Allen v. Lewis-Grenz CA4/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketG064741
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/13/26 Allen v. Lewis-Grenz CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ROBERT ALLEN, as Trustee, etc.,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and G064741
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-
v. 00991613)
KEVIN LEWIS-GRENZ et al., OPINION
Defendants, Cross-complainants
and Appellants;
ROBERT ALLEN,
Cross-defendant and
Respondent.
Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed.
Shane, DiGiuseppe & Rodgers, Stephen A. DiGiuseppe for
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant and for Cross-defendant and
Respondent.
Law Office of Nicole C. Pearson, Nicole C. Pearson and Jessica R.
Barsotti for Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Starting in 2014, Robert Allen, as trustee of the 1989 Allen
Family Revocable Trust (the trust), leased a house (the property) to Kevin
Lewis-Grenz and Julie Lewis-Grenz. Following a dispute regarding the
Grenzes’ right of first refusal to purchase the property, the Grenzes notified
Allen they would move out of the property in May 2017 although their most
recent lease term did not expire until December 2017.
Allen sued the Grenzes for breach of contract and to recover for
property damage allegedly caused by the Grenzes. The Grenzes filed a cross-
complaint against Allen, as trustee and as an individual, asserting claims
primarily related to Allen’s failure to return their security deposit, pursuit of
various damage claims against them, and efforts to renegotiate the Grenzes’
right of first refusal. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment
in favor of the Grenzes on the complaint and in favor of the trust and Allen
on the cross-complaint. Allen, as trustee, and the Grenzes each appealed.
For the reasons we explain, we reject the contentions raised by
the parties in their respective appeals and affirm.
FACTS1
Before Allen began renting the property to the Grenzes in
January 2014, “[t]he [p]roperty had never been previously rented and was
generally in satisfactory shape at the beginning of the lease term. The
property had not been remodeled much over the many years, was ‘dated’, and
needed some work–e.g., had old and stained pink and green carpet and old
wallpaper, plumbing issues, a lot of dry rot, leaking windows, and termite
1 The quoted material in this section is taken from the trial
court’s written decision following the bench trial.
2
damage. The property was built in the 1960s, a second level was added in the
1980s, and an additional dining room space was added in the 1990s. The
property had been the primary full-time residence for . . . Allen’s parents
between about 1996 to 2011, when the parents experienced health issues and
moved out. . . . Allen, a trained plumber, took care of the property’s plumbing
and hired an HVAC person at one time thereafter to make sure the heating
system was functioning properly. . . . Allen’s brother squatted in the house for
less than a year and the property was thereafter cleaned and put up for rent.
“[Allen and the Grenzes] utilized a standard residential lease or
month-to-month rental agreement form from the California Association of
Realtors. The document contains numerous errors (including misspelling [the
Grenzes]’ names and incorrect reference date for the addendum) but it is
undisputed that [the Grenzes] agreed to pay $5,000.00 per month and provide
a $5,000.00 security deposit. Other terms included ‘no pets’, an integration
clause, and a general provision prohibiting any repairs, alterations, or
improvements to the property without the landlord’s prior written consent.
“Also, [the Grenzes] were given a right of first refusal via, an
attached written addendum. [The Grenzes] were interested in eventually
purchasing the property but were told that the property would not be sold
until both of . . . Allen’s elderly parents passed away. [Allen] was not ready to
sell at the time for tax reasons related to . . . Allen’s parents.
“Within months after moving in, [the Grenzes] made numerous
modifications to the property. Clear and colored pictures of the modifications
were provided to [Allen]. [The Grenzes] spent between $20,000 to $25,000 in
property improvements, including about $9,000 to $10,000 for
painting. . . . Allen never visited the property at this time but the parties’
joint realtor and nearby neighbor Ann Jochim did check in with [the Grenzes]
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and was aware of the modifications. Ms. Jochim was [Allen’s] ‘eyes and ears’,
as . . . Allen resided about two hours away in another County.
“[Allen] concedes authorizing some modifications (e.g., taking
wallpaper down and painting walls and ceilings white, replacing some carpet
with hard wood flooring, removing paneling in one of the bedrooms, removing
small shelving) but not others (e.g., putting in recessed lighting, taking out
molding). In contrast, [the Grenzes] insist that authorization was provided
for all modifications they made. Such is consistent with [the Grenzes’]
proffered evidence that they didn’t proceed with certain proposed
modifications for which [Allen] declined to authorize. For example, [the
Grenzes] wanted to take a desk out of the office but didn’t when [Allen] would
not give them permission for such. Also, [Allen] rejected [the Grenzes’]
request to paint a fireplace but did agree that [the Grenzes] could remove a
brown hutch. Further, [the Grenzes] did not remove cabinetry in the kitchen
area because [Allen] did not give permission for the removal.
“[A.] The 2014, 2015[,] and 2016 Lease Agreements
“Before the expiration of the first one-year lease (for 2014), the
parties entered into another one-year lease to cover all of 2015. The terms
were essentially the same. Before the expiration of that second one-year lease
(for 2015), the parties entered into another one-year lease, to cover all of
2016. The terms again were essentially the same—including the monthly
rent amount of $5,000.00 and an attached written addendum that provides
[the Grenzes] with a right of first refusal to purchase the property.
“[B.] The 2017 Lease Agreement
“Before the expiration of the 2016 lease, both sides signed
another one-year lease agreement, to cover all of 2017. This time, the 2017
agreement did not attach another addendum stating that [the Grenzes] had a
4
right of first refusal to purchase the property. The 2017 agreement, however,
did incorporate by reference the prior lease addendum between the parties
regarding a right of first refusal. While [the Grenzes] signed a new addendum
for the right of first refusal for the 2017 agreement, [Allen] did not sign the
same.
“Despite signing the 2017 lease agreement, [Allen] sought a more
comprehensive agreement for the right of first refusal than what was
previously agreed to. [Allen’s] attorney thereafter prepared a proposed
comprehensive version. Among other things, the proposal would have
required [the Grenzes] to pay a $10,000.00 fee for the right of first refusal
and to pay all closing costs if [the Grenzes] purchased the [p]roperty. [The
Grenzes] did not agree to the addendum prepared by [Allen]’s attorney.”
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“After it appeared that the parties could not agree to terms to
modify the right of first refusal previously agreed to, [the Grenzes] opened
escrow on another nearby property, gave [Allen] notice via e[-]mail on April 5,
2017[,] that [the Grenzes] would be vacating the property ‘once escrow
close[d] in 30 days’, and vacated the property they had been leasing sometime
in late May of 2017.” (Underscoring and some capitalization omitted & italics
added.)
“It was undisputed that [the Grenzes] paid rent for the entire
month of May.” That month, Allen executed a lease with Paige and Jay
Kunkle (collectively, the Kunkles) for a term originally set to begin on June 1,
2017, but that date was continued by addendum to July 1, 2017.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2018, Allen, as trustee of the trust, filed a complaint
against the Grenzes asserting claims for breach of lease and “negligence-
5
property damage.” In July 2018, the Grenzes filed a cross-complaint against,
inter alia, Allen, in both his capacity as trustee and as an individual.2 The
Grenzes’ second amended cross-complaint, which is their operative cross-
complaint, asserted claims for breach of written contract, violation of Civil
Code section 1941 et seq.,3 violation of section 1950.5 et seq., negligence,
negligence per se, intentional misrepresentation, concealment, negligent
misrepresentation, violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200
et seq., equitable indemnity, apportionment, contribution, and declaratory
relief.
Following a four-day bench trial, the trial court issued its
decision in which the court found in favor of the Grenzes on the trust’s
complaint against them, and in favor of the trust and Allen on the Grenzes’
cross-complaint against them. Judgment awarding no recovery to any party
was entered accordingly. Allen, as trustee, and the Grenz’s appealed from the
judgment, respectively.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWS THE PARTIES AGREED TO THE 2017 LEASE
In their cross-appellant’s brief, the Grenzes challenge the trial
court’s finding the parties ever agreed to the 2017 lease agreement which the
court found they breached. Following a completed bench trial, we review
questions of fact decided by the trial court for substantial evidence. (Orange
2 The Grenzes also named several other cross-defendants in their
cross-complaint who all were dismissed by the time of trial and are not
parties in this appeal.
3 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless
otherwise specified.
6
County Water Dist. v. MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
229, 239.)
“‘Under the substantial evidence standard of review, “we must
consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in
support of the [findings]. [Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts
and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. . . . Even
in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more
different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is
without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the
trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of
a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. . . . [Citations.]” [Citation.]
To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance,
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citations.] However,
substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] “The
ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling
in question in light of the whole record.”’” (65283 Two Bunch Palms Building
LLC v. Coastal Harvest II, LLC (2023) 91 CalApp.5th 162, 168.) “‘“‘To the
extent the trial court drew conclusions of law based upon its findings of fact,
we review those conclusions of law de novo.’”’” (Ibid.)
In its decision, the trial court found “there was a valid,
enforceable, lease for one year that was set to terminate on its own terms on
December 31, 2017” which “contained the earlier right of first refusal.”4 The
trial court’s finding was supported by the copy of the 2017 lease agreement
4 We note the 2017 lease agreement provided for a term short of
the entire calendar year, beginning January 15, 2017 and ending December
31, 2017.
7
admittedly signed by all parties and admitted into evidence. As stipulated by
the parties, that agreement expressly incorporated the addendum of the
parties’ prior lease agreements providing the Grenzes the right of first refusal
to purchase the property. The trial court acknowledged Allen’s efforts to
renegotiate the right of first refusal provision after the lease agreement had
been signed by all parties, and noted that even though those efforts were
unsuccessful, no party ever rescinded the 2017 lease agreement.
Significantly, there was no dispute between the parties regarding the right of
first refusal provision at the time the 2017 lease agreement was signed by
them.
The Grenzes argue “substantial and undisputed evidence shows
that Allen rescinded and left the essential right of first refusal element for
future agreement by refusing to sign it while executing only the lease
portion” which “conduct prevented formation of the complete agreement that
the Grenzes expected.” (Capitalization omitted.) The Grenzes, however,
misapprehend the governing standard of review. As discussed ante, we
review whether substantial evidence supports the judgment, not whether
substantial evidence might support a different outcome.
In any event, as discussed ante, substantial evidence shows the
parties reached a complete agreement which included the incorporation by
reference of the prior agreements’ addenda regarding the Grenzes’ right of
first refusal, when they all signed the 2017 lease agreement. While the record
shows the Grenzes also signed a new addendum, essentially reiterating the
same right of first refusal provision contained in the addenda of the prior
agreements, which Allen refused to sign, and then Allen proposed an entirely
new right of first refusal agreement which the Grenzes refused to sign, such
efforts to modify the 2017 lease agreement do not show an agreement was
8
never reached in the first place or that it was rescinded. Allen’s undisclosed
intent, if any, at the time of executing the 2017 lease agreement is not
relevant. (See Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v.
Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956 [under
California’s objective approach, “‘[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by
the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the
parties, that controls interpretation’”].)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ALLOWING THE TRUST TO
RETAIN THE SECURITY DEPOSIT
In its decision, the trial court noted the 2017 lease agreement
provided that in the event of early termination, the Grenzes would be
responsible for, inter alia, lost rent. The court also found the Grenzes, in light
of their early termination of the 2017 lease agreement, were responsible for
lost rent for the month of June. The court further found “[Allen, as trustee,]
properly used the [Grenzes’] security deposit of $5,000.00 to cover the
$5,000.00 owing for the month of June.”
On cross-appeal, the Grenzes argue: “Even if a valid year-long
lease had been formed,” which finding we confirmed ante was supported by
substantial evidence, the trial court erred by allowing Allen, as trustee, “to
retain the security deposit due to Allen’s failure to comply with . . . section
1950.5, and his bad acts.” Their argument continues: “The law requires
forfeiture of security deposits when landlords fail to comply with statutory
procedures, and Allen’s violations triggered these forfeiture provisions as a
matter of law.”
Former section 1950.5 was added in 1977 and amended several
times before being repealed in July 2024 by its own provision. Section 1950.5
9
was again added effective January 1, 2024, operative July 1, 2024. (Assem.
Bill No. 12 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2023, ch. 733 § 2.) Our references to
section 1950.5 in this opinion are to the version in effect in 2017.
Section 1950.5, subdivision (f), “was enacted to ensure the speedy
return of security deposits on the termination of tenancy and to prevent the
improper retention of such deposits.” (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9
Cal.4th 738, 746.) Section 1950.5 by its own terms is limited to the
disposition of security deposits. (See § 1950.5, subd. (a) [“This section applies
to security for a rental agreement for residential property that is used as the
dwelling of the tenant”].) Among other things, the statute limits the types of
claims a landlord may assert when seeking to levy on a security deposit and
sets forth inspection and other procedures governing entitlement to the
security deposit when the tenancy terminates. (§ 1950.5, subds. (e)-(i).) A
landlord who retains a security deposit in bad faith may be subject to
statutory damages of up to twice the amount of the security deposit.
(§ 1950.5, subd. (l).)
In its decision, the trial court found Allen failed to comply with
various provisions of section 1950.5. Specifically, the court found Allen “did
not provide a writing notifying [the Grenzes] of their right to an initial
inspection or provide a proper initial inspection” in violation of
subdivision (f)(1) of section 1950.5. The court also found Allen did not give the
Grenzes the required pre-move out itemized statement in violation of section
1950.5, subdivision (f)(2) and thus deprived them of the opportunity to
remedy any deficiency (see § 1950.5, subd. (f)(3)), or give them the post-move
10
out itemized statement (accompanied by copies of bills, invoices, and/or
receipts) in violation of subdivision (g) of section 1950.5.5
The trial court did not find Allen’s failure to comply with section
1950.5 and his retention of the security deposit on behalf of the trust was in
bad faith. The court explained in its decision: “Under the circumstances here,
especially as it was unclear when [the Grenzes] would be moving out, the
court finds that [Allen, as trustee,] did not act in bad faith. (See . . . § 1950.5[,
subd.] (l) [‘The court may award damages for bad faith whenever the facts
warrant that award . . . ’]; see also, Granberry v. Islay Investments[, supra,] 9
Cal.4th [at p.] 741 [a landlord who in good faith fails to comply with the
requirements of this statute may nevertheless recover damages for unpaid
rent, repairs, and cleaning in a subsequent judicial proceeding].)”
Substantial evidence shows the trust was entitled to recover
$5,000 for lost rent for the month of June 2017 following the Grenzes early
move out in breach of the 2017 lease agreement. Allen’s retention of the
$5,000 security deposit on behalf of the trust to cover loss in that exact
amount, therefore, was not in bad faith. We find no error.
5 The trial court acknowledged Allen proffered a letter dated
June 16, 2017, that was sent to the Grenzes by certified registered mail
instead of by regular first-class mail, postage prepaid or via personal delivery
prescribed by statute. The court noted the manner of delivery chosen by Allen
required the Grenzes to either sign upon delivery or pick up the letter at the
post office. The court found no competent evidence showed the Grenzes
refused to sign for the letter and it was undisputed they did not receive it in
June of 2017. Instead, the letter was returned to Allen after the Grenzes did
not pick it up at the post office.
11
III.
THE JUDGMENT CONFORMS TO THE COURT’S DECISION ON THE COMPLAINT
In his opening brief, Allen, as trustee, argues the judgment must
be reversed on the complaint because it does not conform to the trial court’s
decision following trial. Specifically, he argues the trial court stated in its
decision it found the Grenzes had breached the 2017 lease agreement and yet
judgment was entered in the Grenzes’ favor on the complaint.
“[T]he elements . . . for breach of contract are (1) the existence of
the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance,
(3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821; see Munoz v.
MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648, 662 [affirming right to sue for breach
of contract based on alleged breach of lease].) Here, although the trial court
found the Grenzes breached the 2017 lease agreement, their breach only
resulted in the loss of one month’s rent totaling $5,000. As Allen had already
retained the security deposit in the amount of $5,000, the trust did not
sustain any damages as a result of the breach.
The trial court therefore did not err by concluding Allen failed to
prevail on his breach of contract claim and entering judgment in the Grenzes’
favor accordingly.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING ALLEN’S CLAIM FOR “PAINTING
COSTS NECESSARY TO REMEDY THE PREMISES FOR RE-RENTAL”
In his opening brief, Allen argues the trial court erred by denying
the trust an award of damages for painting costs pursuant to paragraph 30 of
the 2017 lease agreement. Paragraph 30 of that agreement provides in
relevant part: “BREACH OF CONTRACT; EARLY TERMINATION: In
12
addition to any obligations established by paragraph 29, in the event of
termination by Tenant prior to completion of the original term of the
Agreement, Tenant shall also be responsible for . . . painting costs necessary
to ready Premises for re-rental.” (Italics added & boldface omitted.)
Allen argues the court should have awarded him the amount of
$17,600 for what the trust spent having the entire interior of the house
painted before the Kunkles moved in. Substantial evidence, however,
supports the trial court’s finding those painting costs were not necessary to
ready the property for re-rental.
Substantial evidence shows at the beginning of their tenancy, the
Grenzes paid for the house to be professionally painted. Julie Grenz testified
that in 2014, and in the hope of eventually purchasing the property, she and
her husband, with Allen’s permission, spent about $25,000 to $30,000 in
making repairs and improvements to the property.6 Those repairs and
improvements included taking down wallpaper, removing shelves, installing
can lighting, replacing flooring, and having the house professionally painted.
They did not charge Allen for their repairs and improvements because they
had leased the property “as is.”
Substantial evidence shows new tenants for the property were
quickly found. Shortly after the Grenzes communicated in March or April
2017 to realtor Ann Jochim that they had purchased a home and would be
moving out of the property that May, Jochim told them to send an e-mail
giving written notice so the property could be put on the market right away
and eliminate time between their moving out and new tenants moving in.
Jochim mentioned that there was “not a lot of inventory” so the property
6 We refer to Julie and Kevin Grenz and Jay and Paige Kunkle
individually by their first names for clarity; we intend no disrespect.
13
could be leased at a higher price than what the Grenzes had paid “because of
all the upgrades [they] did” at the property. The Grenzes gave written notice
in early April 2017 confirming they would no longer be leasing the property
in 30 days.
Shortly thereafter, Allen and Jochim identified the Kunkles as
the new tenants. Although the lease would not be signed by Jay until the first
week of May (it was dated May 9, 2017, with an original move in date of June
1, 2017), on April 26, 2017, Julie started having conversations with Paige,
who was an interior designer, about improvements and work Paige wanted to
do at the property.
On April 27, 2017, after Julie told Jochim they were set to close
on their new house, and Jochim confirmed the Grenzes would need to pay
rent for May because the Kunkles could not move in until June 1, Julie
asked, “Is [Allen] planning to do anything to the house to get it ready for new
tenants?” Jochim responded they had not gotten that far and that she just
knew she had it rented. She added the Kunkles “want[ed] to paint and put
wood and miscellaneous things on their own.”
Although at some point, Allen decided to paint the entire interior
of the property white, Paige planned to have certain walls painted specific
colors. In addition, Paige wanted certain areas of the house painted a color
white that was different from the white color the Grenzes had used. Allen
agreed the Kunkles could paint the interior whatever color they wanted but
at their own expense. An addendum to the lease signed by Jay and Allen
confirmed “[p]ainting and cosmetic items can be done by the tenant.” After
Paige brought some paint over to the property, the Grenzes put paint
swatches on the wall for her.
14
In addition, Julie testified that before the Grenzes turned in their
keys to the property, they painted the property to prepare it for the Kunkles.
In one text message, she reported they had “[s]pent all weekend smoothing
walls and sanding and painting.” She testified they did the typical patch and
paint after patching holes in the walls caused by hanging pictures and
touching up scuffs.
Although Allen testified he thought the painting at the property
“[was] so badly done” that “[i]t all needed to be redone,” Julie testified that
the property was in perfect condition by the date the Kunkles were originally
scheduled to move in. In addition, Julie testified photos Allen proffered at
trial showing problems with certain walls of the property did not reflect how
the property looked when the Grenzes moved out of the property.
As discussed ante, in reviewing the judgment for substantial
evidence, we do not weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence as that is the
province of the trier of fact. In addition, “we defer to the trial court’s
assessments of credibility.” (McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399,
415.) Here, substantial evidence, particularly in the form of Julie’s trial
testimony showing their painting efforts and the Kunkles’ plan to paint the
property themselves after moving in, supported the trial court’s denial of
Allen’s request for damages in the form of painting costs based on the finding
such costs were not necessarily incurred within the meaning of the parties’
2017 lease agreement.
In his opening brief, Allen argues specific findings in the court’s
written decision supporting its denial of damages for painting costs are
unsupported by substantial evidence. In its written decision, the trial court
stated: “Re necessary painting costs: The court finds that [Allen, as trustee,]
failed to show that painting was ‘necessary to ready the [p]remises for re-
15
rental,’ as required by the terms of the lease agreement. The subsequent
tenants for the [p]roperty (i.e., [the Kunkles]) agreed to the lease and moved
in before any painting by [Allen, as trustee,] and the new tenants were
ultimately responsible for painting the [p]roperty.” He argues insufficient
evidence supports the findings the Kunkles moved into the property before
any painting by Allen had occurred and that the Kunkles were ultimately
responsible for painting the property.
We agree with Allen the record shows Allen had arranged for
painting at the property before the Kunkles moved in. The court’s ultimate
finding Allen’s painting costs were not necessary, however, was not
dependent on the timing of the painting of the property vis-a-vis the Kunkles’
move in date.
Significantly, Allen, does not cite any evidence in support of his
contentions the Kunkles insisted that he paint the interior of the property at
his cost as a condition of their signing the lease agreement with him or that
he otherwise was required to paint the interior of the property. He also does
not cite evidence supporting any suggestion he would have been unable to
lease the property to anyone else unless he first painted its interior.
Instead, Allen testified he proceeded with painting the property’s
entire interior while under the impression he had a right to paint the
property by virtue of the Grenzes’ act of terminating the lease early. Indeed
in the opening brief, Allen argues: “[U]nder the [l]ease, [Allen] had the right
to paint regardless of the condition of paint to get the property ready for re-
renting.”
In addition, in light of the provision in the Kunkles’ lease
addendum authorizing them to paint the property at their expense, the
16
court’s finding the Kunkles were ultimately responsible for painting the
property is supported by the evidence. We find no error.
V.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF DAMAGES
FOR NEGLIGENT PROPERTY DAMAGE
In his complaint, Allen, as trustee, asserted a claim for
negligence against the Grenzes. Allen testified repairing the damage the
Grenzes caused to the property cost $46,387.80. “The elements of a cause of
action for negligence are: the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he
[or she] breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal
cause of the resulting injury.’” (Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 278.)
In its written decision, the trial court rejected the negligence
claim to the extent it sought damages arising from modifications made by the
Grenzes at the property, stating in its decision as follows: “[Allen as trustee]
also seeks damages for modifications made by [the Grenzes] during their
tenancy. The court finds [Allen as trustee] failed to show damages for any
modification and that [Allen as trustee] authorized the modifications made to
the [p]roperty after entering into the lease agreement.”
The trial court also rejected the negligence claim to the extent it
sought an award of damages for repairs to the property, stating: “[Allen] also
seeks damages for repairing and cleaning[7] the [p]roperty after [the Grenzes]
vacated the [p]roperty. The court finds that [Allen as trustee] failed to show
that [the Grenzes] caused the need for any repairs or cleaning after they
vacated the [p]roperty. And although it was undisputed that [the Grenzes]
7 In his opening brief, Allen confirms he did not seek
reimbursement for cleaning the property after the Grenzes moved out.
17
had a dog despite the ‘no pets’ provision in the lease, [Allen as trustee] failed
to show that the dog caused any damages to the [p]roperty, as opposed to
being caused by ordinary wear and tear. Further, the court notes that repairs
or cleaning would have resulted in the Kunkles moving in earlier and a
smaller deduction to the security deposit for the month of June. [¶]
Accordingly, the court finds that [the Grenzes] do not owe [Allen as trustee]
anything on the [c]omplaint.” (Italics added.)
In his opening brief, Allen simply summarizes the evidence he
presented at trial to support his damages claims. He does not address the
court’s finding he failed to show the alleged property damages were caused by
the Grenzes except to argue that, because he observed the damages after
their tenancy, they must have been caused by the Grenzes.
When, as is the case here, the trier of fact has concluded the
party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party
appeals, “‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment. . . . [¶] Thus, where the issue on
appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.”’” (Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream,
Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838; see Patricia A.
Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258,
270; In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 201 [where party fails to meet its
burden on an issue in the trial court, “the inquiry on appeal is whether the
weight and character of the evidence . . . was such that the [trial] court could
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not reasonably reject it”]; Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 319, 333; Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
972, 978–979.)
We acknowledge Allen presented extensive photographic
evidence of damage to the property he alleges was caused by the Grenzes. We
cannot conclude, however, that the weight and character of the evidence
presented at trial compelled the court to find the Grenzes caused that
damage. We therefore find no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interest of justice, no party shall
recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
SCOTT, J.
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