Aljojo v. Aljojo CA2/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB348602
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 Aljojo v. Aljojo CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
EMAD ALJOJO, B348602, B351723
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV10315)
v.
ADNAN ALJOJO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.
Zach’s Law and Zachary C. Skidelsky for Defendant and
Appellant.
Grant Shenon Almaraz and Adam D.H. Grant for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
This case stems from a claimed forgery of a quitclaim deed
committed by appellant Adnan Aljojo (appellant) against his
brother, Emad Aljojo (respondent). Following a bench trial, the
court found appellant obtained the quitclaim deed at issue by
fraud. Specifically, the court found respondent did not sign the
deed nor give appellant permission to sign his name. The
quitclaim deed was thus void.
After respondent moved to amend the judgment, appellant
appealed from the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in
overruling his demurrer on the grounds that respondent’s
complaint was time-barred; the judgment was entered against
the wrong party; and the denial of appellant’s motion to vacate
was an abuse of discretion, among other things.
The trial court later granted respondent’s motion to amend
the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 187,
adding appellant in his capacity as trustee of the Aljojo Revocable
Trust (trust) as a judgment debtor.1 Appellant appealed from the
postjudgment order and from the subsequently filed final
judgment.2
This court has consolidated the two appeals for the
purposes of argument and opinion. As set forth below, we find no
error and affirm the judgment in full.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2 The appeal from the postjudgment order, filed in October
2025, was consolidated with the earlier filed appeal.
2
BACKGROUND
I. The property and quitclaim deed
Respondent purchased a mixed commercial and residential
property located at 4716 Melrose Avenue in Los Angeles (Melrose
property) with funds from his own savings and that of his siblings
(not including appellant) in June 2009. The property was
purchased with the intention of using the storefront for the
family business and generating rental income from the
residential unit. Despite conflicting evidence from appellant, the
trial court found respondent was the true original owner of the
Melrose property.
A quitclaim deed dated January 11, 2016, purportedly
transferred the Melrose property from respondent to appellant.
Respondent testified he did not sign the document, and his
signature was forged by appellant. After hearing the evidence,
the trial court found respondent did not sign the quitclaim deed,
nor did he give permission to appellant to sign respondent’s
name. Respondent’s expert witness persuasively showed the
signature on the quitclaim deed, attributed to respondent, did not
match known signatures of respondent. While appellant denied
forging respondent’s signature on the quitclaim deed, he
admitted forging respondent’s signature in other situations,
including having forged appellant’s signature to obtain a false
driver’s license in respondent’s name and having falsely claimed
to be respondent in a court proceeding.
The trial court found respondent did not intend to transfer
the Melrose property to appellant. The quitclaim deed to the
Melrose property was obtained by fraud and was declared void.
The court cancelled the 2016 quitclaim deed.
3
II. Appellant’s transfer of the property to the trust
On September 28, 2017, appellant purportedly transferred
the Melrose property into the trust via a quitclaim deed.
Appellant conveyed the property to himself and Alaa H. Ali as
trustees of the trust.3
Throughout the proceedings below, appellant concealed
that the Melrose property was trust property and that he was
trustee of the trust. Instead, appellant declared he was the
owner of the Melrose property and it was “a hundred percent”
his.
III. Complaint and demurrer
On March 24, 2022, respondent filed his complaint for
cancellation of written instrument under Civil Code section 3412,
naming appellant as the defendant. Respondent sought
cancellation of the deed conveying the Melrose property to
appellant based on “Fraud in Factum and Non-Delivery.” This
was respondent’s sole cause of action against appellant.
Respondent sought an order canceling the quitclaim deed and all
written instruments flowing from the deed.
Appellant demurred to the complaint on statute of
limitations grounds, arguing the action was time-barred based on
respondent’s pleaded discovery date. Respondent opposed the
demurrer, arguing a five-year statute of limitations applied to his
cause of action for cancellation of a void instrument, and that he
did not know of the quitclaim deed until 2022.
3 At the time of transfer, Ali was appellant’s wife. Ali filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage on December 15, 2021, in Los
Angeles County Superior Court. It is presumed the couple is no
longer married.
4
The trial court overruled the demurrer, holding “[t]he sole
remedy sought in [respondent’s] complaint [is] cancellation of the
subject deed. Though [respondent’s] complaint may implicate
some fraudulent activity, [respondent] does not seek damages nor
state a cause of action for fraud. The Court is unpersuaded that
the complaint is clearly and affirmatively barred on its face.”
IV. Trial
A bench trial was held January 22 through January 24,
2025. Appellant and respondent provided conflicting testimony
regarding the purchase of the Melrose property. While the court
found respondent credible, it did not credit appellant’s testimony,
finding, “The credible evidence did not support [appellant’s] claim
that he purchased the Melrose property with his own funds, or
that he was the true owner.” As to the 2016 quitclaim deed, the
court found respondent did not sign the deed nor give appellant
permission to sign his name. Because the quitclaim deed was
obtained by fraud, the court found it void.
The court found appellant had failed to prove respondent’s
claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The
court explained, “[appellant] did not offer evidence at trial
establishing when [respondent] knew or should have learned of
his claim.” The court rejected appellant’s assertion the
allegations of respondent’s complaint were sufficient to show that
respondent’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
The court filed a final statement of decision on March 20,
2025.
V. Appellant’s bankruptcy, motion to vacate the
judgment, and appeal from the initial judgment
On March 28, 2025, appellant filed for bankruptcy in an
effort to trigger an automatic stay prior to the entry of the
5
judgment. The bankruptcy filing occurred after the court’s
March 20, 2025 final decision but before judgment was entered
on May 22, 2025.
On May 2, 2025, the bankruptcy filing was dismissed.
On May 30, 2025, appellant filed a motion to vacate the
judgment. Appellant argued judgment was entered against the
wrong party. Appellant claimed he did not own the property
when respondent’s complaint was filed, as the trust was the true
owner. Appellant asserted the trustee, in his representative
capacity, was an indispensable party, and the court could not
adjudicate the rights to the property without naming the trustee
in his representative capacity. Appellant further argued
respondent took contradictory positions in the litigation, by
saying he was not claiming fraud to avoid the statute of
limitations defense, but in the bankruptcy proceedings, claiming
the basis of the action was fraud.
Respondent opposed the motion, arguing, among other
things, that appellant waived the wrong party argument by
failing to raise it prior to the motion and that appellant, in his
capacity as trustee, could be added to the judgment by way of an
amendment and the alter ego doctrine.
On July 14, 2025, the court denied appellant’s motion to
vacate the judgment, noting, “Throughout the litigation
[appellant] asserted that he owned the property, never raising as
a defense that the trust was an indispensable party, or that
[appellant] could only be sued in his capacity as trustee.”
VI. Postjudgment proceedings
On July 22, 2025, respondent filed a postjudgment motion
seeking to amend the judgment pursuant to section 187, to add
appellant in his capacity as trustee as an additional judgment
6
debtor. Respondent contended the trust and its trustee were
sufficiently connected to the original judgment debtor to justify
amendment of the judgment.
On July 25, 2025, while respondent’s postjudgment motion
was pending, appellant prematurely filed a notice of appeal from
the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of respondent.
On September 1, 2025, appellant resigned as trustee of the
trust to avoid the amended judgment.
On October 10, 2025, the trial court granted respondent’s
motion to amend the judgment.
On October 20, 2025, appellant separately appealed from
the order granting the motion to amend the judgment.4 ]
On November 26, 2025, the court entered an amended
judgment formally adding appellant in his capacity as trustee of
the trust as a judgment debtor.
On December 10, 2025, appellant filed a notice of appeal
from the final judgment entered November 26, 2025.
DISCUSSION
I. Demurrer
Appellant first argues the trial court erred in overruling his
demurrer because the action was time-barred on the face of the
complaint.
A. Standard of review
When reviewing an order on a demurrer, we “‘examine the
complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient
to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being
4 As explained above, the appeal filed October 20, 2025, (B
350479) was consolidated with the appeal filed July 25, 2025, (B
348602.)
7
assumed true for this purpose.’” (Committee for Green Foothills
v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32,
42.) “‘“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie
where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. … In
order for the bar … to be raised by demurrer, the defect must
clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is
not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be
barred.”’” (Ibid.)
B. The parties’ positions
Respondent’s complaint was filed March 24, 2022.
Appellant argues the complaint, on its face, is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations because the gravamen of
respondent’s cause of action is fraud, with a three-year statute of
limitations found in section 338, subdivision (d).
Respondent disagrees, claiming the sole cause of action was
for cancellation of a written instrument, covered by the five-year
statute of limitations found in sections 318 and 319 that is
applicable specifically to “actions involving the title to or
possession of real property.” (Robertson v. Superior Court (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1327.)
Respondent further argues, even under the three-year
statute, his claim is not time-barred. If the allegations of the
complaint were taken as evidence, the complaint did not show
respondent learned that appellant had transferred the Melrose
property more than three years before filing his complaint.
We discuss the factual and legal issues separately below
and conclude no error occurred.
C. The applicable statute of limitations
In overruling appellant’s demurrer, the trial court
acknowledged respondent’s argument that the five-year statute of
8
limitations for cancellation of instruments was applicable.
(§§ 318, 319.) The trial court noted the “sole remedy sought in
[respondent’s] complaint [was] cancellation of the subject deed.
Though [respondent’s] complaint may implicate some fraudulent
activity, [respondent] does not seek damages or state a cause of
action for fraud.” The court thus found the complaint was not
“clearly and affirmatively barred on its face.”
In its final decision following trial, however, the court
stated, “The Court has ruled that the three-year statute of
limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d) applies
here.” The court cited Zakaessian v. Zakaessian (1945) 70
Cal.App.2d 721, 725, for the proposition that where the gravamen
of a cause of action involves fraud or mistake, the statute of
limitations for fraud applies. Zakaessian involved a cause of
action to set aside and cancel a deed, which was issued by
mistake. (Id. at p. 724.) Because the matter involved fraud or
mistake, the ordinary statute of limitations for canceling a void
instrument was not applicable and instead former section 338,
subdivision (4), applied. (Zakaessian, at p. 725.)
We find no error in the trial court’s final determination
that section 338, subdivision (d) is applicable here. The Supreme
Court has cautioned that courts must “look beyond the relief
sought, and to view the matter from the basic cause of action
giving rise to the plaintiff’s right to relief.” (Leeper v. Beltrami
(1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 214.) Courts have applied section 338,
subdivision (d) in cases involving transfers of property where
plaintiffs have sought to void such transfers based on fraud or
mistake. (See, e.g., Welsher v. Glickman (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d
134, 140 [“where the right to cancel rests on the ground of fraud
or mistake, then the three-year statute of limitations [section
9
338, subdivision (d)] relating to such grounds is applicable”];
Zakaessian v. Zakaessian, supra, 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 725 [“when
the gravamen of the cause of action involves fraud or a mistake,”
the ordinary statute “to set aside and cancel a void instrument” is
inapplicable and section 338, subdivision (d) applies].)5
If the complaining party “‘knows nothing about the
fraudulent conveyance, the cause … does not arise until he
discovers the fraud by which his rights have been invaded.’”
(Richardson v. Michel (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 188, 200.) Thus, in
order to demonstrate respondent’s cause of action was barred,
appellant was required to point to allegations showing when
respondent learned that his rights had been invaded. (Stueve
Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303,
315.)
D. The action is not time-barred on the face of the
complaint
Applying the three-year statute of limitations found in
section 338, subdivision (d), we find the trial court did not err in
5 Robertson v. Superior Court, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 1319, at
pp. 1327–1328, cited by respondent, is inapplicable as it involved
an action to void a quitclaim deed and two related instruments on
the ground that the grantor was mentally incompetent at the
time she executed the deed. Here, in contrast, the ground for
respondent’s action to void the deed was appellant’s fraudulent
act of forging respondent’s signature. Further, the Robertson
court specifically acknowledged, “‘Ordinarily a suit to set aside
and cancel a void instrument is governed by section 343 ….’
[Citations.] The only exception to this rule … would be … when
fraud or mistake are involved, in which case the three-year
period of [former] section 338, subdivision (4) would apply.” (Id.
at p. 1326.)
10
overruling appellant’s demurrer as the allegations of the
complaint did not show it was barred as a matter of law.
Respondent’s complaint contained the following allegations:
“[Respondent] and the Aljojo family first became aware of
[appellant’s] fraudulent activity in or around June of 2017 when
[appellant] filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Adel
Aljojo, who is [respondent] and [appellant’s] other brother. That
case involved another family residential property located at 600
N. Plymouth Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90004.”
“[Respondent] and the rest of the Aljojo family were
shocked when they learned of the eviction case. They believed
the Plymouth property was owned by [respondent] and
[appellant’s] mother, Nadia Kamel Salem …
“… The Aljojos checked the title records and learned that
[appellant] had fraudulently transferred both the subject
Property and the Plymouth property to himself.”
These allegations do not show respondent’s complaint was
time-barred as a matter of law. As the trial court explained, the
complaint “alleges that [respondent] learned in 2017 of alleged
fraud concerning the Clinton (Plymouth) property, not the
Melrose property that is the subject of [respondent’s] lawsuit.
The complaint then alleges that, at an unspecified time, some
(unnamed) family member[s] learned that [appellant] had also
transferred the Melrose property. This does not establish,
without further evidence, that [respondent] knew more than
three years before filing his complaint that [appellant] had
transferred the Melrose property.”
The trial court did not err in this assessment of the
allegations. While the allegations make clear that respondent,
along with other family members, learned of appellant’s fraud as
11
to the Plymouth property in 2017, it makes no allegations as to
when respondent learned that appellant had fraudulently
transferred the Melrose property. In the absence of such facts,
the trial court could not conclude the complaint was time-barred
as a matter of law.6
The trial court properly declined to sustain appellant’s
demurrer on statute of limitations grounds. “‘“In order for the
bar … to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and
affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough
that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”’”
(Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of
Supervisors, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 42.) Here, the allegations, at
best, showed the complaint might be barred; this was insufficient
to sustain appellant’s demurrer. The ruling was proper.
II. Judicial estoppel
Appellant next argues respondent may not enforce a
judgment based on fraud because he is judicially estopped from
relying on fraud. Appellant contends respondent avoided
dismissal at the demurrer phase by asserting his claim was not
based on fraud. Later, respondent prevailed by establishing
fraud. Respondent also asserted appellant committed fraud in
seeking relief from the stay in appellant’s bankruptcy
proceedings. Appellant asserts judicial estoppel precludes a
6 Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Association (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 889, 902, is not helpful to appellant, because there,
the record showed an investigation into the recorded documents
at issue during a specified year. Here, while respondent alleged
certain family members checked property records at an
unspecified time, he did not allege which family members or
specify the year the property records were reviewed.
12
party from taking inconsistent positions to gain advantage where
the court accepted the earlier position. (Citing Jackson v. County
of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181.)
A. Applicable legal principles
The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies when “‘(1) the same
party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in
judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party
was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal
adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions
are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken
as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.”’” (Blix St. Records,
Inc. v. Cassidy (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 39, 47 (Blix).)
“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine to protect against
fraud on the courts.” (Blix, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)
“[T]he doctrine is primarily concerned with the connection
between a party and the judicial system, not the relationship
between the parties.” (Jogani v. Jogani (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
158, 169 (Jogani).) It is “‘“the intentional assertion of an
inconsistent position that perverts the judicial machinery.”’” (Id.
at p. 170.) “‘[B]ecause of its harsh consequences, the doctrine
should be applied with caution and limited to egregious
circumstances.’” (Blix, supra, at p. 47.)
“The determination of whether judicial estoppel can apply
to the facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.” (Blix, supra,
191 Cal.App.4th at p. 46.) However, “[e]ven if the necessary
elements of judicial estoppel are found, because judicial estoppel
is an equitable doctrine, … [citations], whether it should be
applied is a matter within the discretion of the trial court,” and is
thus reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 46.)
13
B. The trial court did not err in declining to apply
judicial estoppel
In denying appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment, the
trial court declined to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
finding it did not provide a basis to vacate the judgment. We find
no error in the trial court’s declining to apply the doctrine of
judicial estoppel in this matter as the court found no “totally
inconsistent” position in respondent’s arguments there (Blix,
supra, 191 Cal.App.4th, at p. 47) and no “perver[sion] [of] the
judicial machinery”’” (Jogani, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 170).
A review of respondent’s positions in the trial court reveals
no inconsistency. Respondent initially asserted a cause of action
for cancellation of the quitclaim deed due to “Fraud in Factum
and Non-Delivery.” Because he sought recovery of real property,
respondent argued a five-year statute of limitations applied.
Respondent never argued fraud was not present, but only that
the presence or absence of fraud was not determinative of the
applicable statute of limitations. While arguing the five-year
statute of limitations was applicable, respondent acknowledged
appellant’s “fraud may have played a role.” However, respondent
argued the case mainly concerned the recovery of title to real
property.
In bankruptcy court, respondent argued the judgment debt
was nondischargeable because it stemmed from fraudulent
conduct. Respondent cited the trial court’s March 20, 2025 final
statement of decision, in which the trial court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that appellant obtained the 2016 quitclaim
deed by fraud.
Respondent thus maintained a consistent position in both
the trial court and bankruptcy court that appellant committed a
14
fraudulent act. Respondent’s arguments in favor of the
application of the five-year statute of limitations were not
inconsistent with this position. Appellant has thus failed to show
the doctrine of judicial estoppel is applicable.
III. Amendment of judgment
A. Relevant background
On March 20, 2025, after trial, the court entered a final
statement of decision in favor of respondent, finding appellant
obtained the Melrose property through fraud.
On March 28, 2025, appellant filed for bankruptcy to
trigger an automatic stay prior to the entry of judgment.
The bankruptcy filing was dismissed on May 2, 2025.
The judgment in this matter was entered on May 22, 2025.
On May 30, 2025, appellant filed a motion to vacate the
judgment, which was denied on July 14, 2025.
On July 22, 2025, respondent filed a postjudgment motion
to amend the judgment pursuant to section 187, seeking to add
appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment
debtor.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
May 22, 2025 entry of judgment on July 25, 2025.
On September 1, 2025, appellant resigned as trustee of the
trust.
On October 10, 2025, the trial court granted respondent’s
motion to amend the judgment.
Appellant appealed from the order formally adding
appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment
debtor on October 20, 2025.
15
An amended judgment formally adding appellant, in his
capacity as the trustee of the trust, as a judgment debtor was
entered by the court on November 26, 2025.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the November 26,
2025 final judgment in this case on December 10, 2025.
B. Section 187
Section 187 provides when a court has jurisdiction over a
matter, “all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also
given.” In the exercise of its jurisdiction, “any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (§ 187.)
“Section 187 grants every court the power and authority to
carry its jurisdiction into effect.” (Highland Springs Conference
& Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267,
280 (Highland Springs).) “This includes the authority to amend
a judgment to add an alter ego of an original judgment debtor,
and thereby make the original judgment debtor liable on the
judgment.” (Ibid.)
“‘This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that
the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant
but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.’”
(McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owner’s Ass’n., (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 746, 752 (McClellan).) “‘“Such a procedure is an
appropriate and complete method by which to bind new
individual defendants where it can be demonstrated that … they
in fact had control of the previous litigation, and thus were
virtually represented in the lawsuit.”’” (Ibid.)
“To prevail on the motion, the judgment creditor must
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘(1) the parties to
be added as judgment debtors had control of the underlying
16
litigation and were virtually represented in that proceeding; (2)
there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the entity and the owners no longer exist; and (3)
an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of
the [original defendant] alone.’” (Highland Springs, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)
Section 187 proceedings are “equitable proceedings which
may be brought ‘“‘“‘at any time so that the judgment will properly
designate the real defendants.’”’”’” (Highland Springs, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 289.)
We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s
determination that liability should attach to appellant in his
capacity as trustee. (McClellan, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.)
“The decision to grant or deny the motion lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court [citation] and will not be disturbed on
appeal if there is a legal basis for the decision and substantial
evidence supports it.” (Highland Springs, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
at p. 280.)
C. There was no error in amending the judgment
after appellant’s July 25, 2025 notice of appeal
was filed
Appellant’s main argument surrounding the trial court’s
grant of respondent’s motion to amend the judgment concerns the
timing. Appellant argues once a notice of appeal is filed, the trial
court is divested of jurisdiction over matters embraced by the
judgment. Appellant cites section 916, subdivision (a), which
provides, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the
trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the
matters embraced therein or affected thereby.” Appellant asserts
only two very narrow exceptions apply: (1) the right of a court to
17
correct a clerical error by a “nunc pro tunc amendment thereto”
(Lang v. Superior Court (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 16, 18) and (2) the
ability of a court to vacate a void—not voidable—judgment
(People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1473). Appellant
contends adding a new judgment debtor constitutes a substantive
modification, not a clerical error. Thus, appellant argues, it falls
squarely within matters embraced by the judgment and the court
had no jurisdiction to decide the matter due to the automatic stay
imposed by section 916, subdivision (a).
The only final and appealable judgment in this matter was
the judgment entered November 26, 2025. Appellant’s July 25,
2025 notice of appeal—filed three days after respondent had filed
a motion to amend the judgment—was premature. Pursuant to
California Rules of Court, appellant’s July 25, 2025 notice of
appeal must be construed as having been filed immediately after
the entry of the amended judgment, which was the November 26,
2025 final, appealable judgment in this case. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(d).)7
Appellant has filed four notices of appeal in this matter.8
Rather than declare the appeals premature and dismiss them, we
have discretion to consolidate them, treat them as a single appeal
7 California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d) provides: “(1) A
notice of appeal filed after judgment is rendered but before it is
entered is valid and is treated as filed immediately after entry of
judgment. (2) The reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal
filed after the superior court has announced its intended ruling,
but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after
entry of judgment.”
8 A notice of appeal filed April 21, 2025, purportedly
appealing from the judgment, was abandoned on May 16, 2025.
18
from the final November 26, 2025 judgment, and hear them
together, as we have done here.
Appellant’s premature July 25, 2025 appeal, filed after the
trial court had rendered its decision on the merits below, but at a
time when appellant knew there was a postjudgment motion to
amend the judgment pending, was not effective to give rise to a
stay of the trial court proceedings, which were not final at the
time. We therefore reject appellant’s arguments that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order granting respondent’s
motion to amend the judgment and the final amended judgment.
D. The trial court did not err in granting the
motion to amend
Appellant argues the court improperly amended the
judgment to add appellant, in his capacity as trustee, as a
judgment debtor. Appellant points out he had already resigned
as trustee of the trust. Appellant argues he was never sued as a
trustee and was not a trustee when the final judgment was
entered. Thus, he argues the postjudgment amendment wasn’t a
mere insertion of the name of the real defendant but instead was
an impermissible, substantive change. Appellant argues
respondent provided no evidence appellant in his capacity as
trustee had control of the litigation and was virtually represented
in the litigation. (Citing Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 486, 517 (Greenspan).)
Section 187 authorizes trial courts to amend a judgment to
add additional judgment debtors. (Greenspan, supra, 191
Cal.App.4th at p. 508.) This is “‘“‘an equitable procedure based
on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add
a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the
real defendant.”’’” (Ibid.) “‘“[T]he greatest liberality is to be
19
encouraged”’ in allowing judgments to be amended to add the
“real defendant,” or alter ego of the original judgment debtor, ‘“in
order to see that justice is done.”’” (Highland Springs, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) “Although the doctrine is most often
applied to corporations, it also applies to trusts.” (Greenspan,
supra, at p. 520.)
An individual can be the alter ego of a trustee. (Torrey
Pines Bank v. Hoffman (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 308, 316 [“these
guarantors, as persons who created, administered, and benefited
from the trust, were the alter egos of the trustees as principal
obligors”]. The alter ego doctrine requires satisfaction of two
elements: (1) a unity of interest and ownership such that the
separate personalities of the corporation (or trustee) and the
individual do not exist; and (2) an inequitable result if the
corporate (or trustee) identity is not disregarded. (Greenspan,
supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 511.)
The required elements were met in this case. Appellant
treated the trust assets as his own, repeatedly asserting he had
sole ownership and control of the Melrose property.9 Thus, there
was a unity of interest and ownership such that the separate
9 During his May 9, 2023 deposition, appellant asserted on at
least seven occasions that the property was his alone, without
once referencing a trust. For example, when asked if he believed
he was the legal owner of the Melrose property, appellant said,
“Any decision as far as the property is concerned … my decision,
my rule, my saying, period.” Later, when asked if he believed he
was the owner of the Melrose property, he said, “since day one of
purchasing the house and the property, since day one, it’s not in
my mind, it’s mine. It’s a hundred percent mine.” Appellant
made similar statements and took this position throughout the
litigation.
20
personalities of appellant as an individual, and appellant as
trustee, did not exist. Appellant had control of the litigation,
thus appellant, in his capacity as trustee, was virtually
represented in the litigation. (Greenspan, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th
at p. 508.)
Further, if the trial court disregarded respondent’s alter
ego theory, it would create an inequitable result. Respecting the
separate identity of the trustee in this case would allow appellant
to shield the Melrose property from respondent and the court.
Appellant obtained the Melrose property by fraud, and
respondent is its true owner. Thus, the legal separation between
appellant as an individual and appellant as the trustee of the
trust should be disregarded. Legal separation between entities
may be disregarded by the alter ego doctrine when the legal
entity is used “to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or
accomplish some other wrongful inequitable purpose.” (Curci
Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 221.)
Appellant’s attempt to use the fiction of legal separation between
himself individually and as trustee in this case is designed to
accomplish a wrongful, inequitable purpose and was rightfully
rejected by the trial court.10
10 Under the circumstances of this case, we reject appellant’s
argument that all trustees must be joined in their representative
capacities for the court to exercise jurisdiction over trust
property. The cases cited by appellant do not support appellant’s
position. In Bank of California, Nat’l. Asso. v. Superior Court
San Francisco (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516, a decedent left legacies and
bequests to a large number of legatees. The decedent’s niece
brought an action to enforce an alleged contract under which the
decedent agreed to leave his entire estate to her. (Id. at p. 519.)
The complaint named as defendants the executor and all the
21
Appellant cites Dill v. Berquist Constr. Co. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444, for the proposition that a judgment
entered against a party not properly before the court is void as a
matter of law. Dill held, “a default judgment entered against a
defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner
prescribed by statute is void.” It does not address the
circumstances before the court in this matter and fails to support
appellant’s position.
We reject appellant’s argument that the judgment was void
because it was entered against the wrong party. As explained in
detail above, the court corrected the judgment and added
appellant in his capacity as trustee of the trust as a judgment
debtor. The court’s actions were valid and effective to allow
respondent to enforce the judgment against appellant as trustee.
IV. Motion to vacate
Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant asserts the motion to
vacate revealed the judgment rested on a time-barred claim,
inconsistent legal theories, and a wrong party defect. While we
have discussed each of these arguments above, we will briefly
address appellant’s arguments in the context of appellant’s
motion to vacate the judgment.
beneficiaries under the will but was served only on the executor
and the residual legatee. (Ibid.) The court discussed the
necessity of joinder of the remaining legatees. The case did not
involve, nor did the court discuss, a trust with more than one
trustee. Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419,
427, also does not stand for the proposition that the failure to join
all trustees is a jurisdictional defect. Appellant has failed to
provide legal authority for this proposition, therefore we decline
to consider it further.
22
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment was filed
pursuant to section 473, subdivision (d), section 663, and
equitable grounds.11
A trial court’s order under section 473, subdivision (d) is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 358, 369.) In the case of a void judgment, “[t]he trial
court’s determination whether a judgment is void is reviewed de
novo; its decision whether or not to set aside a void order is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) Because a motion under
section 663 is designed to enable “‘rectification of a judgment
rendered upon erroneous application of the law to facts,’” it is
reviewed de novo. (Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th
470, 476.)
B. Judgment against appellant as an individual
Appellant first argues judgment was wrongly entered
against him as an individual, although record title was held by
the trust and no trustee was a party to the action. Appellant
argues the trial court adjudicated rights in property owned by a
nonparty, which was beyond the court’s authority.
As set forth in detail above, the trial court did not err in
denying appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment on this
ground. Appellant cites no authority suggesting the trial court’s
judgment was void, therefore we review the trial court’s decision
11 Section 473, subdivision (d) permits a court to correct
clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders and set aside any void
judgment or order. Section 663 allows a court to set aside and
vacate a judgment if there exists an incorrect or erroneous legal
basis for the judgment.
23
to deny appellant’s motion to vacate under the abuse of discretion
s