In re M.C. CA4/2

Filed 10/28/26 In re M.C. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re M.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E087809 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2400347) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v. Q.X., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge. Affirmed. 1  Michelle D. Pena, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Minh Tran, County Counsel, and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Defendant and appellant Q.X. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating dependency jurisdiction over her two children, M.C. and E.C.; granting sole legal and physical custody to their father, R.C. (Father); and ordering monitored visitation for her. Mother argues that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to provide her with reasonable services by failing to ensure that visits took place when the children did not want to visit with her. She also argues that the exit order granting her monitored visitation improperly delegates to the children the court’s discretion to determine whether visits will occur. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Jurisdiction and Disposition—M.C.’s Removal from Both Parents Mother and Father are the parents of two children, 14-year-old M.C. and her younger brother, 13-year-old E.C. Mother and Father were married in China in 2011, moved to California, and divorced in 2019. They lived separately, shared custody of the children, and had a liberal arrangement whereby the children lived with one of them for roughly a month at a time. M.C. was diagnosed with autism 2 spectrum disorder and began receiving services around the time she was four years old. The family came to DPSS’s attention on July 21, 2024, when the agency received a referral alleging neglect of M.C. by Mother after a bystander found M.C. wandering alone near a busy intersection in Murrieta. M.C., who appeared to the bystander to have special needs, explained that she was walking to her father’s house because she could not find her mother when she woke up that morning. The bystander contacted law enforcement. When the police arrived, M.C. gave them Father’s address, and they returned her to his care. About two weeks later, when the social worker was able to make contact with Mother and interview her about the incident, Mother said that she had attended a retreat out of town but had told Father before she left to pick M.C. up from her house. She said that she had turned her phone off at the beginning of her trip to get some rest and that she thought she was being scammed when she later saw the messages from law enforcement and DPSS. Initially, DPSS believed that the children could be protected without juvenile court intervention, with a safety plan and voluntary family maintenance services for both parents. As its investigation progressed, however, the agency determined that court intervention was necessary. In October 2024, DPSS filed out-of-custody petitions for M.C. and E.C. under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that there was a substantial risk the children 3 would be neglected by both parents.1 DPSS recommended allowing both children to remain in the parents’ care with family maintenance services. The following month, DPSS filed an amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b), and recommended removing M.C. from both parents. The petition alleged that: (1) both parents neglected M.C.’s mental health needs by failing to enroll the child in services to address her behavioral issues and developmental delays; (2) both parents engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the children; (3) Mother left M.C. unattended in her home on at least two occasions; (4) Mother had unresolved mental health issues, including diagnoses of anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder for which she was not taking medication or under a doctor’s care; and (5) Father locked M.C. in her bedroom and restrained her to the bed when he would leave his house, in a misguided attempt to keep the child safe. On November 22, 2024, the juvenile court detained M.C. from both parents and found that DPSS made a prima facie showing that both children came within section 300. The court ordered supervised visits with M.C. for the parents twice a week, for two hours. Regarding M.C.’s placement, the court ordered DPSS “to take all efforts, even if they are extraordinary, to make sure that [M.C. is] placed in a suitable family-style foster home environment.” 1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 4  Placement in a foster home proved to be difficult due to M.C.’s tendency to become aggressive with her caregivers and their children, and she spent the majority of the time leading up to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on psychiatric holds or at an emergency shelter. On January 29, 2025, a psychiatrist at Children’s Mental Health recommended modifying M.C.’s medications and avoiding further hospitalizations, if possible, as they were destabilizing for the child. Father visited with M.C. regularly during this period, and their interactions were positive and loving. M.C. and Father would cry and hug each other, and Father would encourage her to listen to the adults caring for her and avoid violent behavior. M.C. would express to Father how much she loved him and wanted to live with him. Mother visited with M.C. only a few times and often had to be redirected because she was talking negatively about Father. In addition, when the social worker would update Mother about M.C.’s progress and location, Mother appeared more interested in complaining about Father and her finances than about her daughter’s situation. The social worker made an unannounced visit to Father’s home on January 25, 2025 to interview E.C. The child reported that he had no concerns about living with Father and that he only wanted to see Mother on Sundays. He said that he “does not like the man, David, who helps [Mother] at her house.” He said that Mother had been late or failed to pick him up from school three or four times. 5  In an addendum report submitted on January 30, 2025, DPSS continued to recommend that M.C. be removed from both parents. The social worker observed that Mother “fixate[d] on the Father’s actions” and “frequently divert[ed] the conversation regarding the children’s care and safety or services to repetitive recounting of previous [alleged] abuse by Father over the course of their relationship.” The social worker believed that Father “appear[ed] to be more consistent in presenting to visitation and engaging [M.C.] in a controlled setting” but added that it was “still unclear” whether he was “prepared to address [M.C.’s] needs and behaviors in the community and at home.” The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place on February 5, 2025. The juvenile court found the amended petition’s allegations true, declared the children dependents, removed M.C. from both parents, and allowed E.C. to remain in the parents’ care. The court ordered family reunification services for both parents for M.C. and family maintenance services for both parents for E.C. The court approved the “step-up” plan for Father that DPSS recommended and M.C.’s counsel agreed with, whereby his visits, if successful, would transition from supervised to unsupervised and extended. The court set the six-month review hearing for August 7, 2025. B. Supplemental Petition and Removal of E.C. from Mother In March 2025, Dr. Kenneth Garrett conducted psychological evaluations of Mother, Father, and M.C. Regarding Mother, Dr. Garrett opined that therapy would be “ ‘essentially unproductive’ ” because she spent most of the session 6 “ ‘blaming, angry, and presenting herself as a victim.’ ” He also expressed a concern that if Mother were given unsupervised visitation with the children, “ ‘she would spend a great deal of the time badmouthing the father which would not help in any way in stabilizing this situation.’ ” He identified her probable diagnoses as major depressive disorder moderate, generalized anxiety disorder, and unspecified personality disorder (turbulent type with histrionic and narcissistic features). Dr. Garrett identified M.C.’s probable diagnoses as autism, attention deficit disorder (mixed type), and intermittent outbursts. He recommended that she attend regular psychiatric appointments and enroll in specialized education. Regarding Father, Dr. Garrett did not identify any current probable diagnosis but did identify as a past probable diagnosis major depression “due to situational divorce.” Dr. Garrett opined: “ ‘In general, [Father] seems to be coping well with the idea of being the primary parent of his children at this point and has dedicated himself full-time to that endeavor. Beyond that I don’t have any recommendations for mental health services currently. He will probably need some form of behavioral modification training to cope with some of [M.C.’s] behavioral issues moving forward.’ ” On May 13, 2025, DPSS authorized M.C. to be placed with Father. Less than a month later, DPSS filed a section 387 supplemental petition on behalf of E.C., alleging that the previous disposition had not been effective because Mother failed to address her unresolved mental health issues and her behavior toward the child was placing him at substantial risk of emotional harm. 7 In the detention report, DPSS informed the court that Mother had behaved inappropriately during her visits with both children and that redirection was unsuccessful. Mother believed that M.C. had live bugs on her face and would pick at the child’s face while also telling the child negative things about Father. As a result of this behavior, multiple visits with M.C. had to be terminated. E.C. reported that mother would ask him why he does not want to see her anymore, and that she told him to tell people he does not have a mother. He also reported that Mother often texted on her phone while she was driving with him in the car. On multiple occasions, Mother told the social worker that E.C. was “ ‘too fat’ ” and that M.C. was ugly and used to be pretty. In texts to the social worker, she would refer to her children as “ ‘the fat boy and ugly girl’ ” and would refer to M.C. as a “ ‘crazy dirty girl’ ” and to E.C. as a “ ‘BIG, FAT boy.’ ” Mother was also overheard during visits telling M.C. that she was ugly and showing M.C. a photograph of E.C. and saying that he was fat now but had not been when he lived with her. Mother posted a photograph of E.C. on social media with a caption in Mandarin that, when translated to English, said he “looked like a homeless boy and smelled terrible.” On May 1, 2025, Mother texted the social worker that she was having suicidal thoughts. She stated, “ ‘I am trying to kill myself almost every single day! But I trying my best to [stay] alive for my KIDs I have my loved ones! And you guys help the Bad man come back and get away my kids back to him …. So I don’t trust any one that close to him either! No way for me to trust the social 8 worker team and attorney and judge, court also! I think all you guys are trying to trap me again! It’s not safe at all for me!’ ” The social worker responded by encouraging Mother to seek professional help and providing her with referrals to a therapist and the phone number for a suicide and crisis hotline. Mother replied with a lengthy text that mostly complained about Father. On May 7, the social worker learned that Mother was seeking a restraining order against Father in family law court, alleging that Father was harassing her and neglecting M.C. In support, she submitted a photograph of M.C.’s bare chest to a family law court as proof that Father was not ensuring that M.C. wore a bra. In the photograph, someone besides Mother can be seen holding up M.C.’s shirt. The social worker believed that the Mother’s allegations against Father were unfounded and was concerned that she was “campaigning against the Father” in an attempt to circumvent the juvenile court and “gain custody of the children.” On May 27, after one of her visits with M.C. was cancelled due to her inappropriate behavior, Mother texted the social worker that she would no longer visit her children. On May 30, E.C. appeared upset after a visit and told the social worker that Mother had said he “looked homeless.” Despite Mother’s statement that she no longer wanted to visit with the children, the social worker continued to offer her visitation. During a visit with both children on June 3, Mother refused to speak with the children, then said she was not feeling well and ended the visit early. 9  Mother’s therapist reported to the social worker that she had a difficult time getting Mother to focus on her mental health and parenting issues during sessions because Mother only wanted to discuss her issues with Father. The therapist also reported that Mother appeared to lack the ability to gain insight. A psychiatrist had prescribed Lexapro and Prazosin for Mother. The social worker reported that “Mother presents as agitated, excitable, and obsessive over the father having custody of the children, the [physical] condition of her children, and depicts the father as evil and abusive. She consistently sends me pages of texts in which she will make comments about her children’s appearances, which have proven to be inaccurate or exaggerated…. She has continued to accuse father of abusing and harassing her with no proof of this. [She] has been directed and re-directed to … enjoy the children and interact positively, but she is unable or unwilling to cease behaviors such as examining and complaining about their appearance and care, calling them names, speaking about the case, or speaking negatively to them about their father.” At the detention hearing on June 4, 2025, the juvenile court found that Mother was engaging in “an ongoing pattern of inappropriate comments … directed toward [E.C.] that would affect his emotional well-being” and detained E.C. from her. In its jurisdiction and disposition report, DPSS recommended removing E.C. from Mother’s care and ordering family reunification services. Mother’s visits during this period generally did not go well. During a June 5 visit, Mother would not talk to E.C. and let him spend the entire visit on the 10 couch alone. E.C. appeared unhappy and asked to leave the visit early. Although Father brought him to visits, E.C. refused to attend the next three visits with Mother, on June 10, 12, and 16. During a July 1 visit, M.C. asked Mother if she was crying, and Mother replied that she cried “everyday” because M.C. was not with her. After the visit, Father informed the social worker that E.C. had come home “confused and anxious” about a card Mother had given him, which read, “ ‘Happy 4th [E.C.] I hope the lawyers are working hard to get you home. From David.’ ” Father said that when David was not staying with Mother, he was unhoused. The social worker again advised Mother not to talk about placement with the children, and Mother responded with a lengthy text in which she accused DPSS of taking her children away from her and questioning the agency’s right to look at the “ ‘private gift’ ” she had given to her children. On July 4, Mother texted the social worker, “ ‘I want to kill myself everyday, my [M.C.] and [E.C.] is the reason I [am] alive[], and you guys help bad person to kill me!’ ” Again, the social worker encouraged Mother to reach out to her therapist and also provided her with resources. When the social worker reported Mother’s behavior to her therapist, the therapist responded that Mother had denied experiencing suicidal thoughts and said her medication was working. The juvenile court held the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearings on the supplemental petition on July 25, 2025. The court found the petition’s allegation against Mother true and found by clear and convincing evidence that removal of E.C. from her care was necessary to protect the child’s emotional 11 wellbeing. Although E.C. was in Father’s custody, the court ordered reunification services for Mother.2 C. Six-month Review Hearing and Return of M.C. to Father In advance of the six-month review hearing on the initial section 300 petition, DPSS filed a status review report recommending that M.C. be returned to Father’s care with family maintenance services. The social worker reported that Father was benefitting from services, his case plan was almost complete, and he was “making great strides in parenting.” M.C. was receiving in-home applied behavior analysis services three days a week for three hours at a time. She was attending a nonpublic school where she received specialized education and had an individualized education plan. School staff reported that M.C.’s behavior was improving and she was less aggressive. She was seeing a psychiatrist regularly for medication management. Her current prescriptions (Guanfacine, Benztropine, Haloperidol, and Sertraline) were designed to reduce agitation and assist with mood stabilization and attention disorder. Father was “diligent about ensuring [M.C.] attends her many appointments.” The six-month review hearing took place on August 7, 2025. The juvenile court found that Father’s progress had been substantial and that return of M.C. to his custody would not create a substantial risk of harm. The court ordered M.C. returned to his custody with family maintenance services. Although at this point 2 Because E.C. remained in Father’s custody, Mother was not entitled to reunification services. (In re Pedro Z. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 19 (Pedro Z.).) 12 both children were now in Father’s custody, the court ordered reunification services for Mother for both children. The court reduced Mother’s supervised visits to two, one-hour visits per week, and authorized DPSS to terminate her visits if she behaved inappropriately. The court set a family maintenance review hearing pursuant to section 364 and ordered DPSS to assess the appropriateness of terminating jurisdiction. D. Twelve-month Review Hearing and Termination of the Dependency On December 11, 2025, DPSS submitted a status review report recommending that the juvenile court terminate the dependency and grant sole legal and physical custody to Father. Both M.C. and E.C. were doing well in Father’s home, and E.C. was meeting his developmental milestones. The social worker described Father’s relationship with M.C. as supportive, validating, patient, and easy-going. During this reporting period, both children refused to visit with Mother on multiple occasions. Prior to each scheduled visit, the children were brought to DPSS’s office to meet with Mother, and when they expressed resistance, DPSS staff would talk to them and try to encourage them to attend the visit. When the children refused an in person visit, DPSS tried to conduct the visit over a video call so that the children could discuss their wishes with Mother. Father and the social worker encouraged M.C. to visit with Mother, and M.C. attended a Zoom video visit on her birthday in November. Both children refused in person visits in 13 December, so the social worker arranged for Zoom video visits on December 2, 9, and 11. At a visit on December 16, 2025, M.C. wore a hat with her own artwork taped onto it. Mother removed the art from the hat, threw the art in the trash, and pointed at M.C.’s chest and told her to wear a bra. M.C. was upset after the visit, and the next day at school, she engaged in aggressive behavior toward her classmates, which was something she had not done in “quite some time.” At the next visit, M.C. appeared uncomfortable and anxious, rocking in her chair, picking at her fingers, and taking deep breaths. On December 22, 2025, the juvenile court authorized DPSS to provide Mother with visitation in a therapeutic setting. In an addendum report filed on January 29, 2026, DPSS informed the court that Mother had terminated her individual counseling sessions after she read her therapist’s progress report. DPSS continued to recommend terminating the dependency and granting sole physical and legal custody of the children to Father. The social worker reported that Father was cooperative with DPSS and continued to benefit from services, whereas Mother still blamed DPSS and Father for the juvenile court’s involvement with her family and still appeared to suffer from unresolved mental health issues. On February 4, 2026, the juvenile court held the 12-month, family maintenance review hearing under section 364. Mother provided the following stipulated testimony: “If Mother were to testify, Mother would say that she is asking the Court to return both minors to her care today. She has substantially 14 completed her case plan, and most of her visits with the children have gone well. She is committed to providing a safe environment for both children.” Mother’s counsel argued that DPSS “failed to provide [Mother] with reasonable services” because it “failed to provide her with consistent and meaningful visitation” despite the fact that “no articulable safety issue [had been] identified.” Father’s counsel, counsel for M.C., and counsel for E.C. agreed with DPSS’s recommendation to terminate the dependency, grant sole physical and legal custody to Father, and grant monitored visitation to Mother. The court found that DPSS provided Mother with reasonable services and that Mother failed to benefit from those services. The court also found that the conditions justifying the initial assumption of jurisdiction over E.C. and M.C. no longer existed and were not likely to exist if supervision was withdrawn. The court ordered termination of jurisdiction over each of the children upon the filing of a family law exit order granting sole legal and physical custody of the children to Father and monitored visitation for Mother “one time per week for a two-hour visit as a minimum.” Regarding Mother’s visitation, the court ordered that it was “to be supervised by a paid professional monitor at Mother’s expense, and that “the minors’ wishes will be taken into consideration as it relates to that visitation.” The custody order in the final judgment filed on March 2, 2026 stated: “Mother’s supervised visits to occur one time per week for 2 hours supervised by paid professional monitor at mother’s expense. Minors’ wishes to be taken into consideration.” 15  Mother filed a timely appeal. DISCUSSION A. Reunification Services Mother argues the court erred by finding at the 12-month, family maintenance review hearing that DPSS provided her with reasonable services. She asserts that the record demonstrates that DPSS allowed the children to refuse visits instead of “ensuring visits occurred when they would otherwise be safe.” According to Mother, DPSS’s failure to provide reasonable services and the court’s finding that DPSS did provide such services “prevented her from reunifying with the children before jurisdiction was terminated.” Mother’s argument lacks merit because she was not entitled to reunification services for either child by the time of the 12-month, family maintenance review hearing. At such a hearing, the issue is not reunification but whether the dependency may safely be terminated. “At the jurisdiction stage of a dependency proceeding, the court determines whether the child is a person described by section 300. [Citations.] If the juvenile court finds a basis to assume jurisdiction, the court is then required to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition for the child. [Citations.] Typically, once the child has been adjudged to be a dependent child … , the juvenile court determines what services the child and family need to be reunited and free from court supervision. [Citations.] The court then sets a review hearing, which must be held within six months, to evaluate the family’s circumstances and 16 decide whether continued dependency jurisdiction is necessary.” (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 205-206 (Destiny D.), fn. omitted.) Section 16507 provides that “[f]amily reunification services shall only be provided when a child has been placed in out-of-home care, or is in the care of a previously noncustodial parent under the supervision of the juvenile court.” (§ 16507, subd. (b).) Section 361.5 sets out the circumstances under which a juvenile court may, must, and must not order reunification services. (§ 361.5; see generally In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141.) That provision “is inapplicable when at the disposition hearing” or—as here—at a later review hearing “a child is returned to the custody of a parent.” (In re Pedro Z. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 19 (Pedro Z.); In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 636; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2024) § 2.129[2], pp. 2-554.) “[W]hen the child remains in a parent’s home, the court reviews the status of the case every six months under section 364; under such review, the court is not concerned with reunification, but in determining ‘whether the dependency should be terminated or whether further supervision is necessary.’ ” (Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) “This is so because the focus of dependency proceedings ‘is to reunify the child with a parent, when safe to do so for the child. (§§ 300.2, 361.5, subd. (a), 16507.)’ [Citation.] The goal of dependency proceedings—to reunify a child with at least one parent—has been met when, at 17 disposition [or a later review hearing], a child is placed with a former custodial parent and afforded family maintenance services.” (Pedro Z., at p. 20.) Under section 364, subdivision (c), “the juvenile court must terminate dependency jurisdiction unless either the parent, the guardian, the child, or the social services agency establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions justifying assumption of jurisdiction exist or will exist if supervision is withdrawn. Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing at the review hearing, termination of dependency jurisdiction will be the ‘default result.’ ” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1155–1156, italics added; see also Destiny D., 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 207 [observing that the Legislature has “grant[ed] the juvenile court broad authority to enter orders to protect a dependent child and to reunite the family and terminate jurisdiction as quickly as possible”].) Once the child has been safely placed in the custody of one parent, the lack of visitation with the noncustodial parent is not a proper basis for continuing dependency jurisdiction. (See In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 111–112 [juvenile court properly terminated jurisdiction where children were safe in the mother’s care even though one child was refusing visits with the father and their relationship had deteriorated]; In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1500, disapproved on other grounds in In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 204 [where child was safely placed with father, visitation issues and conflict between parents did not justify continuing jurisdiction].) 18  As these principles demonstrate, Mother was not entitled to reunification services for E.C., because E.C. remained in Father’s custody when the court removed the child from Mother’s care. (§§ 361.5, 16507, subd. (b); Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 19.) For the same reason, after the court returned M.C. to Father’s care at the six-month review hearing, Mother was no longer entitled to services designed to reunify her with M.C. Although the court was not authorized to order reunification services for Mother at either of those junctures, it could have, in its discretion, authorized DPSS to provide “enhancement” services for her. Section 362—the provision that requires the court to order family maintenance services for the custodial parent—authorizes the court to “make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child.” Courts have interpreted that provision as authorizing courts to order discretionary or enhancement services to the noncustodial parent. (E.g., Destiny D., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) Enhancement services are “ ‘not designed to reunify the child with that parent, but instead to enhance the child’s relationship with that parent by requiring that parent to address the issues that brought the child before the court.’ ” (In re A.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636, 642, fn. 5, italics added.) The fact that Mother received reunification services for longer than she was legally entitled to them constitutes an unexpected benefit. Section 364 provides no authority for a juvenile court to assess a parent’s reunification efforts at a family maintenance review hearing. Instead, the issue before the court is whether any party has shown, by a preponderance of the 19 evidence, that the conditions justifying assumption of jurisdiction over the dependent child still exists or will exist if supervision is withdrawn. Because no such evidence was presented at the children’s family maintenance review hearing, the juvenile court correctly determined that termination of the dependency was required. Mother’s challenge to the court’s reasonable services finding fails because she was not entitled to reunification services. B. Visitation Mother argues that, in fashioning the family law exit orders, the juvenile court improperly delegated to the children the discretion to decide whether visitation will occur. We disagree. Upon the termination of dependency jurisdiction over a child, “section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent order.’ When making a custody determination under section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513, fn. omitted; see § 362.4; In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 862-865.) “ ‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody [and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case (§ 362.4).’ [Citation.] We review the juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of that discretion.” (In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112-113.) 20  The juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur and may not delegate the power to grant or deny visitation to any other party, like a social worker, a therapist, or the child. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009 (Christopher H.); In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317 (S.H.).) “The court may, however, delegate discretion to determine the time, place and manner of the visits.” (Christopher H., at pp. 1008- 1009.) Thus it is “[o]nly when the court delegates the discretion to determine whether any visitation will occur” that “the court improperly delegate[s] its authority and violate the separation of powers doctrine.” (Ibid.) As noted above, the custody order/final judgment (which was printed on Judicial Council for JV-200) states: “Mother’s supervised visits to occur one time per week for 2 hours supervised by paid professional monitor at mother’s expense. Minors’ wishes to be taken into consideration.” Because the order explicitly sets a visitation schedule, we conclude that it does not allow the children to determine whether visits will occur. The provision allowing the children’s wishes to be “taken into consideration” refers to the time, place, and manner of the visits, not to the ultimate decision of whether visits will occur. The court made that clear at the conclusion of the hearing, when it set the visitation schedule and stated that “the minors’ wishes will be taken into consideration as it relates to that visitation.” (Italics added.) In other words, the court set the frequency and length of the visitation, and the children are allowed to have a say in the time, place, and 21 manner of the visits. Such a visitation order is entirely proper. (Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1008-1009.) We are not persuaded by Mother’s comparison to the improper order in S.H. Unlike the order here, the order in S.H. “did not specify either the frequency or the length of visitation” and the order stated that “ ‘if the children refuse a visit, then they shall not be forced to have a visit.’ ” (S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 313, 316.) Mother correctly points out that the minute orders from the 12- month review hearing state that “[v]isitation shall be at the discretion of the children, and the children shall not be forced to visit.” However, because that language conflicts with the court’s oral pronouncement and the custody order/final judgment, and because the court’s oral pronouncement controls, we presume the conflicting language in minute orders is simply a clerical error. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) To avoid any unnecessary confusion in the future, we will direct the juvenile court to correct the minute order to reflect the visitation order in the oral pronouncement and final judgment. (See In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 800 [directing the juvenile court “to correct the exit order so it is consistent with the oral order regarding visitation”].) Finally, we note that the “propriety” of a visitation order and its “enforcement” are “two distinct issues.” (In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046 (Sofia M.).) If, going forward, Mother is dissatisfied with how the visitation order is being enforced, then it will be her burden to seek enforcement or modification of the order in family law court. (Ibid.) “When a child refuses 22 visitation, it is the parent’s burden to request a specific type of enforcement, or a specific change to the visitation order.” (Ibid.) “The court does not err by failing to do that which it is not requested to do. [¶] … [¶] Absent a request, it is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to the intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a parent.” (Ibid.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The juvenile court is directed to correct nunc pro tunc the February 4, 2026 minute orders for the family maintenance review hearing so that the orders reflect the court’s oral pronouncement and the custody order/final judgment. Specifically, the court shall strike from the minute orders the phrase “[v]isitation shall be at the discretion of the children, and the children shall not be forced to visit” and replace it with the phrase “the minors’ wishes will be taken into consideration as it relates to that visitation.” NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS FIELDS J. We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. CODRINGTON J. 23