People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB352470
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B352470
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. 24CJCF02288 &
v. 25CJSJ0086)
LEXINGTON NATIONAL
INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jill Feeney, Judge. Affirmed.
Moaddel Law Firm and Daniel Moaddel for Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Keever R. Muir,
Assistant County Counsel, and Steven M. Rich, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
In April 2024, appellant Lexington National Insurance
Company (Lexington) posted a $30,000 bail bond for Javier
Banuelos’s release from custody.1 In July 2025, after the trial
court declared the bond forfeited and the appearance period
ended without Banuelos’s appearance, the court entered
summary judgment and judgment against Lexington. In
September 2025, after Banuelos appeared in the trial court,
Lexington’s bail agent filed a motion to vacate summary
judgment under Penal Code section 980, subdivision (b), which
the trial court denied.2
Lexington appeals from the denial of its section 980 motion,
arguing summary judgment was improper because the People did
not comply with that statutory provision. The People argue, and
we agree, that because Lexington’s motion was untimely, the
trial court properly denied it. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2024, Lexington posted a $30,000 bail bond for
Banuelos after he was charged with assault with a non-firearm
deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The bond specified that
Banuelos was required to appear in the trial court on April 22,
1 Although he was criminally charged under the name Jaime
Hernandez and his bail bond also listed that as his name, a bench
warrant hearing minute order in the record clarifies that his
correct name is Javier Banuelos. We refer to him by his correct
name.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
2024. When Banuelos did not appear on that date, the court
ordered the bond forfeited.3
On April 23, 2024, the superior court clerk mailed a notice
of bond forfeiture to Lexington and its bail agent. Under
section 1305, subdivision (b)(1), the appearance period expired
185 days later on October 25, 2024.4
On October 21, 2024, the bail agent filed a motion to extend
the appearance period, which the trial court granted, extending
the period through May 21, 2025. On May 21, 2025, the bail
agent filed a motion to toll the appearance period for 30 days.
The trial court denied that motion on July 11, 2025 and stated it
intended to enter summary judgment.5 On July 17, 2025, the
trial court granted summary judgment, and it entered judgment
against Lexington. That same day, the superior court clerk
3 “ ‘When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails
without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court
must declare a forfeiture of the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (a).)’ ”
(People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35,
42 (Financial).)
4 The appearance period is the “ ‘185 days after the date the
clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five
days for mailing) to the appropriate parties . . . . (§ 1305, subd.
(b).) During this time, the surety on the bond is entitled to move
to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on certain
grounds, such as an appearance in court by the accused. (§ 1305,
subd. (c)(1).)’ ” (Financial, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 42.)
5 If the forfeiture has not been set aside by the end of the
appearance period, inclusive of any extension, “the court which
has declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment
against each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for
which the bondsman is bound.” (§ 1306, subd. (a).)
3
served Lexington and its bail agent with notice of entry of
judgment.
On September 2, 2025, Banuelos appeared in the trial
court.
On September 15, 2025, the bail agent filed a motion to set
aside summary judgment on bond forfeiture, which it brought
under section 980, subdivision (b).6 The People opposed, arguing
the motion was untimely because it should have been filed within
the appearance period. On October 24, 2025, the trial court
denied the motion in a minute order. The appellate record does
not include any notice of entry regarding this denial.
Lexington timely appealed.
6 Section 980, subdivision (b), provides: “The clerk shall
require the appropriate agency to enter each bench warrant
issued on a private surety-bonded felony case into the national
warrant system (National Crime Information Center (NCIC)). If
the appropriate agency fails to enter the bench warrant into the
national warrant system (NCIC), and the court finds that this
failure prevented the surety or bond agent from surrendering the
fugitive into custody, prevented the fugitive from being arrested
or taken into custody, or resulted in the fugitive’s subsequent
release from custody, the court having jurisdiction over the bail
shall, upon petition, set aside the forfeiture of the bond and
declare all liability on the bail bond to be exonerated.” As
discussed below, for a petition under section 980 to be timely, it
must be filed during the pre-judgment appearance period.
(People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.)
4
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Denied The Section 980 Motion
Lexington’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred by denying its bail agent’s motion to set aside
summary judgment and forfeiture. The People argue, among
other things, that the trial court properly denied the bail agent’s
motion because it was untimely.7 Lexington did not file a reply
brief or request oral argument and so it did not respond to the
People’s argument the section 980 motion was untimely.
We agree with the People the section 980 motion was
untimely filed in the trial court. A motion under section 980
must be filed within the appearance period before summary
judgment is entered. (People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 407, 413 (Bankers) [relief under Penal Code
section 980 requires a timely motion to be filed during the pre-
judgment, 185-day appearance period]; see also People v.
7 The People also argue the appeal should be dismissed
because Lexington’s notice of appeal from the denial of the
section 980 motion was untimely. We conclude Lexington’s
appeal from the denial of the motion is timely because the record
before us does not reflect Lexington was served with an order
denying the motion or notice of entry. That means Lexington had
180 days after its motion was denied to file its notice of appeal.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) & (e); People v.
United Bonding Ins. Co. (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 441, 442 [bail
forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and “the time within
which to file the notice of appeal is that prescribed for appeals in
civil cases”].) The trial court denied the motion on October 24,
2025, and Lexington filed its notice of appeal on December 24,
2025, which is within 180 days.
5
Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 656,
663 [“once the appearance period has expired, a trial court no
longer has the jurisdiction to provide relief from forfeiture,
whether in the form of exoneration of the bail bond or
reinstatement of the bail bond”]; People v. Accredited Surety &
Casualty Co., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1503 [same].)8
Here, the trial court extended the appearance period to
May 21, 2025 and denied the bail agent’s request to toll that
period. The court then entered summary judgment and judgment
against Lexington on July 17, 2025. The bail agent filed the
motion to set aside the summary judgment on September 15,
2025. Because Lexington’s bail agent filed the motion after the
appearance period ended and after judgment was entered, the
motion was untimely, and the trial court properly denied it.
(Bankers, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.)
8 As People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 308, 313 explained, a court may vacate the
forfeiture and exonerate the bond if a motion is brought under
section 1305, subdivision (c)(3), within 20 days from the service of
notice of entry of judgment. Lexington did not file such a motion.
6
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 980 motion is affirmed. The
People may recover its costs on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.
7