Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Aljojo v. Aljojo CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO EMAD ALJOJO, B348602, B351723 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV10315) v. ADNAN ALJOJO, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed. Zach’s Law and Zachary C. Skidelsky for Defendant and Appellant. Grant Shenon Almaraz and Adam D.H. Grant for Plaintiff and Respondent. This case stems from a claimed forgery of a quitclaim deed committed by appellant Adnan Aljojo (appellant) against his brother, Emad Aljojo (respondent). Following a bench trial, the court found appellant obtained the quitclaim deed at issue by fraud. Specifically, the court found respondent did not sign the deed nor give appellant permission to sign his name. The quitclaim deed was thus void. After respondent moved to amend the judgment, appellant appealed from the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer on the grounds that respondent’s complaint was time-barred; the judgment was entered against the wrong party; and the denial of appellant’s motion to vacate was an abuse of discretion, among other things. The trial court later granted respondent’s motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 187, adding appellant in his capacity as trustee of the Aljojo Revocable Trust (trust) as a judgment debtor.1 Appellant appealed from the postjudgment order and from the subsequently filed final judgment.2 This court has consolidated the two appeals for the purposes of argument and opinion. As set forth below, we find no error and affirm the judgment in full. 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 The appeal from the postjudgment order, filed in October 2025, was consolidated with the earlier filed appeal. 2 BACKGROUND I. The property and quitclaim deed Respondent purchased a mixed commercial and residential property located at 4716 Melrose Avenue in Los Angeles (Melrose property) with funds from his own savings and that of his siblings (not including appellant) in June 2009. The property was purchased with the intention of using the storefront for the family business and generating rental income from the residential unit. Despite conflicting evidence from appellant, the trial court found respondent was the true original owner of the Melrose property. A quitclaim deed dated January 11, 2016, purportedly transferred the Melrose property from respondent to appellant. Respondent testified he did not sign the document, and his signature was forged by appellant. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found respondent did not sign the quitclaim deed, nor did he give permission to appellant to sign respondent’s name. Respondent’s expert witness persuasively showed the signature on the quitclaim deed, attributed to respondent, did not match known signatures of respondent. While appellant denied forging respondent’s signature on the quitclaim deed, he admitted forging respondent’s signature in other situations, including having forged appellant’s signature to obtain a false driver’s license in respondent’s name and having falsely claimed to be respondent in a court proceeding. The trial court found respondent did not intend to transfer the Melrose property to appellant. The quitclaim deed to the Melrose property was obtained by fraud and was declared void. The court cancelled the 2016 quitclaim deed. 3 II. Appellant’s transfer of the property to the trust On September 28, 2017, appellant purportedly transferred the Melrose property into the trust via a quitclaim deed. Appellant conveyed the property to himself and Alaa H. Ali as trustees of the trust.3 Throughout the proceedings below, appellant concealed that the Melrose property was trust property and that he was trustee of the trust. Instead, appellant declared he was the owner of the Melrose property and it was “a hundred percent” his. III. Complaint and demurrer On March 24, 2022, respondent filed his complaint for cancellation of written instrument under Civil Code section 3412, naming appellant as the defendant. Respondent sought cancellation of the deed conveying the Melrose property to appellant based on “Fraud in Factum and Non-Delivery.” This was respondent’s sole cause of action against appellant. Respondent sought an order canceling the quitclaim deed and all written instruments flowing from the deed. Appellant demurred to the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, arguing the action was time-barred based on respondent’s pleaded discovery date. Respondent opposed the demurrer, arguing a five-year statute of limitations applied to his cause of action for cancellation of a void instrument, and that he did not know of the quitclaim deed until 2022. 3 At the time of transfer, Ali was appellant’s wife. Ali filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on December 15, 2021, in Los Angeles County Superior Court. It is presumed the couple is no longer married. 4 The trial court overruled the demurrer, holding “[t]he sole remedy sought in [respondent’s] complaint [is] cancellation of the subject deed. Though [respondent’s] complaint may implicate some fraudulent activity, [respondent] does not seek damages nor state a cause of action for fraud. The Court is unpersuaded that the complaint is clearly and affirmatively barred on its face.” IV. Trial A bench trial was held January 22 through January 24, 2025. Appellant and respondent provided conflicting testimony regarding the purchase of the Melrose property. While the court found respondent credible, it did not credit appellant’s testimony, finding, “The credible evidence did not support [appellant’s] claim that he purchased the Melrose property with his own funds, or that he was the true owner.” As to the 2016 quitclaim deed, the court found respondent did not sign the deed nor give appellant permission to sign his name. Because the quitclaim deed was obtained by fraud, the court found it void. The court found appellant had failed to prove respondent’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court explained, “[appellant] did not offer evidence at trial establishing when [respondent] knew or should have learned of his claim.” The court rejected appellant’s assertion the allegations of respondent’s complaint were sufficient to show that respondent’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court filed a final statement of decision on March 20, 2025. V. Appellant’s bankruptcy, motion to vacate the judgment, and appeal from the initial judgment On March 28, 2025, appellant filed for bankruptcy in an effort to trigger an automatic stay prior to the entry of the 5 judgment. The bankruptcy filing occurred after the court’s March 20, 2025 final decision but before judgment was entered on May 22, 2025. On May 2, 2025, the bankruptcy filing was dismissed. On May 30, 2025, appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant argued judgment was entered against the wrong party. Appellant claimed he did not own the property when respondent’s complaint was filed, as the trust was the true owner. Appellant asserted the trustee, in his representative capacity, was an indispensable party, and the court could not adjudicate the rights to the property without naming the trustee in his representative capacity. Appellant further argued respondent took contradictory positions in the litigation, by saying he was not claiming fraud to avoid the statute of limitations defense, but in the bankruptcy proceedings, claiming the basis of the action was fraud. Respondent opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that appellant waived the wrong party argument by failing to raise it prior to the motion and that appellant, in his capacity as trustee, could be added to the judgment by way of an amendment and the alter ego doctrine. On July 14, 2025, the court denied appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment, noting, “Throughout the litigation [appellant] asserted that he owned the property, never raising as a defense that the trust was an indispensable party, or that [appellant] could only be sued in his capacity as trustee.” VI. Postjudgment proceedings On July 22, 2025, respondent filed a postjudgment motion seeking to amend the judgment pursuant to section 187, to add appellant in his capacity as trustee as an additional judgment 6 debtor. Respondent contended the trust and its trustee were sufficiently connected to the original judgment debtor to justify amendment of the judgment. On July 25, 2025, while respondent’s postjudgment motion was pending, appellant prematurely filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of respondent. On September 1, 2025, appellant resigned as trustee of the trust to avoid the amended judgment. On October 10, 2025, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to amend the judgment. On October 20, 2025, appellant separately appealed from the order granting the motion to amend the judgment.4 ] On November 26, 2025, the court entered an amended judgment formally adding appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment debtor. On December 10, 2025, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment entered November 26, 2025. DISCUSSION I. Demurrer Appellant first argues the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer because the action was time-barred on the face of the complaint. A. Standard of review When reviewing an order on a demurrer, we “‘examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being 4 As explained above, the appeal filed October 20, 2025, (B 350479) was consolidated with the appeal filed July 25, 2025, (B 348602.) 7 assumed true for this purpose.’” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) “‘“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. … In order for the bar … to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”’” (Ibid.) B. The parties’ positions Respondent’s complaint was filed March 24, 2022. Appellant argues the complaint, on its face, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations because the gravamen of respondent’s cause of action is fraud, with a three-year statute of limitations found in section 338, subdivision (d). Respondent disagrees, claiming the sole cause of action was for cancellation of a written instrument, covered by the five-year statute of limitations found in sections 318 and 319 that is applicable specifically to “actions involving the title to or possession of real property.” (Robertson v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1327.) Respondent further argues, even under the three-year statute, his claim is not time-barred. If the allegations of the complaint were taken as evidence, the complaint did not show respondent learned that appellant had transferred the Melrose property more than three years before filing his complaint. We discuss the factual and legal issues separately below and conclude no error occurred. C. The applicable statute of limitations In overruling appellant’s demurrer, the trial court acknowledged respondent’s argument that the five-year statute of 8 limitations for cancellation of instruments was applicable. (§§ 318, 319.) The trial court noted the “sole remedy sought in [respondent’s] complaint [was] cancellation of the subject deed. Though [respondent’s] complaint may implicate some fraudulent activity, [respondent] does not seek damages or state a cause of action for fraud.” The court thus found the complaint was not “clearly and affirmatively barred on its face.” In its final decision following trial, however, the court stated, “The Court has ruled that the three-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d) applies here.” The court cited Zakaessian v. Zakaessian (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 721, 725, for the proposition that where the gravamen of a cause of action involves fraud or mistake, the statute of limitations for fraud applies. Zakaessian involved a cause of action to set aside and cancel a deed, which was issued by mistake. (Id. at p. 724.) Because the matter involved fraud or mistake, the ordinary statute of limitations for canceling a void instrument was not applicable and instead former section 338, subdivision (4), applied. (Zakaessian, at p. 725.) We find no error in the trial court’s final determination that section 338, subdivision (d) is applicable here. The Supreme Court has cautioned that courts must “look beyond the relief sought, and to view the matter from the basic cause of action giving rise to the plaintiff’s right to relief.” (Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 214.) Courts have applied section 338, subdivision (d) in cases involving transfers of property where plaintiffs have sought to void such transfers based on fraud or mistake. (See, e.g., Welsher v. Glickman (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 134, 140 [“where the right to cancel rests on the ground of fraud or mistake, then the three-year statute of limitations [section 9 338, subdivision (d)] relating to such grounds is applicable”]; Zakaessian v. Zakaessian, supra, 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 725 [“when the gravamen of the cause of action involves fraud or a mistake,” the ordinary statute “to set aside and cancel a void instrument” is inapplicable and section 338, subdivision (d) applies].)5 If the complaining party “‘knows nothing about the fraudulent conveyance, the cause … does not arise until he discovers the fraud by which his rights have been invaded.’” (Richardson v. Michel (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 188, 200.) Thus, in order to demonstrate respondent’s cause of action was barred, appellant was required to point to allegations showing when respondent learned that his rights had been invaded. (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 315.) D. The action is not time-barred on the face of the complaint Applying the three-year statute of limitations found in section 338, subdivision (d), we find the trial court did not err in 5 Robertson v. Superior Court, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 1319, at pp. 1327–1328, cited by respondent, is inapplicable as it involved an action to void a quitclaim deed and two related instruments on the ground that the grantor was mentally incompetent at the time she executed the deed. Here, in contrast, the ground for respondent’s action to void the deed was appellant’s fraudulent act of forging respondent’s signature. Further, the Robertson court specifically acknowledged, “‘Ordinarily a suit to set aside and cancel a void instrument is governed by section 343 ….’ [Citations.] The only exception to this rule … would be … when fraud or mistake are involved, in which case the three-year period of [former] section 338, subdivision (4) would apply.” (Id. at p. 1326.) 10 overruling appellant’s demurrer as the allegations of the complaint did not show it was barred as a matter of law. Respondent’s complaint contained the following allegations: “[Respondent] and the Aljojo family first became aware of [appellant’s] fraudulent activity in or around June of 2017 when [appellant] filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Adel Aljojo, who is [respondent] and [appellant’s] other brother. That case involved another family residential property located at 600 N. Plymouth Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90004.” “[Respondent] and the rest of the Aljojo family were shocked when they learned of the eviction case. They believed the Plymouth property was owned by [respondent] and [appellant’s] mother, Nadia Kamel Salem … “… The Aljojos checked the title records and learned that [appellant] had fraudulently transferred both the subject Property and the Plymouth property to himself.” These allegations do not show respondent’s complaint was time-barred as a matter of law. As the trial court explained, the complaint “alleges that [respondent] learned in 2017 of alleged fraud concerning the Clinton (Plymouth) property, not the Melrose property that is the subject of [respondent’s] lawsuit. The complaint then alleges that, at an unspecified time, some (unnamed) family member[s] learned that [appellant] had also transferred the Melrose property. This does not establish, without further evidence, that [respondent] knew more than three years before filing his complaint that [appellant] had transferred the Melrose property.” The trial court did not err in this assessment of the allegations. While the allegations make clear that respondent, along with other family members, learned of appellant’s fraud as 11 to the Plymouth property in 2017, it makes no allegations as to when respondent learned that appellant had fraudulently transferred the Melrose property. In the absence of such facts, the trial court could not conclude the complaint was time-barred as a matter of law.6 The trial court properly declined to sustain appellant’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds. “‘“In order for the bar … to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”’” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 42.) Here, the allegations, at best, showed the complaint might be barred; this was insufficient to sustain appellant’s demurrer. The ruling was proper. II. Judicial estoppel Appellant next argues respondent may not enforce a judgment based on fraud because he is judicially estopped from relying on fraud. Appellant contends respondent avoided dismissal at the demurrer phase by asserting his claim was not based on fraud. Later, respondent prevailed by establishing fraud. Respondent also asserted appellant committed fraud in seeking relief from the stay in appellant’s bankruptcy proceedings. Appellant asserts judicial estoppel precludes a 6 Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Association (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 902, is not helpful to appellant, because there, the record showed an investigation into the recorded documents at issue during a specified year. Here, while respondent alleged certain family members checked property records at an unspecified time, he did not allege which family members or specify the year the property records were reviewed. 12 party from taking inconsistent positions to gain advantage where the court accepted the earlier position. (Citing Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181.) A. Applicable legal principles The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when “‘(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.”’” (Blix St. Records, Inc. v. Cassidy (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 39, 47 (Blix).) “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine to protect against fraud on the courts.” (Blix, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) “[T]he doctrine is primarily concerned with the connection between a party and the judicial system, not the relationship between the parties.” (Jogani v. Jogani (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 158, 169 (Jogani).) It is “‘“the intentional assertion of an inconsistent position that perverts the judicial machinery.”’” (Id. at p. 170.) “‘[B]ecause of its harsh consequences, the doctrine should be applied with caution and limited to egregious circumstances.’” (Blix, supra, at p. 47.) “The determination of whether judicial estoppel can apply to the facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.” (Blix, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 46.) However, “[e]ven if the necessary elements of judicial estoppel are found, because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, … [citations], whether it should be applied is a matter within the discretion of the trial court,” and is thus reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 46.) 13 B. The trial court did not err in declining to apply judicial estoppel In denying appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment, the trial court declined to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, finding it did not provide a basis to vacate the judgment. We find no error in the trial court’s declining to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this matter as the court found no “totally inconsistent” position in respondent’s arguments there (Blix, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th, at p. 47) and no “perver[sion] [of] the judicial machinery”’” (Jogani, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 170). A review of respondent’s positions in the trial court reveals no inconsistency. Respondent initially asserted a cause of action for cancellation of the quitclaim deed due to “Fraud in Factum and Non-Delivery.” Because he sought recovery of real property, respondent argued a five-year statute of limitations applied. Respondent never argued fraud was not present, but only that the presence or absence of fraud was not determinative of the applicable statute of limitations. While arguing the five-year statute of limitations was applicable, respondent acknowledged appellant’s “fraud may have played a role.” However, respondent argued the case mainly concerned the recovery of title to real property. In bankruptcy court, respondent argued the judgment debt was nondischargeable because it stemmed from fraudulent conduct. Respondent cited the trial court’s March 20, 2025 final statement of decision, in which the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant obtained the 2016 quitclaim deed by fraud. Respondent thus maintained a consistent position in both the trial court and bankruptcy court that appellant committed a 14 fraudulent act. Respondent’s arguments in favor of the application of the five-year statute of limitations were not inconsistent with this position. Appellant has thus failed to show the doctrine of judicial estoppel is applicable. III. Amendment of judgment A. Relevant background On March 20, 2025, after trial, the court entered a final statement of decision in favor of respondent, finding appellant obtained the Melrose property through fraud. On March 28, 2025, appellant filed for bankruptcy to trigger an automatic stay prior to the entry of judgment. The bankruptcy filing was dismissed on May 2, 2025. The judgment in this matter was entered on May 22, 2025. On May 30, 2025, appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which was denied on July 14, 2025. On July 22, 2025, respondent filed a postjudgment motion to amend the judgment pursuant to section 187, seeking to add appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment debtor. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s May 22, 2025 entry of judgment on July 25, 2025. On September 1, 2025, appellant resigned as trustee of the trust. On October 10, 2025, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to amend the judgment. Appellant appealed from the order formally adding appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment debtor on October 20, 2025. 15 An amended judgment formally adding appellant, in his capacity as the trustee of the trust, as a judgment debtor was entered by the court on November 26, 2025. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the November 26, 2025 final judgment in this case on December 10, 2025. B. Section 187 Section 187 provides when a court has jurisdiction over a matter, “all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given.” In the exercise of its jurisdiction, “any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (§ 187.) “Section 187 grants every court the power and authority to carry its jurisdiction into effect.” (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 280 (Highland Springs).) “This includes the authority to amend a judgment to add an alter ego of an original judgment debtor, and thereby make the original judgment debtor liable on the judgment.” (Ibid.) “‘This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.’” (McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owner’s Ass’n., (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 746, 752 (McClellan).) “‘“Such a procedure is an appropriate and complete method by which to bind new individual defendants where it can be demonstrated that … they in fact had control of the previous litigation, and thus were virtually represented in the lawsuit.”’” (Ibid.) “To prevail on the motion, the judgment creditor must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘(1) the parties to be added as judgment debtors had control of the underlying 16 litigation and were virtually represented in that proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the entity and the owners no longer exist; and (3) an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the [original defendant] alone.’” (Highland Springs, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.) Section 187 proceedings are “equitable proceedings which may be brought ‘“‘“‘at any time so that the judgment will properly designate the real defendants.’”’”’” (Highland Springs, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.) We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s determination that liability should attach to appellant in his capacity as trustee. (McClellan, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.) “The decision to grant or deny the motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court [citation] and will not be disturbed on appeal if there is a legal basis for the decision and substantial evidence supports it.” (Highland Springs, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.) C. There was no error in amending the judgment after appellant’s July 25, 2025 notice of appeal was filed Appellant’s main argument surrounding the trial court’s grant of respondent’s motion to amend the judgment concerns the timing. Appellant argues once a notice of appeal is filed, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over matters embraced by the judgment. Appellant cites section 916, subdivision (a), which provides, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby.” Appellant asserts only two very narrow exceptions apply: (1) the right of a court to 17 correct a clerical error by a “nunc pro tunc amendment thereto” (Lang v. Superior Court (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 16, 18) and (2) the ability of a court to vacate a void—not voidable—judgment (People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1473). Appellant contends adding a new judgment debtor constitutes a substantive modification, not a clerical error. Thus, appellant argues, it falls squarely within matters embraced by the judgment and the court had no jurisdiction to decide the matter due to the automatic stay imposed by section 916, subdivision (a). The only final and appealable judgment in this matter was the judgment entered November 26, 2025. Appellant’s July 25, 2025 notice of appeal—filed three days after respondent had filed a motion to amend the judgment—was premature. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, appellant’s July 25, 2025 notice of appeal must be construed as having been filed immediately after the entry of the amended judgment, which was the November 26, 2025 final, appealable judgment in this case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d).)7 Appellant has filed four notices of appeal in this matter.8 Rather than declare the appeals premature and dismiss them, we have discretion to consolidate them, treat them as a single appeal 7 California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d) provides: “(1) A notice of appeal filed after judgment is rendered but before it is entered is valid and is treated as filed immediately after entry of judgment. (2) The reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment.” 8 A notice of appeal filed April 21, 2025, purportedly appealing from the judgment, was abandoned on May 16, 2025. 18 from the final November 26, 2025 judgment, and hear them together, as we have done here. Appellant’s premature July 25, 2025 appeal, filed after the trial court had rendered its decision on the merits below, but at a time when appellant knew there was a postjudgment motion to amend the judgment pending, was not effective to give rise to a stay of the trial court proceedings, which were not final at the time. We therefore reject appellant’s arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order granting respondent’s motion to amend the judgment and the final amended judgment. D. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to amend Appellant argues the court improperly amended the judgment to add appellant, in his capacity as trustee, as a judgment debtor. Appellant points out he had already resigned as trustee of the trust. Appellant argues he was never sued as a trustee and was not a trustee when the final judgment was entered. Thus, he argues the postjudgment amendment wasn’t a mere insertion of the name of the real defendant but instead was an impermissible, substantive change. Appellant argues respondent provided no evidence appellant in his capacity as trustee had control of the litigation and was virtually represented in the litigation. (Citing Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 517 (Greenspan).) Section 187 authorizes trial courts to amend a judgment to add additional judgment debtors. (Greenspan, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.) This is “‘“‘an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.”’’” (Ibid.) “‘“[T]he greatest liberality is to be 19 encouraged”’ in allowing judgments to be amended to add the “real defendant,” or alter ego of the original judgment debtor, ‘“in order to see that justice is done.”’” (Highland Springs, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) “Although the doctrine is most often applied to corporations, it also applies to trusts.” (Greenspan, supra, at p. 520.) An individual can be the alter ego of a trustee. (Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 308, 316 [“these guarantors, as persons who created, administered, and benefited from the trust, were the alter egos of the trustees as principal obligors”]. The alter ego doctrine requires satisfaction of two elements: (1) a unity of interest and ownership such that the separate personalities of the corporation (or trustee) and the individual do not exist; and (2) an inequitable result if the corporate (or trustee) identity is not disregarded. (Greenspan, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 511.) The required elements were met in this case. Appellant treated the trust assets as his own, repeatedly asserting he had sole ownership and control of the Melrose property.9 Thus, there was a unity of interest and ownership such that the separate 9 During his May 9, 2023 deposition, appellant asserted on at least seven occasions that the property was his alone, without once referencing a trust. For example, when asked if he believed he was the legal owner of the Melrose property, appellant said, “Any decision as far as the property is concerned … my decision, my rule, my saying, period.” Later, when asked if he believed he was the owner of the Melrose property, he said, “since day one of purchasing the house and the property, since day one, it’s not in my mind, it’s mine. It’s a hundred percent mine.” Appellant made similar statements and took this position throughout the litigation. 20 personalities of appellant as an individual, and appellant as trustee, did not exist. Appellant had control of the litigation, thus appellant, in his capacity as trustee, was virtually represented in the litigation. (Greenspan, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.) Further, if the trial court disregarded respondent’s alter ego theory, it would create an inequitable result. Respecting the separate identity of the trustee in this case would allow appellant to shield the Melrose property from respondent and the court. Appellant obtained the Melrose property by fraud, and respondent is its true owner. Thus, the legal separation between appellant as an individual and appellant as the trustee of the trust should be disregarded. Legal separation between entities may be disregarded by the alter ego doctrine when the legal entity is used “to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful inequitable purpose.” (Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 221.) Appellant’s attempt to use the fiction of legal separation between himself individually and as trustee in this case is designed to accomplish a wrongful, inequitable purpose and was rightfully rejected by the trial court.10 10 Under the circumstances of this case, we reject appellant’s argument that all trustees must be joined in their representative capacities for the court to exercise jurisdiction over trust property. The cases cited by appellant do not support appellant’s position. In Bank of California, Nat’l. Asso. v. Superior Court San Francisco (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516, a decedent left legacies and bequests to a large number of legatees. The decedent’s niece brought an action to enforce an alleged contract under which the decedent agreed to leave his entire estate to her. (Id. at p. 519.) The complaint named as defendants the executor and all the 21 Appellant cites Dill v. Berquist Constr. Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444, for the proposition that a judgment entered against a party not properly before the court is void as a matter of law. Dill held, “a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” It does not address the circumstances before the court in this matter and fails to support appellant’s position. We reject appellant’s argument that the judgment was void because it was entered against the wrong party. As explained in detail above, the court corrected the judgment and added appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment debtor. The court’s actions were valid and effective to allow respondent to enforce the judgment against appellant as trustee. IV. Motion to vacate Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant asserts the motion to vacate revealed the judgment rested on a time-barred claim, inconsistent legal theories, and a wrong party defect. While we have discussed each of these arguments above, we will briefly address appellant’s arguments in the context of appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment. beneficiaries under the will but was served only on the executor and the residual legatee. (Ibid.) The court discussed the necessity of joinder of the remaining legatees. The case did not involve, nor did the court discuss, a trust with more than one trustee. Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 427, also does not stand for the proposition that the failure to join all trustees is a jurisdictional defect. Appellant has failed to provide legal authority for this proposition, therefore we decline to consider it further. 22 A. Applicable law and standard of review Appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment was filed pursuant to section 473, subdivision (d), section 663, and equitable grounds.11 A trial court’s order under section 473, subdivision (d) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 369.) In the case of a void judgment, “[t]he trial court’s determination whether a judgment is void is reviewed de novo; its decision whether or not to set aside a void order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) Because a motion under section 663 is designed to enable “‘rectification of a judgment rendered upon erroneous application of the law to facts,’” it is reviewed de novo. (Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 476.) B. Judgment against appellant as an individual Appellant first argues judgment was wrongly entered against him as an individual, although record title was held by the trust and no trustee was a party to the action. Appellant argues the trial court adjudicated rights in property owned by a nonparty, which was beyond the court’s authority. As set forth in detail above, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment on this ground. Appellant cites no authority suggesting the trial court’s judgment was void, therefore we review the trial court’s decision 11 Section 473, subdivision (d) permits a court to correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders and set aside any void judgment or order. Section 663 allows a court to set aside and vacate a judgment if there exists an incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the judgment. 23 to deny appellant’s motion to vacate under the abuse of discretion s