Brodsky v. Ervin Cohen & Jessup CA2/7

Filed 10/29/26 Brodsky v. Ervin Cohen & Jessup CA2/7 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN JONATHAN BRODSKY, as Trustee B339271 of the ADCO Trust, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV03810) v. ERVIN COHEN & JESSUP LLP et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Affirmed. Ervin Cohen & Jessup, Michael C. Lieb and Allan B. Cooper for Defendant and Appellant Ervin Cohen & Jessup. Willenken, Jason H. Wilson and Kirby Hsu for Defendant and Appellant Reeve E. Chudd. Rosen Saba, James R. Rosen and Abigail Page for Plaintiff and Respondent.  ________________________ INTRODUCTION Jonathan Brodsky, as Trustee of the ADCO Trust, sued Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP, a law firm, and Reeve E. Chudd, one of its partners (together, ECJ), for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment. Broadly, the complaint alleges ECJ conspired with Robert Kory to dissipate and divert the assets from singer-songwriter Leonard Cohen’s family trust after his death. ECJ demurred on multiple grounds, and the trial court overruled the demurrer in its entirety. Relevant to this appeal, the court rejected ECJ’s argument that Brodsky was required, but failed, to obtain a prefiling order pursuant to Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a).1 Section 1714.10 “requires a plaintiff to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing before he or she may pursue a ‘cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.’ ” (Stueve v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 327, 329 (Stueve).) After our original opinion issued on March 18, 2026, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to this court. We vacated our prior opinion and invited the parties to provide supplemental briefing. Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs, we affirm. 1 Section 1714.10, subdivision (d) makes appealable this part of the court’s order on demurrer. Further section references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 Leonard Cohen was a well-known singer-songwriter. He had two children, Adam and Lorca Cohen.3 In 1998, Leonard created the Leonard Cohen Family Trust Agreement (the family trust), which named Adam and Lorca as beneficiaries. ECJ were Leonard’s estate planning attorneys. 1. The Family Trust In 2005, ECJ drafted an amendment and restatement to the original family trust (2005 restatement), naming Adam, Lorca, and Anjani Thomas, a fellow musician, as successor co- trustees. Adam and Lorca remained the beneficiaries of the trust. In or around 2005, Leonard learned his long-time business manager had embezzled more than $5 million from him. Leonard retained Kory, an attorney, to represent him. Kory became his personal manager in 2008. Kory subsequently oversaw most aspects of Leonard’s career, including providing management, legal, and accounting services. In 2008, Leonard established two sub-trusts, ADCO and LORCO, one for each of his children. He named Kory as the trustee for these sub-trusts. Leonard also named Kory as successor trustee to the family trust in 2010 and 2014 2 Because this is an appeal from a demurrer, we recite the facts as alleged in the operative complaint. (See Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 340.) 3 For ease of reference and meaning no disrespect, we refer to members of the Cohen family by their first names. 3 amendments. Thereafter, Leonard began to suspect Kory was not acting in Leonard’s interest and, on July 2, 2016, he revoked the 2010 and 2014 amendments. This act had the effect of restoring Adam, Lorca, and Thomas as successor co-trustees of the family trust under the 2005 restatement. The 2016 amendment provided that after distribution of specific bequests, the remainder beneficiaries to the family trust were ADCO and LORCO. Leonard died on November 7, 2016. After Leonard’s death, the operative complaint alleges that Chudd replaced a section of the 2005 restatement to appoint Kory as the sole successor trustee of the family trust, instead of Adam, Lorca, and Thomas. The complaint alleges this act was a forgery of the 2005 restatement. Chudd then drafted an acceptance of the appointment, which Kory signed. When Adam and Lorca inquired about and requested copies of the operative family trust, Chudd and Kory represented to them that Kory was the trustee of the family trust and provided them with copies of the trust documents. On June 15, 2017, Lorca’s counsel met with Chudd and asked “why Adam and Lorca should not be the Trustees (and why they should not simply request Thomas to decline). [Chudd] responded, ‘I fucked up.’ [¶] [Chudd] went on to explain that he had made a ‘scrivener’s error’ in the [2016 amendment]. According to [Chudd], Leonard had actually not intended to revoke the trustee succession provision of the [2010 and 2014 amendments].” On February 8, 2023, in a deposition in a different case, Chudd admitted replacing the pages in the 2005 restatement. 4  2. The Lawsuit Several lawsuits were filed against ECJ, Chudd, and Kory.4 Among them, ADCO and LORCO petitioned in probate court to remove Kory as trustee of these sub-trusts. In July 2022, Brodsky replaced Kory as trustee of the ADCO trust. Brodsky sued ECJ and Chudd in this action on February 21, 2023, for compensatory and punitive damages. In the first amended complaint, Brodsky alleges five causes of action for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting Kory’s breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment based on the facts leading to the forgery. The complaint alleges Chudd “either never communicated the fact of [Chudd]’s ‘error’ to Kory . . . or, in collusion with Kory, never communicated the fact of his ‘error’ to the beneficiaries of ADCO or LORCO.” Brodsky alleges ECJ continues to represent Kory in the various lawsuits against Kory and that it asserts Kory is the rightful trustee of the family trust. He further alleges Kory has paid ECJ out of trust assets in these actions, to the detriment of ADCO and LORCO, the remainder beneficiaries of the family trust. According to Brodsky, Kory has also used trust assets to pay ECJ for legal services in connection with business ventures in which Kory engaged in self-dealing. “For example, ECJ represents [the family trust] in connection with an archive sale being peddled by Kory’s company RKM.” In short, “[Chudd]’s admitted forgery and fraud enabled Kory to serve as trustee of 4 ECJ filed a motion seeking judicial notice of filings in related cases involving the family trust on the one hand and ECJ on the other. The motion is denied as unnecessary because these filings do not affect our analysis in this case. 5 both [the family trust] and ADCO, and Defendants served as his counsel for both. Wearing both hats, Defendants not only failed to reveal their dual roles (there was never a disclosure and/or conflict waiver presented to Adam or Lorca), but actively exploited numerous conflicts of interest, allowing Kory to pillage the [family trust] assets for himself, [Chudd] and EC&J.” Brodsky alleges ECJ’s fees and Kory’s disbursements have collectively exceeded $9 million. 3. The Demurrer ECJ filed a demurrer, arguing, among other things, that Brodsky was required to receive court approval before filing the complaint pursuant to section 1714.10. The trial court overruled the demurrer. It ruled that section 1714.10 did not apply because “[a]lthough the FAC makes allegations that Defendants conspired with former Trustee, Robert Kory, neither the original complaint nor the FAC actually assert a civil conspiracy cause of action.” The court additionally determined that even if the complaint alleged a civil conspiracy claim, the complaint fell under a statutory exception to the prefiling requirement because ECJ “owed an independent legal duty to Plaintiff not to defraud them as nonclients per Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (c).” 4. Appellate Proceedings ECJ timely appealed. After the parties completed briefing, this court sent the following letter two weeks before oral argument: The parties are requested to address at oral argument the effect, if any, of the following italicized language in Civil 6  Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a): ‘No cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which is based upon the attorney’s representation of the client, shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters’ a prefiling order. (See Stueve v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 327, 330 [estate planning transactional activities are not activities ‘“arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.’”]; Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 209, fn. 16 [(Favila)] [‘This phrase suggests section 1714.10, subdivision (a)’s pleading hurdle applies only to situations in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.’] At oral argument, the parties addressed the issues raised in the focus letter. ECJ distinguished Stueve and urged this court to follow Cortese v. Sherwood (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 445 (Cortese), a case it had cited in its briefs but for a different proposition. In particular, ECJ argued the conspiracy arose from multiple attempts to contest or compromise claims or disputes: (1) the dispute between Leonard and Kory beginning in 2005 when Leonard distrusted Kory’s management of his business affairs; (2) the dispute between Adam and Lorca, on the one hand, and ECJ, on the other, after Leonard’s death regarding who was the rightful successor trustee; and (3) the dispute that arose when Adam and Lorca attempted to oust Kory as successor trustee. 7  On March 18, 2026, we issued an opinion affirming the trial court’s ruling but on the ground that the matter did not fall within the scope of subdivision (a) of section 1714.10 rather than the exclusion specified in subdivision (c). (See D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [a trial court “ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason” and “[i]f right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion”].) ECJ filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to Government Code section 68081. When we denied the petition for rehearing, ECJ filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter with directions to grant the petition for rehearing and afford the parties the opportunity for supplemental briefing. We have done so. ECJ argues in its supplemental brief that “the Brodsky complaint expressly alleges that Kory’s disputed claim to be successor trustee triggered the conspiracy between Kory and his counsel.” In particular, “the claim or dispute was over the rightful successor trustee of the [family trust]; and the alleged bad act was an attempt to prevail in that dispute, initially by forging a document to make Kory the successor trustee, and subsequently by covering up that act and misleading the supposedly legitimate successor trustees.” According to ECJ, Brodsky’s complaint alleges that “[t]he conduct began with an attempt to overturn Leonard’s decision to replace Kory as successor trustee and continued with a series of actions designed to insulate Kory from attack so that, supposedly, he could loot the estate.” ECJ further argued that Stueve was distinguishable and 8 Favila’s interpretation of section 1714.10, subdivision (a), was dicta and wrong. DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Section 1714.10, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “No cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which is based upon the attorney’s representation of the client, shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing the pleading that includes the claim for civil conspiracy to be filed after the court determines that the party seeking to file the pleading has established that there is a reasonable probability that the party will prevail in the action.” Subdivision (c) of that section creates two exceptions to the prefiling requirement: “This section shall not apply to a cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client, where (1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the attorney’s acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney’s financial gain.” “Applying section 1714.10 thus requires the court to initially determine whether the pleading falls either within the coverage of the statute or, instead, within one of its stated exceptions.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 818 (Berg).) When it applies, “the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing [of a 9 reasonable probability of prevailing] before being allowed to assert the claim.” (Klotz v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Klotz).) Failure to obtain a prefiling order can be raised in a demurrer. (§ 1714.10, subd. (b).) We review de novo the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer. (Klotz, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349; Berg, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 822.) “[W]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Aghaian v. Minassian (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 447, 451, fn. 2.) B. Overview of Section 1714.10 In Favila, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th pages 207 to 209, this court provided an overview of the development of section 1714.10, which “is helpful to an understanding of the statute’s limited scope and proper application”: “Section 1714.10 was originally enacted in 1988 in response to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wolfrich Corp. v. United Services Automobile Assn. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1206 (Wolfrich), which held, although an insurance company’s attorneys could not be sued directly for violating Insurance Code section 790.03, they could be sued for conspiring with their client to commit unfair or deceptive acts or practices prohibited by the code. (Wolfrich, at p. 1211.) To prevent the assertion of conspiracy claims against attorneys ‘as a tactical ploy, particularly in actions against insurance companies’ (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 718), former section 1714.10 required a prefiling 10 judicial determination of probable merit for any claim against an attorney alleging the attorney had conspired with his or her client. [Citations and footnotes omitted.] . . . “In 1989, however, the Supreme Court in Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39 (Doctors’ Co.) disapproved Wolfrich, holding no claim for conspiracy to violate the Insurance Code could be maintained against an attorney retained by an insurance company to assist in the defense of an insured against a third party claim. (Id. at p. 41.) The court relied on the doctrine, commonly referred to as the ‘agent’s immunity rule,’ that ‘[a] cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise . . . if the alleged conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party who did have that duty.’ (Id. at p. 44.) The court held, ‘[b]ecause the noninsurer defendants are not subject to [the only statutory duty toward plaintiff claimed to have been breached] and were acting merely as agents of the insurer “and not as individuals for their individual advantage” [citation], “they cannot be held accountable on a theory of conspiracy.” ’ (Id. at p. 45.) “The court explained, however, ‘[i]t remains true, of course, that under other sets of circumstances “[attorneys] may be liable for participation in tortious acts with their clients, and such liability may rest on a conspiracy” [citations]. For example, an attorney who conspires to cause a client to violate a statutory duty peculiar to the client may be acting not only in the performance of a 11  professional duty to serve the client but also in furtherance of the attorney’s own financial gain.’ (Doctors’ Co., supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 46.) Additionally, a claim may lie ‘against an attorney for conspiring with his or her client to cause injury by violating the attorney’s own duty to the plaintiff.’ (Id. at p. 47.)” Favila further recounted that the Legislature amended the statute in 1991 in response to Doctors’ Co. so that it would “apply only to situations in which it was alleged an attorney had engaged in a conspiracy with his or her client ‘arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim.’ ” (Favila, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 209, quoting section 1714.10, subd. (a).) Favila observed, “This phrase suggests section 1714.10, subdivision (a)’s pleading hurdle applies only to situations in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” (Favila, at p. 209, fn. 16.) Favila also observed the 1991 amendment created a new subdivision (c), which contained exceptions to the procedural requirements of subdivision (a) for the two situations described in Doctors’ Co.: “ ‘where (1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the attorney’s acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney’s financial gain.’ ” (Favila, at p. 209; see also Pavicich v. Santucci (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 382, 393-394 (Pavicich) [discussing legislative history of 1991 amendment to § 1714.10].) 12 C. Brodsky Was Not Required To Comply With the Prefiling Requirement Under Section 1714.10 We conclude Brodsky was not required to comply with the prefiling requirement under section 1714.10. The plain language of section 1714.10, subdivision (a), requires Brodsky to obtain a prefiling order only if he alleges a “cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute . . . .” Brodsky’s complaint, however, does not allege a conspiracy between ECJ and Kory “arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.” The complaint rests on Chudd’s purported forgery of the 2005 restatement by replacing the section naming Adam, Lorca, and Thomas as successor trustees with one naming Kory as trustee. Indeed, ECJ describes “the essence” of Brodsky’s lawsuit as a conspiracy “to steal the trusteeship of the [family trust], which enabled Kory to loot it.” There is nothing in the complaint to show that, at the time of Leonard’s death and when Chudd committed the alleged forgery, any “claim or dispute” existed. Instead, the complaint alleges ECJ and Kory concealed the fraud from Adam and Lorca when they began to ask questions after Leonard’s death. Brodsky was not required to comply with the prefiling requirement because “section 1714.10, subdivision (a)’s pleading hurdle applies only to situations in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” (Favila, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 209, fn. 16.) 13  1. Stueve Is On Point and Supports the Conclusion Brodsky Was Not Required To Comply With Section 1714.10 Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at page 329 presents substantially the same facts and is on point. Stueve held that section 1714.10 “does not impede a plaintiff’s pursuit of the type of claims we have here—potentially meritorious claims against a law firm that allegedly conspired to abscond with its clients’ assets.” (Stueve, at p. 329.) In Stueve, plaintiffs sued, among others, a lawyer and his law firm for “a purported Ponzi scheme . . . to siphon off the assets of the Stueve family . . . the ‘heirs’ (in lay terms) to the Alta Dena Dairy fortune.” (Ibid.) The trial court granted the law firm’s motion to strike the conspiracy allegations pursuant to section 1714.10. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that claims arising from the “siphoning off of assets through fraudulent estate planning, including the misappropriation of [the plaintiffs’] assets through the diversion of those assets to entities created and controlled by the defendants” do not describe a conspiracy requiring a prefiling order pursuant to section 1714.10, subdivision (a). (Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 331.) Stueve explained, “As is plain from the face of the statute, ‘[s]ection 1714.10 prohibits the unauthorized filing of an action for nonexempt civil conspiracy against an attorney based on conduct arising from the representation of a client that is in connection with any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Transactional activities are not “ ‘arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.’ ” (Ibid.) Similarly, ECJ’s legal services are 14 transactional activities not subject to section 1714.10’s prefiling requirement. ECJ attempts to distinguish Stueve by relying on the facts stated in its companion case, Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 311–312 (Stueve Bros. Farms). Stueve Bros. Farms discussed whether the plaintiff heirs filed their claims against the attorneys within the limitations period. (Ibid.) Stueve Bros. Farms does not override the holding in Stueve regarding section 1714.10. Nor do the facts described in Stueve Bros. Farms distinguish Stueve from this case. ECJ’s own description of the facts set out in Stueve Bros. Farms demonstrates how closely aligned Stueve is to the factual allegations of this case and reinforces the significance of Stueve. ECJ describes Stueve Bros. Farms as follows: “the heirs alleged that the attorneys initiated a scheme to steal money from the estate of the Alta Dena Dairy founders and to direct the funds to entities the attorneys controlled (which entities were thus their ‘clients’). By the time the dispute arose, the conduct underlying the conspiracy claim had been completed.” Here, Brodsky alleged Chudd initiated a scheme to steal money from Leonard’s estate and to direct the funds to ECJ (through payment of their fees) and ECJ’s client, Kory, by committing the alleged forgery of the 2005 amendment to designate Kory as the successor trustee. By the time the dispute arose, the conduct underlying the conspiracy claim had been completed. Stueve Bros. Farms does not help ECJ. ECJ also challenges Stueve’s holding, arguing that its “interpretation would render Section 1714.10 useless because it would provide a less potent remedy than . . . [t]he litigation privilege (Civ. Code[,] § 47(b)) and the procedural protection 15 available by way of special motion to strike [known as anti- SLAPP] (Code Civ. Proc.[,] § 425.16).” According to ECJ, the litigation privilege and anti-SLAPP statute “already provide protection against acts done by a lawyer, conspiring with a client, in a ‘legal dispute’ or ‘litigation.’ ” That is not a persuasive reason to disregard Stueve’s holding. That there may be some overlap between the statutes does not mean we may disregard the plain language of section 1714.10 and its legislative history. (See Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 691, 698 [overlapping laws may be read together and both given effect].) As stated by Favila in its statutory overview, the original version of section 1714.10 applied to claims against an attorney for “ ‘a civil conspiracy with his or her client.’ ” (Favila, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 207, fn. 13, quoting from Stats. 1988, ch. 1052, § 1, pp. 3407-3408.) The Legislature then amended section 1714.10 to apply to claims against an attorney for a civil “conspiracy with his or her client ‘arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim’ ” or dispute. (Favila, at p. 209, quoting Stats. 1991, ch. 916, § 1, p. 4108.) Favila reasonably observed that this additional language suggested section 1714.10, subdivision (a), only applied to a previous or current legal dispute or litigation. (Favila, at p. 209, fn. 16.) Stueve examined section 1714.10 and other cases addressing the statute. It concluded section 1714.10 did not apply to transactional activities “given the plain wording of subdivision (a) thereof.” (Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.) Given this legislative history and Stueve’s and Favila’s analysis, we decline to broaden section 1714.10’s reach by omitting language—the phrase, “arising from any attempt to 16 contest or compromise a claim or dispute”—that the Legislature added to the statute. (See, e.g., Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545 [“in construing this, or any statute, we may not broaden or narrow the scope of the provision by reading into it language that does not appear in it or reading out of it language that does”].) 2. Brodsky’s Allegations Do Not Establish a “Claim or Dispute” Existed When Chudd Committed the Alleged Forgery Moreover, Brodsky’s allegations demonstrate the alleged conspiracy did not arise from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute because neither is alleged to have existed at the time of the conspiracy. As stated, the complaint alleges Adam and Lorca only began to dispute Kory’s status as successor trustee after Chudd’s forgery. In our original opinion, we addressed ECJ’s argument that, for purposes of section 1714.10, subdivision (a), there are “three layers” of claims or disputes from which the conspiracy arose: (1) Leonard’s dispute with Kory (allegedly demonstrated by Leonard’s email to Kory shortly before his death demanding to know “how much did you take home,” and Leonard’s decision to amend the family trust to reinstate Adam, Lorca, and Thomas as co-trustees); (2) Adam’s and Lorca’s dispute with Kory and ECJ after Leonard’s death when they questioned Kory and ECJ about the family trust and asked to see the relevant trust documents; and (3) Adam’s and Lorca’s petitions to remove Kory as trustee of ADCO and LORCO. In its supplemental briefing, ECJ argues that “ECJ’s alleged conspiracy with Kory to undermine [the 2016 17 amendment’s] effectiveness, arose out of an ongoing claim or dispute between Leonard and Kory.” ECJ also asserts that Kory and ECJ continued the alleged conspiracy by concealing their fraudulent misconduct and misleading Adam and Lorca into believing Kory has always been the successor trustee. In short, “[t]he conduct began with an attempt to overturn Leonard’s decision to replace Kory as successor trustee and continued with a series of actions designed to insulate Kory from attack so that, supposedly, he could loot the estate.” But, as we have explained, the conspiracy alleged in the operative complaint is between ECJ and Kory. For this reason, we reject the argument that the conspiracy alleged in the complaint arose from an attempt to compromise Leonard’s dispute with Kory. At that time, Leonard was ECJ’s client, not Kory. Section 1714.10 applies to allegations of conspiracies between an attorney and his or her client, and plainly a conspiracy between ECJ and Kory against Leonard does not qualify. ECJ attempts to circumvent this analysis by arguing that “section 1714.10 does not apply only to a dispute or claim with the plaintiff.” ECJ thus contends section 1714.10 applies to an alleged conspiracy between ECJ and Kory against a third party (such as ADCO or Adam) that arose from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute between Leonard and Kory. We are not persuaded. ECJ’s interpretation of section 1714.10 runs counter to Favila, Stueve, and Cortese, which agreed that “section 1714.10, subdivision (a)’s pleading hurdle applies only to situations in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” (Favila, supra, 18 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 209, fn. 16 [italics inserted]; accord Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 457; Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.) ECJ has not directed us to any case stating otherwise or disagreeing with these cases. We are also not persuaded that ECJ’s and Kory’s alleged conspiracy “to prevail on Kory’s disputed claim to be successor trustee” after Leonard’s death—ECJ’s layers (2) and (3)— constitute claims or disputes that gave rise to the alleged conspiracy because they both postdate the conspiracy pleaded in the complaint.5 In its supplemental briefing, ECJ contends the operative complaint’s allegations plead an “open-ended conspiracy” whereby ECJ “ ‘colluded and conspired with Kory to enrich themselves’ ” after Leonard died by misleading Adam and Lorca into believing Kory was the rightful successor trustee. ECJ does not cite any authority supporting the proposition that section 1714.10 is triggered by acts committed after the conspiracy arises. ECJ relies on Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at page 445, both in its initial briefing and in its supplemental briefing, for the proposition that an attorney’s false statements inducing a third party not to bring suit constitute an attempt to compromise a claim. Cortese is inapposite. 5 ECJ contends, “The Court’s earlier opinion appears to require an order of precedence: the first act in the conspiracy must take place after the claim or dispute arises.” ECJ misreads the opinion. In this case, Brodsky alleged Chudd’s forgery triggered Adam’s and Lorca’s claims or disputes about whom Leonard designated to be the successor trustee. This analysis does not set out a rule, it merely sets out the chronology of the facts alleged. 19  In Cortese, the plaintiff daughter sued her mother’s and stepfather’s attorney for breach of trust. She alleged her stepfather promised she would inherit a portion of his estate when he died and that his attorney made similar affirmative statements to her about her inheritance. When her mother died, the plaintiff questioned her stepfather, who was the executor and trustee of her mother’s estate, and his attorney “ ‘about the low value of the Estate.’ ” (Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.) She alleged the attorney then “persuaded or ‘induced’ [her] not to challenge” her stepfather’s actions regarding her mother’s estate “and to agree to early termination of [her mother’s] trust, by representing she would receive a large inheritance from [her stepfather’s] estate when he died.” (Id. at p. 455.) After his death, the plaintiff learned she was not a beneficiary to his estate. (Id. at p. 452.) Cortese held “the dispute need not have matured into litigation for section 1714.10’s prefiling requirements to apply.” (Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) It concluded, “the alleged conduct arose from an attempt to compromise a dispute because [the plaintiff] alleges [the attorney] ‘induced [her] into foregoing any challenges to [her stepfather’s] actions as executor and trustee by stating that she should not worry about the valuations as she would be a very wealthy woman at [his] death.” (Ibid.) Cortese does not help ECJ because the alleged conspiracy here centers on Chudd’s purported forgery of the 2005 amendment, rather than any false statements inducing a third party not to bring suit. In Cortese, the stepdaughter disputed her stepfather’s conduct, which was facilitated by the attorney, who, in turn, persuaded her to forestall litigation through 20 misrepresentations. Here, by contrast, the complaint alleges that Chudd’s forgery initiated the dispute among the parties. There was no claim or dispute to be compromised until Chudd committed the forgery, Kory was improperly appointed as the trustee of the family trust, and Adam and Lorca learned about it. In other words, Chudd’s purported forgery arose from a transactional activity unrelated to any claim or dispute. DISPOSITION The order overruling ECJ’s demurrer on the ground that section 1714.10’s prefiling requirement does not apply is affirmed. Brodsky may recover his costs on appeal. MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur: FEUER, J. STONE, J. 21