Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic LLC CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketD086743
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic LLC CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GLENN KIRKEBY et al., D086743
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-
00032731-CU-BT-NC)
v.
THE CROSBY CLINIC LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an amended judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, Earl H. Maas, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Decker Law, James Decker, Griffin Schindler and Chris Jones for
Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Robert A. Ball, Robert A. Ball and John M. Donnelly for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
In the fourth appeal in this matter, The Crosby Clinic, LLC (Crosby
Clinic or Clinic) seeks to shield assets from Glenn and Anastasia Kirkeby,
judgment creditors and former business partners of the Clinic’s alter ego,
defendant Larry Burns. In this latest appeal, the Crosby Clinic challenges
the trial court’s order granting the Kirkebys’ motion to amend the judgment
to add the Crosby Clinic as a judgment debtor. Specifically, the Clinic argues
Code of Civil Procedure section 580 barred the trial court from awarding
damages against it because of its earlier default and because the complaint
did not specify the amount of damages sought by the Kirkebys.1 The Clinic
also contends the trial court erred by finding that its participation in the
litigation was sufficient to support the court’s decision to add it as a judgment
debtor. As we shall explain, we reject these arguments and affirm the
amended judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Initial Proceedings
The Kirkebys first filed suit against Burns and various entities they
alleged were under his control in September 2017. The lawsuit was also filed
derivatively on behalf of MHCD, LLC, an entity jointly owned by the
Kirkebys and Burns. Thereafter, Burns filed a demurrer to the complaint
and sought to limit the Kirkebys’ discovery requests. Before the demurrer
was resolved, in January 2018, the Kirkebys filed their First Amended
Complaint (FAC) against Burns and the entities under his control, including
the Crosby Clinic. The FAC alleged the Kirkebys started a drug and alcohol
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 Additional facts concerning the underlying dispute are set forth in our
three prior opinions in this matter. (See Kirkeby v. Kahn (Sept. 17, 2024,
D082333) [nonpub. opn.] (Kirkeby I), Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic, LLC
(January 13, 2025, D083640 [nonpub. opn.] (Kirkeby II), and Kirkeby v. Kahn
(June 9, 2025, D083388 [nonpub. opn.].)
2
abuse rehabilitation facility in 2002 shortly after meeting Burns, and that
Burns claimed to be a licensed attorney and experienced business manager,
who could help them operate the business.
The FAC alleged that, unbeknownst to the Kirkebys, Burns
misappropriated funds, business opportunities, and real estate (including the
assets underlying this appeal) through his management of the rehabilitation
center, known as the Crosby Center. In 2014, the Kirkebys discovered Burns
was embezzling the business’s assets and contacted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.3 The FAC also alleged Burns and the various entities named
in the complaint, including the Crosby Clinic, were each other’s alter egos.4
The FAC asserted, there “is such a unity of interest and control between and
among the Defendants, and each other, and Burns that their separate
identities have ceased to exist, or never did exist” and that to “treat Burns
and each entity Defendant (excepting the nominal Defendant, MHCD) as
separate entities would perpetuate a fraud or result in gross injustice.”
Burns and the entity defendants filed a demurrer to the FAC, which
the trial court overruled. Burns and the Crosby Center filed separate
answers on April 10, 2018.
3 In their appellate brief, the Kirkebys assert that Burns is facing felony
criminal charges in a case pending in San Diego Superior Court.
4 The complaint named as the other entity defendants: The Crosby
Clinic, LLC; Interlawus, LLC; AAE Alcohol Rehab Service Center; AAE
Crosby Center; AAE Women Eating Disorder Center; Dream Catcher Detox
Center, Inc.; KBY Properties, LLC; Crosby Recovery Foundation; AAA
National Credit Reporting, Corp.; Internet Creative Marketing, Inc.;
Stonegate Investment Group, LLC; Applied Psychology Systems, LLC; The
Neuroscience Institute; and L Burns Research Institute.
3
In October 2019, MHCD filed a cross-complaint, which alleged similar
claims against Burns, his then-wife Anne Kahn, and the same entities
controlled by Burns named in the FAC. In addition, the complaint contained
a cause of action for quiet title, asserting that Burns and the entities he
controlled concealed, misappropriated, and diverted MHCD’s assets,
resulting in the defendants wrongfully obtaining title to two properties in
Escondido, one located on Camino De Las Lomas (Camino Property) and one
located on Circle R Way (Circle R Property). MHCD sought adjudication of
its ownership rights in the properties, and to quiet title in the two properties
in its favor. MHCD also filed notices of pendency of action for the properties
on October 24, 2019, with the San Diego County Recorder.
The next day, October 25, 2019, the trial court struck the answers to
the FAC of many of the entity defendants, including the Crosby Clinic, for
failure to retain counsel. The court entered defaults against the entities the
same day.
In December 2019, MHCD, Burns, several of the named entities
controlled by Burns, and Kahn entered stipulations for each property that
enjoined transfer of the properties. Under the stipulations, the parties
“agree[d] not to, and [were] enjoined from, encumbering, impairing, selling,
transferring, conveying, or otherwise assigning the real estate and
improvements ... during the pendency of this lawsuit.” In addition, the
stipulations permitted the Crosby Clinic and NSI to seek refinancing of the
Circle R Property, which faced foreclosure. MHCD agreed to dismiss its quiet
title claim without prejudice and release the notices of pendency filed for each
property to allow for the refinancing of the Circle R Property using the
4
Camino Property as collateral. The stipulations were signed into orders by
the trial court on December 17, 2019.5
In November 2020, despite the stipulated injunction orders precluding
transfer or encumbrance of the properties, Burns encumbered the Camino
Property with a deed of trust in the amount of $200,000. A little over a
month later, on December 14, 2020, Burns conveyed title in the Camino
Property from the Crosby Clinic to “Larry Burns Trustee of the Xanadau
Dominican Irrevocable Trust – 2020” and conveyed title in the Circle R
Property from NSI, another entity defendant controlled by Burns, to “Larry
Burns Trustee of the Xanadau Dominican Irrevocable Trust – 2020.” This
prompted the Kirkebys to record the stipulated injunction orders on the
Camino and Circle R Properties with the county recorder on March 1, 2021.
On November 3, 2021, the Kirkebys filed an application for an order to
show cause (OSC) asserting Burns had violated the court’s stipulated
injunction orders by transferring and encumbering the Camino Property and
transferring the Circle R Property. After issuing the OSC, the court found
Burns in contempt for violating the stipulated orders. On January 14, 2022,
the court issued an order directing Burns to remove the encumbrance on the
Camino Property and to reconvey the property back to the Crosby Clinic.
B. Sanctions Against Burns & Additional Injunction Violations
After Burns failed to reconvey the Camino Property back to the Crosby
Clinic, on March 3, 2022, the Kirkebys and MHCD jointly moved for
terminating sanctions against Burns based on his violations of the stipulated
5 In January 2020, Burns and the entity defendants filed a demurrer to
MHCD’s cross-complaint. The court overruled the demurrer, and Burns and
the other defendants answered the cross-complaint in March 2020.
5
orders related to the two properties, and his failure to respond to their
discovery requests. On May 2, 2022, the trial court granted the motions,
issuing terminating sanctions against Burns “based on his disobedience of
the court’s 1/14/22 order as to … reconveyance of the property” and Burns’s
“repeated violations of orders.” The court struck Burns’s answers to the FAC
and MHCD’s cross-complaint, deemed all matters alleged in the FAC and
cross-complaint admitted, and entered defaults against Burns and in favor of
the Kirkebys and MHCD. In addition, the court struck the answers of the
entity defendants, including the Crosby Clinic, to MHCD’s cross-complaint
because those entities had failed to retain counsel. The court also deemed
admitted the allegations against the entity defendants.
On September 26, 2022, the Kirkebys and MHCD dismissed Kahn from
the underlying proceedings without prejudice. Two days later, on September
28, 2022, a judgment of dissolution was entered in the divorce proceedings
between Kahn and Burns (Burns v. Kahn, Case No. 20FL010428N). The
judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA), which
provided that title in the Camino and Circle R Properties would be
transferred from the Crosby Clinic and NSI (which the judgment described as
entities created and maintained by Burns) to Kahn free and clear of any
interest of Burns, the Crosby Clinic, or NSI. The document stated the
transfers are “[s]ubject to approval by the Court in related matters, including
the Kirkeby Matter ....” The dissolution judgment also stated that the parties
to the dissolution agreed that the Circle R and Camino Properties “shall be
awarded to [Kahn] as her sole and separate property and the parties shall
sign all documents necessary to transfer all two (2) properties to [Kahn].”
On September 30, 2022, Burns, as manager of the Crosby Clinic,
transferred title in the Camino Property to Kahn by quitclaim deed.
6
C. Damages Trial
On November 18, 2022, at a default prove-up hearing, the Kirkebys’
counsel requested the court vacate the hearing and set the case for trial
solely on the issue of damages. The court granted the request, and entered
an order on November 22, 2022, stating that in lieu of the prove-up hearing,
the matter was set for trial “on the issue of damages only.” The order also
modified the May 2, 2022 order issuing terminating sanctions against Burns
to be “changed to issue sanctions on the issue of liability, [and] that the
matters alleged in [the FAC] remain deemed admitted as to Burns.” The
order further provided that “the defaults previously entered against Burns
pursuant to the [May 2, 2022 order] be vacated, but that Burns be permitted
to only present evidence at the upcoming trial on the issue of damages.”
On January 5 and 30, 2023, the parties proceeded to a bench trial on
the issue of damages for the claims asserted against Burns. After the trial,
the court issued its final decision. The court noted Burns was previously
found guilty of contempt and his liability was “established by motions well
prior to trial.” The court found “the evidence regarding intentional transfer
of assets, sometimes in direct contravention of existing court orders, [wa]s
abundant” and awarded the Kirkebys “$3,037,216 in damages directly related
to the intentional actions” of Burns and also awarded treble damages, for a
total compensatory damage award of $9,111,648. The court denied the
Kirkebys’ claim for punitive damages, finding they had not established that
Burns would have the ability to satisfy such a judgment. Finally, the court
found the Kirkebys were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and could
seek them in postjudgment proceedings.
The court entered judgment in favor of the Kirkebys on April 20, 2023.
The judgment included the court’s finding that “[p]rior to trial, the Court
7
ordered issue sanctions against Burns and the Crosby Center Entities,
inclusive of NSI and the Crosby Clinic, on the issue of liability and all
matters alleged in the above referenced causes of action in the FAC were
deemed admitted as to Burns and the Crosby Center Entities. This included
admission of Paragraphs 25 through 28 of the FAC which alleged, among
other things, that at all relevant times to these proceedings, Burns and the
Crosby Center Entities, inclusive of NSI and the Crosby Clinic, were the alter
egos of each other, and further, the alter egos of Burns as well as each other’s
agent, servant, employee, assignee, successor-in-interest, co-conspirator and
aider and abettor.” (Fn. omitted.)
D. Additional Efforts to Prevent Kahn and Burns’s Transfer of Property
On March 29, 2023, the Kirkebys filed a motion to compel Kahn and
Burns to reconvey title in the Camino Property back to the Crosby Clinic, or
alternatively to void the September 30, 2022 quitclaim deed transferring title
from the Crosby Clinic to Kahn, asserting the transfer had again violated the
stipulated injunction. On April 11, 2023, Kahn filed a competing motion
seeking to expunge the stipulated injunction, arguing she was the owner of
the property pursuant to the judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding,
she had been dismissed from the underlying case in September 2022, and the
Crosby Clinic was not a signatory to the Camino Property stipulation.
On May 5, 2023, the trial court granted the Kirkebys’ motion and
denied Khan’s motion. Under its authority pursuant to section 128,
subdivision (a)(4), the court ordered Khan to reconvey title to the Camino
Property to the Crosby Clinic. In its ruling, the trial court found there was
no dispute that the conveyance of title to the Camino Property via the
September 30, 2022 quitclaim deed violated the stipulated injunction. The
court also noted Burns’s history of willful violations of the injunction and
8
referenced its prior July 29, 2022 order finding Khan and Burns had
conspired to create a “fictional lease” related to the Circle R Property to be
used for their benefit in these proceedings. The court rejected Khan’s
arguments that the stipulation for the Camino Property was “void” or that
the transfer of title to Khan under the dissolution judgment superseded the
trial court’s jurisdiction and authority to order that title be reconveyed back
to the Crosby Clinic.6
Despite the court’s order, on May 18, 2023, Kahn, who now purported
to be the managing member of the Crosby Clinic, again violated the
stipulated injunction, transferring the Camino Property from the Clinic to
herself. As a result, the Kirkebys filed an ex parte application seeking to
hold Kahn in contempt and to force a reconveyance of the property back to
the Crosby Clinic. The property was reconveyed back to the Clinic on August
4, 2023.
Shortly after, on August 18, 2023, the Crosby Clinic, now represented
by Kahn’s counsel, filed a motion to vacate the November 22, 2022 order
vacating entry of default against Burns and the subsequent judgment
entered on April 20, 2023. The Clinic “asserted that Burns had been
deprived of due process because the Kirkebys had failed to set forth the
amount of damages they were seeking in the FAC. The motion also argued
the failure to identify the amount of damages violated section 425.10,
subdivision (a)(2). The Crosby Clinic asserted that by taking a default in
October 2019, it gave up its right to defend the lawsuit in exchange for the
6 Our opinion in Kirkeby I, supra, D082333, affirmed the trial court’s
order.
9
certainty that it could not be held liable for any damages because none were
asserted in the complaint.” (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.)
“The Clinic also argued that the court’s order vacating the default
judgment entered against Burns was void because it was obtained by the
Kirkebys through the extrinsic fraud of not providing Burns notice of their
request to vacate the default against him. Finally, the Crosby Clinic argued
it had standing to attack the judgment because, ‘if given full effect, [the
judgment] would injuriously affect [the] Crosby Clinic, LLC’s rights.’ ”
(Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.)
The Kirkebys opposed the motion, arguing the Crosby Clinic did not
have standing to challenge the judgment because it awarded damages solely
against Burns, not the Clinic. Further, they asserted the Clinic’s corporate
standing should be disregarded because it had been adjudged Burn’s alter
ego. The court denied the motion to vacate, finding there was no evidence the
order vacating the default and the subsequent judgment entered in favor of
the Kirkebys against Burns was obtained by extrinsic fraud.
The Crosby Clinic appealed from the order. On January 13, 2025, this
court affirmed the trial court’s order. We clarified that the judgment only
awarded damages to the Kirkebys against Burns and concluded the Crosby
Clinic lacked standing to challenge the judgment with respect to Burns.
(Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.) In our opinion, we noted that, under
section 580, the trial court lacked authority to award damages against the
Crosby Clinic because the FAC did not pray for a specific damage award and
the court had entered a default judgment against the Clinic. (Ibid.)
E. Motion to Amend and Entry of Amended Judgment
On May 15, 2025, the Kirkebys filed the motion underlying this latest
appeal seeking to add the Crosby Clinic, which holds title to the Camino
10
Property, as an additional judgment debtor with respect to the April 20, 2023
Judgment against Burns.7 They argued (1) the Clinic had control of the
underlying litigation and was, thus, represented at trial; (2) a unity of
interest and ownership between the Clinic and Burns was present such that
their separate personalities no longer existed; and (3) an inequitable result
would follow if Burns’s acts were treated as his alone.
In opposition, the Crosby Clinic looked to statements in this court’s
prior decision affirming the court’s denial of the Clinic’s motion to vacate the
judgment to assert that amendment of the judgment against Burns would
violate section 580’s prohibition against unalleged damages in a default
judgment. The Clinic also argued it was not Burns’s alter ego because it did
not have sufficient control over the litigation to satisfy due process concerns.
After a hearing, the trial court found the Kirkebys had met their
burden to show that the Clinic was Burns’s alter ego. The court concluded
the Crosby Clinic had sufficient control of the underlying litigation and had
been virtually represented in the relevant proceedings. In its order, the court
explained that Burns and the entities he controlled, including the Clinic,
“repeatedly transferred/moved assets to prevent Plaintiffs (and other
creditors) from being able to reach them.” Further, the court found there was
such a unity of interest between Burns and the Crosby Clinic that separate
identities did not exist, and that an inequitable result would follow if they
were not treated as one. The court’s order stated that in reaching this
7 The Kirkebys previously moved to amend the judgment in June 2024,
but the trial court denied the motion without prejudice pending the
resolution of prior appeals.
11
conclusion it relied on the judgment against Burns, which adjudged Burns
and the Crosby Clinic “the alter egos of each other.”
The court entered an amended judgment adding the Crosby Clinic as a
judgment debtor on July 10, 2025. The Clinic timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
The Crosby Clinic argues the amended judgment is void because it
awards damages against a defaulted defendant in excess of the amount
prayed for in the complaint in violation of section 580. The Kirkebys respond
that the amended judgment does not impose damages against the Crosby
Clinic in its capacity as a defaulted defendant. Rather, the amended
judgment adds the Clinic as an additional judgment debtor based solely on its
status as Burns’s alter ego. We agree with the Kirkebys that section 580’s
prohibition does not preclude adding the Crosby Clinic as an additional
judgment debtor.
We set forth the relevant law concerning the limitation imposed by
section 580 in our prior decision, Kirkeby II, supra, D083640. Therein, we
explained that section 425.10, subdivision (a) states that a complaint shall
contain both a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in
ordinary and concise language” and a “demand for judgment for the relief to
which the pleader claims to be entitled.” Further, the statute provides that
“[i]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded
shall be stated.” (§ 425.10, subd. (a).) In turn, section 580, subdivision (a)
provides that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer,
cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by
Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115; but in
any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with
12
the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. The court
may impose liability, regardless of whether the theory upon which liability is
sought to be imposed involves legal or equitable principles.” Cases in which
terminating sanctions strike a defendant’s answer are subject to the same
limitation. (See Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1161, 1175 [§ 580 governs “the amount of damages available on a
default judgment entered as a discovery sanction”].)
“ ‘[T]he primary purpose of the section is to guarantee defaulting
parties adequate notice of the maximum judgment that may be assessed
against them.’ ” (Stein v. York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 320, 325 (Stein).) “A
defendant has the right to elect not to answer the complaint. [Citation.]
Although this may have been a tactical move by [a] defendant, it is a
permissible tactic. [A d]efendant, relying on the absence of a statement of
damages in the complaint, [is] entitled to have default entered against him.
Section 580 ‘ensure[s] that a defendant who declines to contest an action ...
[is] not ... subject[ed] ... to open-ended liability’ and operates as a limitation
on the court’s jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
Section 580 is strictly construed. (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d
822, 826.) “ ‘The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure
fundamental fairness. Surely, this would be undermined if the door were
opened to speculation, no matter how reasonable it might appear in a
particular case, that a prayer for damages according to proof provided
adequate notice of a defaulting defendant’s potential liability.’ ” (Stein,
supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) “If a default judgment awarded against a
defendant exceeds the relief demanded in the complaint [citation], or is a
different form of relief than that demanded in the complaint [citation], the
defendant is ‘effectively denied a fair hearing … [citations].’ Thus, a default
13
judgment in an amount greater than the amount demanded is void and
subject to either direct or collateral attack.” (Id. at p. 326.)
As both parties agree, this court previously determined that a damage
award against the Crosby Clinic—as a defendant in the underlying matter—
was not available because the FAC did not contain a specific damage prayer,
and on October 25, 2019, the trial “court struck its answer, found it had failed
to retain counsel, and entered a default judgment against it.” (Kirkeby II,
supra, D083640.) The Crosby Clinic now asserts that because a direct
damage award against the Clinic was not available, it also could not be added
to the judgment as an additional judgment debtor. The Clinic concedes that
there is no authority for the blanket proposition that a corporate defendant
that defaults and is spared from damages by the limits of section 580, could
not later be added as a judgment debtor based on alter ego liability. Instead,
in support of its argument the Clinic relies on cases in which the addition of a
judgment debtor is not available because of due process concerns.
The Crosby Clinic relies on Motores de Mexicali, S.A. v. Superior Court
(1958) 51 Cal.2d 172 (Motores), in which the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment against a business that ultimately went bankrupt. (Id. at p. 173.)
The plaintiff obtained a portion of the judgment in the company’s bankruptcy
proceeding and then attempted to add three individuals who controlled the
company as judgment debtors. In the plaintiff’s petition for an order to show
cause why the judgment should not be corrected to add the individuals, the
plaintiff asserted the company “was simply being used by [the individuals] as
a means for diverting the revenues of the business to themselves as salaries
and loan repayments while at the same time avoiding any personal liability
for the obligations of the business. They knew that their financial
manipulations would ultimately lead the corporation into bankruptcy. The
14
petition concluded with the assertion that [the individuals] operated [the
company], merely as their alter ego, and that they should thus be held
individually liable for the debts of the business ….” (Id. at p. 174.)
Our Supreme Court rejected the claim. The high court held that
because judgment had been entered by default against the corporate
defendant, the cases relied on by the plaintiff where the trial court had
corrected a judgment “by designating as judgment debtors those persons
whom it finds to have used the particular entity named in the original
judgment as their alter ego,” were distinguishable. (Motores, supra, 51 Cal.2d
at p. 174.) In the cases cited by the plaintiffs, the alter ego added as a
judgment debtor was the parent corporation of a subsidiary, which had
participated in the litigation and subsidized the defense. (Id. at p. 175.) The
court held that because the individuals the plaintiff was attempting to add as
additional judgment debtors had not been sued, and the corporation had
defaulted in the litigation without mounting any defense, their due process
rights would be violated by allowing the requested amendment to the
judgment. (Id. at p. 176.) In contrast, Burns is an individual who did
participate in and defend the action. Critically, Motores did not address
whether section 580 can bar a defaulted defendant from later being added as
a judgment debtor based on a determination that it is the alter ego of a non-
defaulted individual defendant.
Likewise, Wolf Metals, Inc. v. Rand Pacific Sales, Inc. (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 698 (Wolf Metals), on which the Clinic also relies, held that the
individual owner of a bankrupt corporation could not be added as a judgment
debtor on an alter ego theory where a default judgment had been entered
against the corporate defendant. Wolf Metals concluded that the facts before
it were no different than those in Motores and, thus, the Supreme Court’s
15
holding was controlling. (Wolf Metals, at p. 708.) Unlike Wolf Metals, here a
default judgment was entered against the Clinic, the party to be added as an
additional judgment debtor, and not against the existing judgment debtor,
Burns.8 And, like Motores, Wolf Metals does not address the application of
section 580 at all.
The third case the Clinic cites, NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208
Cal.App.3d 772 (NEC Electronics), similarly reversed an order adding the
executive of a corporation, who had been adjudged the corporation’s alter ego,
as an additional judgment debtor. The Court of Appeal held the trial court
erred because, like a defaulting defendant, the corporate defendant “did not
appear at trial and did not make any attempt to defend the … lawsuit.”
(NEC Electronics, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 780.) Thus, the executive’s
interests were not represented in the underlying proceedings and Motores
required reversal. (Ibid.)
The due process concerns at issue in Motores, Wolf Metals, and NEC
Electronics are not present in this case and none of these decisions addressed
section 580. Rather, the three cases address whether a plaintiff can hold
individuals, who are the alter egos of corporate entities, liable for those
entities’ debts. The cases do not address the situation presented here, where
the plaintiffs seek corporate assets, specifically real estate held by the Crosby
Clinic, to satisfy the judgment debt of an individual defendant who is the
alter ego of that entity. Put simply, these cases do not suggest that because
section 580 precludes a damages award against a defaulted party, the
8 While the trial court did enter terminating sanctions against Burns,
the subsequent default judgment was vacated, and Burns proceeded to trial
to determine the damages owed to the Kirkebys.
16
defaulted party could not be added as a judgment debtor based on alter ego
liability. In sum, the Crosby Clinic has failed to establish that section 580
precluded the trial court from adding the Clinic as an additional judgment
debtor. (See Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323 [“ ‘a
fundamental principle of appellate procedure [is] that a trial court judgment
is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that
the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment’ ”].)
II
The Crosby Clinic next contends that insufficient evidence supported
the trial court’s determination that it, as Burn’s alter ego, sufficiently
participated in and controlled the litigation to be properly added as an
additional judgment debtor. The Kirkebys respond that there was ample
evidence in the voluminous record to support the trial court’s factual finding
of sufficient control. Again, we agree with the Kirkebys.
A
“Pursuant to section 187, a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a
judgment to add additional judgment debtors. (NEC Electronics, supra, 208
Cal.App.3d at p. 778.) Section 187 grants to every court the power to use all
means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those processes are not set
out in the code. ([Ibid].) Section 187 states: ‘When jurisdiction is, by the
Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or
judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given;
and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not
specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to
17
the spirit of this code.’ ” (McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owners
Assn. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 746, 752 (McClellan).)
“It is well settled that when a corporation ‘is used by an individual or
individuals, or by another corporation, to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a
statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, a court
may disregard the corporate entity and treat the acts as if they were done by
the individuals themselves or by the controlling corporation ... the court will
disregard the “fiction” of corporate entity[.]’ (9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(9th ed. 1989) Corporations, § 12, p. 524.)” (McClellan, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 752–753.) “Utilizing section 187, judgments are typically ‘amended to
add additional judgment debtors on the grounds that a person or entity is the
alter ego of the original judgment debtor. [Citations.] This is an equitable
procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to
add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real
defendant.’ ” (McClellan, at p. 752.)
To prevail in a motion to add a judgment debtor under this theory, the
plaintiff “must show that (1) the parties to be added as judgment debtors had
control of the underlying litigation and were virtually represented in that
proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the entity and the owners no longer exist; and (3) an
inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the entity
alone.” (Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd. Partnership
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 815–816.)
B
The Crosby Clinic challenges only the first prong of this test. It does
not dispute that it is Burns’s alter ego, or that injustice would result if
Burns’s acts were not treated as the acts of the Clinic. Rather, the Clinic
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argues there was no evidence that it was represented in or controlled the
underlying litigation. The Kirkebys respond that there was ample evidence
of the Clinic’s participation in the initial stages of the litigation, and of its
later participation, after default was entered against it, by its repeated
violations (through Crosby and Kahn as its agents) of the injunction orders
issued by the trial court.
With respect to its initial participation in the lawsuit, the record shows
that the Clinic, acting through Burns as its agent, was a significant
participant prior to its default and that the Clinic filed pleadings, including a
demurrer and answer to the complaint, answered discovery, and opposed
discovery motions brought by the Kirkebys. In addition, Burns verified
discovery responses for the Crosby Clinic and obtained legal counsel on the
Clinic’s behalf. Further, during the trial to establish the amount of damages
to be awarded against Burns, he was the managing member of the Clinic and,
thus, represented its interests in that proceeding.
Thereafter, the Crosby Clinic continued to take action—through Burns
and later Kahn—in the underlying trial court proceedings by unlawfully
attempting to transfer the Camino Property for the benefit of Burns and
Kahn, and to disadvantage the Kirkebys’ claim to the asset. Further, Kahn
continued to argue for the Clinic itself in the trial court and this court after
the court entered a default against it.9 Specifically, Kahn, as agent for the
9 The default was entered after the Clinic failed to obtain representation.
(See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
1141, 1145 [“a corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself
before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through
a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. It must
be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record”].)
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Crosby Clinic, argued that the entity was not subject to the injunctive order
because it was not a signatory to the stipulation. She unsuccessfully
advanced this position on behalf of the Clinic both in the trial court and in
this court on appeal. (Kirkeby I, supra, D082333.) The Clinic also
unsuccessfully moved the trial court to vacate the judgment entered against
Burns under section 580 and pursued the same result in another appeal to
this court, which we also denied. (Kirkeby II, supra, D083640.)
These facts constituted sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s
determination that the Clinic was an active and well-represented participant
in the litigation, negating any claim that its due process rights are infringed
by adding it as an additional judgment debtor. (See Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v.
Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1110
[Additional judgment debtor entities sufficiently controlled the litigation
where they “filed a responsive pleading, participated in discovery, opposed
summary judgment, and pursued a JAMS appeal.”]; Mirabito v. San
Francisco Dairy Co. (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 54, 60 [“the evidence is sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that in effect the two corporations are identical …. To
hold otherwise upon the facts herein would be to deny respondent the fruits
of fairly contested litigation, place a premium upon acts and conduct which
have misled a litigant, and frustrate the very purpose of our jurisprudence”].)
Given these facts, ample evidence supported the trial court’s
determination that the Crosby Clinic controlled, participated and was
represented in the proceedings. Accordingly, the court’s decision to amend
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the judgment to include the Clinic as an additional judgment debtor did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.10
DISPOSITION
The amended judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded the
costs of appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
10 Although we do not reach the issue because it was not raised, we note
that the equities in this case favor the addition of the Clinic as an additional
judgment debtor. The Clinic has been adjudged Burns’s alter ego previously
and yet has maintained its efforts to unlawfully transfer the property outside
the court’s jurisdiction to prevent the Kirkebys from satisfying their
judgment. (See Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. L.M. Ross Law Group, LLP
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188–1189 [“even if all the formal elements
necessary to establish alter ego liability are not present, an unnamed party
may be included as a judgment debtor if ‘the equities overwhelmingly favor’
the amendment and it is necessary to prevent an injustice”].)
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