Marriage of Aghamahmoudi and Darehshiri CA4/1

Filed 10/21/26 Marriage of Aghamahmoudi and Darehshiri CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re the Marriage of Aghamahmoudi and Darehshiri ALIREZA AGHAMAHMOUDI, D084777 Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. HOMEIRA DAREHSHIRI, 18FL004669C) Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Alana W. Robinson, Judge. Affirmed. Homeira Darehshiri, in pro. per, for Appellant. No appearance by Respondent. Homeira Darehshiri appeals from a judgment of dissolution entered on August 9, 2024. She asserts that she suffered a medical emergency during the trial, and that the trial court continued in her absence, violating her right to due process, and that there are numerous errors in the judgment. Darehshiri does not support her arguments with citations to authority or the record. After reviewing the record and considering Darehshiri’s arguments— to the extent that we can decipher them—we conclude that Darehshiri has not met her burden to establish error on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Alireza Aghamahmoudi and Homeira Darehshiri were married first in Malaysia and again in the United States, on or about December 29, 2010. They separated in January 2018. Darehshiri has one child from a prior marriage, but she and Aghamahmoudi did not have any children together. Despite having relatively few assets, the divorce process was lengthy. A. Initial Delays and Bankruptcy Aghamahmoudi filed a petition for dissolution on April 19, 2018.1 Darehshiri filed a request for orders regarding spousal support and attorney fees in June 2018. Originally, the trial court determined that the issues would be heard at trial. However, there were several delays due to changes in counsel, and sometime around March 2021, Darehshiri filed for bankruptcy as to certain debts that were potentially community property. At that point, the court agreed to hold a hearing on spousal support. B. March 3, 2021 Hearing Regarding Spousal Support The trial court held the hearing on spousal support on March 3, 2021. Darehshiri was represented by attorney Denny Kershek. The trial court stayed all remaining matters, other than the request for spousal support, pending Darehshiri’s bankruptcy. Aghamahmoudi presented paystubs as proof of his monthly income. During the hearing, Darehshiri testified that 1 The record indicates that Darehshiri filed a petition for dissolution a month earlier, in March 2018, but that case was dismissed. 2 she was trying to discharge two debts from bankruptcy: a credit card for $19,826 and a car lease for $23,095.2 After hearing testimony from both parties, the trial court ordered Aghamahmoudi to pay spousal support in the amount of $800 per month for one-half the length of the marriage, or three and a half years, from March 2021 to September 2024. C. January 20, 2022 Hearing Regarding Attorney Fees The trial court held another hearing on January 20, 2022, in response to a request for orders filed by Darehshiri. Darehshiri was not represented by counsel. The court denied Darehshiri’s request for attorney fees, because she did not have an attorney and did not submit any documentation regarding fees owed to any prior attorney. In addition, the court denied Darehshiri’s request to finalize the Malaysian/Iranian divorce between the parties because the court found that it had no jurisdiction over a religious ceremony. D. June 10, 2022 Partial Trial At a subsequent hearing on June 10, 2022, attorney Erik Jenkins entered an appearance on behalf of Darehshiri. Jenkins represented to the court that Darehshiri’s bankruptcy had been completed, and that the debts Darehshiri sought to have discharged were in fact discharged. The trial court identified the following disputed issues regarding the division of marital property: Six Persian rugs; jewelry and gold coins that Darehshiri alleged were hers but which Aghamahmoudi sold at a pawn shop; household furnishings; a Union Bank checking account with a balance of $1,460; $2,638 in cash; a 2017 tax refund of approximately $1,800; Aghamahmoudi’s 401(k) 2 The bankruptcy court subsequently dismissed Darehshiri’s bankruptcy petition, and she refiled a new petition shortly thereafter. 3 retirement plan; a lease deposit; debt consolidated into a National Debt Relief debt; two vehicles; a laptop computer; and a $10,000 student loan. Both parties testified regarding the rugs, the pawned items, the Union Bank account, the tax refund, and the lease deposit. The court made factual findings as to the rugs, and assigned three to each party, with an offset of $1,500 credited to Darehshiri. As to the pawned items, the court found that there was contradictory evidence, but that it was undisputed that Aghamahmoudi pawned it during the marriage and, therefore, the court made no finding of reimbursement to Darehshiri. The parties agreed to split the $1,460 value of the Union Bank account and the $1,700 tax refund, and the trial court found there was no credible evidence that Aghamahmoudi had $2,638 in cash. The court found that the lease deposit was made during the marriage, and that Darehshiri still lived in the apartment, and therefore credited $655 to Aghamahmoudi. After addressing the foregoing issues, the court noted that it was 4:30 p.m. and that they would need to break for the day. It stated that the remaining issues included the National Debt Relief debt, the cars, the laptop, the student loan, and Darehshiri’s deferred request for attorney fees. The court set the next trial date for April 14, 2023. The court asked counsel to prepare a partial judgment on the issues that it had ruled on. E. Continuances Throughout 2022 and 2023 Darehshiri filed a motion to set aside the trial order from June 10, 2022, which was heard on October 6, 2022. The court noted that she had also filed an appeal and that the trial court therefore did not have jurisdiction. The court continued these matters until April 14, 2023. On April 14, 2023—the date set for trial—Aghamahmoudi stated that his attorney had informed him that her license to practice law was suspended so he no longer had counsel. Darehshiri was not present because of a medical 4 emergency and the court noted that she had also sought a continuance and accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA). Accordingly, the court continued the trial to November 6, 2023. On November 6, 2023, Darehshiri requested another continuance. The court noted the request was for the same reason and supported by the same letter from a medical provider as the April request. The court suggested taking a short break during Darehshiri’s argument, so that Darehshiri could compose herself. Darehshiri (who was appearing remotely) disconnected and failed to rejoin the hearing, despite the court’s attempts to call her. The court noted that “on one of the phone calls [from the clerk to Darehshiri], a person picked up the phone and identified himself as an EMT.” Aghamahmoudi’s counsel then stated that he wanted “the record to reflect that on April 14, 2023, this was pretty much the exact thing that happened and now it’s happened again.” The court reset the trial date for November 13, 2023. On November 13, 2023, Darehshiri asked for another continuance. She represented that she had retained counsel from Legal Aid, and that she could not proceed on her own because she had an “extreme panic attack” during the last hearing. The trial court stated that it would “grant one last continuance, but [that it needed] the parties to understand that this [would] be the last continuance.” The court set the matter for August 7, 2024, and denied a request from Aghamahmoudi to stay spousal support in the meantime. F. August 7, 2024 Trial There is no transcript concerning the August 7, 2024 hearing. The Findings and Order After Hearing indicates that Darehshiri did not appear in person. It states: “The court does not find good cause for Respondent not appearing in person as was previously ordered. However, the court will proceed today and provide Respondent additional time to formulate her thoughts. The court states these matters have been pending for some time 5 and will be concluded today.” Darehshiri was not represented by counsel. She asked for another continuance, based on the unavailability of a court reporter, which the trial court denied. The trial court then considered Darehshiri’s arguments to set aside the June 10, 2022 orders, as well as a related request for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. The court found Darehshiri’s arguments unpersuasive. It stated that Darehshiri did not identify a basis for the court to set aside the previous orders and noted that she “seems to be re-arguing and blaming her attorney for failing to present evidence which is not a valid reason for a reconsideration motion.” The court denied Darehshiri’s motions. The parties proceeded to argument on the outstanding issues for trial. The trial court granted Darehshiri a 15-minute recess and noted that Darehshiri once again disconnected from the proceedings, and failed to answer several calls from the court clerk. Given the history of the case, the trial court denied any further request for continuance. On August 9, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution. The court reconfirmed its orders of June 10, 2022 regarding the rugs, the pawned items, and the cash. The trial court found Aghamahmoudi’s testimony regarding several remaining items credible and awarded him $480 for the 2017 tax return and $325 for the apartment deposit. It awarded one car to Aghamahmoudi and awarded him a credit for $8,359.78 for post separation payments he made towards the car that remained in Darehshiri’s possession, and an additional credit of $5,434.29 for one-half of the payments he had made towards National Debt Relief. The court found that the laptop at issue had no value. Based on these findings, the court concluded that Darehshiri owed Aghamahmoudi a total of $11,849.07. The court found 6 further that Darehshiri’s student loans were her sole and separate debt. Finally, the court confirmed that Aghamahmoudi would no longer owe spousal support after September 30, 2024. Darehshiri filed a timely notice of appeal. II. DISCUSSION A. General Appellate Principles and Standard of Review We review issues concerning spousal support, division of community property, and imposition of sanctions in a dissolution proceeding for an abuse of discretion. (In re Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.) We review a finding of whether property is separate or community for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842, 849.) “We review factual findings of the family court for substantial evidence, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. [Citation.] In reviewing evidence on appeal, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged in order to uphold the trial court’s finding. [Citation.] In that regard, it is well established that the trial court weighs the evidence and determines issues of credibility and these determinations and assessments are binding and conclusive on the appellate court.” (In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1051–1052.) “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) The burden is on the appellant to establish that the trial court committed error that justifies reversal. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) In doing so, the appellant must adhere to rules of appellate procedure. They must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 7 17, 29 [“It is axiomatic that an appellant must support all statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the record”].) And they must “provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 (Nelson); see In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived”].) Darehshiri’s status as an in propria persona litigant does not lessen her burden on appeal. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) We treat in propria persona litigants like any other party, affording them “ ‘the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Ibid.) As with any other litigant, “[w]e are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for [Darehshiri].” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) “ ‘Nor [are we] required to consider alleged error where the appellant merely complains of it without pertinent argument.’ ” (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.) B. Darehshiri Has Not Met Her Burden to Establish Error Darehshiri raises numerous arguments on appeal. She asserts that the trial court erred by proceeding despite her medical absence; that the trial court improperly reassigned debts that were discharged in bankruptcy; that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence; that the trial court improperly ignored fiduciary breaches and misconduct; and that the trial court failed to resolve all issues. In almost all instances, Darehshiri fails to support her arguments with appropriate citation to the record or cogent legal argument supported by legal 8 authority. Rather than providing citations to specific pages of the voluminous record, Darehshiri routinely cites to the last page of the voluminous Clerk’s and/or Reporter’s Transcript. In other instances, she provides a narrative description of the pleadings she intends to cite but does not provide specific page numbers in the record. Although she does provide some citations to legal authority, in most instances, she fails to explain how the authority applies to the specific facts of this case or to her legal arguments. As a result, Darehshiri has waived her arguments on appeal. (See Nelson, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.) Nonetheless, we will briefly address those arguments to the extent that we are able to decipher them. We turn first to Darehshiri’s assertion that the trial court erred by proceeding despite her alleged medical emergency. Darehshiri contends that she suffered an acute medical emergency requiring emergency transportation (i.e., an ambulance) on August 7, 2024, but she provides no citation or evidence to support this assertion. She argues further that she was unable to present witnesses, but again, presents no evidence or citation to suggest that she had witnesses present. While the record does indicate that Darehshiri did have witnesses with her at a hearing on December 13, 2021 hearing, there is no similar indication on August 7, 2024. Rather, as the trial court explained, Darehshiri appeared remotely, despite the trial court requiring her to appear in person, and disconnected partway through the proceedings, as she had done on two prior occasions. Darehshiri relies on Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389 to assert that the denial of a continuance where a party is absent for medical reasons may violate due process. While we acknowledge that there may be some instances where this is true, Oliveros is not relevant here, and Darehshiri has not established that there was a violation of her 9 right to due process in this case. In Oliveros, the trial court denied a continuance based on counsel having an unexpected conflict with trial in another case, and the appellate court explained, “the court must look beyond the limited facts which cause a litigant to request a last-minute continuance and consider the degree of diligence in his or her efforts to bring the case to trial, including participating in earlier court hearings, conducting discovery, and preparing for trial.” (Id. at p. 1396.) Here, the trial court did just that. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 594, subd. (a) [trial court may proceed to judgment in a party’s absence if the party had actual notice of the hearing].) The court explained that there had been numerous prior continuances, that it had informed Darehshiri at the last hearing that there would be no more continuances and that that trial would go forward, and found that Aghamahmoudi would be prejudiced by another continuance. Moreover, as noted, the trial court had required that Darehshiri appear in person, likely to address any concerns related to her medical or ADA needs. By appearing remotely, despite the trial court’s order, Darehshiri precluded the creation of an adequate record as to her alleged emergency. Next, Darehshiri contends the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, primarily because the trial court credited Aghamahmoudi’s oral statements. “The trial court possesses broad discretion to determine the value of community assets as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented.” (In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 670.) “All issues of credibility are for the trier of fact.” (Ibid.) Darehshiri asserts that Aghamahmoudi made inconsistent statements and did not produce all relevant evidence, but she fails to identify any specific inconsistent statement or unproduced evidence. The trial court 10 reviewed the trial briefs and exhibits, and took testimony from Aghamahmoudi and Darehshiri, when she was present. It then made the appropriate credibility determinations and factual findings. We will not reweigh those findings on appeal. Darehshiri argues further that the judgment is not adequately supported because her medical emergency precluded her from providing testimony on several issues at the August 7, 2024 trial. We have already addressed that contention but note that the judgment does indicate that the trial court did consider Darehshiri’s prior testimony. For example, in the August 9, 2024 judgment, the trial court reconfirmed its earlier ruling regarding the rugs, which it had made at the prior trial after hearing from both parties. Darehshiri next contends that the August 9, 2024 judgment fails to adjudicate multiple issues, including sanctions that the trial court had previously ordered on June 30, 2020. The minute order from the June 30, 2020 hearing indicates that the trial court did not order sanctions; rather, the court stated the parties could address the issue of attorney fees, including sanctions, at trial. The court noted attorney fees and sanctions among the remaining issues following the June 10, 2022 hearing, but because Darehshiri was not present for the entirety of the August 7, 2024 trial, it appears there was no further argument and thus, no further ruling from the court.3 Darehshiri lists several other allegedly unadjudicated issues. Some of those issues—such as the rugs, jewelry, and Union Bank account—are addressed in the August 9, 2024 judgment, and Darehshiri does not establish 3 The record does continue a minute order from March 14, 2024, denying attorney fees under Family Code Section 2030 because “the court does not see a disparity in income.” 11 that the others—such as the alleged fiduciary breaches and request for sanctions—were adequately raised or argued before the trial court. Darehshiri argues that the trial court improperly credited Aghamahmoudi for post-separation payments on community debts that were discharged in bankruptcy. It appears Darehshiri is referring to the National Debt Relief payments. It is not apparent whether, or to what extent, the National Debt Relief payments were related to the debts discharged in bankruptcy. However, it is apparent that Aghamahmoudi did not join in that bankruptcy. Aghamahmoudi testified that he made regular payments for many months (likely before the debts were discharged), as outlined by the agreement with National Debt relief, and Darehshiri does not appear to dispute that testimony. There is also no evidence that Aghamahmoudi received any reimbursement for those payments because of the bankruptcy. Darehshiri has not established that the trial court erred by crediting Aghamahmoudi for the payments he made on community debt during the pendency of the divorce. (See Family Code § 2626 [“The court has jurisdiction to order reimbursement in cases it deems appropriate for debts paid after separation but before trial.”]; In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1272 [family court has broad discretion to award credits for post separation payment of community debts].) Finally, Darehshiri also asserts that she was prejudiced by attorney negligence. She does not provide any specific citations to the record or any 12 authority to support her position.4 As a general matter, the competency of counsel hired by a party in a dissolution matter provides no grounds for reversal. (See, e.g., Chevalier v. Dubin (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 975, 978 [finding no authority to support reversal in a civil case “on the grounds of incompetency of counsel.”]; In re Marriage of Campi (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1574 [“Ineffective assistance of counsel has no place in contested dissolution proceedings.”].) Moreover, Darehshiri had several different attorneys at various points during the litigation and does not identify which attorney she is referring to. Regardless, Darehshiri represented herself by the end of the case, and had the opportunity, both then and when she had other counsel, to submit any additional evidence or testimony she felt necessary. Darehshiri has not established, or even identified, any error based on attorney negligence. 4 Darehshiri refers to a June 30, 2020 order on sanctions. At that time, she was represented by attorney Richard Prantil, who soon after withdrew as her counsel. The minutes from the hearing indicate counsel agreed on a procedure for resolving discovery disputes, and that the issue of attorney fees, including sanctions, could be addressed at the time of trial. 13  III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal. KELETY, J. WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J. BUCHANAN, J. 14