Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN THE PEOPLE, B352470 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. 24CJCF02288 & v. 25CJSJ0086) LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jill Feeney, Judge. Affirmed. Moaddel Law Firm and Daniel Moaddel for Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Keever R. Muir, Assistant County Counsel, and Steven M. Rich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________ INTRODUCTION In April 2024, appellant Lexington National Insurance Company (Lexington) posted a $30,000 bail bond for Javier Banuelos’s release from custody.1 In July 2025, after the trial court declared the bond forfeited and the appearance period ended without Banuelos’s appearance, the court entered summary judgment and judgment against Lexington. In September 2025, after Banuelos appeared in the trial court, Lexington’s bail agent filed a motion to vacate summary judgment under Penal Code section 980, subdivision (b), which the trial court denied.2 Lexington appeals from the denial of its section 980 motion, arguing summary judgment was improper because the People did not comply with that statutory provision. The People argue, and we agree, that because Lexington’s motion was untimely, the trial court properly denied it. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On April 11, 2024, Lexington posted a $30,000 bail bond for Banuelos after he was charged with assault with a non-firearm deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The bond specified that Banuelos was required to appear in the trial court on April 22, 1 Although he was criminally charged under the name Jaime Hernandez and his bail bond also listed that as his name, a bench warrant hearing minute order in the record clarifies that his correct name is Javier Banuelos. We refer to him by his correct name. 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 2024. When Banuelos did not appear on that date, the court ordered the bond forfeited.3 On April 23, 2024, the superior court clerk mailed a notice of bond forfeiture to Lexington and its bail agent. Under section 1305, subdivision (b)(1), the appearance period expired 185 days later on October 25, 2024.4 On October 21, 2024, the bail agent filed a motion to extend the appearance period, which the trial court granted, extending the period through May 21, 2025. On May 21, 2025, the bail agent filed a motion to toll the appearance period for 30 days. The trial court denied that motion on July 11, 2025 and stated it intended to enter summary judgment.5 On July 17, 2025, the trial court granted summary judgment, and it entered judgment against Lexington. That same day, the superior court clerk 3 “ ‘When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (a).)’ ” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35, 42 (Financial).) 4 The appearance period is the “ ‘185 days after the date the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five days for mailing) to the appropriate parties . . . . (§ 1305, subd. (b).) During this time, the surety on the bond is entitled to move to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on certain grounds, such as an appearance in court by the accused. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).)’ ” (Financial, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 42.) 5 If the forfeiture has not been set aside by the end of the appearance period, inclusive of any extension, “the court which has declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the bondsman is bound.” (§ 1306, subd. (a).) 3 served Lexington and its bail agent with notice of entry of judgment. On September 2, 2025, Banuelos appeared in the trial court. On September 15, 2025, the bail agent filed a motion to set aside summary judgment on bond forfeiture, which it brought under section 980, subdivision (b).6 The People opposed, arguing the motion was untimely because it should have been filed within the appearance period. On October 24, 2025, the trial court denied the motion in a minute order. The appellate record does not include any notice of entry regarding this denial. Lexington timely appealed. 6 Section 980, subdivision (b), provides: “The clerk shall require the appropriate agency to enter each bench warrant issued on a private surety-bonded felony case into the national warrant system (National Crime Information Center (NCIC)). If the appropriate agency fails to enter the bench warrant into the national warrant system (NCIC), and the court finds that this failure prevented the surety or bond agent from surrendering the fugitive into custody, prevented the fugitive from being arrested or taken into custody, or resulted in the fugitive’s subsequent release from custody, the court having jurisdiction over the bail shall, upon petition, set aside the forfeiture of the bond and declare all liability on the bail bond to be exonerated.” As discussed below, for a petition under section 980 to be timely, it must be filed during the pre-judgment appearance period. (People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.) 4 DISCUSSION A. The Trial Court Properly Denied The Section 980 Motion Lexington’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying its bail agent’s motion to set aside summary judgment and forfeiture. The People argue, among other things, that the trial court properly denied the bail agent’s motion because it was untimely.7 Lexington did not file a reply brief or request oral argument and so it did not respond to the People’s argument the section 980 motion was untimely. We agree with the People the section 980 motion was untimely filed in the trial court. A motion under section 980 must be filed within the appearance period before summary judgment is entered. (People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 407, 413 (Bankers) [relief under Penal Code section 980 requires a timely motion to be filed during the pre- judgment, 185-day appearance period]; see also People v. 7 The People also argue the appeal should be dismissed because Lexington’s notice of appeal from the denial of the section 980 motion was untimely. We conclude Lexington’s appeal from the denial of the motion is timely because the record before us does not reflect Lexington was served with an order denying the motion or notice of entry. That means Lexington had 180 days after its motion was denied to file its notice of appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) & (e); People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 441, 442 [bail forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and “the time within which to file the notice of appeal is that prescribed for appeals in civil cases”].) The trial court denied the motion on October 24, 2025, and Lexington filed its notice of appeal on December 24, 2025, which is within 180 days. 5 Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 656, 663 [“once the appearance period has expired, a trial court no longer has the jurisdiction to provide relief from forfeiture, whether in the form of exoneration of the bail bond or reinstatement of the bail bond”]; People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1503 [same].)8 Here, the trial court extended the appearance period to May 21, 2025 and denied the bail agent’s request to toll that period. The court then entered summary judgment and judgment against Lexington on July 17, 2025. The bail agent filed the motion to set aside the summary judgment on September 15, 2025. Because Lexington’s bail agent filed the motion after the appearance period ended and after judgment was entered, the motion was untimely, and the trial court properly denied it. (Bankers, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.) 8 As People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 308, 313 explained, a court may vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond if a motion is brought under section 1305, subdivision (c)(3), within 20 days from the service of notice of entry of judgment. Lexington did not file such a motion. 6 DISPOSITION The order denying the section 980 motion is affirmed. The People may recover its costs on appeal. MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur: SEGAL, J. FEUER, J. 7