawful detainer actions, a landlord must strictly comply with the requirements of a 3-day notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), including stating in the 3-day notice “ ‘the amount which is 12 due.’ ” (Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038.) “A notice that seeks rent in excess of the amount due is invalid and will not support an unlawful detainer action.” (Ibid.) In this case, the evidence was that B-B Barry provided a 3- day notice to Gemigniani in June 2023, stating the total amount due was $19,341, which was alleged as the basis for the July 2023 unlawful detainer action. It is undisputed that $17,192 of the total amount stated in the notice was for months covered by the rent moratorium and in forbearance until February 2024. The July 2023 action could not succeed because the amount stated in the June 2023 3-day notice was clearly in excess of the amount due. This evidence met Gemigniani’s burden to show any reasonable attorney would have concluded under the applicable laws that there was no probable cause to bring the July 2023 action based on the June 2023 3-day notice. 2. Malice “The malice element goes to the defendant’s subjective intent in initiating or continuing the prior action. (Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1156–1157 (Sierra Club).) It is not limited to actual hostility or ill will and may be present when proceedings are instituted or maintained primarily for an improper purpose. (Ibid.)” (Olivares, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) “Malice may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the defendants’ lack of probable cause, supplemented with proof that the prior case was instituted largely for an improper purpose. (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 225 13 (Daniels).) This additional proof may consist of evidence that the prior case was knowingly brought without probable cause or was brought to force a settlement unrelated to its merits. (Id. at pp. 226, 228.) A defendant attorney’s investigation and research also may be relevant to whether the attorney acted with malice. [Citation.]” (Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1113–1114.) In this case, a trier of fact making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of Gemigniani could find B-B Barry brought the July 2023 action for an improper purpose, satisfying the malice requirement for malicious prosecution. B-B Barry applied funds that Gemigniani paid in February to satisfy her February rent obligation, despite her written notice to B-B Barry that (1) she could not afford to make the February rent payment, which she was not required to make under the rent moratorium, and (2) she was requesting the funds be applied to the first payment due after the rent moratorium expired. In June 2023, B-B Barry used its application of the funds to the February 2023 rent obligation to claim that rent for April 2023, outside the moratorium, had not been paid, which B-B Barry bootstrapped to justify a 3-day notice demanding payment for multiple months in arrears, including dates covered by the moratorium and in forbearance until February 2024. B-B Barry served the 3-day notice exactly two weeks after learning that Gemigniani had been approved for housing assistance for earlier arrears. Gemigniani did not make any rent payments in 2022, but the 3-day notice calculated the amount due beginning with the rent obligation for July 2022, such that the total amount stated in the 3-day notice was greater than the amount of assistance that Gemigniani would receive from the rent relief program. B-B Barry employed 14 the services of a knowledgeable property management company and legal counsel. From the evidence, a trier of fact could infer that B-B Barry brought the July 2023 action for an improper purpose, demanding an excessive amount of rent, greater than the amount of the housing assistance that Gemigniani was approved to receive for the earlier months, to intimidate Gemigniani and force her to vacate her rent-controlled apartment, allowing B-B Barry to re-rent the unit at a higher rate. Viewed in the light most favorable to Gemigniani, the trier of fact could find B-B Barry acted with malice when it filed the July 2023 action without probable cause. 3. Favorable Termination “A voluntary dismissal is presumed to be a favorable termination on the merits unless proved otherwise to a jury because the natural assumption is that one does not simply abandon a meritorious action. (Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann [, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400].) When termination is other than by a judgment on the merits, the court examines the record to see if the disposition reflects the opinion of the court or the prosecuting party that the action would not succeed, and if there is a dispute as to the circumstances of the termination, the determination of the reasons underlying the dismissal is a question of fact. (Id. at p. 1399.)” (Olivares, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 354.) Gemigniani has shown B-B Barry’s voluntary dismissal of the July 2023 action was a termination in her favor under the circumstances of this case. After filing the July 2023 action, B-B Barry learned several dates included in the complaint were 15 protected by the rent moratorium. An unlawful detainer action cannot be based on a 3-day notice that seeks rent in excess of the amount due. Because B-B Barry voluntarily dismissed the action after the disclosure of this evidence, Gemigniani has made a prima facie showing that the dismissal reflected B-B Barry’s opinion that the unlawful detainer action could not succeed based on the June 2023 3-day notice. B-B Barry’s argument that it dismissed the July 2023 action based on technicalities in an abundance of caution merely raises a triable factual dispute as to the true circumstances of the termination and does not defeat plaintiffs’ prima facie showing as a matter of law. (See Olivares, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 354.) The anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied because Gemigniani made a prima facie showing of evidence that, if credited by the trier of fact, would allow judgment in her favor. DISPOSITION The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Respondent Staci Gemigniani is awarded her costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. MOOR, J. WE CONCUR: HOFFSTADT, P. J. KIM (D.), J. 16