Full Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT _______________________________ BAP NO. EB 25-018 _______________________________ Bankruptcy Case No. 24-10108-MAF Adversary Proceeding No. 24-01004-MAF _______________________________ SCOTT L. FENSTERMAKER, Debtor. _______________________________ MARTHA CZYMMEK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT L. FENSTERMAKER, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine (Hon. Michael A. Fagone, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge) _______________________________ Before Lamoutte, Godoy, and Finkle, U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges. _______________________________ Scott L. Fenstermaker, pro se, on brief for Defendant-Appellant. Adam R. Prescott, Esq., on brief for Plaintiff-Appellee. _________________________________ October 27, 2026 _________________________________ Godoy, U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. The debtor-appellant, Scott L. Fenstermaker, appeals from the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment determining that his debts to the appellee, Martha Czymmek, arising from three pre-petition sanctions awards are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the Panel AFFIRMS the summary judgment. BACKGROUND I. Pertinent Pre-Petition History Czymmek and Fenstermaker, who is an attorney, are siblings. In 1997, their father executed a will dividing his estate equally among his three children. Subsequently, the father and Fenstermaker had a falling out. In 2016, the father revoked the 1997 will and executed a new will that excluded Fenstermaker as a beneficiary and named Czymmek as executrix. In May 2017, Fenstermaker filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the father, who was still alive, and Czymmek to invalidate the 2016 will. That action was dismissed in March 2018. Fenstermaker represented himself in that proceeding and in all later proceedings. The father passed away in June 2018, and Czymmek sought to settle his estate in Connecticut Probate Court based on the 2016 will. In August 2018, the Connecticut Probate Court entered a final judgment approving the settlement of the father’s estate. Almost a year later, Fenstermaker filed an application with the Connecticut Probate Court to probate the 1997 will. The Connecticut Probate Court denied admission of the 1997 will into probate, and Fenstermaker appealed by filing a complaint in Connecticut Superior Court. Czymmek was a “defendant/appellee” in the proceeding and took an active role, incurring legal fees. The Connecticut Superior Court dismissed the appeal for lack of statutory authority to grant the relief 2 requested and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fenstermaker’s attempts to appeal the dismissal to the Connecticut Appellate Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court, and finally the U.S. Supreme Court, were unsuccessful. During these proceedings, Czymmek filed four motions asking the Connecticut Superior Court to order Fenstermaker to pay her legal fees and costs incurred opposing his efforts to revive the 1997 will. Fenstermaker responded to Czymmek’s motions and the court held hearings. In May 2023, the Connecticut Superior Court ordered Fenstermaker to pay Czymmek’s attorney’s fees. In its memorandum of decision (the “Connecticut Sanction Decision”), the court examined Fenstermaker’s knowledge and conduct before he applied to probate the 1997 will and throughout his attempts to appeal the denial of that application for probate. The court observed, among other things, that Fenstermaker had rejected the father’s attempts to communicate with him before the father executed the 2016 will. The Connecticut Superior Court further noted that during Fenstermaker’s 2017 federal court action to invalidate the 2016 will, the father submitted multiple affidavits supporting its validity. Among those were the father’s own affidavit denying that Czymmek influenced Fenstermaker’s disinheritance, noting her share had not increased as a result, and expressing concern that Fenstermaker’s goal in federal court was to reduce the assets the father could convey upon his death by causing him to incur legal fees. The Connecticut Superior Court concluded that, at least from the 2017 federal court action, Fenstermaker knew about his father’s 2016 revocation of the 1997 will and execution of the 2016 will. The court further found that before Fenstermaker applied to probate the 1997 will in July 2019, he knew the Connecticut Probate Court had entered a final order approving the settlement of his father’s estate based on the 2016 will. 3 Evaluating whether to award fees and costs to Czymmek, the Connecticut Superior Court summarized the applicable legal standards as follows: It is generally accepted that the court has the inherent authority to assess attorney’s fees when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. . . . This bad faith exception applies, not only to the filing of an action, but also in the conduct of the litigation. . . . . . . We have emphasized that, in determining whether a party has engaged in bad faith, [t]he appropriate focus for the court . . . is the conduct of the party in instigating or maintaining the litigation. . . . From that conduct, the court may infer the subjective intent of the person against whom sanctions are sought. Some examples of evidence that would support a finding of bad faith include a party’s use of oppressive tactics or its wilful [sic] violations of court orders . . . or a finding that the challenged actions [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes . . . . Dkt. No. 19, at 27 (citation omitted).1 The court then concluded Fenstermaker’s litigation was in bad faith, reasoning: [T]he court infers [Fenstermaker]’s subjective intent in pursuing multiple levels of litigation that the action was brought in bad faith as [Fenstermaker] petitioned to have . . . the 1997 will[] admitted into probate with the full and detailed knowledge that the 1997 will and its two codicils had been revoked by the 2016 will. . . . [Fenstermaker]’s conduct was frivolous in that he brought an action and subsequent appeals without a basis in law and fact for doing so. In other words, [Fenstermaker’]s claim was unwarranted under existing law. Despite his level of education and experience as an attorney, [Fenstermaker] sought to admit the 1997 will with the full knowledge that such will had been revoked and continued on with years of litigation. [Fenstermaker] did so knowing there was no factual basis for his claim. It is clear to this court that [Fenstermaker] has acted in bad faith in continuing this action and that his purpose in doing so was to harass [Czymmek] and to cause her to incur expense in defending against [Fenstermaker]’s allegations. Id. at 35. The Connecticut Superior Court thus ordered Fenstermaker to pay Czymmek’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $90,766.50, plus $3,009.27 in expenses and costs, for a total 1 Citations to the sanctioning courts’ respective decisions and orders, filed on the bankruptcy court docket as attachments to Czymmek’s amended supporting statement of material facts at docket entry 19 (“Dkt. No. 19”), are included for reference. As Dkt. No. 19 includes multiple documents, the pincites refer to the page number in the ECF header. 4 award of $93,775.77 (the “Connecticut Sanction”). Fenstermaker appealed the Connecticut Sanction to the Connecticut Appellate Court, which dismissed the appeal in June 2023 for Fenstermaker’s failure to comply with appellate procedure. Fenstermaker’s request for reconsideration of the dismissal was denied. In August 2023, Czymmek filed the Connecticut Sanction as a foreign judgment in New York state court. Fenstermaker removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “N.Y. District Court”) and moved to enjoin enforcement of the judgment, arguing the Connecticut Superior Court lacked authority to sanction him, the sanction was unreasonable, and the Connecticut Appellate Court violated his due process rights by dismissing his appeal of the Connecticut Sanction without a hearing. Czymmek moved to dismiss or remand the case to state court because the N.Y. District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and requested attorney’s fees and costs for improper diversion into federal court. Fenstermaker did not respond to Czymmek’s request for attorney’s fees. In January 2024, the N.Y. District Court granted Czymmek’s motion to remand and for attorney’s fees. In its opinion and order (the “N.Y. District Court Sanction Decision”), the N.Y. District Court observed that a supplemental proceeding merely to collect a judgment debt, like Czymmek’s proceeding in New York state court, was ineligible for removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446. The court determined that Fenstermaker, as a lawyer, knew removal was improper but did it anyway. The N.Y. District Court observed that Fenstermaker was asking it to overrule the Connecticut state court when it had no jurisdiction to do so, and that Fenstermaker predicated his removal notice on the same arguments the Connecticut courts already rejected. 5 In determining that Czymmek was entitled to attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the N.Y. District Court observed that “[t]he appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party,” and as such, “absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Dkt. No. 19, at 45 (citation modified). Though the analysis turned on the removing party’s objective reasonableness, the N.Y. District Court also examined Fenstermaker’s subjective intent and determined his removal “constitute[d] a frivolous attempt to escape enforcement of a judgment entered against him” and that his removal arguments “[were] an effort to delay execution of the judgment and force Czymmek to incur unnecessary expenses.” Id. The N.Y. District Court concurred with the Connecticut Superior Court that Fenstermaker litigated in bad faith to harass Czymmek and to cause her to incur expenses, concluding that “[t]he only purpose of his removal notice, predicated on the same arguments that ha[d] been rejected by multiple courts, could have been to forestall Czymmek and to delay the day of reckoning when he would have to make good on the Connecticut Judgment.” Id. at 46. The N.Y. District Court thus granted Czymmek’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs and, by separate order, awarded $13,685.00, plus post-judgment interest (the “New York Sanction”). Around the time she commenced the New York state court proceeding, Czymmek also filed the Connecticut Sanction as a foreign judgment in Maine state court. Fenstermaker objected and requested a stay while he sought reconsideration of the Connecticut Appellate Court’s dismissal of his appeal and while the N.Y. District Court ruled on his removal of the New York state court proceeding. In support, Fenstermaker repeated the arguments he made to 6 the Connecticut state courts and the N.Y. District Court, adding that the Connecticut Sanction was cruel and unusual punishment and an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In February 2024, Czymmek filed a motion for sanctions against Fenstermaker in the Maine proceeding, to which Fenstermaker responded. In March 2024, the Maine state court issued an order (the “Maine Sanction Decision”) concluding that “Fenstermaker’s attempts at appeal and [a] stay were solely to delay the Judgment from being registered in Maine and were filed in bad faith.” Dkt. No. 19, at 51. The court found that: Fenstermaker has not demonstrated any basis to delay enforcement of the Judgment. Each asserted basis in this matter has been repeatedly rejected by the Courts of Connecticut and New York, including the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York. Fenstermaker continues to assert the very same arguments here, yet again, arguments that have not only been continuously rejected, but rejected as “frivolous” and in “bad faith”. This Court is baffled by the breathtaking nerve of Fenstermaker to continue to assert arguments and claims that are continually rejected, in a court of law, while being completely oblivious to the consequences of his actions and his obligations as an attorney. Id. at 52. The Maine state court further found that Fenstermaker’s objections and arguments were “frivolous, contumacious, (and) instituted primarily for the purpose of delay.” Id. at 53 (quoting Lincoln v. Burbank, 147 A.3d 1165, 1176 (Me. 2016)). The court noted that “sanctions are appropriate in egregious cases, namely when a party seeks relief with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, thereby increasing litigation costs and wasting time and resources.” Id. (quoting Whittet v. Whittet, 167 A.3d 1258, 1259-60 (Me. 2017)). The court concluded that Fenstermaker’s filings in the Maine action were “unequivocally sanction-worthy,” reasoning: [I]ndeed as [j]udges in Connecticut and New York have found, Fenstermaker does not assert any concrete or plausible arguments that would permit this court to even remotely consider staying this matter. The cases which are the basis for this matter have been concluded finally. His arguments have been soundly rejected. His requests for stay and to reinstate the appeals have been quickly and resoundingly dismissed. There are no Court actions pending to vacate or undo 7 this Judgment. Fenstermaker is an attorney licensed to practice in Maine (although currently under suspension). Therefore, his pleadings here violate his obligation to read pleadings and, upon signing them and submitting them to a tribunal in this state, acknowledge that he “has read the pleading or motion; that to the best of the signor’s knowledge[,] information and belief that there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” M.R. Civ. P. 11(a). His voluminous filings here were for one purpose and one purpose alone, i.e. delay. His violation subjects him to “an appropriate sanction” which may include an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Id. .... Accordingly, as a sanction for Fenstermaker’s actions in this matter, which the Court finds were in bad faith, made solely for the purpose of delay, and violated his obligations under Rule 11 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Czymmek is awarded her reasonable counsel fees and costs of court incurred for defending Fenstermaker’s objections. Dkt. No. 19, at 53-54. In a separate order, the Maine state court ordered Fenstermaker to pay Czymmek attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $7,017.18 “for the frivolous and dilatory nature of his filings in this matter” (the “Maine Sanction”). Id. at 61. In total, Fenstermaker has been ordered to pay Czymmek $114,478.18 in attorney’s fees, plus accrued interest and costs. The record reflects that Fenstermaker has not paid anything toward that amount. II. The Bankruptcy Case and Adversary Proceeding In May 2024, Fenstermaker filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code with the Maine bankruptcy court. Czymmek filed proofs of claim asserting a $109,934.96 claim arising from the Connecticut Sanction and the Maine Sanction, and a $13,794.17 claim arising from the New York Sanction. Czymmek then filed a three-count complaint against Fenstermaker seeking a declaratory judgment that his debt to Czymmek arising from each of the three sanctions awards was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) for willful and malicious injury. 8 A. The Motion for Summary Judgment Czymmek filed a motion for summary judgment and an amended supporting statement of material facts with exhibits, including an affidavit and copies of the courts’ respective decisions and orders sanctioning Fenstermaker. Czymmek argued that the sanctions awards, which were based on Fenstermaker’s willful and malicious attempts to harm Czymmek through frivolous litigation, were entitled to collateral estoppel effect such that the bankruptcy court should adopt their findings and conclusions and enter judgment for Czymmek that the debts are nondischargeable. Czymmek argued collateral estoppel could apply to establish the nondischargeability of a debt if each underlying order would be subject to the doctrine under the laws of the issuing jurisdiction. She asserted that Connecticut law, federal law, and Maine law are substantially similar and require the same analysis. She maintained that she and Fenstermaker were parties in the prior litigations, the courts issued final judgments on attorney’s fees, and the courts’ factual findings and characterizations of Fenstermaker’s conduct were necessary to the attorney’s fees awards. For each action, Czymmek asserted the issue was actually litigated because she filed motions for sanctions and fees with each court and Fenstermaker either responded or had an opportunity to respond before the court ruled. Finally, she contended each award made specific factual findings encompassing whether Fenstermaker’s conduct was “willful and malicious.” Czymmek argued the undisputed material facts supported the conclusion that the sanctions awards resulted from Fenstermaker’s willful and malicious acts that injured her. Czymmek further contended that Fenstermaker’s frivolous litigation was willful, as the sanctioning courts variously found his purposes were to harass her, cause her to incur unnecessary litigation expenses, and to delay execution of the judgment. Czymmek next argued 9 Fenstermaker’s frivolous litigation was malicious because he knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause or excuse, citing the sanctioning courts’ findings of bad faith. Finally, she contended that litigation costs from frivolous litigation are nondischargeable debts under § 523(a)(6). Fenstermaker filed a response accompanied by his declaration but no statement of material facts. He argued that Czymmek failed to establish that collateral estoppel applied, and therefore, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Fenstermaker’s actions were willful and malicious. Fenstermaker contended that the debts at issue arose from Czymmek’s efforts to administer their father’s “insolvent” estate. He stated Czymmek “claim[ed] to have filed” motions seeking over $90,000 in attorney’s fees and costs she “claimed to have incurred” in the Connecticut proceedings. Fenstermaker said he understood his father had $1.5 million in assets shortly before his death, which were not accounted for in the probate proceeding, and that “[b]ankers from PNC Bank had secured a general power of attorney from the father prior to his death and the father had signed an affidavit stating it was his intent that his assets pass through his estate at his death and that Fenstermaker be afforded the opportunity to challenge his disinheritance.” Fenstermaker also argued that Czymmek could not rely on the copies of the sanctions awards because they were not certified under Federal Rule of Evidence 902 and she was not qualified to attest to whether the awards were recorded or filed under Evidence Rule 901(b) because she was “either a housewife, or a registered dietician.” Fenstermaker similarly asserted that because Czymmek failed to provide copies of her motions for attorney’s fees underlying the 10 sanctions awards, or any other “support of an evidentiary nature,” she could not establish the elements of collateral estoppel under applicable law. Focusing on the Connecticut Sanction, Fenstermaker argued that Connecticut collateral estoppel law requires not only that the issues be identical in the current and prior proceedings, but that “[t]he terms, as used in the first action, must be identical to the terms as used in the second.” He further contended he could not fully and fairly litigate his challenge to Czymmek’s administration of the father’s estate because the Connecticut Superior Court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. Although Fenstermaker acknowledged that a ruling on attorney’s fees is distinct from a ruling on the merits, he argued that the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over his claims meant it lacked authority to make findings about his knowledge, conduct, bad faith, purpose, and intent in litigating. Similarly, he argued that the Connecticut Appellate Court’s dismissal of his appeal of the Connecticut Sanction for failure to comply with a deficiency order denied him due process, his right to appeal, and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the sanction because the court placed the deficiency order in the court’s electronic mailbox instead of emailing, mailing, or calling Fenstermaker to notify him. Fenstermaker next asserted that even if collateral estoppel applied to the Connecticut Sanction Decision, it should not apply here because he “could not have reasonably expected that [Czymmek] would spend $93,775.77 defending . . . the Insolvent Estate.” Fenstermaker implied that Czymmek’s disproportionate expenditure was to avoid certain causes of action the father’s estate had against her and PNC Bank for assets not included in the administration proceeding. He contended that because he could not develop his challenges to Czymmek’s administration of the estate, it was “highly likely that [he] had no intent to cause [Czymmek] to expend $93,775.77 in attorneys’ fees and costs defending the Insolvent Estate,” noting the parties’ brother was also a 11 defendant in the Connecticut Superior Court action but did not expend fees in that matter. Lastly, he argued that because his opportunity to litigate his challenge to the estate administration proceeding would be different in the bankruptcy court versus the Connecticut Superior Court, collateral estoppel should not apply to the Connecticut Sanction Decision. B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Summary Judgment The bankruptcy court entered summary judgment in Czymmek’s favor on all three counts of the complaint and a memorandum of decision determining Fenstermaker’s debts from the three sanctions awards were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). In its thorough decision, the bankruptcy court examined the parties’ arguments and the sanctioning courts’ findings and determinations in detail. The bankruptcy court concluded that issue preclusion applied to each sanction award, that the issues necessarily determined by the sanctioning courts established the elements of § 523(a)(6) such that a trial was not needed, and that Czymmek was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. III. The Appeal This appeal followed. Czymmek has filed a Motion for Damages and Costs Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8020, arguing that the appeal is frivolous and continues Fenstermaker’s “saga of bad-faith litigation and appeals” for the purpose of imposing litigation costs on Czymmek and delaying payments to her. The Panel will address the Motion for Damages and Costs in a separate order. APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The Panel has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees of the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(c); see also Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 39 (2020). Here, the bankruptcy court entered summary judgment in favor of 12 Czymmek on all three counts of the complaint. Therefore, the judgment is final, and the Panel has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 506 (2015); see also Encanto Rests., Inc. v. Aquino Vidal (In re Cousins Int’l Food, Corp.), 565 B.R. 450, 458 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2017) (“An order granting summary judgment is a final order where no counts against any defendants remain.”) (citation omitted). The standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Prime Healthcare Servs.–Landmark LLC v. United Nurses & Allied Prof’ls, Local 5067, 848 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2017); Boudreau v. United States (In re Boudreau), 622 B.R. 817, 823 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2020). DISCUSSION I. The Applicable Standards A. The Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56, made applicable to adversary proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 7056. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056. Summary judgment should be granted “when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant has successfully demonstrated an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Kirby v. 21st Mortg. Corp. (In re Kirby), 599 B.R. 427, 439 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso), 37 F.3d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1994)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A]n issue is ‘genuine’ if the record permits a rational factfinder to resolve that issue in favor of either party,” and “[a] fact is ‘material’ if its existence or nonexistence has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.” In re Kirby, 599 B.R. at 439 (quoting Harrington v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 810 F.3d 852, 857 (1st Cir. 2016)). 13 “Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Grossman v. Durham Com. Cap. Corp. (In re Connolly Geaney Ablitt & Willard, PC), 614 B.R. 133, 148 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A trial-worthy issue is not established by ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.’” Hermosilla v. Hermosilla, 447 B.R. 661, 667 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)). A party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or . . . to properly address another party’s assertions of fact . . . , the court may” “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion” or “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3); see In re Connolly Geaney Ablitt & Willard, PC, 614 B.R. at 148. “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.” In re Kirby, 599 B.R. at 439 (citing Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013)). However, the court “is freed from the usual constraints that attend the adjudication of summary judgment motions” when “the basic dispute between the parties concerns the factual inferences that one might draw from the more basic facts to which the parties have drawn the court’s attention, where there are no significant disagreements about those 14 basic facts, and where neither party has sought to introduce additional factual evidence or asked to present witnesses.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 603 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation modified). “In those circumstances, ‘[t]he court may then engage in a certain amount of differential fact finding, including the sifting of inferences.’” Wiscovitch Rentas v. Oriental Bank (In re Builders Holding, Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 17-00012, 2026 WL 752589, at *6 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 16, 2026) (quoting Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d at 603). B. Nondischargeability Under § 523(a)(6) for Willful and Malicious Injury Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge any debt for “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). To except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6), creditors must show: (1) the debtor injured them or their property; (2) the debtor’s actions were willful; and (3) the debtor’s actions were malicious. O’Rorke v. Porcaro (In re Porcaro), 545 B.R. 384, 396 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). “The creditor bears the burden of proving [its] claim under § 523(a)(6) by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . but to obtain summary judgment, the record must compel a determination of nondischargeability as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Gray v. Tacason (In re Tacason), 537 B.R. 41, 49-50 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2015)). Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define “injury,” “it is understood to mean a ‘violation of another’s legal right, for which the law provides a remedy.’” In re Tacason, 537 B.R. at 50 (quoting First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2013)). The U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that the word “willful,” as used in § 523(a)(6), “modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 15 61 (1998); see In re Porcaro, 545 B.R. at 396. In this circuit, “[a]n injury is malicious ‘if it was wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill- will.’” Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Levasseur (In re Levasseur), 737 F.3d 814, 818 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see In re Porcaro, 545 B.R. at 397. “[W]illfulness requires a showing of intent to injure or at least of intent to do an act which the debtor is substantially certain will lead to the injury in question.” DeWitt v. Stewart (In re Stewart), 948 F.3d 509, 528 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Levasseur, 737 F.3d at 818). C. Collateral Estoppel “[C]ollateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” González-Piña v. Rodríguez, 407 F.3d 425, 430 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Collateral estoppel principles apply in discharge exception proceedings under § 523(a). Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991); B.B. v. Bradley (In re Bradley), 466 B.R. 582, 586 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012); cf. Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 217 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he principles of issue preclusion apply to nondischargeability proceedings in bankruptcy”) (citing Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284 n.11). The bankruptcy court’s dischargeability determination will be governed by any factual issues that were actually and necessarily decided by the prior court. See In re Bradley, 466 B.R. at 586; see also Wolstein v. Docteroff (In re Docteroff), 133 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that collateral estoppel applies if the facts established by the previous federal court judgment meet the requirements of nondischargeability). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, “the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent nondischargeability proceeding under federal bankruptcy law is governed by the collateral estoppel law of the state from which the 16 judgment is taken.” In re Bradley, 466 B.R. at 586 (quoting Stowe v. Bologna (In re Bologna), 206 B.R. 628, 630-31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997)) (further citations omitted). To establish the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment, courts apply federal principles of collateral estoppel. See Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2006). II. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Granting Czymmek’s Motion for Summary Judgment A. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact 1. The Facts in Czymmek’s Statement of Material Facts Are Deemed Admitted Rule 56(e)(2) permits a court to consider a fact undisputed for purposes of a motion for summary judgment if the opposing party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see id. advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (observing that Rule 56(e)(2) “authorizes the court to consider a fact as undisputed for purposes of the motion when response or reply requirements are not satisfied . . . reflect[ing] the ‘deemed admitted’ provisions in many local rules”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (describing the procedures for supporting and objecting to factual positions). Local Rule 56 of the Local Rules of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, made applicable to adversary proceedings by Rule 7056-1 of the Local Rules of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine, requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to “submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts.” D. Me. Local R. 56(c)(1); D. Me. LBR 7056-1. “The opposing statement must admit, deny, or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material facts.” D. Me. Local R. 56(c)(1). “Facts in a supporting or opposing 17 statement of material facts, if supported by record citations, will be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” D. Me. Local R. 56(g)(1). Fenstermaker failed to file an opposing statement of material facts supported by record citations. Thus, Czymmek’s asserted facts were deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. See D. Me. Local. R. 56(g)(1); cf. In re Connolly Geaney Ablitt & Willard, PC, 614 B.R. at 151 (holding the bankruptcy court did not err in deeming appellee’s asserted facts admitted because appellants failed to state clearly and concisely the facts claimed to be disputed and to rebut the evidence presented in support of the appellee’s stated material facts, as required by the applicable local rule). To the extent Fenstermaker sought to introduce or imply additional facts in his briefs before the bankruptcy court, they were properly disregarded due to his failure to comply with these rules.2 2. The Sanctions Decisions Can Be Considered To Support Czymmek’s Motion for Summary Judgment Czymmek’s undisputed statement of material facts was supported by her affidavit, which included as exhibits copies of the sanctions decisions. Citing Rule 56(c)(4), and without raising specific concerns about their accuracy or authenticity, Fenstermaker argues the decisions are “not of an evidentiary character” and “must be disregarded” because they were not certified under Federal Rule of Evidence 902 and Czymmek is not qualified to attest to whether the awards are recorded or filed under Evidence Rule 901(b). Fenstermaker misreads Rule 56’s evidentiary requirements. First, the suggestion that the decisions must be presented at summary judgment in a form admissible at trial is at odds with Rule 56(c)(2), which plainly provides that “[a] party may object that the material cited to support 2 The Panel further observes that Fenstermaker’s allegations of additional facts were conclusory without supplying any evidentiary support. 18 or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (emphasis added). Second, it mischaracterizes Rule 56(c)(4), which states that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added). Nothing in Rule 56(c)(4) suggests the sanctions decisions must be certified or that Czymmek must be able to authenticate them in a motion for summary judgment. On the contrary, Rule 56(c) makes clear that “[t]he standard is not whether the evidence at the summary judgment stage would be admissible at trial—it is whether it could be presented at trial in an admissible form.” Rahim ex rel. Estate of Rahim v. Doe, 51 F.4th 402, 412 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2012)); see Ortolano v. City of Nashua, 769 F. Supp. 3d 96, 98 (D.N.H. 2025) (stating that “a party objecting to consideration of particular evidence at summary judgment on grounds of admissibility must demonstrate that the evidence ‘cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence’” at trial) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). Fenstermaker does not suggest the sanctions decisions could not be presented at trial in an admissible form; nor could he, as his inclusion of a certified copy of the Connecticut Sanction Decision with his opposition to summary judgment shows they can. Accordingly, Czymmek was entitled to rely on the copies of the sanctions decisions in support of summary judgment, and it was proper for the bankruptcy court to consider them. Having established that the bankruptcy court could consider the sanctions decisions on summary judgment, the next question is whether they established the elemen