Conservatorship of M.T. CA3

Filed 11/3/26 Conservatorship of M.T. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Plumas) Conservatorship of the Person of M.T. C103004 D.T., (Super. Ct. No. PR1100015) Petitioner and Respondent, v. D.R., as Conservator, etc., et al., Objectors and Respondents. Petitioners G.T. 1 and D.T., representing themselves in propria persona, sought to remove D.R. and B.R. as conservators of M.T., alleging conservators failed to act in the best interest of M.T. Conservators opposed their removal and requested petitioners’ visits with M.T. as contained in a settlement agreement be terminated or modified. Following a court trial, the trial court denied the petition to remove conservators and modified the visitation agreement to require petitioners to pay for M.T.’s transportation. D.T. appeals, representing herself in propria persona, and contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter, made several evidentiary errors, abused its discretion by failing to remove conservators, and impermissibly infringed on her right to 1 Petitioner G.T. is not a party to this appeal. 1 maintain a familial relationship with M.T. by imposing unreasonable visitation conditions. 2 We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND M.T. is 30 years old and has epilepsy, which has resulted in her having physical and cognitive disabilities. Conservators are M.T.’s grandparents and have cared for her under a conservatorship since 2011. Petitioners are M.T.’s mother (G.T.) and sister (D.T.), who filed a petition to remove conservators from caring for M.T. Conservators filed a motion to terminate or modify petitioners’ visits with M.T. as contained in a settlement agreement. At an October 2024 hearing on the petition, conservators requested a continuance because M.T.’s neurologist, Dr. Ning Zhong, was unavailable. Petitioners opposed the motion to continue, and the court denied the motion. The parties then stipulated to the admission of Dr. Zhong’s June 2024 and July 2024 reports. Conservators also requested judicial notice of all court investigator reports, which petitioners also opposed. The trial court denied conservators’ request, noting it believed the reports were hearsay and required a proper foundation before admission into evidence. M.T.’s attorney objected to the admission of evidence from petitioners’ proposed expert witnesses because petitioners had not designated an expert before trial. The court sustained M.T.’s objection and excluded expert testimony from witnesses who had not been designated experts before trial. Petitioners called Tiara Greer to testify about a visit she and petitioners had with M.T. in August 2024. According to Greer, conservators denied them visitation with M.T., prompting petitioners to call the police to enforce their right to visit with M.T. 2 While D.T. argues the trial court’s orders require her to pay for a professional monitor, the orders explicitly require her to pay for transportation and are silent regarding a professional monitor. 2 M.T. subsequently visited with them and seemed happy and engaged the whole time. M.T. did not have any seizures during the visit. Petitioners also called Oroville Police Officer Brandi Vanpoole as a witness, who testified she responded to a call in August 2024 that conservators were refusing visitation to petitioners. At the time of her response, petitioners showed Officer Vanpoole court documents purporting to give them visitation. Petitioners also called Oroville Police Officer Cody Codorniz as a witness, who testified that he responded to a call in March 2024 regarding conservators’ refusal to allow unsupervised visits. Officer Codorniz testified petitioners provided him with custody documents and he spoke to conservator B.R. Petitioners then called a court ordered investigator, Kathleen Whitman, to testify about her findings related to the allegations in the petition. Whitman testified to the contents of her report and said she had met with M.T. twice—once virtually and once in person—and both times M.T. was confined to her bed. Whitman’s conclusion was that conservators should not be removed but they should make changes. Specifically, Whitman believed M.T. was isolated to her room given conservators’ advanced age and was not receiving government services, including participation in adult day programs, transportation, a well-fitted wheelchair, physical therapy, speech therapy, installation of home modifications, and caregiving assistance. When Whitman spoke to conservators, they showed resistance to obtaining services that could assist them with their caregiving responsibilities. Whitman believed M.T. only left the house when conservators rented an accessible van to take her to doctor’s appointments and when conservators took her to church services once or twice a month. Whitman’s investigation was not concerned with conservators’ management of M.T.’s seizures, but about the restrictions placed on M.T. and her lack of activities. There was no indication that M.T. had any social interactions with her peers or people with similar conditions. Conservators told Whitman that M.T.’s health was declining, but Whitman did not see any indication of that in M.T.’s medical records. M.T.’s medical 3 records, however, provided that M.T. had tested for phenobarbital toxicity, meaning she had an overaccumulation of phenobarbital medication in her body. D.T. testified she was M.T.’s sister and was currently pursuing a doctorate degree in biomedical engineering, focusing on epilepsy and seizure management and prediction. D.T. has been in M.T.’s life for 13 years. In the past, she saw M.T. every couple of years but then had to take a break during the pandemic and later because conservators denied her visits with M.T. D.T. reestablished visitation in July 2020 through a court stipulation. D.T. now sees M.T. during in-person visits once or twice a year and speaks to her through video calls three times a week. As early as July 2019, D.T. began raising concerns about M.T.’s health with conservators when she noticed M.T.’s feet appeared unkempt. In June 2020, M.T. looked as though she had gained a lot of weight and was bedbound or in a wheelchair during D.T.’s calls. M.T.’s eyes appeared sunken in and the skin around her eyes was droopy; she also lacked facial expressions. When D.T. visited with M.T. in July 2020, M.T. was bedridden the entire time, except to go to church services, with B.R. explaining M.T. had previously broken her leg and could no longer walk. At that time, D.T. also raised concerns with conservators that M.T. stopped breathing in her sleep. B.R.’s response indicated to D.T. that she was unwilling to seek help for the condition. In addition to these concerns, D.T. was also concerned about B.R.’s failure to administer medication when M.T. experienced a seizure. In D.T.’s opinion, B.R. believes God has a lot of control over her and M.T.’s life. When M.T. has a seizure, B.R. does not call 911 and only prays over her. Given B.R.’s response, D.T. called adult protective services. In February 2023, M.T. appeared to have a seizure while on a video call with D.T. When D.T. raised concerns with B.R., she responded that M.T. was fine. This prompted D.T. to call adult protective services again. D.T. called adult protective services again in September 2023 because M.T. had a cluster of six seizures during a visit where her lips 4 turned blue. B.R. refused to call 911 or administer rescue medication, and instead prayed over M.T. D.T. visited M.T. again in March 2024 and noticed M.T. had cuts on her leg and her feet were even more unkempt than they had been before. M.T.’s eyes were also droopy. D.T. again spoke to B.R. about M.T.’s inability to walk and B.R. said M.T. was afraid to walk after she had broken her leg, so she remained bedbound. This prompted D.T. to call adult protective services again. In August 2024, D.T. was denied visitation with M.T. Petitioners introduced text messages B.R. sent telling them their visit was denied. When the trial court asked petitioners for a hearsay exception for the evidence, petitioners responded the messages “are not being used to prove … anything specifically regarding the matter for which this conservatorship is based on. It’s information regarding just -- it’s not for proof of anything specific, it’s just to demonstrate the conservators’ interaction with the petitioners in terms of how they present.” The trial court excluded the evidence as irrelevant. On cross-examination, D.T. testified she lived in New York. She further testified she has extensive knowledge in the area of epilepsy and is concerned for M.T. because over the years she has seen how M.T.’s seizures have affected her, how her motor skills have declined, how she has gained weight, and how she can no longer walk. Following D.T.’s testimony, conservators moved for judgment as a matter of law. Conservators argued petitioners could not meet their burden under Probate Code 3 section 2650 to demonstrate conservators should be removed. M.T.’s counsel agreed. The trial court denied the petition to terminate the conservatorship but ordered conservators to obtain an evaluation for services and a second medical opinion regarding 3 Section references are to the Probate Code, unless otherwise indicated. 5 M.T.’s treatment plan. The court then permitted conservators to present evidence on their motion to terminate or modify visits. B.R. testified that M.T. gets seizures when she is tired, stressed, or taken out of her regular environment. For example, during the September 2023 visit, petitioners called the police causing M.T. to later experience three seizures due to the noise and commotion. During the March 2024 visit, petitioners again called the police. M.T. saw the officers and experienced an increase in seizures during the week of petitioners’ visit. Also during this visit, petitioners had an ambulance take M.T. to the hospital without B.R.’s knowledge and M.T. later experienced a grand mal seizure. During the August 2024 visit, petitioners called the police to B.R.’s home where M.T. saw them. Each of the seven visits in August 2024 were 10 hours long, with a single rest break in the middle. B.R. did not believe M.T. had sufficient rest breaks during the visits. On the last day of the August 2024 visit, M.T. had a seizure and then one each of the next three days. On cross-examination, B.R. testified that D.T. did not raise concerns about M.T.’s health in 2020 or tell her M.T. was not breathing in her sleep. B.R. further detailed a September 2023 argument with petitioners about whether petitioners’ visits should be monitored, which occurred in front of M.T. and led to police being called to B.R.’s house. B.R. also described when police were called during the March 2024 and August 2024 visits and M.T.’s resulting stress. Following this line of questioning the court day ended and the hearing had to be continued several months due to court and party availability. At the January 2025 continued hearing, petitioners questioned B.R. about her prior testimony related to how often petitioners visited before 2023. B.R. testified she had always allowed petitioners to visit M.T. any time they wanted. B.R. was then questioned by her counsel about the appropriate time increments for visits. On recross-examination, petitioners asked B.R. about the visit they had at Christmas of 2024 after the last court hearing. In particular, petitioners asked B.R. about the fact she permitted the visits to last 6 nearly 12 hours despite her prior testimony that M.T. could only have short visits to reduce the possibility of seizures. B.R. explained she allowed petitioners to visit for longer because M.T.’s lift had broken shortening a prior visitation period and she wanted to make up time so petitioners could have a quality visit with M.T. During closing arguments on the motion to terminate visitation, conservators made clear they were not arguing for termination of petitioners’ visits but limitation of the visits to reasonable time increments. M.T.’s attorney also advocated for clarity to the prior stipulation as to the length of the visits, as well as transportation costs and the requirement for a monitor. When petitioners attempted to respond to conservators’ and M.T.’s closing arguments, the trial court denied rebuttal. The trial court found there was no cause to remove conservators and denied the petition. It modified the conditions of the conservatorship to require conservators have M.T. evaluated for available services and file the written assessments, along with doctor’s reports, with the court. The court also ordered petitioners visitation with M.T. while being monitored by a third-party professional once every three months and alternating holidays, with each visit to consist of four consecutive days not to exceed five hours on each day. The court further ordered petitioners to pay for M.T.’s transportation to the visits. D.T. appeals. DISCUSSION I The Trial Court Had Authority To Hear The Conservatorship Matter D.T. contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the conservatorship matter. We disagree. 7  A Background During testimony, it was revealed that M.T. lived with conservators in Butte County, despite her conservatorship being overseen by the Plumas County Superior Court. Conservators indicated they were going to file a change of venue motion once the current proceeding was over. Petitioners informed the trial court they had requested a transfer to Butte County from a different judge, but it was denied because the judge thought the case needed to stay in Plumas County because it originated in Plumas County. M.T.’s attorney indicated she also raised the issue with the prior judge and the judge denied transfer. 4 B D.T. Has Not Proven Error D.T. argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because venue was improper and should have been in Butte County where M.T. resided. Not so. Venue and jurisdiction are separate legal concepts. Indeed, “[v]enue or territorial jurisdiction establishes the proper place for trial, but is not an aspect of the fundamental subject matter jurisdiction of the court and does not affect the power of a court to try a case.” (Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1055.) The superior court has jurisdiction of conservatorship proceedings because section 2200 empowers all superior courts with authority to hear conservatorship matters. Thus, contrary to D.T.’s argument the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction and its decision is not void. 4 In her opening brief, D.T. argues that M.T.’s counsel actually opposed transferring the case to Butte County. But these facts are not contained in the record supplied by D.T., and we cannot consider them. (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 628.) 8  To the extent D.T. argues venue was improper, she has not established error. Venue is determined at the commencement of the conservatorship proceeding and is found in the county in which the proposed conservatee resides. (§ 2201, subd. (a).) 5 D.T. has not pointed to any indication in the record that M.T. did not reside in Plumas County at the time the petition to place her under a conservatorship was filed. Accordingly, D.T. has not met her burden to demonstrate the trial court erred by hearing the case in Plumas County. (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 649 [on appeal “the party asserting trial court error may not ... rest on the bare assertion of error but must present argument and legal authority on each point raised”].) II There Was No Evidentiary Error D.T. raises several contentions of evidentiary error. We will address each one in turn. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.) “ ‘ “Under the abuse of discretion standard, ‘a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal ... is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 26.) Generally, the application of ordinary rules of evidence does not implicate the federal Constitution; accordingly, we review allegations of error under the “reasonable probabilit[y]” standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837, 5 Conservators argue section 1995 gives the trial court that appointed a conservator exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the proceeding until it is terminated by the court or the appointment expires. Section 1995, however, appears in the California Conservatorship Jurisdiction Act (§ 1980 et seq.), which determines whether the courts of California, as opposed to courts of other states, have jurisdiction over a conservatorship proceeding (§ 1992). Still, for a conservatee who resides in California, any court of the state has jurisdiction. (§ 1993, subd. (a).) 9 unless the erroneous admission of evidence affects the fundamental fairness of the trial, in which case the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 would apply. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227.) A Exclusion Of The Court Investigator’s Report Did Not Result In Prejudice D.T. contends the trial court erred by excluding from evidence a report prepared by Whitman whom petitioners called as a witness. In particular, D.T. contends Whitman’s report was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. We will not address whether the court’s exclusion of the report constituted error because, even if it did, the error did not result in prejudice. Whitman was called as a witness and testified to the contents of her report. D.T. does not point to any evidence from Whitman’s report Whitman was precluded from testifying about. In fact, D.T. acknowledges Whitman was permitted to refresh her memory with her report before testifying to the contents. Accordingly, the exclusion of Whitman’s report did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial, thus was not federal error, nor would the report’s admission reasonably result in a more favorable outcome to petitioners. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.) B Exclusion Of Text Messages And E-mails Did Not Result In Prejudice D.T. contends the trial court erred by excluding text messages from conservators to petitioners that D.T. alleges demonstrated a deliberate intent to disregard a court order and deny her an August 2024 visit with M.T. D.T. also contends e-mails sent from conservators’ attorney concerning her visitations were improperly excluded for the same reason. We will not address whether the court’s exclusion of the text messages and e‑mails constituted error because, even if it did, the error did not result in prejudice. 10  At trial, petitioners called Officer Vanpoole who testified that, in August 2024, she was called to facilitate a custody transfer of M.T. when conservators would not let petitioners take M.T. for a visitation. Petitioners showed Officer Vanpoole what appeared to be court documents showing they were entitled to visit with M.T. Given this testimony, petitioners were not harmed by the exclusion of text messages and e-mails demonstrating conservators withheld visitation from petitioners in August 2024. This fact was established by Officer Vanpoole’s testimony. Accordingly, the exclusion of text messages and e-mails did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial, thus was not federal error, nor would their admission reasonably result in a more favorable outcome to petitioners. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.) C The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding Petitioners’ Expert’s Testimony D.T. contends the trial court erred by excluding testimony from petitioners’ expert, Dr. Dugan, related to Dr. Dugan’s review of M.T.’s medical records and the nature of her medical condition. D.T. acknowledges on reply that she did not designate Dr. Dugan as an expert witness before trial, as the court noted when excluding the testimony. D.T. seems to argue her failure to designate an expert witness should not have resulted in the witness’s exclusion. We disagree. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.300 provides that “the trial court shall exclude from evidence the expert opinion of any witness that is offered by any party who has unreasonably failed to do any of the following,” including “(a) [l]ist that witness as an expert under [Code of Civil Procedure s]ection 2034.260” and “(b) [s]ubmit an expert witness declaration.” Here, D.T. concedes she did not designate Dr. Dugan as an expert (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.300, subd. (a)), nor does she point to any indication in the record she supplied an expert declaration (id., § 2034.300, subd. (b)). Given the statutory mandate the court shall exclude from evidence the testimony of an expert in light of these 11 failures, the trial court was well within its discretion to exclude Dr. Dugan’s expert testimony. (Cf. Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537, 571-572.) D.T. also argues she could have called Dr. Dugan as a lay witness to testify about her review of M.T.’s medical records. As a lay witness, however, Dr. Dugan lacked personal knowledge of M.T.’s medical history. As D.T. concedes, Dr. Dugan never met M.T., and her testimony would have been reliant on her review of M.T.’s medical records. While experts may rely on hearsay to form their opinions (People v. Yuksel (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 850, 856), lay witnesses may not testify to hearsay and must possess personal knowledge (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 675). Accordingly, D.T. has not demonstrated the trial court erred by excluding Dr. Dugan’s testimony. D The Trial Court Did Not Deny Petitioners The Right To Present A Defense D.T. contends the trial court denied petitioners the right to present a defense by: (1) failing to let petitioners ask questions of M.T.’s counsel, who D.T. alleges made false statements by claiming she moved away from M.T.; (2) excluding petitioners’ complaint to the State Bar of California (State Bar) about conservators’ attorney’s advice to deny petitioners visits with M.T.; (3) limiting the cross-examination of conservator B.R.; (4) limiting the cross-examination of Dr. Zhong; and (5) excluding text messages and e‑mails from conservators and their attorney denying petitioners visits. We disagree. “ ‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the [constitutional] right to present a defense. Courts retain … a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611.) “It follows, for the most part, that the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such ‘normal’ rules does not implicate the federal Constitution.” (Ibid.) 12 Thus, we will address whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding the errors D.T. alleges and then determine the effect of those errors, i.e., whether the errors collectively denied petitioners the right to present a defense or prejudiced their case. First, D.T. claims the trial court failed to permit petitioners to rebut M.T.’s counsel’s purportedly false statement that D.T. decided to move away from M.T. According to D.T., this statement was false because she had always lived in Los Angeles, while M.T. was the person who moved. 6 D.T., however, concedes in her opening brief that she had moved from Los Angeles to New York near the time of the hearing. Further, D.T. testified she had recently moved to New York, making it unnecessary for M.T.’s counsel to introduce evidence establishing that fact. Thus, M.T.’s counsel’s argument was grounded in the evidence and not improper in this regard. Second, D.T. argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding petitioners’ State Bar complaint against conservators’ attorney, complaining about his advice to conservators to deny petitioners visitation despite the existence of a court order. D.T. claims the trial court excluded the complaint because the complaint was irrelevant, but it also stated the complaint was hearsay. We discern no abuse of discretion. A State Bar complaint, much like a police report, is a textbook example of hearsay of written statements made out of court to prove the truth of the matters asserted. (See, e.g., People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 818.) As D.T. argues on appeal, petitioners proffered the State Bar complaint to demonstrate the truth of the allegations contained in it—they were being denied visits with M.T. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding petitioners’ complaint to the State Bar. 6 D.T. does not specify where M.T. lived and then moved to. From the record, it appears M.T. moved from Plumas County, where she resided when placed under a conservatorship, to Butte County, where she resided at the time of the hearing. 13  Third, D.T. contends the trial court erred by failing to let petitioners cross-examine B.R. about false statements she made during her prior days of testimony. According to D.T., the trial court abruptly ended petitioners’ cross-examination of B.R. during an October 2024 hearing and then refused to let them question B.R. at the January 2025 continued hearing about statements she made at the October 2024 hearing. We disagree with D.T.’s characterization of the record. The trial court did not abruptly end petitioners’ cross-examination of B.R.; instead, the court day had ended. The parties selected a new court date based on their schedules without objection from any of the parties. At the continued hearing, petitioners were permitted to ask questions of B.R. about her prior testimony related to visits between 2018 and 2022. The only limitation to petitioners’ questioning was that the court reporter had not been present at the prior hearing, so the reporter could not read back testimony from that hearing. Petitioners were permitted to recite their recollection of B.R.’s prior testimony and then ask questions regarding inconsistencies. Thus, D.T. has not shown error. Fourth, D.T. contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to permit her to cross-examine Dr. Zhong about his report regarding M.T.’s medical records. But conservators moved to continue trial for the purpose of securing Dr. Zhong’s attendance and petitioners objected to the continuance, instead stipulating to the admission of Dr. Zhong’s report. In light of the stipulation, D.T. is foreclosed from complaining on appeal that the court should not have considered the report or that petitioners should have been given time to secure Dr. Zhong’s attendance for the purpose of cross-examination. (See People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328, fn. 7.) Finally, D.T. contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding text messages and e-mails from conservators and their attorney denying petitioners visits. We have already addressed this claim of error, concluding it did not affect the outcome of the trial because the evidence petitioners sought to admit through the text messages was 14 admitted through the testimony of Officer Vanpoole. For the same reasons, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion on this point. Because D.T. has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion, her argument the trial court infringed on petitioners’ right to present a defense must fail. III The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying The Petition D.T. contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying the petition to remove conservators because it failed to consider section 2650 and the reasons stated therein for removing a conservator. We disagree. Under section 2650, and as relevant here, conservators may be removed for their “failure to perform duties or incapacity to perform duties suitably” and because they have an adverse interest that creates an “unreasonable risk” they will fail to perform their duties faithfully. (§ 2650, subds. (c), (f).) We review an order removing a conservator for cause under section 2650 for abuse of discretion. (Guardianship of Davis (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 754, 761 [whether there is sufficient cause to remove a conservator “is a question of fact to be determined in the broad discretion of the trial judge, whose determination will not be disturbed except upon a showing of manifest abuse of discretion”].) “[A] trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless the record establishes it exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence [citation], failed to follow proper procedure in reaching its decision [citation], or applied the wrong legal standard to the determination.” (Conservatorship of Scharles (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1334, 1340.) D.T. argues the trial court failed to consider Probate Code section 2650’s reasons for removal when making its decision. D.T. has not met her burden to demonstrate this is the case. There was no statement of decision in this case, but neither was one requested. A party may request a statement of decision after a court trial to ask the court to explain the factual and legal basis of its decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) If neither party 15 requests a statement of decision, we apply the doctrine of implied findings and presume the trial court made all necessary factual findings to support the judgment. (Michael U. v. Jaime B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792-793, superseded by statute on another issue as noted in In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448-449.) Since no statement of decision was requested in this case, we presume the court applied the correct statutes in making its decision, even if the court did not say it was applying those statutes. We consequently reject D.T.’s challenge on reasons for removal as we must assume the trial court considered the entirety of Probate Code section 2650 without evidence to the contrary. D.T. still contends the trial court abused its discretion because the record shows conservators’ advanced age prevented them from adequately caring for M.T., as evidenced by M.T.’s lack of medical treatment and government services. (See § 2650, subd. (c).) We disagree. The parties stipulated to the admission of Dr. Zhong’s most recent medical reports, which presumably speak to M.T.’s current physical condition and medical treatment, and which D.T. did not provide as part of the appellate record. (See Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 [failure of the appellant to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant].) Further, while D.T. observed B.R.’s purported indifference to M.T.’s seizures, there is no evidence provided to us on appeal establishing the medically recommended response to M.T.’s seizures. Also, while Whitman recommended conservators take advantage of government services to make caregiving easier given conservators’ advanced age, this recommendation was accounted for in the court’s order requiring conservators to consult with services. It is clear the court considered conservators’ age and ability to care for M.T. and crafted its decision with those issues in mind. In whole, the record does not establish the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary or capricious; we discern no abuse of discretion. D.T. also contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find conservators had an adverse interest—their hatred of petitioners—that created an 16 unreasonable risk they would fail to perform their duties faithfully. (See § 2650, subd. (f).) The record refutes D.T.’s claim. There is no indication conservators would fail in their duties as conservators because of their disagreements with petitioners. The evidence established that conservators had cared for M.T. since 2011 despite disagreements between the parties. While services were recommended by Whitman, the court ordered conservators to be evaluated for those services. There is no indication conservators would stop performing the core functions of a conservator in light of their purported animosity towards petitioners. Accordingly, D.T. has not established the trial court abused its discretion by denying the petition to remove conservators. IV D.T. Has Not Shown The Trial Court Infringed On Her Fundamental Right To Maintain Familial Relations D.T. contends the trial court’s visitation order violates the equal protection clause, as well as procedural and substantive due process principles by requiring her to pay transportation costs. 7 D.T. has not proven error. “ ‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘This means that an appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test [a] claim. The appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the 7 Conservators argue D.T. forfeited this claim. The trial court, however, denied petitioners the opportunity to rebut the argument they should bear costs for transportation, thus providing an exception to the forfeiture doctrine. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 793 [“A litigant need not object, however, if doing so would be futile”].) 17 record. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, the California Rules of Court expressly require appellate briefs to ‘[s]tate each point … and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619- 620.) It is not the appellate court’s “ ‘place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’ ” (Id. at p. 620.) If an appellant asserts a point “ ‘but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited on appeal].’ ” (Ibid.) D.T.’s arguments related to equal protection and due process lack citation to legal authority demonstrating the hearings she participated in deprived her of a right to be heard or infringed on a recognizable protected class. Given the lack of citation to authority, we must conclude the issue is forfeited on appeal. Consequently, D.T. has failed to demonstrate error in the trial court’s visitation orders. 8 8 Under the heading for this argument, D.T. brings a collateral claim that the trial court impermissibly relied on B.R.’s testimony M.T. experienced increased seizures due to stress to prove a medical diagnosis that M.T. suffered from increased seizures when she was under stress. We disagree. B.R. testified to her personal knowledge of observing M.T.’s increased seizures after long visits with petitioners, as well as her personal knowledge of M.T.’s medical diagnosis and treatment. Further, the parties stipulated to the admission of Dr. Zhong’s medical report providing context to M.T.’s medical needs, which the trial court reviewed. D.T. also contends the court improperly relied on Dr. Zhong’s reports without providing for cross-examination. We previously addressed this argument and similarly reject it here. 18  DISPOSITION The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Conservators are awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).) /s/ ROBIE, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/ MAURO, J. /s/ FEINBERG, J. 19