Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic LLC CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA GLENN KIRKEBY et al., D086743 Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017- 00032731-CU-BT-NC) v. THE CROSBY CLINIC LLC, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an amended judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H. Maas, III, Judge. Affirmed. Decker Law, James Decker, Griffin Schindler and Chris Jones for Defendant and Appellant. Law Offices of Robert A. Ball, Robert A. Ball and John M. Donnelly for Plaintiffs and Respondents. In the fourth appeal in this matter, The Crosby Clinic, LLC (Crosby Clinic or Clinic) seeks to shield assets from Glenn and Anastasia Kirkeby, judgment creditors and former business partners of the Clinic’s alter ego, defendant Larry Burns. In this latest appeal, the Crosby Clinic challenges the trial court’s order granting the Kirkebys’ motion to amend the judgment to add the Crosby Clinic as a judgment debtor. Specifically, the Clinic argues Code of Civil Procedure section 580 barred the trial court from awarding damages against it because of its earlier default and because the complaint did not specify the amount of damages sought by the Kirkebys.1 The Clinic also contends the trial court erred by finding that its participation in the litigation was sufficient to support the court’s decision to add it as a judgment debtor. As we shall explain, we reject these arguments and affirm the amended judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. Initial Proceedings The Kirkebys first filed suit against Burns and various entities they alleged were under his control in September 2017. The lawsuit was also filed derivatively on behalf of MHCD, LLC, an entity jointly owned by the Kirkebys and Burns. Thereafter, Burns filed a demurrer to the complaint and sought to limit the Kirkebys’ discovery requests. Before the demurrer was resolved, in January 2018, the Kirkebys filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Burns and the entities under his control, including the Crosby Clinic. The FAC alleged the Kirkebys started a drug and alcohol 1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Additional facts concerning the underlying dispute are set forth in our three prior opinions in this matter. (See Kirkeby v. Kahn (Sept. 17, 2024, D082333) [nonpub. opn.] (Kirkeby I), Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic, LLC (January 13, 2025, D083640 [nonpub. opn.] (Kirkeby II), and Kirkeby v. Kahn (June 9, 2025, D083388 [nonpub. opn.].) 2 abuse rehabilitation facility in 2002 shortly after meeting Burns, and that Burns claimed to be a licensed attorney and experienced business manager, who could help them operate the business. The FAC alleged that, unbeknownst to the Kirkebys, Burns misappropriated funds, business opportunities, and real estate (including the assets underlying this appeal) through his management of the rehabilitation center, known as the Crosby Center. In 2014, the Kirkebys discovered Burns was embezzling the business’s assets and contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation.3 The FAC also alleged Burns and the various entities named in the complaint, including the Crosby Clinic, were each other’s alter egos.4 The FAC asserted, there “is such a unity of interest and control between and among the Defendants, and each other, and Burns that their separate identities have ceased to exist, or never did exist” and that to “treat Burns and each entity Defendant (excepting the nominal Defendant, MHCD) as separate entities would perpetuate a fraud or result in gross injustice.” Burns and the entity defendants filed a demurrer to the FAC, which the trial court overruled. Burns and the Crosby Center filed separate answers on April 10, 2018. 3 In their appellate brief, the Kirkebys assert that Burns is facing felony criminal charges in a case pending in San Diego Superior Court. 4 The complaint named as the other entity defendants: The Crosby Clinic, LLC; Interlawus, LLC; AAE Alcohol Rehab Service Center; AAE Crosby Center; AAE Women Eating Disorder Center; Dream Catcher Detox Center, Inc.; KBY Properties, LLC; Crosby Recovery Foundation; AAA National Credit Reporting, Corp.; Internet Creative Marketing, Inc.; Stonegate Investment Group, LLC; Applied Psychology Systems, LLC; The Neuroscience Institute; and L Burns Research Institute. 3 In October 2019, MHCD filed a cross-complaint, which alleged similar claims against Burns, his then-wife Anne Kahn, and the same entities controlled by Burns named in the FAC. In addition, the complaint contained a cause of action for quiet title, asserting that Burns and the entities he controlled concealed, misappropriated, and diverted MHCD’s assets, resulting in the defendants wrongfully obtaining title to two properties in Escondido, one located on Camino De Las Lomas (Camino Property) and one located on Circle R Way (Circle R Property). MHCD sought adjudication of its ownership rights in the properties, and to quiet title in the two properties in its favor. MHCD also filed notices of pendency of action for the properties on October 24, 2019, with the San Diego County Recorder. The next day, October 25, 2019, the trial court struck the answers to the FAC of many of the entity defendants, including the Crosby Clinic, for failure to retain counsel. The court entered defaults against the entities the same day. In December 2019, MHCD, Burns, several of the named entities controlled by Burns, and Kahn entered stipulations for each property that enjoined transfer of the properties. Under the stipulations, the parties “agree[d] not to, and [were] enjoined from, encumbering, impairing, selling, transferring, conveying, or otherwise assigning the real estate and improvements ... during the pendency of this lawsuit.” In addition, the stipulations permitted the Crosby Clinic and NSI to seek refinancing of the Circle R Property, which faced foreclosure. MHCD agreed to dismiss its quiet title claim without prejudice and release the notices of pendency filed for each property to allow for the refinancing of the Circle R Property using the 4 Camino Property as collateral. The stipulations were signed into orders by the trial court on December 17, 2019.5 In November 2020, despite the stipulated injunction orders precluding transfer or encumbrance of the properties, Burns encumbered the Camino Property with a deed of trust in the amount of $200,000. A little over a month later, on December 14, 2020, Burns conveyed title in the Camino Property from the Crosby Clinic to “Larry Burns Trustee of the Xanadau Dominican Irrevocable Trust – 2020” and conveyed title in the Circle R Property from NSI, another entity defendant controlled by Burns, to “Larry Burns Trustee of the Xanadau Dominican Irrevocable Trust – 2020.” This prompted the Kirkebys to record the stipulated injunction orders on the Camino and Circle R Properties with the county recorder on March 1, 2021. On November 3, 2021, the Kirkebys filed an application for an order to show cause (OSC) asserting Burns had violated the court’s stipulated injunction orders by transferring and encumbering the Camino Property and transferring the Circle R Property. After issuing the OSC, the court found Burns in contempt for violating the stipulated orders. On January 14, 2022, the court issued an order directing Burns to remove the encumbrance on the Camino Property and to reconvey the property back to the Crosby Clinic. B. Sanctions Against Burns & Additional Injunction Violations After Burns failed to reconvey the Camino Property back to the Crosby Clinic, on March 3, 2022, the Kirkebys and MHCD jointly moved for terminating sanctions against Burns based on his violations of the stipulated 5 In January 2020, Burns and the entity defendants filed a demurrer to MHCD’s cross-complaint. The court overruled the demurrer, and Burns and the other defendants answered the cross-complaint in March 2020. 5 orders related to the two properties, and his failure to respond to their discovery requests. On May 2, 2022, the trial court granted the motions, issuing terminating sanctions against Burns “based on his disobedience of the court’s 1/14/22 order as to … reconveyance of the property” and Burns’s “repeated violations of orders.” The court struck Burns’s answers to the FAC and MHCD’s cross-complaint, deemed all matters alleged in the FAC and cross-complaint admitted, and entered defaults against Burns and in favor of the Kirkebys and MHCD. In addition, the court struck the answers of the entity defendants, including the Crosby Clinic, to MHCD’s cross-complaint because those entities had failed to retain counsel. The court also deemed admitted the allegations against the entity defendants. On September 26, 2022, the Kirkebys and MHCD dismissed Kahn from the underlying proceedings without prejudice. Two days later, on September 28, 2022, a judgment of dissolution was entered in the divorce proceedings between Kahn and Burns (Burns v. Kahn, Case No. 20FL010428N). The judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA), which provided that title in the Camino and Circle R Properties would be transferred from the Crosby Clinic and NSI (which the judgment described as entities created and maintained by Burns) to Kahn free and clear of any interest of Burns, the Crosby Clinic, or NSI. The document stated the transfers are “[s]ubject to approval by the Court in related matters, including the Kirkeby Matter ....” The dissolution judgment also stated that the parties to the dissolution agreed that the Circle R and Camino Properties “shall be awarded to [Kahn] as her sole and separate property and the parties shall sign all documents necessary to transfer all two (2) properties to [Kahn].” On September 30, 2022, Burns, as manager of the Crosby Clinic, transferred title in the Camino Property to Kahn by quitclaim deed. 6 C. Damages Trial On November 18, 2022, at a default prove-up hearing, the Kirkebys’ counsel requested the court vacate the hearing and set the case for trial solely on the issue of damages. The court granted the request, and entered an order on November 22, 2022, stating that in lieu of the prove-up hearing, the matter was set for trial “on the issue of damages only.” The order also modified the May 2, 2022 order issuing terminating sanctions against Burns to be “changed to issue sanctions on the issue of liability, [and] that the matters alleged in [the FAC] remain deemed admitted as to Burns.” The order further provided that “the defaults previously entered against Burns pursuant to the [May 2, 2022 order] be vacated, but that Burns be permitted to only present evidence at the upcoming trial on the issue of damages.” On January 5 and 30, 2023, the parties proceeded to a bench trial on the issue of damages for the claims asserted against Burns. After the trial, the court issued its final decision. The court noted Burns was previously found guilty of contempt and his liability was “established by motions well prior to trial.” The court found “the evidence regarding intentional transfer of assets, sometimes in direct contravention of existing court orders, [wa]s abundant” and awarded the Kirkebys “$3,037,216 in damages directly related to the intentional actions” of Burns and also awarded treble damages, for a total compensatory damage award of $9,111,648. The court denied the Kirkebys’ claim for punitive damages, finding they had not established that Burns would have the ability to satisfy such a judgment. Finally, the court found the Kirkebys were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and could seek them in postjudgment proceedings. The court entered judgment in favor of the Kirkebys on April 20, 2023. The judgment included the court’s finding that “[p]rior to trial, the Court 7 ordered issue sanctions against Burns and the Crosby Center Entities, inclusive of NSI and the Crosby Clinic, on the issue of liability and all matters alleged in the above referenced causes of action in the FAC were deemed admitted as to Burns and the Crosby Center Entities. This included admission of Paragraphs 25 through 28 of the FAC which alleged, among other things, that at all relevant times to these proceedings, Burns and the Crosby Center Entities, inclusive of NSI and the Crosby Clinic, were the alter egos of each other, and further, the alter egos of Burns as well as each other’s agent, servant, employee, assignee, successor-in-interest, co-conspirator and aider and abettor.” (Fn. omitted.) D. Additional Efforts to Prevent Kahn and Burns’s Transfer of Property On March 29, 2023, the Kirkebys filed a motion to compel Kahn and Burns to reconvey title in the Camino Property back to the Crosby Clinic, or alternatively to void the September 30, 2022 quitclaim deed transferring title from the Crosby Clinic to Kahn, asserting the transfer had again violated the stipulated injunction. On April 11, 2023, Kahn filed a competing motion seeking to expunge the stipulated injunction, arguing she was the owner of the property pursuant to the judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding, she had been dismissed from the underlying case in September 2022, and the Crosby Clinic was not a signatory to the Camino Property stipulation. On May 5, 2023, the trial court granted the Kirkebys’ motion and denied Khan’s motion. Under its authority pursuant to section 128, subdivision (a)(4), the court ordered Khan to reconvey title to the Camino Property to the Crosby Clinic. In its ruling, the trial court found there was no dispute that the conveyance of title to the Camino Property via the September 30, 2022 quitclaim deed violated the stipulated injunction. The court also noted Burns’s history of willful violations of the injunction and 8 referenced its prior July 29, 2022 order finding Khan and Burns had conspired to create a “fictional lease” related to the Circle R Property to be used for their benefit in these proceedings. The court rejected Khan’s arguments that the stipulation for the Camino Property was “void” or that the transfer of title to Khan under the dissolution judgment superseded the trial court’s jurisdiction and authority to order that title be reconveyed back to the Crosby Clinic.6 Despite the court’s order, on May 18, 2023, Kahn, who now purported to be the managing member of the Crosby Clinic, again violated the stipulated injunction, transferring the Camino Property from the Clinic to herself. As a result, the Kirkebys filed an ex parte application seeking to hold Kahn in contempt and to force a reconveyance of the property back to the Crosby Clinic. The property was reconveyed back to the Clinic on August 4, 2023. Shortly after, on August 18, 2023, the Crosby Clinic, now represented by Kahn’s counsel, filed a motion to vacate the November 22, 2022 order vacating entry of default against Burns and the subsequent judgment entered on April 20, 2023. The Clinic “asserted that Burns had been deprived of due process because the Kirkebys had failed to set forth the amount of damages they were seeking in the FAC. The motion also argued the failure to identify the amount of damages violated section 425.10, subdivision (a)(2). The Crosby Clinic asserted that by taking a default in October 2019, it gave up its right to defend the lawsuit in exchange for the 6 Our opinion in Kirkeby I, supra, D082333, affirmed the trial court’s order. 9 certainty that it could not be held liable for any damages because none were asserted in the complaint.” (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.) “The Clinic also argued that the court’s order vacating the default judgment entered against Burns was void because it was obtained by the Kirkebys through the extrinsic fraud of not providing Burns notice of their request to vacate the default against him. Finally, the Crosby Clinic argued it had standing to attack the judgment because, ‘if given full effect, [the judgment] would injuriously affect [the] Crosby Clinic, LLC’s rights.’ ” (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.) The Kirkebys opposed the motion, arguing the Crosby Clinic did not have standing to challenge the judgment because it awarded damages solely against Burns, not the Clinic. Further, they asserted the Clinic’s corporate standing should be disregarded because it had been adjudged Burn’s alter ego. The court denied the motion to vacate, finding there was no evidence the order vacating the default and the subsequent judgment entered in favor of the Kirkebys against Burns was obtained by extrinsic fraud. The Crosby Clinic appealed from the order. On January 13, 2025, this court affirmed the trial court’s order. We clarified that the judgment only awarded damages to the Kirkebys against Burns and concluded the Crosby Clinic lacked standing to challenge the judgment with respect to Burns. (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.) In our opinion, we noted that, under section 580, the trial court lacked authority to award damages against the Crosby Clinic because the FAC did not pray for a specific damage award and the court had entered a default judgment against the Clinic. (Ibid.) E. Motion to Amend and Entry of Amended Judgment On May 15, 2025, the Kirkebys filed the motion underlying this latest appeal seeking to add the Crosby Clinic, which holds title to the Camino 10 Property, as an additional judgment debtor with respect to the April 20, 2023 Judgment against Burns.7 They argued (1) the Clinic had control of the underlying litigation and was, thus, represented at trial; (2) a unity of interest and ownership between the Clinic and Burns was present such that their separate personalities no longer existed; and (3) an inequitable result would follow if Burns’s acts were treated as his alone. In opposition, the Crosby Clinic looked to statements in this court’s prior decision affirming the court’s denial of the Clinic’s motion to vacate the judgment to assert that amendment of the judgment against Burns would violate section 580’s prohibition against unalleged damages in a default judgment. The Clinic also argued it was not Burns’s alter ego because it did not have sufficient control over the litigation to satisfy due process concerns. After a hearing, the trial court found the Kirkebys had met their burden to show that the Clinic was Burns’s alter ego. The court concluded the Crosby Clinic had sufficient control of the underlying litigation and had been virtually represented in the relevant proceedings. In its order, the court explained that Burns and the entities he controlled, including the Clinic, “repeatedly transferred/moved assets to prevent Plaintiffs (and other creditors) from being able to reach them.” Further, the court found there was such a unity of interest between Burns and the Crosby Clinic that separate identities did not exist, and that an inequitable result would follow if they were not treated as one. The court’s order stated that in reaching this 7 The Kirkebys previously moved to amend the judgment in June 2024, but the trial court denied the motion without prejudice pending the resolution of prior appeals. 11 conclusion it relied on the judgment against Burns, which adjudged Burns and the Crosby Clinic “the alter egos of each other.” The court entered an amended judgment adding the Crosby Clinic as a judgment debtor on July 10, 2025. The Clinic timely appealed. DISCUSSION I The Crosby Clinic argues the amended judgment is void because it awards damages against a defaulted defendant in excess of the amount prayed for in the complaint in violation of section 580. The Kirkebys respond that the amended judgment does not impose damages against the Crosby Clinic in its capacity as a defaulted defendant. Rather, the amended judgment adds the Clinic as an additional judgment debtor based solely on its status as Burns’s alter ego. We agree with the Kirkebys that section 580’s prohibition does not preclude adding the Crosby Clinic as an additional judgment debtor. We set forth the relevant law concerning the limitation imposed by section 580 in our prior decision, Kirkeby II, supra, D083640. Therein, we explained that section 425.10, subdivision (a) states that a complaint shall contain both a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language” and a “demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled.” Further, the statute provides that “[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” (§ 425.10, subd. (a).) In turn, section 580, subdivision (a) provides that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115; but in any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with 12 the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. The court may impose liability, regardless of whether the theory upon which liability is sought to be imposed involves legal or equitable principles.” Cases in which terminating sanctions strike a defendant’s answer are subject to the same limitation. (See Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1175 [§ 580 governs “the amount of damages available on a default judgment entered as a discovery sanction”].) “ ‘[T]he primary purpose of the section is to guarantee defaulting parties adequate notice of the maximum judgment that may be assessed against them.’ ” (Stein v. York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 320, 325 (Stein).) “A defendant has the right to elect not to answer the complaint. [Citation.] Although this may have been a tactical move by [a] defendant, it is a permissible tactic. [A d]efendant, relying on the absence of a statement of damages in the complaint, [is] entitled to have default entered against him. Section 580 ‘ensure[s] that a defendant who declines to contest an action ... [is] not ... subject[ed] ... to open-ended liability’ and operates as a limitation on the court’s jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) Section 580 is strictly construed. (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826.) “ ‘The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness. Surely, this would be undermined if the door were opened to speculation, no matter how reasonable it might appear in a particular case, that a prayer for damages according to proof provided adequate notice of a defaulting defendant’s potential liability.’ ” (Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) “If a default judgment awarded against a defendant exceeds the relief demanded in the complaint [citation], or is a different form of relief than that demanded in the complaint [citation], the defendant is ‘effectively denied a fair hearing … [citations].’ Thus, a default 13 judgment in an amount greater than the amount demanded is void and subject to either direct or collateral attack.” (Id. at p. 326.) As both parties agree, this court previously determined that a damage award against the Crosby Clinic—as a defendant in the underlying matter— was not available because the FAC did not contain a specific damage prayer, and on October 25, 2019, the trial “court struck its answer, found it had failed to retain counsel, and entered a default judgment against it.” (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.) The Crosby Clinic now asserts that because a direct damage award against the Clinic was not available, it also could not be added to the judgment as an additional judgment debtor. The Clinic concedes that there is no authority for the blanket proposition that a corporate defendant that defaults and is spared from damages by the limits of section 580, could not later be added as a judgment debtor based on alter ego liability. Instead, in support of its argument the Clinic relies on cases in which the addition of a judgment debtor is not available because of due process concerns. The Crosby Clinic relies on Motores de Mexicali, S.A. v. Superior Court (1958) 51 Cal.2d 172 (Motores), in which the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against a business that ultimately went bankrupt. (Id. at p. 173.) The plaintiff obtained a portion of the judgment in the company’s bankruptcy proceeding and then attempted to add three individuals who controlled the company as judgment debtors. In the plaintiff’s petition for an order to show cause why the judgment should not be corrected to add the individuals, the plaintiff asserted the company “was simply being used by [the individuals] as a means for diverting the revenues of the business to themselves as salaries and loan repayments while at the same time avoiding any personal liability for the obligations of the business. They knew that their financial manipulations would ultimately lead the corporation into bankruptcy. The 14 petition concluded with the assertion that [the individuals] operated [the company], merely as their alter ego, and that they should thus be held individually liable for the debts of the business ….” (Id. at p. 174.) Our Supreme Court rejected the claim. The high court held that because judgment had been entered by default against the corporate defendant, the cases relied on by the plaintiff where the trial court had corrected a judgment “by designating as judgment debtors those persons whom it finds to have used the particular entity named in the original judgment as their alter ego,” were distinguishable. (Motores, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 174.) In the cases cited by the plaintiffs, the alter ego added as a judgment debtor was the parent corporation of a subsidiary, which had participated in the litigation and subsidized the defense. (Id. at p. 175.) The court held that because the individuals the plaintiff was attempting to add as additional judgment debtors had not been sued, and the corporation had defaulted in the litigation without mounting any defense, their due process rights would be violated by allowing the requested amendment to the judgment. (Id. at p. 176.) In contrast, Burns is an individual who did participate in and defend the action. Critically, Motores did not address whether section 580 can bar a defaulted defendant from later being added as a judgment debtor based on a determination that it is the alter ego of a non- defaulted individual defendant. Likewise, Wolf Metals, Inc. v. Rand Pacific Sales, Inc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 698 (Wolf Metals), on which the Clinic also relies, held that the individual owner of a bankrupt corporation could not be added as a judgment debtor on an alter ego theory where a default judgment had been entered against the corporate defendant. Wolf Metals concluded that the facts before it were no different than those in Motores and, thus, the Supreme Court’s 15 holding was controlling. (Wolf Metals, at p. 708.) Unlike Wolf Metals, here a default judgment was entered against the Clinic, the party to be added as an additional judgment debtor, and not against the existing judgment debtor, Burns.8 And, like Motores, Wolf Metals does not address the application of section 580 at all. The third case the Clinic cites, NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772 (NEC Electronics), similarly reversed an order adding the executive of a corporation, who had been adjudged the corporation’s alter ego, as an additional judgment debtor. The Court of Appeal held the trial court erred because, like a defaulting defendant, the corporate defendant “did not appear at trial and did not make any attempt to defend the … lawsuit.” (NEC Electronics, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 780.) Thus, the executive’s interests were not represented in the underlying proceedings and Motores required reversal. (Ibid.) The due process concerns at issue in Motores, Wolf Metals, and NEC Electronics are not present in this case and none of these decisions addressed section 580. Rather, the three cases address whether a plaintiff can hold individuals, who are the alter egos of corporate entities, liable for those entities’ debts. The cases do not address the situation presented here, where the plaintiffs seek corporate assets, specifically real estate held by the Crosby Clinic, to satisfy the judgment debt of an individual defendant who is the alter ego of that entity. Put simply, these cases do not suggest that because section 580 precludes a damages award against a defaulted party, the 8 While the trial court did enter terminating sanctions against Burns, the subsequent default judgment was vacated, and Burns proceeded to trial to determine the damages owed to the Kirkebys. 16 defaulted party could not be added as a judgment debtor based on alter ego liability. In sum, the Crosby Clinic has failed to establish that section 580 precluded the trial court from adding the Clinic as an additional judgment debtor. (See Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323 [“ ‘a fundamental principle of appellate procedure [is] that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment’ ”].) II The Crosby Clinic next contends that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s determination that it, as Burn’s alter ego, sufficiently participated in and controlled the litigation to be properly added as an additional judgment debtor. The Kirkebys respond that there was ample evidence in the voluminous record to support the trial court’s factual finding of sufficient control. Again, we agree with the Kirkebys. A “Pursuant to section 187, a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a judgment to add additional judgment debtors. (NEC Electronics, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 778.) Section 187 grants to every court the power to use all means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those processes are not set out in the code. ([Ibid].) Section 187 states: ‘When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to 17 the spirit of this code.’ ” (McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owners Assn. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 746, 752 (McClellan).) “It is well settled that when a corporation ‘is used by an individual or individuals, or by another corporation, to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, a court may disregard the corporate entity and treat the acts as if they were done by the individuals themselves or by the controlling corporation ... the court will disregard the “fiction” of corporate entity[.]’ (9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1989) Corporations, § 12, p. 524.)” (McClellan, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 752–753.) “Utilizing section 187, judgments are typically ‘amended to add additional judgment debtors on the grounds that a person or entity is the alter ego of the original judgment debtor. [Citations.] This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.’ ” (McClellan, at p. 752.) To prevail in a motion to add a judgment debtor under this theory, the plaintiff “must show that (1) the parties to be added as judgment debtors had control of the underlying litigation and were virtually represented in that proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the entity and the owners no longer exist; and (3) an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the entity alone.” (Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd. Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 815–816.) B The Crosby Clinic challenges only the first prong of this test. It does not dispute that it is Burns’s alter ego, or that injustice would result if Burns’s acts were not treated as the acts of the Clinic. Rather, the Clinic 18 argues there was no evidence that it was represented in or controlled the underlying litigation. The Kirkebys respond that there was ample evidence of the Clinic’s participation in the initial stages of the litigation, and of its later participation, after default was entered against it, by its repeated violations (through Crosby and Kahn as its agents) of the injunction orders issued by the trial court. With respect to its initial participation in the lawsuit, the record shows that the Clinic, acting through Burns as its agent, was a significant participant prior to its default and that the Clinic filed pleadings, including a demurrer and answer to the complaint, answered discovery, and opposed discovery motions brought by the Kirkebys. In addition, Burns verified discovery responses for the Crosby Clinic and obtained legal counsel on the Clinic’s behalf. Further, during the trial to establish the amount of damages to be awarded against Burns, he was the managing member of the Clinic and, thus, represented its interests in that proceeding. Thereafter, the Crosby Clinic continued to take action—through Burns and later Kahn—in the underlying trial court proceedings by unlawfully attempting to transfer the Camino Property for the benefit of Burns and Kahn, and to disadvantage the Kirkebys’ claim to the asset. Further, Kahn continued to argue for the Clinic itself in the trial court and this court after the court entered a default against it.9 Specifically, Kahn, as agent for the 9 The default was entered after the Clinic failed to obtain representation. (See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145 [“a corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. It must be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record”].) 19 Crosby Clinic, argued that the entity was not subject to the injunctive order because it was not a signatory to the stipulation. She unsuccessfully advanced this position on behalf of the Clinic both in the trial court and in this court on appeal. (Kirkeby I, supra, D082333.) The Clinic also unsuccessfully moved the trial court to vacate the judgment entered against Burns under section 580 and pursued the same result in another appeal to this court, which we also denied. (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.) These facts constituted sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that the Clinic was an active and well-represented participant in the litigation, negating any claim that its due process rights are infringed by adding it as an additional judgment debtor. (See Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1110 [Additional judgment debtor entities sufficiently controlled the litigation where they “filed a responsive pleading, participated in discovery, opposed summary judgment, and pursued a JAMS appeal.”]; Mirabito v. San Francisco Dairy Co. (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 54, 60 [“the evidence is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that in effect the two corporations are identical …. To hold otherwise upon the facts herein would be to deny respondent the fruits of fairly contested litigation, place a premium upon acts and conduct which have misled a litigant, and frustrate the very purpose of our jurisprudence”].) Given these facts, ample evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the Crosby Clinic controlled, participated and was represented in the proceedings. Accordingly, the court’s decision to amend 20 the judgment to include the Clinic as an additional judgment debtor did not constitute an abuse of discretion.10 DISPOSITION The amended judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded the costs of appeal. MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: DATO, J. CASTILLO, J. 10 Although we do not reach the issue because it was not raised, we note that the equities in this case favor the addition of the Clinic as an additional judgment debtor. The Clinic has been adjudged Burns’s alter ego previously and yet has maintained its efforts to unlawfully transfer the property outside the court’s jurisdiction to prevent the Kirkebys from satisfying their judgment. (See Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. L.M. Ross Law Group, LLP (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188–1189 [“even if all the formal elements necessary to establish alter ego liability are not present, an unnamed party may be included as a judgment debtor if ‘the equities overwhelmingly favor’ the amendment and it is necessary to prevent an injustice”].) 21