Kleidman v. Shah CA6

Filed 11/13/26 Kleidman v. Shah CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PETER KLEIDMAN, H052143 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 2013-1-CV247406) v. NITIN SHAH et al., Defendants and Respondents. In 2013, self-represented plaintiff Peter Kleidman filed a cause of action for fraud against a number of defendants, including Nitin Shah (defendants).1 In March 2015, during the pendency of the case, a document entitled “Settlement and Release Agreement” (agreement) was executed, which purported to settle all claims between Kleidman and defendants. Kleidman subsequently disputed the validity of the agreement, and following substantial litigation, including the filing of additional lawsuits and several appeals by Kleidman, defendants jointly filed a cross-complaint in 2021 for breach of contract arising of Kleidman’s alleged failure to abide by the terms of the agreement. On May 8, 2024, the trial court granted defendants’ joint motions for summary judgment on their 1 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the following opinions from the previous appeals filed in the same underlying trial court case, Kleidman v. Shah et al. (Jun. 29, 2020, H042565 [nonpub. opn.]. ) and Kleidman v. Feeva Technology, Inc. (Apr. 27, 2021, H041738 [nonpub. opn.].) cross-complaint and dismissed the entire action in full. Kleidman now appeals the final judgment and dismissal, and challenges the validity and enforceability of the agreement. Further, on February 11, 2026, after the completion of briefing but prior to oral argument, defendants jointly filed a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure2 section 391 et seq. requesting that Kleidman either be ordered to furnish security to maintain the appeal, based on his prior designation as a vexatious litigant by three other courts, or, in the alternative, that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety. For the reasons explained below, we deny defendants’ motion, but find no merit to Kleidman’s claims and affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 A. Original Lawsuit and Operative Complaint In 2009, Kleidman invested $250,000 into defendant startup Feeva Technology, Inc. Feeva ran out of funds in 2010 and sold its remaining assets through an assignment for the benefit of creditors. In October 2014, Kleidman filed a fourth amended complaint for fraud against defendants Feeva Technology Inc., several of Feeva’s former corporate officers and directors including Nitin Shah, Robert Quist, David Becker, Don Lloyd Cook, EJ Von Schaumburg, Michael Maidy, Timothy Cox, Martin Pichinson, and Bernie Murphy, and various corporate entities that had been involved in Feeva’s management, including Becker Legal Group LLC (BLG), Bridge and Post, Inc., Sherwood Partners LLC, Sherwood Management LLC, and FeevT (Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors), LLC. In his complaint, Kleidman alleged that Feeva did not receive reasonable value for the sale of assets and he should have received some return on his initial investment. 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 “We draw the facts recited here from the parties’ separate statements of undisputed material facts, evidence admitted in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment, and admissions in the parties’ appellate briefs.” (Kim v. County of Monterey (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 312, 316.) 2 B. Execution of Agreement While the complaint remained pending, the parties attended a one-day mediation session in March 2015. At the conclusion of mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement that purported to settle the entire case, which was formalized into a comprehensive written agreement. The agreement, which was executed on March 25, 2015, stated that it was entered into by Kleidman and all of the defendants named in Kleidman’s action plus Feeva’s insurer, U.S. Specialty Insurance Company (USSIC). The agreement required USSIC and Sherwood Partners to each contribute $95,000 to Kleidman for a total settlement amount of $190,000. The agreement further provided that within five days of the effective date of the agreement, Kleidman was to dismiss his action against defendants “with prejudice, including without limitation as to all Parties to this Agreement” including “any and all appeals” and also to dismiss with prejudice an appeal in another case in the Ninth Circuit. Kleidman was also required to release defendants from any further claims and never again institute any claim against them. In turn, defendants were required to “release and forever discharge” Kleidman “from any and all Claims” they “ever had, now have, or may have, from the beginning of the world to the date of this Agreement … .” Each defendant was also required to release each of the other defendants from any claims against one another. The agreement further provided as follows: “Each Party represents and warrants that: (a) he or it has obtained all necessary approvals or authorizations required to consummate the covenants, releases and conditions of this Agreement. … Each person executing this Agreement on behalf of a Party further represents and warrants that he or she has obtained all necessary approvals or authorizations to execute this Agreement on behalf of that Party. [¶] … [D]uly authorized persons on behalf of each of the undersigned have executed this Agreement….” Kleidman personally signed the agreement, as did defendants Becker, Shah, Cook, and Von Schaumburg. Cook also signed on behalf of Bridge and Post, Inc. as its “Acting 3 General Counsel.” Becker additionally signed on behalf of Becker Legal Group, LLC, as “Managing Member.” Jonathan Gaskin, Feeva’s attorney, signed the Agreement for Feeva Technology, Inc. as Feeva’s “Legal Representative.” Bernie Murphy signed the Agreement on his own behalf and “For” Pichinson, Cox, and Maidy. Murphy also signed for Sherwood Partners LLC as “Senior Managing Director”, and for Sherwood Management LLC, and FeevT (Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors), LLC as their “Authorized Legal Representative.” Alan L. Martini, Quist’s attorney, signed the Agreement for Quist. Stephen Schaffer signed on behalf of USSIC as its “Authorized Representative.” Defendants also indicated that Kleidman signed the agreement after all the other parties. In his separate statements, while Kleidman did not dispute that a document was signed on March 25, 2015, at the conclusion of mediation, Kleidman disputed any facts regarding the contents and signatures, and argued that the document was not a valid settlement agreement with any legal effect because contract formation never occurred. After the agreement was fully executed, defendants claimed that Kleidman partially performed by providing Sherwood Partners and USSIC with his W-9 tax form as set forth in paragraph 1 of the agreement, which Kleidman disputed. However, on March 30, 2015, Kleidman sent an e-mail to defendants entitled “Revocation,” which read: “I have changed my mind about the settlement and I hereby revoke what I signed on March 25, 2015.” C. Enforcement of Agreement and First Appeal On April 10, 2015, defendants jointly filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6.4 Kleidman opposed the motion on the grounds that 4 This section provides the following: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may 4 not all the parties had personally signed the document. In May 2015, the trial court granted the section 664.6 motion, ordered Kleidman to comply with the terms of the agreement, and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Kleidman subsequently appealed from the judgment, arguing that the trial court lacked the power to grant the section 664.6 motion because not all parties had personally signed the agreement. A different panel of this court agreed that because the agreement was between Kleidman and all of the defendants, the defendants could not seek enforcement of the agreement under section 664.6 unless they had all personally signed the agreement. (Kleidman v. Shah et al., supra, H042565 [nonpub. opn.].) This court therefore reversed the judgment of dismissal. (Kleidman, supra, H042565.) D. Proceedings on Remand 1. Filing of Cross-Complaint and Subsequent Litigation Following remand, the parties stipulated on September 20, 2020, that they would stay all proceedings regarding the merits of the underlying case pending “a methodology to litigate the validity and enforceability” of the agreement. On July 21, 2021, the parties filed a written stipulation agreeing that defendants would file a cross-complaint regarding the validity and enforceability of agreement, and would be permitted to move for summary judgment on the cross-complaint after the time for Kleidman’s response was due. The parties further agreed that Kleidman would be permitted to respond to the cross-complaint, and the parties would be able to litigate the validity and enforceability of the agreement without waiving or negatively impacting their rights or remedies regarding other proceedings on the underlying merits of the case. Shortly before the parties filed the written stipulation, this court issued its opinion in another pending appeal filed by Kleidman in the same underlying case, where dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (§ 664.6, subd. (a).) 5 Kleidman challenged USSIC’s authority to appoint Kaufhold Gaskin LLP (KG) to represent Feeva in the absence of a tender from Feeva. (Kleidman v. Feeva Technology, Inc., supra, H041738 [nonpub. opn.].) This court found no merit to Kleidman’s claim and concluded that USSIC’s insurance contract with Feeva allowed USSIC to associate in the defense of any claim even without a tender. (Kleidman, supra, H041738.) Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, defendants jointly filed a cross-complaint on September 14, 2021, for breach of the agreement and declaratory relief. In the cross- complaint, defendants alleged that the agreement remained valid and enforceable, even if not through the mechanisms provided under section 664.6, and Kleidman had breached the agreement by refusing to perform the conditions provided, including refusing to dismiss the underlying action and initiating further litigation and appeals against defendants. Defendants further alleged that they had performed all terms and conditions as provided under the agreement, including tendering the settlement payment. In his response filed on April 1, 2022, Kleidman raised three affirmative defenses: (1) Quist lacked capacity to sue because he was now deceased; (2) USSIC should be joined as a party: and (3) there was another action pending under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c), namely, Santa Clara Superior Court case No. 21CV384873. 2. Motions for Summary Judgment a. Defendants’ Motion On November 28, 2023, and November 29, 2023, defendants filed motions for summary judgment on their cross-complaint. Defendants argued that there was no triable issue of material fact on the validity and enforceability of the settlement agreement because it satisfied all requirements of contract formation as follows: (1) Kleidman and all defendants expressly represented they had the authority to sign and consummate the agreement; (2) Kleidman’s participation in mediation and signature on the agreement after all other parties and their authorized representatives had signed, as well as his subsequent revocation e-mail referencing the agreement, reflected his consent to the 6 terms therein; (3) settlement of the underlying case was a lawful object of the agreement; and (4) Kleidman received satisfactory consideration under the agreement, namely, $190,000 and releases by all defendants of any potential claims against him. Defendants also alleged that they had performed under the agreement because they had not filed any claims against Kleidman or each other, and USSIC had made a $95,000 payment to Kleidman within the time period specified in the agreement. Defendants further claimed that Kleidman initially performed under the agreement by providing his W-9 form, but subsequently breached the agreement after sending his revocation e-mail on March 30, 2015, by failing to dismiss the underlying law action, initiating new appeals and actions against defendants, and not abiding by the express terms of the agreement. Lastly, defendants argued that Kleidman had not asserted a valid basis to challenge the agreement, because he presented no facts or evidence reflecting any condition in the agreement that all the parties sign before the agreement was effective, and had in fact waived such an argument by being the last signatory; further, none of his affirmative defenses were meritorious. In support of their motions, defendants submitted declarations from the following individuals: Gaskin, Becker, Cook, Shah, Von Schaumburg, Cox, Pichinson, Murphy, Maidy, and Quist. In their declarations, Gaskin, Cook, Shah, Von Schaumburg, and Murphy stated that they were personally present at the mediation, signed the agreement on their own behalf or, for Gaskin, Cook and Murphy, on behalf of other defendants whom they were authorized to represent, witnessed Kleidman signing the agreement, and witnessed the other parties present signing the agreement either on their own behalf or on behalf of the defendants they represented. Quist declared that while he had been present initially in the mediation, he had to leave early and therefore authorized his attorney, Martini, to sign any settlement on his behalf, a fact that was attested to by the other parties personally present at the mediation. Becker declared that while he was not personally present at the mediation session, he appeared by telephone standby and signed 7 the settlement on behalf of himself, as well as on behalf of BLG, for which he was the managing member. Cox and Pichinson declared that while they could not be personally present, they had both authorized Murphy to attend and execute any settlements on their behalf Maidy similarly declared that: (1) he was the Managing Member of Sherwood Partners, LLC and Co-President of its successor entity, Sherwood Partners, as well as the manager of Sherwood Management, LLC, and FeevT; (2) he could not be personally present at mediation; and (3) he had authorized Murphy to attend and execute a settlement both on his (Maidy’s) personal behalf as well as on behalf of the four named entities, who were all named defendants. In conjunction with their motions, defendants also requested that the trial court take judicial notice of several documents, including but not limited to the following: (1) an order issued by the Northern District of California in Kleidman v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015, No. 5:14–CV–05158-HRL) 2015 WL 556409 dismissing Kleidman’s federal lawsuit against USSIC on the grounds that Kleidman lacked standing to challenge USSIC’s assumption of Feeva’s defense and appointment of KG; (2) an order issued by the Northern District of California in Kleidman v. Murphy et al. (N.D. Cal. September 25, 2023, No. 22-CV-06355-HSG ) 2023 WL 6232562, finding Kleidman to be a vexatious litigant and dismissing Kleidman’s complaint against Murphy, Gaskin, Maidy, Pichinson, Cox, Sherwood Partners, Inc., USSIC, Leslie Quist (the wife of Robert Quist), Chief Justice Guerrero, Administrative Presiding Justice Lui, and Administrative Presiding Justice Greenwood on the basis that Kleidman’s claims were repetitive and therefore barred by res judicata; and (3) this court’s prior opinion in Kleidman v. Feeva Technology, Inc., supra, H041738 [nonpub. opn.], finding that USSIC was authorized to associate in Feeva’s defense and appoint KG to represent Feeva. b. Kleidman’s response In opposition, Kleidman argued that there was a triable issue of material fact regarding the validity of the agreement because the eleven “putative representative 8 capacity signatures” did not validly bind the individuals that the signers purported to represent. Kleidman specifically claimed that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether certain defendants properly delegated the ability to settle to the representatives who signed on their behalf. Kleidman also reiterated his claim that USSIC was not authorized to appoint KG to represent Feeva, arguing that even though this issue had been previously litigated and decided, it now needed to be looked from a different “legal lens” based on the burden of proof required in a summary judgment motion. Kleidman further contended that there were no “outward manifestations” of his consent to the agreement, nor did he receive any benefit of the bargain from the contract, particularly when he revoked his consent within days of signing and refused to accept or endorse the settlement checks issued to him. Kleidman also contended that he only viewed the settlement as an offer to enter into an agreement, and he therefore retained the right to revoke his consent until the contract was validly formed. Kleidman additionally claimed that his failure to object to the validity of any signatures at the time of signing did not constitute a waiver of this issue at a later date, because he believed the time limit for challenging such validity was dictated by the relevant statute of limitations. c. Defendants’ reply In reply, defendants claimed that none of the arguments presented by Kleidman reflected that there were triable issues of material fact. Defendants noted that any subjective beliefs or understanding Kleidman had about whether the agreement was merely an offer to settle, or his ability to challenge the signatures at a later date, were irrelevant to the issue of whether his actions objectively manifested his consent to the agreement. Defendants further argued that Kleidman did not have the ability to revoke after he had consented to and signed the agreement, and that he erroneously placed no significance on the legal effect of his signature. Finally, defendants contended that Kleidman’s challenges to the validity of the signatures did not create triable issues of material fact because the evidence as presented in the motions for summary judgment 9 demonstrated that certain defendants had authorized agents to execute a settlement on their behalf, and Kleidman failed to demonstrate that such delegation was invalid. 3. Hearing and Order On March 12, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Prior to the hearing, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In its ruling, the trial court concluded that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kleidman, defendants had provided sufficient evidence to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment for their breach of contract claim. The court also found that Kleidman had not presented any evidence of a triable issue of material fact because there was undisputed evidence of his consent to the agreement and his intent to be bound by its terms at the time of signing, and his challenges to the authority of designated agents to agree to a settlement on behalf of certain defendants had already been litigated and decided. The court further rejected Kleidman’s contention that he believed the agreement was an offer to settle, not an actual settlement agreement, based on his objective actions during mediation and at the time of signing, as well as his own words in his revocation e-mail that he had changed his mind about the settlement—thus reflecting an awareness that this was not merely an offer. In granting the motions for summary judgment, the trial court also indicated that defendants were entitled to specific performance of the agreement. At the hearing, Kleidman objected to the trial court’s tentative ruling, and made several evidentiary objections on several grounds to the declarations submitted by defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment. After noting his objections for the record, the court adopted its tentative ruling as a formal order, which was filed on March 12, 2024. A final judgment was filed on May 8, 2024, reflecting the court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment, ordering specific performance of the agreement, and dismissing the entire action with prejudice. Kleidman timely appealed. 10  II. DISCUSSION A. Defendants’ Section 391 Motion As a preliminary matter, we address defendants’ motion requesting that Kleidman be required to either furnish security to maintain his appeal, or, in the alternative, that the instant appeal be dismissed outright as meritless and solely intended to harass or cause delay. 1. Brief Procedural Background On October 11, 2024, after Kleidman filed his notice of appeal from the final judgment, defendants filed their first motion pursuant to section 391.1 requesting that Kleidman be ordered to furnish security in the amount of $240,000 as a prerequisite to maintaining his appeal. In their motion, defendants claimed that Kleidman had been designated as a vexatious litigant in three other courts, including the Northern District of California, the Santa Clara County Superior Court, and the Los Angeles County Superior Court, based on him “routinely misus[ing] the court system to impose unwarranted costs for meritless claims.” Defendants further argued that Kleidman’s instant appeal was meritless, given that his only argument was that he “changed his mind” after signing the agreement, but did not contest that he had in fact signed and brought no claims challenging the validity of his signature. Because Kleidman was represented by counsel at the outset of his appeal, this court denied defendants’ motion on January 6, 2025. After the completion of briefing, but prior to oral argument, Kleidman’s counsel substituted out of the matter on December 10, 2025, and Kleidman chose to represent himself moving forward. On February 11, 2026, defendants filed a renewed motion pursuant to section 391.1, asking for a stay in proceedings and an order that Kleidman be ordered to furnish security in the amount of $225,000 as a prerequisite to maintaining his appeal. In their motion, defendants argued that Kleidman’s counsel had simply been acting as a “front” for Kleidman, given that the style of writing and formatting of the opening and reply 11 briefs were substantively identical to several prior filings that Kleidman had filed while representing himself. Defendants further contended that after Kleidman’s counsel substituted out of the matter in December, Kleidman made no attempts to retain new counsel, thus suggesting that he had only retained counsel to satisfy procedural requirements and was “pulling the puppet strings” all along. As Kleidman allegedly had no reasonable probability of success on the merits of the appeal, defendants therefore asserted that he should be required to furnish security, particularly given his prior vexatious litigant designation and his history of filing excessive litigation pertaining to the validity of the same settlement agreement, all of which had been previously denied. In addition, because Kleidman was now self-represented, defendants alternatively asked that Kleidman’s appeal be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to section 391.3, subdivision (b), on the basis that his appeal was meritless and solely intended to harass or cause delay. Defendants argued that Kleidman had managed to “sidestep” pre-filing inspection and other vexatious litigant requirements by retaining counsel to file his appeal, then substituting counsel out after the matter was briefed and ready for a decision on the merits. Defendants further contended that Kleidman had previously petitioned for permission to appeal the same underlying issue on three prior occasions, all of which were denied by this court, thus demonstrating that the current appeal was solely brought to harass defendants and delay conclusion of litigation. In conjunction with their motion, defendants filed a request for judicial notice of several documents, including court filings from the three other court proceedings where appellant was declared to be a vexatious litigant, as well as prior orders from this court dismissing appellant’s claims on substantially the same issues raised in the instant appeal regarding the validity of the parties’ March 2015 settlement agreement. Kleidman opposed defendants’ motion, citing many of the same arguments raised in his opening and reply briefs regarding the merits of his appeal; he also opposed the request for judicial notice on the following bases: (1) the request did not comply with the 12 Rules of Court; (2) none of the documents appear in the record on appeal; (3) the documents are not relevant to the merits of the appeal, or the issue of whether appellant has a reasonable probability of success on the merits (as required under section 391.1); and (4) the documents were not contained in respondents’ separate statements. Upon comparing the documents submitted by defendants in their request for judicial notice with the record on appeal and arguments made in the parties’ briefing, we concluded that scope of an evidentiary hearing was indistinguishable on the unique circumstances of this case from the scope of oral argument, and deemed oral argument to be heard along with defendants’ joint motion pursuant to section 391. 2. Applicable Legal Principles A vexatious litigant is one who: “In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person … .” (§ 391, subd. (b)(1).) “Litigation,” for purposes of determining vexatious litigant status, means “any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court.” (§ 391, subd. (a).) This includes appeals and writ petitions. (McColm v. Westwood Park Assn. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1211.) A defendant in pending litigation may move for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security on the ground the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and has no reasonable probability of prevailing against the moving defendant. (§ 391.1, subd. (a).) After such a motion is filed, the litigation is stayed pending a hearing. (§ 391.6.) If, after a hearing, the court finds for the defendant, it must order the plaintiff to furnish security. If the plaintiff does not do so, the action will be dismissed. (§ 391.3, subd. (a); see also Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1170.) Alternatively, a defendant in pending litigation may also move to dismiss the case pursuant to section 391.3, subdivision (b), on the basis that the litigation has no merit and has been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay. (§§ 391.1, subd. (a); 391.3, subd. 13 (b).) However, such a remedy only applies to litigation filed by a vexatious litigant already subject to a prefiling order pursuant to section 391.7 who was represented by counsel at the time the litigation was filed but became self-represented after the withdrawal of his or her attorney. (§ 391.3, subd. (b).) 3. Analysis In the instant case, defendants do not request that we make a finding in the first instance that Kleidman is a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 391.7. Kleidman also does not dispute that he has been previously found to be a vexatious litigant in other court proceedings. Therefore, the only question we must address is whether Kleidman’s appeal has no reasonable probability of success such that he should either be required to furnish security to proceed forward, or, alternatively, the matter should be dismissed as meritless. However, given that the appeal is resolved in full by the instant opinion, we conclude that we need not determine whether defendants are entitled to either of their requested remedies. 5 In making this determination, we do not take lightly the fact that three other courts have found Kleidman to be a vexatious litigant and subjected him to prefiling orders. However, we also note that when defendants filed their second motion pursuant to section 391 in February 2026 after Kleidman’s counsel substituted out, the matter had already been fully briefed, and oral argument was scheduled. While we recognize that the statutory scheme of section 391 allows defendants to file a motion for relief at any time in pending litigation, we are also cognizant that the current motion was considered by this court late in the history of this appeal. In addition, given our inherent power under the California Constitution to control judicial proceedings, we find that reaching the merits at this late stage will ensure the prompt and efficient administration of justice. (See Kinney 5 Indeed, during oral argument, defendants’ counsel addressed this procedural issue and conceded (as did Kleidman) that if this court were to reach the merits of the appeal and affirm the lower court’s order, defendants’ motion would essentially be moot. 14 v. Clark (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 724, 740 [acknowledging a court’s inherent powers under section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure to “do whatever is necessary and appropriate, in the absence of controlling legislation, to ensure the prompt, fair, and orderly administration of justice”].) Therefore, as the merits of the appeal have already been addressed and resolved in full by the instant opinion, we deny without prejudice6 defendants’ motion for security, or alternatively, dismissal of the litigation, as moot. B. General Principles Regarding Summary Judgment and Standard of Review A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (§ 437c, subd. (a)(1).) A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A plaintiff or cross-complainant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that each element of” the “cause of action” in question has been “proved,” and hence that “there is no defense” thereto. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar); see also § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “Once the plaintiff or cross- complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ ” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850, fn. omitted).) 6 This denial is made without prejudice if defendants find it necessary to file a subsequent motion if Kleidman chooses to engage in further litigation in this appeal. 15  “In ruling on the motion, the court must ‘consider all of the evidence' and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn therefrom [citation].” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) In considering the parties’ evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, the court “strictly scrutinize[es]” the declarations submitted by the moving party and “liberally constru[es]” those offered by the opposing party, and it “resolv[es] any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the opposing party’s] favor.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 (Saelzler); see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) We review de novo the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 767, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) In so doing, we “view the evidence in a light favorable to … the [opposing] party [citation], liberally construing [the opposing party’s] evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing [plaintiffs’ or cross-complainants’] own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the opposing party’s] favor.” (Saelzler, supra, at p. 768.) We then independently determine whether the evidence establishes either that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or that there is a dispute on a material point that requires a trial to resolve. (CSAA Ins. Exchange v. Hodroj (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 272, 276.) Although our review is de novo, it remains Kleidman’s burden, as the appellant, to affirmatively show error. (Villalobos v. City of Santa Maria (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 383, 388.) Accordingly, we direct our attention to Kleidman’s appellate contentions and do not ourselves “ ‘ “cull the record for the benefit of the appellant … to attempt to uncover … triable issues.” ’ ” (Golightly v. Molina (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1519; see also Helm v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1228, fn. 5; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.) 16 C. Cause of Action for Breach of Settlement Agreement Defendants filed a cross-complaint against Kleidman for breach of the agreement. “ ‘A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles [that] apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.’ [Citation.] Its validity is thus ‘judged by the same legal principles applicable to contracts generally.’ ” (Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1585 (Stewart).) The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract include: “(1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.” (CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1239.) Accordingly, the plaintiff, or cross-complainants as in this case, must first establish the existence of a valid contract, which requires proof of the following: parties who are capable of entering into contract, their mutual consent, a lawful object, and sufficient cause or consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550; see also Stewart, supra, at pp. 1585–1586.) D. Analysis In challenging the court’s order granting summary judgment, Kleidman raises 27 issues on various legal grounds. For conciseness and clarity, we shall divide these issues into two main categories as follows: (1) Kleidman contends that the settlement agreement was not a valid and enforceable contract, in part asserting that eleven signatures in the agreement by agents other than the named defendants were unauthorized; and (2) Kleidman argues that portions of the final judgment are in violation of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore unenforceable and/or void. 17  1. Existence of a Valid Contract a. Defendants Met Their Burden to Demonstrate There Was a Valid Contract, and Kleidman Did Not Offer Evidence Reflecting a Triable Issue of Fact as the Contract’s Validity As stated above, to establish the existence of a valid contract, four elements must be proven: (1) parties who are capable of entering into contract; (2) their mutual consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) sufficient cause or consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550; see also Stewart, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1585–1586.) The undisputed facts in the record establish the following: the parties through their respective agents participated in a full day mediation in March 2015, and at the conclusion of the mediation, they signed the agreement, which purported to be a full resolution of the case. In addition, the settlement agreement on its face demonstrated that each element of a valid contract had been satisfied. It identified Kleidman and all defendants by name, facially evidenced mutual consent by specifically stating that all the parties thereto were in agreement with the terms therein, had a lawful object of resolving all pending litigation, and contained sufficient consideration in the form of the $190,000 payment to Kleidman in exchange for him dismissing all pending claims and not filing future lawsuits, and similar releases by each defendant against Kleidman and one another. Further, the agreement contained the following language immediately before the signatures lines: “NOW, THEREFORE, duly authorized persons on behalf of each of the undersigned have executed this Agreement as of the [March 25, 2015] date first above written.” Accordingly, we find that defendants established the existence of a valid contract, thus shifting the burden to Kleidman to demonstrate that there was a triable issue of material fact as to the contract’s validity. Kleidman claims that there was no mutual consent because he believed that the agreement was merely a proposal or offer to settle, which he was entitled to revoke at any time prior to acceptance pursuant to Civil Code section 1586, and did in fact revoke in his 18 March 30, 2015, e-mail. Yet even viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to Kleidman, we find no merit to his contention that his subjective belief demonstrates a lack of mutual assent. “Mutual assent to contract is based upon objective and outward manifestations of the parties; a party’s ‘subjective intent, or subjective consent, therefore is irrelevant.’ ” (Stewart, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587.) Defendants’ motion and supporting evidence established from the face of the agreement that there was mutual assent by all parties to enter