In re Y.G. CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB349037
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 In re Y.G. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re Y.G., B349037
a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01445A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
U.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Sally Espinoza, Judge. Affirmed.
Rita Kathryn Himes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over Y.G., a minor child, under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) and
removed Y.G. from both of his parents.1 Y.G’s mother, U.M., appeals from
the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under subdivision (a) and from the
removal order.
While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court released Y.G. to his
father, D.G., in Arizona and terminated jurisdiction. Based on those
proceedings, we conclude that mother’s appeal of the removal order is now
moot and we decline to consider it. However, we conclude that regardless of
mootness we should exercise our discretion to review the juvenile court’s
assumption of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a).
Having done so, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I. Factual History
The record relates the following, which primarily comes from the police
report of the responding officer and from statements made by mother to a Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) case
worker.
On May 14, 2025, mother had been arguing with her boyfriend, M.C., in
her bedroom about eviction documents. Y.G., who was two years old at the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Our discussion of the factual record reflects the substantial evidence
standard of review.
2
time, was sitting on the bed.3 Mother ordered M.C. out of the bedroom and
he refused to leave. When mother tried to remove M.C.’s backpack from the
bedroom, he pushed her with his hand on her collarbone to stop her. In
response, mother bit M.C.’s arm and struck him with a cord. M.C. told the
police that mother had also slapped and punched him.
When the police arrived, the officer found M.C. in the living room,
bleeding from his mouth, with blood on his right hand and a visible bite mark
on his left arm. Mother had locked herself in the bedroom with Y.G. Mother
initially did not cooperate with police and acted “erratic [and] resistive.” The
officer deemed mother as the aggressor and arrested her for spousal battery.
Police and DCFS took Y.G. into protective custody.
At the scene, police found a tray containing tobacco and marijuana in
the bedroom on the mattress where Y.G. had been laying. Police noted a
strong odor of marijuana in the room. Police also observed a “glass bulbous
pipe with black and white residue” of a type commonly used to smoke
methamphetamine on a chair against a wall. Mother admitted to police that
she smoked marijuana, and that she had rolled a blunt while in the bedroom
with Y.G. the day of the altercation. Mother told both the police and DCFS
that the pipe belonged to M.C. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine
on May 16 and May 19, 2025. Mother told DCFS that between June 2023
and January 2024, she alternated between periods of daily
methamphetamine use and sobriety. She admitted that she was a daily
smoker from January 2024 to the day of her arrest.
3 In her statement to police, mother said Y.G. was sleeping on a mattress
on the floor but woke up and began crying during the altercation.
3
II. Procedural History
On May 16, 2025, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). DCFS alleged that Y.G.’s physical health and
safety were at risk and that Y.G. was at risk of serious physical harm
because of mother’s violent conduct and her substance abuse. DCFS filed an
amended petition on August 7, 2025, which included additional allegations
that Y.G.’s physical and emotional health and safety were endangered by
past incidents of domestic violence between mother and father.4 DCFS
recommended Y.G.’s removal from both parents with reunification services.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on September 8, 2025, the
juvenile court sustained the amended petition in its entirety. The court
removed Y.G. from both parents, finding clear and convincing evidence of a
substantial danger to his physical or emotional well-being and no reasonable
means of avoiding removal despite reasonable efforts by DCFS to do so.
Mother appealed on September 17, 2025.
On October 3, 2025, the court ordered DCFS to begin the process to
place Y.G. with paternal grandmother in Arizona.5 On December 4, 2025, the
juvenile court returned Y.G. to father in Arizona, granted visitation for
mother, and ordered family maintenance services for both parents. The
4 Mother reported to DCFS that she had experienced several unreported
incidents of violence when she was living with father in Arizona. At the time
of the petition, father was living in Arizona and had not had contact with
mother or Y.G. since 2024.
5 Mother’s request for judicial notice of the post-appeal records of the
juvenile court as of April 9, 2026 in this matter is granted. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)
4
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction on June 15, 2026 and granted sole legal
and physical custody of Y.G to father.6
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that two orders—the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
finding under section 300, subdivision (a), and its order removing Y.G. from
mother—were not supported by substantial evidence. Although mother’s
challenge to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is potentially moot, we
exercise our discretion to consider it. We conclude that substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under subdivision (a).
However, we conclude that mother’s challenge to the removal order is
moot, and we do not exercise our discretion to consider the removal order.
I. Mootness
A. General Principles
“In general, it is a court’s duty to decide ‘“‘actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’”’ [Citation.]”
(In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644, overruled in part on other
grounds by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 (D.P.).) “[T]he critical factor
in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate
court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements
must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second,
6 DCFS’s request for judicial notice of the juvenile court’s June 15, 2026
order is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) This order post-dates
mother’s request for judicial notice referenced above.
5
the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
plaintiff seeks.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
Even when a case is moot, we retain discretion to review
determinations by a juvenile court in certain circumstances. (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 282–286.) Courts will generally exercise that discretion “only
when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to
recur, when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties
or when a material question remains for the court’s determination.” (In re
Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 224.)
In D.P., the Supreme Court identified additional factors for appellate
courts to consider when exercising this discretion in juvenile dependency
proceedings. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 284–286.) Those factors include:
(1) whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could potentially impact the
current or future dependency proceedings, (2) the egregiousness or stigma of
the allegations against the parent, and (3) the reason the case became moot.
(Ibid.) Additionally, when “the outcome of the appeal could be ‘the difference
between father’s being an “offending” parent versus a “non-offending” parent,’
a finding that could result in far-reaching consequences with respect to these
and future dependency proceedings, [it may be] appropriate to exercise our
discretion to consider the appeal on the merits.” (In re Quentin H. (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 608, 613.)
But these factors “are not exhaustive, and no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise discretionary
review of a moot appeal. Ultimately, in deciding whether to exercise its
discretion, a court should be guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’
with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety,
6
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citations.]”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
B. Jurisdictional Finding
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under
section 300, subdivision (a) (risk of nonaccidental injury), but not its finding
under subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The juvenile court therefore had
multiple bases to exercise jurisdiction over Y.G. beyond the finding of
jurisdiction under subdivision (a), potentially mooting mother’s challenge to
that jurisdictional finding. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.)
Moreover, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and entered an order awarding father sole legal and physical
custody of Y.G. “[A]n order terminating jurisdiction generally renders an
appeal from a prior order in a dependency proceeding moot.” (In re Miguel J.
(2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 266, 277.) Thus, on its face, the appeal of the
jurisdictional finding would appear to be moot.
Despite this, mother argues this appeal is not moot because the
juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) will
likely result in her being listed on the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI),
which could have consequences for her under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3)
and other statutes.
Mother is correct that a jurisdictional finding that must be reported on
CACI is not moot merely because the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction on
multiple bases or ultimately terminates jurisdiction.7 (In re S.R. (2025) 18
Cal.5th 1042, 1048–1049.) When CACI reporting is at issue, the appellate
court can provide relief even in an otherwise moot appeal—namely, it can
7 DCFS agrees that the jurisdictional appeal is not moot.
7
alleviate the significant consequences of CACI reporting by reversing the
finding that led to the reporting requirement. (Id. at pp. 1055–1056.)
We note one nuance. When, as in this case, a jurisdictional finding by a
juvenile court only potentially—but not certainly—requires a listing on the
CACI, it is unclear under current law whether an appeal of the jurisdictional
finding is moot. (In re S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054 [noting that the
Court had “no occasion to decide whether a case is moot if, for example, a
parent shows the conduct at issue is likely but not indisputably reportable”].)
Here, mother contends that it is likely that the juvenile court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over Y.G. under section 300, subdivision (a) will constitute a
substantiated finding of abuse or neglect that must be reported on CACI, but
she does not assert that this is a certainty.
But, in this case, we need not decide whether the distinction between
potentially and indisputably CACI-reportable matters is meaningful. Even
in a moot case, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, because of the
severe consequences of CACI reporting, we can and ordinarily should conduct
a merits review of a parent’s challenge to a jurisdictional finding when CACI
reporting is at issue. (In re S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 1054.) We exercise
that discretion here.
C. Removal Order
The mootness analysis for the removal order is different. In the
September 8, 2025 order which mother appeals here, the juvenile court
removed Y.G. from both parents and ordered DCFS to provide reunification
services. But, after that order was issued, the juvenile court altered its
custody determination, placed Y.G. with father in father’s home in Arizona,
and terminated jurisdiction entirely. Because neither side addressed the
effect of these later developments in the case, we requested supplemental
8
briefing addressing whether mother’s appeal of the September 8, 2025 order
is now moot. In DCFS’ supplemental brief, it noted that mother has
separately appealed the later orders placing Y.G. with father and
terminating jurisdiction. Mother concedes that she has separately appealed
those orders.8
We conclude that mother’s appeal of the September 8, 2025 order is
moot. We cannot provide meaningful relief by reversing that order. The
September 8, 2025 order has long since been superseded. Y.G. has now been
placed with his father in Arizona, instead of being removed from both
parents. Mother argues that this matter is not moot because she has
separately appealed the juvenile court’s subsequent orders. But under
existing case law, the existence of that appeal demonstrates precisely why
the appeal of the September 8, 2025 order is now moot. (In re Rashad D.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 (Rashad D.) [original order awarding custody
was moot after the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and issued a new
custody order, because “an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction
and awarding custody is necessary for this court to be able to provide
effective relief”]; see also In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 667–668
[disagreeing with cases stating an order terminating jurisdiction moots any
appeal of prior juvenile court orders, but noting that an appeal challenging
custody determination superseded by custody terms in exit order is
nevertheless moot].)
Mother also argues that this appeal is not moot because she is at risk of
being bypassed for reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision
8 Mother’s supplemental request for judicial notice of the juvenile court’s
register of actions, its final judgment filed June 15, 2026, and of the record in
mother’s separate appeal is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
9
(b)(3). That section provides that a juvenile court need not provide
reunification services when it finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]hat
the child or a sibling of the child has been previously adjudicated a dependent
pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of physical or sexual
abuse, that following that adjudication the child had been removed from the
custody of the child’s parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361, that the
child has been returned to the custody of the parent or guardian from whom
the child had been taken originally, and that the child is being removed
pursuant to Section 361, due to additional physical or sexual abuse.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(3).) Mother does not point to any factual basis upon which
this statutory provision might apply to her on the facts here.
We also reject mother’s argument that we should exercise our
discretion to consider the issue because it raises important questions of law.
This is not a case where the claims “present[] issues of public importance,
capable of repetition, yet tending to evade review.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 629, fn.3.) Nor do we find, independently considering the
relevant factors governing our exercise of discretion, that consideration of the
merits of the September 8, 2025 order is warranted here. (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 284–286.) Given later developments, we do not see any
substantial ongoing effect of the September 8, 2025 order. Neither mother
nor DCFS identifies any such ongoing effect. Mother will have the
opportunity to address the placement of Y.G. with father and the juvenile
court’s ultimate termination of jurisdiction via her separate appeal. Thus, we
decline to discretionarily review the dispositional order of removal.
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II. Substantial Evidence Supporting Jurisdiction
We turn to the remaining question: whether substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (a).
A child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300,
subdivision (a) if the child “suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the
child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (Id.) Nonaccidental generally means
a parent or guardian acted intentionally or willfully. (See In re R.T. (2017) 3
Cal.5th 622, 629.) When reviewing a juvenile court’s order assuming
jurisdiction under that subdivision, “‘we look to see if substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports [it]. [Citation.] In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that
issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’” (Id. at p.
633.)
Mother’s primary argument is that she did not knowingly or
intentionally direct any violence at Y.G.
There are diverging views regarding how close a child must be to
domestic violence between the parents to place the child at substantial risk of
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the parent within the
meaning of section 300, subdivision (a). Several courts, including Division
Eight of this District, have concluded that domestic violence while the child is
present at the scene is sufficient to meet this standard. These courts have
reasoned that the risk that a child could be physically injured by violence
intentionally directed at another parent is sufficient to place an incident of
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violence within the meaning of subdivision (a). (In re Miguel J. (2026) 122
Cal.App.5th 266, 280–286 (Miguel F.); In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
114, 121–122 (Nathan E.); see also In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th, 703,
720 (M.M.); In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598–601 (Giovanni
F.).) Our colleagues in Division Seven have taken a more restrictive view,
construing section 300, subdivision (a) as embracing domestic violence
between the parents only if those incidents “occur in the child’s immediate
presence.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 603 (Cole L.), italics
added.) In that case, the court cited M.M. as an example meeting this
threshold, because the minor was present for the incident, was being held by
the father during part of the altercation with the mother, and was “‘at their
feet’” for most of the incident. (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 603, citing
M.M., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) Mother argues that we should adopt
Cole L.’s more-stringent reading of section 300, subdivision (a).9
We need not resolve the apparent split in authority, because even
applying the standard set forth in Cole L., there is substantial evidence of
domestic violence that occurred in Y.G.’s immediate presence. Depending on
which account in the record is accurate, Y.G. was either sitting on the bed
and became upset because of the altercation, or was sleeping on a mattress
on the floor and was awoken. Mother and M.C. engaged in a physical
altercation in the bedroom within striking distance of Y.G. and ending with
M.C. bloodied and mother and Y.G. locked in the bedroom. Y.G. was thus “at
9 In connection with this argument, mother requests judicial notice of
legislative materials which she claims support her interpretation of section
300, subdivision (a). We deny the request because, as we explain herein,
substantial evidence supports the finding of jurisdiction even under mother’s
preferred interpretation. The material presented in mother’s request is
therefore not relevant to our decision.
12
[the] feet” of the violent couple when the violence occurred. (See M.M., supra,
240 Cal.App.4th at p. 706 [father threw mother onto the floor while child was
at their feet].) Under any standard, that is sufficient evidence to support the
juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a).
(Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 600 [struggle over car seat with
child in seat].)
Mother also argues that several of the cases affirming jurisdictional
findings under section 300, subdivision (a), such as Nathan E. and M.M., are
distinguishable because they involved more extreme violence. (See Nathan
E., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 124 [stabbing, pushing down stairs]; M.M.,
supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 706 [father choking mother and throwing her
into a piano, a table, and onto the floor].) But the severity of the violence at
issue in those cases does not demonstrate the absence of jurisdiction in this
case. The relevant inquiry here is whether Y.G. was at risk of serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon him, not whether other violence
would put him at greater risk.
Finally, mother urges us to adopt an interpretation of section 300,
subdivision (a) that is narrower than any existing judicial interpretation of
the provision, including the interpretation in Cole L. In mother’s view,
subdivision (a) should apply only when a child’s parent or guardian has the
specific intent to inflict violence on a child. For example, mother’s counsel
suggested at oral argument that if a parent shoots a gun intending to hit
another parent with the child standing nearby, misses the other parent, and
hits the child instead, the case would not fall within subdivision (a).
Subdivision (a) does not support mother’s interpretation. Under its plain
language, subdivision (a) requires only that there be a “substantial risk” of
“serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s
13
parent or guardian.” Put differently, subdivision (a) does not state that a
parent must intend to inflict violence upon a child to fall within its strictures.
Its language requires only that a parent or guardian commit violence
nonaccidentally (including against a domestic partner), and that the parent’s
violent action has a substantial risk of inflicting serious physical harm upon
the child. While courts have differed about the exact proximity to the child
that is required for an act to fall within subdivision (a), no court has adopted
anything like mother’s specific-intent rule. We decline to adopt such a rule
here.
Given the evidence here and drawing, as we must, “all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders” of the
juvenile court (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773), we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Y.G. was at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally
upon him. We therefore affirm the court’s finding of jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (a).
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order of September 8, 2025 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.
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