Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Werker v. West Coast Smiles CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA HERBERT WERKER, D086957 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020- 00038737-CU-BC-NC) v. WEST COAST SMILES et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed. Herbert Werker, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Scheppach Bauer and Thorey M. Bauer for Defendants and Respondents. Herbert Werker appeals the judgment entered against him in an employment action he filed against Jovan Plamenac, D.D.S. and Dr. Plamenac’s dental practice, West Coast Smiles. Because Werker has failed to provide this court with any cogent argument to support reversal or an adequate record to conduct a meaningful review of the judgment, we must affirm. BACKGROUND On October 13, 2020, Werker, who is self-represented, filed a civil complaint against Dr. Plamenac asserting a claim for breach of contract. On June 1, 2021, Werker filed a first amended complaint (FAC), which added West Coast Smiles, and Dr. Plamenac’s sister, Olivera, and wife, Mary, as defendants. The FAC also added claims for wrongful termination, retaliation in violation of Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5, intentional infliction of emotional distress, failure to pay minimum wage and overtime, failure to provide meal and rest breaks, waiting penalties, wrongful eviction, and loss of income. In the complaint, Werker asserted that Dr. Plamenac hired him as a caretaker for Olivera, who suffered from memory loss. Werker alleged that prior to this arrangement, in 2016, he had answered an ad for a roommate placed by Olivera and that he had lived with her for over a year when Werker convinced Olivera to sell her home. According to the FAC, in 2017, Werker and Olivera moved into Dr. Plamenac’s home and Dr. Plamenac hired Werker to care for Olivera in exchange for rent. Werker alleged that as time went on, Dr. Plamenac required him to do more work in the home and as a manager for Dr. Plamenac’s rental properties, but provided no additional compensation for this work. Werker alleged in September 2020, Dr. Plamenac gave Werker a letter stating he needed to move out of the home into the property’ garage, but Werker refused. The FAC alleged that two days later, Werker came home to find Dr. Plamenac had removed his belongings from the house. Werker alleged he 2 called the Sherriff’s Department and deputies responded to the home. Once there, the deputies served Werker with a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The TRO, attached as an exhibit to the FAC, accused Werker of elder abuse against Olivera and required Werker to move out of the home. According to the FAC, Werker was left homeless and moved into a shelter. In September 2021, Dr. Plamenac filed a motion to strike portions of the FAC under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which the trial court granted on December 13, 2021. The court’s order disposed of many of Werker’s claims, including breach of contract, wrongful termination, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful eviction, and loss of income. Werker appealed that ruling and this court affirmed the order granting Dr. Plamenac’s motion in 2023. (Werker v. West Coast Smiles et al. (June 21, 2023, D080165) [nonpub. opn.].) In February 2024, Werker dismissed Olivera and Mary without prejudice from the lawsuit. In September 2024, Dr. Plamenac filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Werker’s claim for discrimination, which the court granted. At the same time, West Coast Smiles successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Werker’s remaining causes of action. In May 2025, Dr. Plamenac brought a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the remaining claims against him. On August 8, 2025, the court granted summary adjudication of several claims, leaving only Werker’s claims for failure to pay minimum wages and waiting time penalties.1 1 On August 15, 2025, the trial court issued a minute order stating that after argument, it was confirming its tentative rulings denying Werker’s “Motion to Vacate Judgment” and “Motion for Peremptory Challenge.” No underlying pleadings to these motions are included in the appellate record. 3 The two surviving claims proceeded to a bench trial on September 15, 2025, and the court determined that Werker failed to meet his burden on either claim. On September 30, 2025, the court entered judgment against Werker and in favor of Dr. Plamenac and West Coast Smiles, including an award of attorney fees and costs owed to the defendants as result of their successful motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. On October 6, 2025, Werker filed a notice of appeal indicating he was challenging the judgment and the court’s August 15, 2025 denial of his “Motion to Vacate Judgments ” and “Motion for Peremptory Challenge.” DISCUSSION It is exceedingly difficult to decipher the basis for Werker’s appeal or the relief he is seeking. His briefs are garbled, unclear, and lacking logical argument. His opening brief begins with statements suggesting he was the victim of “Labor Trafficking,” and that the trial court held an improper meeting with defense counsel outside of his presence. In the next section, “Appeal Part 1,” Werker claims the TRO was “false,” that the defendants bribed the police to prevent him from obtaining a police report, that the various trial judges assigned to the case were protecting one another, that this court’s opinion affirming the anti-SLAPP order is “against Moral and Ethics,” and that the sheriff’s deputies involved in serving the TRO were terminated by the “Internal Affairs” department. The next section, “Appeal Part 2,” asserts that the judges assigned to the case in the trial court and the justices of this court are prejudiced against him and that a judge “wanted [Werker] to pay for the defendant’s license to run for Mass-Shooting, to get killed by him, as I am on his list for his Slavery to me for 3.5 years, the Bribery to Police Investigation Office, the Murder- Plot.” Werker then sets forth a “Chronology of committed Labor Trafficking,” 4 which presents a convoluted timeline of his relationship with Dr. Plamenac and Olivera, the work that Werker alleges he provided to the family, and confusing statements about fraud and various conspiracies. A subsequent section of the opening brief is titled “Table [o]f Authorities” and states, “There are no cases included to compare as a ‘First Impression’ in relation to his late WWII Reparation efforts not to pay me a dime for my several services for 3.5 years!” Werker identifies “CCP Paragraph 473” and In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92 and People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432 to “Use for: Standard of review/abuse of discretion” and People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466 to “Use for: due process, judicial bias, failure to consider evidence, Rule 8.204 compliance, and relief from judgment.” He provides no explanation connecting these authorities to any particular appellate issue. In the conclusion section of the opening brief, Werker asserts that he was defrauded by Dr. Plamenac and the trial court was biased against him, which should have been disqualifying. Werker also states the trial court only considered the defendant’s statements and did not consider his evidence, and that he asked the trial court to transfer his claims to the criminal court. This section of the brief is extremely convoluted. It is filled with confusing accusations of bias and concludes by stating Werker is “[a]sking respectfully to start the case ‘New from the Beginning’ with a ‘new trial’ To declare the case officially as Labor Trafficking.” Werker provides no citations to the record in any of his briefing. Although self-represented, we may not excuse Werker from following the rules of appellate procedure. (See Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31 [“ ‘as is the case with attorneys, [self-represented] litigants must follow correct rules of procedure’ ”].) A self-represented party “ ‘is to be treated like 5 any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 (Nwosu).) Critically, for most appellate issues, a trial court’s judgment or order is presumed correct and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error on appeal. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”]; accord Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) To make this showing, the appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to facts in the record and, if possible, legal authority to support the claim of error. (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457; see Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”]; id., (a)(1)(B) [briefs must state each “point under a separate heading or subheading … and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].) In addition, the appellant’s factual summary must be limited to “significant facts … in the record” (rule 8.204(a)(2)(C); CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537, 539, fn. 1 [“it is well established that a reviewing court may not give any consideration to alleged facts that are outside of the record on appeal”]), and must include “ ‘ “all the material evidence on the point and not merely [his or her] own evidence.” ’ ” (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.) Further, appellants must present an “adequate record” for review. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574‒575; see LA Investments, LLC v. 2 All subsequent rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 6 Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061 [“Every brief must support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears. (… [R]ule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error. If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, the argument will be deemed waived.”].) Rule 8.122(b) sets out the required contents of an appellant’s appendix or clerk’s transcript. Among other requirements, it “must” include “[a]ny … document filed … in the case in superior court” pertaining to the issues on appeal (rule 8.122(b)(3)(A)); and “[a]ny exhibit admitted in evidence, refused, or lodged” (id., (b)(3)(B)). In light of these standards, we must conclude that Werker has forfeited his appellate contentions and provided us with no basis to reverse the trial court’s rulings. He does not make clear what claims he is attempting to assert or on what basis the judgment or the court’s August 15, 2025 orders should be reversed. Instead, Werker makes only unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, bias, and wrongdoing. These assertions do not provide us with any understanding of Werker’s claims or how the trial court erred in its ruling against him. It is not this court’s role to develop arguments for an appellant, even a self-represented litigant like Werker. (See Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600, disapproved on another ground in Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1011 [“it is not this court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness”].) Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment and the challenged orders. 7 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded the costs of appeal. MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: DO, J. AMIN, J. 8