Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. CA4/1

Filed 10/20/26 Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JULIO MAYEN, D086004 Plaintiff and Appellant, v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2023- 00051234-CU-CO-CTL) COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, James A. Mangione, Judge. Affirmed. Julio Mayen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Stinson, Jan T. Chilton and Maxwell Levins, for Defendant and Respondent Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Spencer Fane and Kirby McDonough; Akerman, Parisa Jassim and Jacqueline Foroutan for Defendants and Respondents Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass Through Trust, The Bank of New York Mellon, and Newrez, LLC.  I. INTRODUCTION In October 2023, plaintiff Julio Mayen filed a federal lawsuit asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of securities and consumer protection laws against several entities associated with a loan that Mayen and his wife (Wife) took out to acquire a residence.1 About a month later, Mayen filed the instant lawsuit asserting essentially the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants here demurred on the grounds that (1) another action was pending between the same parties in federal court; (2) Mayen was judicially estopped from suing the defendants because he did not list his claims against them as an asset in any of his three prior bankruptcy proceedings; (3) Mayen failed to join Wife, who, as a co-borrower, was a necessary and indispensable party; and (4) Mayen’s complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to state valid causes of action. In the meantime, the federal district court dismissed Mayen’s federal lawsuit on the same judicial estoppel theory the defendants raised here (i.e., that Mayen had not listed his legal claims as assets in his bankruptcy schedules). The district court entered a judgment of dismissal and the federal appellate court later affirmed. In this case, the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that Mayen failed to join Wife as a necessary and 1 The entities are Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS); Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for the CertificateHolders of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-07, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-07 (BoNYM); and NewRez, LLC doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (NewRez). 2 indispensable party. The court did not reach the other defense theories. The court later entered judgments of dismissal. On appeal, Mayen argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer on necessary and indispensable party grounds, that the other defense theories likewise fail, and that the trial court’s handling of the demurrer proceedings denied him due process. We conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. However, we reach this conclusion on different grounds than the trial court. (See George v. eBay, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 620, 628 (George) [“We ‘will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings.’ ”].) Specifically, applying the res judicata doctrine of issue preclusion (previously known as collateral estoppel), we conclude that the final judgment in the federal lawsuit — based on that court’s finding that Mayen is judicially estopped from asserting the same claims that are at issue in this lawsuit — likewise judicially estops Mayen from asserting those claims here. Because a valid ground supports the trial court’s sustaining of the demurrer without leave to amend, we need not and do not reach Mayen’s challenges to the other defense theories. (See Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 (Aubry) [“The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’ ”].) We do, however, address and reject Mayen’s due process challenges. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 3  II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. Title and Loan Documents On December 30, 2004, Mayen and Wife bought a residential property in Jamul (the Property). The grant deed conveyed title to Mayen and Wife as “husband and wife, as community property.” The same day they acquired the Property, Mayen and Wife also executed a deed of trust, which was recorded in the county recorder’s office. The deed of trust defines the “Borrower” as Mayen and Wife; the “Lender” as defendant Countrywide; and “MERS” as “the beneficiary under” the deed of trust and “as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” The deed of trust expressly provides that the underlying loan, together with the deed of trust, “can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower.” In 2011, MERS assigned the deed of trust and underlying loan to BoNYM. The assignment was recorded with the county recorder’s office. 2 Because this appeal arises from the sustaining of a demurrer, we summarize the facts based on the allegations in Mayen’s pleadings and on matters of which we may take judicial notice. (See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) We grant the following requests for judicial notice: (1) Mayen’s unopposed request filed on November 25, 2025, seeking judicial notice of certain records in Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. et al., pending before this court under case No. D085693 (see Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [authorizing judicial notice of court records]); Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 599, fn. 1); (2) Countrywide’s opposed request filed on August 3, 2026, seeking judicial notice of certain federal court orders (ibid.); and (3) Mayen’s unopposed request filed on August 21, 2026, seeking judicial notice of Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (2026) ___U.S.___ [146 S.Ct. 1532] (Keathley) (see Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a) [judicial notice of federal decisional law is mandatory]). 4  In June 2023, BoNYM began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Property. Mayen asserts the Property sold at a trustee’s sale in October 2023. B. Mayen’s Prior Bankruptcies Mayen filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions on three separate occasions: in February 2013, August 2016, and November 2016. Each petition was ultimately discharged or dismissed. Mayen’s bankruptcy schedules did not list as assets any potential litigation claims against the defendants in this case. C. Mayen’s Other Lawsuits Mayen has filed several other lawsuits in federal and state court regarding the Property and underlying loan. 1. Federal Court In 2013, Mayen filed a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin foreclosure proceedings based on alleged fraud and violations of debt collection statutes. The federal district court dismissed the case on the basis that “in California a plaintiff may not use the courts to test whether the entity initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure has the authority to do so.” In 2017, Mayen sued the loan servicer for alleged violations of debt collection laws. The federal district court dismissed the case, finding Mayen was judicially estopped from asserting the claims because he failed to list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules. Mayen appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. In October 2023, Mayen filed a federal lawsuit against the defendants in this case, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, 5 “violation of SEC rules and regulations,” and “violation of federal consumer protection law.” In June 2024, the federal district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding Mayen was judicially estopped from asserting the claims because he failed to list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules. Mayen appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. We will refer to this lawsuit as the “parallel federal lawsuit.” We describe it in greater detail in part III.B.1., post. 2. State Court In October 2023, Mayen filed a complaint in state court asserting a single cause of action to quiet title to the Property as against Countrywide, MERS, and BoNYM. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend on “two independent bas[es]”: (1) Mayen failed to join Wife, who was a necessary and indispensable party; and (2) Mayen failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action because he did not allege he had paid the outstanding loan balance, as is required in an action by a borrower seeking to quiet title as against a lender. The court entered judgments of dismissal in 2024. Mayen appealed and that case is pending before us in case No. D085693. D. This Lawsuit 1. The Complaint In November 2023, Mayen filed this lawsuit in state court asserting essentially the same claims against the same defendants regarding the same loan on the same property as in the parallel federal lawsuit. For his first cause of action, Mayen alleged that Countrywide “and all others by and through them” breached a fiduciary duty owed to Mayen by 6 “[f]ail[ing] to provide access to the original documents as promised in the mortgage agreement.” The second cause of action similarly alleged that Countrywide “and all others by and through them” breached their contract by “[f]ailing to provide access to the original documents as per Plaintiff’s request,” “[r]efusing payment without proper justification or explanation,” and “[f]ailing and refusing to adjust the alleged balance monthly for every month that the contract . . . [was] not produced.” In his third cause of action, “Mayen allege[d] a violation of SEC rules and regulations based state laws” by “[l]ack[ing] transparency in securitization processes” and operating under “[m]aterial conflicts of interest among participants in the securitization process.” For his fourth cause of action, “Mayen assert[ed] a claim for violation of consumer protection laws against both Countrywide . . . and all others by and through them” for their alleged “[u]njust refusal of payment without legal basis” and “[f]ailure to provide access to the original loan documents as promised.” Mayen also purported to allege a cause of action for declaratory relief that was derivative of his substantive causes of action, and for “injunctive relief” and “compensatory damages.” 2. The Demurrer The defendants demurred to Mayen’s complaint on the grounds that: (1) another action was pending in federal court involving the same claims and parties; (2) Mayen was judicially estopped from asserting the claims raised in this lawsuit because he did not list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules; (3) Mayen failed to join Wife as a necessary and indispensable 7 party; and (4) Mayen failed to state valid causes of action (e.g., because lenders generally do not owe borrowers a fiduciary duty, Mayen failed to allege the material terms of the contract at issue, securities laws do not apply to lenders, and Mayen failed to identify applicable consumer protection laws). The defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of certain publicly recorded documents (the deed of trust, the assignment of the deed of trust, and nonjudicial foreclosure records) and court filings in Mayen’s bankruptcy and federal cases. Mayen opposed the demurrer. As relevant, he argued (1) the pending parallel federal lawsuit did not bar this lawsuit; (2) the defendants had neither “substantiated their claims of judicial estoppel, nor . . . provided evidence of a prior adjudication that would bar [Mayen]’s current claims”; (3) Wife was not a necessary and indispensable party because she “relinquished her interest in the property”; and (4) the “allegations, while complex due to the nature of the transactions involved, are set forth with sufficient clarity” and detail. 3. The Tentative Ruling On September 20, 2024, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the defendants’ request for judicial notice, sustaining the demurrer on the basis of the pending parallel federal lawsuit, and staying this case pending the outcome of the federal case. 4. The Parties’ Responses to the Tentative Ruling Five days after the court issued its tentative ruling, the defendants filed a supplemental request for judicial notice of recent filings in the parallel federal lawsuit. These filings showed that the federal district court dismissed 8 Mayen’s complaint with prejudice on judicial estoppel grounds and denied Mayen’s motion for reconsideration of that ruling. The next day, Mayen filed an “opposition” to the trial court’s tentative ruling. Mayen argued the tentative ruling misapplied jurisdictional and comity principles. He further argued that the federal court’s procedural dismissal on judicial estoppel grounds did not satisfy res judicata or judicial estoppel principles. 5. The Demurrer Hearing The trial court heard joint argument on the demurrer in this case and Mayen’s quiet title case on October 9, 2024. Mayen repeatedly interrupted the court throughout the hearing. During argument regarding this case, the defense requested that, in light of the recent dismissal of the parallel federal lawsuit, the trial court rule on the merits of their demurrer (rather than based on the pendency of another action between the parties). Mayen responded that he intended to appeal the ruling in the federal case. Mayen explained he had been more focused on his quiet title action. He also expressed concern that it was “proving to be a little difficult to enlighten the court” because the court had not been reviewing his filings “throughout the case.” The trial court took the matter under submission. 6. The Trial Court’s Ruling On November 8, 2024, the trial court entered a minute order granting the parties’ requests for judicial notice and sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The court found that Wife, “as a co-signer on the Promissory Note and co-owner on the Deed of Trust, is a necessary and indispensable party.” The court “disregard[ed]” Mayen’s argument that Wife relinquished her interest in the Property because the claim was “not contained within the 9 pleadings and is contrary to the properly noticed Promissory Note and Deed of Trust.” The trial court entered judgments of dismissal on December 18, 2024. III. DISCUSSION A. Demurrer Standard of Review In reviewing a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer, “ ‘we examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ ” (John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013.) “ ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ’ ” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) “We also consider matters that may be judicially noticed and facts appearing in any exhibits attached to the complaint.” (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 400; see Evans, at p. 6; Code Civ. Proc.,3 § 430.30, subd. (a) [a demurrer lies “[w]hen any ground for objection to a complaint . . . appears . . . from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice”].) “[A] demurrer may be sustained where judicially noticeable facts render the pleading defective [citation], and allegations in the pleading may be disregarded if they are contrary to facts judicially noticed.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 751–752 (Scott); see Evans, at p. 6 [“ ‘ “[A] 3 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 10 complaint otherwise good on its face is subject to demurrer when facts judicially noticed render it defective.” ’ ”].) “In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.” (Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752; Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879–880 (Cantu).) “ ‘We will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings.’ ” (George, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 628; see Scott, at p. 752 [“We will affirm the ruling if there is any ground on which the demurrer could have been properly sustained.”]; Cantu, at p. 880, fn. 10 [“If another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrers even if the trial court relied on an improper ground, whether or not the defendants asserted the proper ground in the trial court.”].) We review the trial court’s denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. (See Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) “The onus is on the plaintiff to articulate the ‘specifi[c] ways’ to cure the identified defect.’ ” (Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145; see Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 890.) 11  B. The Judicial Estoppel Finding in the Parallel Federal Lawsuit Precludes Mayen From Relitigating the Issue in This Case and Bars His Claims As stated above, the federal district court dismissed Mayen’s parallel federal lawsuit on the basis that he was judicially estopped from asserting those claims because he failed to list them as assets in his bankruptcy schedules. The defendants contend that the federal court’s finding of judicial estoppel precludes Mayen from relitigating the issue here. We agree. To be clear, we conclude Mayen is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of judicial estoppel; we do not reach the merits of the underlying judicial estoppel claim, which was fully and finally litigated in the parallel federal lawsuit. 1. Background As noted, in October 2023 — about a month before he filed this lawsuit — Mayen sued the defendants in this case in federal court asserting the same causes of action as here: breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, “violation of SEC rules and regulations,” and “violation of federal consumer protection law[].” Mayen’s substantive allegations are essentially the same in both cases. The defendants moved to dismiss the federal lawsuit on the ground (among others) “that judicial estoppel bars th[e] entire case because [Mayen] did not disclose his instant claims in any of his three prior bankruptcy cases.” Mayen opposed the motion. The federal district court granted the motion with prejudice on judicial estoppel grounds. As the federal court explained, “Under the judicial estoppel doctrine, ‘[w]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal 12 proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.’ ” (Citing New Hampshire v. Maine (2001) 532 U.S. 742, 749.) The court then noted that judicial estoppel applies in the bankruptcy context to prevent debtors from later asserting legal claims they failed to disclose as assets in their bankruptcy schedules or reorganization plans. (Citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (9th Cir. 2001) 270 F.3d 778, 783 (Hamilton) [“In the bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure statements.”]; Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dept. of Transp. (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 267, 271 [“In the bankruptcy context, the federal courts have developed a basic default rule: If a plaintiff-debtor omits a pending (or soon-to-be-filed) lawsuit from the bankruptcy schedules and obtains a discharge (or plan confirmation), judicial estoppel bars the action.”].) The federal district court then found that the requirements of judicial estoppel were met. First, Mayen “asserted inconsistent positions in his three bankruptcy cases and the instant case by not disclosing any claims against the Defendants in his bankruptcy schedules despite his knowledge of the underlying events preceding those bankruptcies.” The court reasoned that Mayen’s knowledge of the claims preceded his bankruptcy petitions because his claims arose from Countrywide’s 2011 assignment of the deed of trust, yet the earliest of his bankruptcy petitions was filed in 2013. Second, the federal court “determine[d] the bankruptcy court accepted [Mayen]’s position by granting automatic stays for the duration of his three 13 bankruptcies even if each bankruptcy case was eventually dismissed.” (Citing Hamilton, supra, 270 F.3d at p. 784 [“Our holding does not imply that the bankruptcy court must actually discharge debts before the judicial acceptance prong may be satisfied. The bankruptcy court may ‘accept’ the debtor’s assertions by relying on the debtor’s nondisclosure of potential claims in many other ways.”]; Sharp v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014, No. 14-CV-00831-LHK) U.S.Dist. LEXIS 124096, at *15–*17 [explaining the granting of automatic stays is sufficient to meet judicial acceptance prong]; Swendsen v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014, No. 2:13-CV-02082-TLN-CKD) 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 37780, at *17–*19 (Swendsen) [same].) Third, the federal court concluded Mayen “derived an unfair advantage by receiving the benefit of automatic stays without disclosing all of his potential assets.” (Citing Swendsen, supra, 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 37780, at *17 [“The law in this area is clear: a plaintiff who has received the benefit of an automatic stay . . . would receive an unfair advantage by prosecuting claims against a defendant after failing to disclose those claims in his bankruptcy proceedings.”].) Having concluded that judicial estoppel barred Mayen’s claims, the federal court determined that “amendment would be futile.” Accordingly, the court dismissed Mayen’s claims with prejudice and entered judgment against him. Mayen moved the federal court to reconsider its dismissal ruling. The court denied the motion. Mayen appealed the federal district court’s rulings dismissing his complaint and denying reconsideration. (See Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (9th Cir., June 4, 2026, No. 24-6421) 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 16325, 14 at *3.) The federal appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the judicial estoppel criteria: “Mayen does not contest the district court’s conclusion on the first factor: that Mayen ‘asserted inconsistent positions in his three bankruptcy cases and the instant case by not disclosing any claims against the [d]efendants in his bankruptcy schedules.’ And the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining, with respect to the second and third factors, that ‘the bankruptcy court accepted [Mayen]’s position by granting automatic stays for the duration of his three bankruptcies’ and that Mayen ‘derived an unfair advantage by receiving the benefit of automatic stays without disclosing all of his potential assets.’ That Mayen did not obtain plan confirmation or discharge in his bankruptcy cases, does not mean that the district court abused its discretion in this respect.” (Ibid., citing Hamilton, supra, 270 F.3d at pp. 784–785.) 2. Relevant Legal Principles “The law of preclusion helps to ensure that a dispute resolved in one case is not relitigated in a later case.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326.) “Issue preclusion,” previously known as collateral estoppel, “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings); see Samara, at p. 327.) “[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings, at p. 825; see Samara, at p. 327.) “Even if these threshold requirements are satisfied, courts may consider the public policies underlying issue preclusion in determining 15 whether the doctrine should be applied. [Citation.] These policies include ‘conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation.’ ” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 686–687 (Meridian Financial), quoting Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 879.) We may affirm on the basis of issue preclusion even if the issue was not raised in the trial court. (See George, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 628; Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 930, 941 [“collateral estoppel may be raised for the first time on appeal when . . . the judgment in the other action becomes final pending appeal and there was thus no opportunity to raise the issue in the trial court”].)4 We review the issue de novo. (Meridian Financial, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 684.) 3. Analysis We conclude that issue preclusion applies because all of its threshold requirements are satisfied and its underlying public policy principles support its application here. 4 Although the judgment in the parallel federal lawsuit technically became final before this appeal commenced, we conclude the defendants did not have a meaningful opportunity to raise the issue in the trial court. The federal court entered judgment months after the defendants filed their demurrer and just days before they filed their reply brief in the support of the demurrer. (See Weil & Brown et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶7:122.9 [“The court may disregard arguments or grounds for demurrer first raised in a reply brief.“].) In any event, Mayen raised preclusion principles in his “opposition” to the trial court’s tentative ruling. 16  First, the judgment in the parallel federal lawsuit is final because it has not been reversed on appeal — to the contrary, it has been affirmed on appeal. (See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc. (9th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 923, 928 [“ ‘[I]n federal courts, a district court judgment is “final” for purposes of res judicata.’ [Citation.] This is so even during the pendency of an appeal.”]; Lumpkin v. Jordan (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1230 [“ ‘A federal judgment “has the same effect in the courts of this state as it would have in a federal court.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The federal rule is that ‘ “a judgment or order, once rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal or modified or set aside in the court of rendition.” ’ ”]; cf. Lumpkin, at p. 1231, fn. 5 [“Under California law, a [state court] judgment is not final for purposes of collateral estoppel while open to direct attack, e.g., by appeal.”].) Therefore, the federal court judgment is final whereas the judgment in this case is not. (See Sosa, at p. 928 [“Like the federal courts, California courts recognize the rule that where parallel litigation is pending in different tribunals, the first case to reach final judgment is accorded preclusive effect, regardless of the order in which the cases were filed.”].) Second, the issue subject to issue preclusion here is identical to the issue in federal court: whether Mayen is judicially estopped from asserting his claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of securities and consumer protection laws because he failed to disclose those claims in prior bankruptcy proceedings. Third, the issue of judicial estoppel was “actually litigated and necessarily decided in the [federal] suit.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “For purposes of collateral estoppel, an issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding.” (Hernandez v. City of 17 Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511.) These requirements are readily met. The defendants properly raised judicial estoppel in their motion to dismiss the parallel federal lawsuit. The issue was submitted to the district court for determination. And the district court determined that judicial estoppel applied and dismissed Mayen’s lawsuit solely on that basis. Fourth, and finally, issue preclusion is being “asserted against one who was a party in the first suit” — Mayen. (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 825.) We therefore conclude that all the requirements for applying issue preclusion are satisfied here. We likewise conclude that the public policy principles underlying issue preclusion support its application here. Invoking the federal court’s judicial estoppel determination to prevent Mayen from relitigating that issue here will “ ‘conserv[e] judicial resources and promot[e] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation.’ ” (Meridian Financial, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 686–687.) Indeed, as detailed above, this is Mayen’s fifth lawsuit against the same defendants (or their privies) regarding the same loan for the same real property. Applying issue preclusion here will promote judicial economy. Mayen resists issue preclusion by attacking certain aspects of the underlying judicial estoppel issue. This line of attack is misguided. First, Mayen argues the trial court here “misapplied judicial estoppel” by “treat[ing] a non-merits federal dismissal as substantive proof . . . requiring dismissal.” This argument fails, however, because the trial court did not apply judicial estoppel or accept the federal court’s judicial estoppel 18 finding. Rather, the trial court found only that Mayen failed to join a necessary and indispensable party. Second, it is immaterial to our analysis that the federal court dismissed the parallel federal lawsuit on judicial estoppel grounds without reaching the underlying merits of Mayen’s individual causes of action. Courts routinely apply issue preclusion when an earlier resolution of an issue disposes of a claim without reaching the underlying merits of that claim. (See, e.g., MIB, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 228, 234–235 [holding that, although prior findings that a court lacked jurisdiction over a party was not preclusive “on the merits of the underlying cause of action,” the findings on those jurisdictional facts were preclusive on the question of jurisdiction in a later case]; Sabek, Inc. v. Engelhard Corp. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 992, 998–999 (Sabek) [same]; Meridian Financial, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 697–703 [affirming the trial court’s finding that a party’s unclean hands as a defendant in an earlier case judicially estopped that party from asserting claims as a plaintiff against a different party in a later case].) Third, Mayen argues the federal court misapplied judicial estoppel by finding that he obtained a sufficient benefit from his bankruptcy petitions even though all the proceedings were ultimately dismissed. (See Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 138–139 [noting that “California courts have held that judicial estoppel bars an action where the plaintiff failed to disclose a legal claim in a prior bankruptcy case,” but concluding the doctrine does not apply where the only advantage obtained was the benefit of the automatic bankruptcy stay].) This argument is “misplaced, however, because a prior judgment is preclusive even when there are doubts about its correctness.” (Meridian Financial, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 701; see 19 Sabek, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 999 [“ ‘ “[a]n erroneous judgment is as conclusive as a correct one” ’ ”].)5 In other words, we are not concerned here with the correctness of the federal court’s resolution of the judicial estoppel defense; we are concerned only with the fact that Mayen fully litigated that defense in the parallel federal lawsuit such that he is now collaterally estopped from relitigating it here. We note, further, that the correctness of the district court’s resolution of this issue has withstood federal appellate review. (See Mayen v. New Penn Financial, LLC (9th Cir., Feb. 27, 2024, No. 19-55996) 2024 U.S.App LEXIS 4509, at *1–*2.) Mayen also takes issue with our application of issue preclusion. His challenges, however, reflect a misunderstanding of demurrer review standards. For example, Mayen suggests we cannot affirm the judgment on a different ground than the trial court relied in sustaining the demurrer. He cites no authority to support this suggestion. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions.”].) And, as noted above, case law squarely holds that we can affirm the judgment on any valid legal theory. (See George, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) 5 Mayen cites the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Keathley regarding judicial estoppel in bankruptcy proceedings. (See Keathley, supra, ___ U.S.___, ___ [146 S.Ct. at p. 1539].) Keathley held only that the “inadvertence or mistake” prong of judicial estoppel requires the court to consider “the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the debtor]’s failure” to disclose legal claims in bankruptcy schedules. (Id. at p. ___ [ 145 S.Ct. at p. 1540.) In so holding, the Keathley court cited Ah Quin with approval. (Ibid.) The federal court cited Ah Quin in its order dismissing Mayen’s case on judicial estoppel grounds. Therefore, Keathley does not alter the outcome here. 20  In a related example, Mayen argues that applying judicial estoppel via issue preclusion does not overcome the trial court’s allegedly erroneous finding that Mayen failed to join a necessary and indispensable party. But we need not find that the trial court’s reasoning was correct on every ground on which it relied. (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 967.) To the contrary, it is Mayen’s burden as the appellant to show that the trial court’s ruling cannot be sustained on any valid legal theory — even theories the trial court did not invoke. (See ibid.; George, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Mayen has not met his burden to overcome our conclusion that issue preclusion applies here. Mayen asserts a variety of other challenges to the judgment and to the application of judicial estoppel via issue preclusion. We have considered these challenges and conclude they either lack merit or are irrelevant because they relate to the trial court’s necessary and indispensable party finding, which is not our basis for affirming the judgment. For example, Mayen contends the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of publicly recorded real property records to establish Wife’s interest in the Property for purposes of finding her a necessary and indispensable party. This contention is irrelevant in light of our issue preclusion holding. Notably, Mayen does not argue the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the federal court records that support our application of judicial estoppel via issue preclusion. Such a challenge would fail, in any event. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [authorizing judicial notice of “[r]ecords of . . . any court of record of the United States”]; City of Oakland v. Hassey (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1492, fn. 10 [taking judicial notice of a federal court order interpreting the same contract]; Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tecolote Investors, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 166, 185 [“It is well accepted that when courts take judicial notice of the 21 existence of court documents, the legal effect of the results reached in orders and judgments may be established.”].) In sum, we conclude that issue preclusion bars Mayen from relitigating the federal district court’s finding that he is judicially estopped from asserting the claims in this lawsuit against these defendants. Because Mayen cannot plead around this defect, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying him leave to amend. C. Mayen Received Due Process Mayen contends the trial court’s handling of the demurrer proceedings denied him due process in a variety of ways. Mayen’s examples of alleged due process violations are unconvincing. Mayen faults the trial court for declining to review the “opposition” he filed to the court’s tentative ruling. But the authorities Mayen cites to support the proposition that “[c]ourts must consider timely-filed submissions material to the issue before them” do not support the proposition. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306 [stating that evidence at law-and-motion hearings must be by declaration or request for judicial notice unless leave is granted to present live testimony; it imposes no duty to consider a written opposition to a tentative ruling]; Moles v. Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 870 [holding that an appellate court justice who did not hear oral argument cannot participate in the final deci