Paul Calvert v. the City of Conway, Arkansas; Mayor Bart Castleberry, in His Official Capacity; Code Officer Spencer Clawson, in His Official Capacity; And Missy Schrag, in Her Official Capacity
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. 193
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-25-171
Opinion Delivered: November 19, 2026
PAUL CALVERT
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 23CV-21-625]
V.
HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE,
JUDGE
THE CITY OF CONWAY,
ARKANSAS; MAYOR BART AFFIRMED.
CASTLEBERRY, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; CODE OFFICER
SPENCER CLAWSON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND MISSY
SCHRAG, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
APPELLEES
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
Paul Calvert owned rental properties in the City of Conway (City). Over several
years, the City found violations of city ordinances, performed cleanup services, and placed
cleanup liens on three of Calvert’s properties. Calvert appealed the liens to the circuit court
along with other original claims. The circuit court dismissed the lien appeals and granted
summary judgment for the City on the remaining claims. Calvert appeals, and we affirm.
I. Facts
Several of Calvert’s rental properties received nuisance-ordinance violations. Across
the properties, the City followed the same process: it issued notices, reinspected them,
scheduled cleanups when the violations persisted, billed Calvert for the cleanup costs, held
hearings, and ultimately placed liens on the properties when the invoices went unpaid. The
three properties were 512 Third Avenue, 1135 Ash Street, and 1900/1902 Dave Ward
Drive.
A. Third Avenue Property
On February 15, 2019, the City sent Calvert a letter telling him that the property
violated city ordinances due to broken-down appliances and furniture, a dilapidated
structure, rubbish, and trash and unsanitary matter in the yard around the residence. It
informed Calvert that it planned to clean up the property if not rectified. When it was not
remedied, the City performed a cleanup and invoiced Calvert for $220.42. The invoice
provided notice that if not paid, the City would hold a hearing to consider imposing a
“clean-up lien” on the property. Calvert did not pay the invoice or attend the hearing, at
which time the City voted to file a “clean-up lien.” Later, the City issued another ordinance
citation in Calvert’s presence. Here are a few examples of the condition of the Third Avenue
property.
2
In June 2019, Calvert met the City at this property, and the City again cited Calvert
for new violations for excess trash, unkempt grass exceeding eight inches in height,
inoperative appliances or furniture in the yard, and dilapidated structures.1
B. Ash Street Property
A similar pattern occurred with Calvert’s Ash Street property. Beginning in January
2019, the City issued citations for trash, inoperative appliances or furniture in the yard,
abandoned vehicles, and an improperly parked trailer. The following photographs are of this
property in January 2019.
1
The City also cited this property in December 2021, performed a cleanup, and held
a hearing in March 2022 regarding a potential clean-up lien. Calvert attended and spoke at
the hearing but could not call witnesses. Calvert did not amend his complaint to include
this lien.
3
After several inspections showing the violations were unresolved, the City sent
Calvert a final notice. Here is an example of one such notice.
Calvert did not remedy the violations. Again, the City cleaned up the property and invoiced
him. Calvert’s tenant paid this invoice. Unfortunately, new violations arose, notices were
4
issued, and repeated inspections showed only partial or no progress. The following are
photographs of Ash Street from May 2019.
The City proceeded with another cleanup, invoice, and notice of a hearing. The City sent
the following form letter to Calvert:
5
Calvert’s attorney spoke at the City’s July meeting. The City presented evidence of the
violations and the cleanup costs. The City voted to file a lien against the property, which it
did.
While the above ordinance violations were being addressed, separate authorities
conducted a child-welfare investigation at this property. They discovered severe health and
safety hazards—including insect infestation, standing water, raw sewage, exposed wiring,
and fire-safety violations.2 The following are photographs of the interior of the Ash Street
property.
2
The police report contained the following statement:
A walk thru [sic] of the residence yielded several items of concern.
The entire home was filled with at least two different types of small flying
bugs. The fireplace was being used to burn trash in what appeared to be an
unsafe manner. The downstairs bathroom hallway had standing water from an
unknown source. The downstairs bathroom toilet and sink were stopped up
and the sink had standing water. Both fixtures also had dark black rings near
where the edge of the water met the porcelain. A downstairs bedroom,
intended to be the kids’ bedroom, had a hole in the wall immediately next to
wiring for a wall outlet. The kitchen area was strewn with pots, pans, dishes,
and other items that left no space to prepare a meal. The refrigerator and
freezer were dirty with dark black and brown stains and spilled foods and
liquids.
6
7
The City obtained a search warrant, and Calvert was present during the search.
Again, the City cited Calvert, this time for ordinance violations regarding overgrown grass,
broken furniture and appliances, trash, inoperable vehicles on the property, stagnant water,
obnoxious odor, dilapidated structure, health hazard, sanitary drainage, and rodent
harborage. The following are a couple of the citations issued to Calvert related to the
property condition:
8
Nuisance placards were posted stating the property was unsafe and uninhabitable.
The City shut off utilities due to safety concerns and informed Calvert that they would not
be reconnected without permits and city-approved repairs. Calvert did not obtain permits,
arguing he did not want the City to re-enter and reinspect the property. The property was
vacant until Calvert sold it in August 2021.3 The new owner paid the lien.
3
Calvert claims that he suffered damages based on the lien. Calvert testified he
purchased the property in 2002 for $25,000, and that he sold it in August 2021 for $60,000
(240 percent of the purchase price). Calvert testified that he did not make “substantial”
improvements to the property when he owned it. There was no evidence of how the lien
directly impacted the sale price.
9
C. Dave Ward Drive Property
Calvert’s Dave Ward property had similar issues. The City cited Calvert for
ordinance violations, which included trash, broken appliances, and discarded tires in the
yard. Multiple inspections showed no progress toward resolving the violations. After giving
notice, the City cleaned the property, invoiced Calvert, and provided him with a hearing
date. At the hearing, the City voted and placed a lien of $186.33.
Calvert alleges that he was locked out of this meeting. Later, Calvert’s attorney sent
a letter to the City stating that the tenant, not Calvert, was responsible for the costs of the
cleanup. Calvert sold the property, and the lien was paid at closing.
Following these property issues, Calvert filed a complaint in the circuit court in May
2021 broadly alleging: (1) the liens were unlawful; (2) the City violated his substantive and
procedural due-process rights; (3) the City unlawfully searched and seized his property; (4)
the fines were excessive; and (5) he is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the City’s
actions were unlawful.
Calvert and the City each brought motions for summary judgment. The circuit court
dismissed Calvert’s lien appeals after finding two were untimely and that the third was moot.
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that Calvert had sufficient
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the liens, the search was pursuant to a valid
warrant, and the property was not unlawfully seized because Calvert was given adequate
notice of the violations and how to remedy them. Calvert appeals.
10
II. Analysis
We review a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Benton Sch. Dist.
v. Greer, 2026 Ark. 53, at 5–6, 730 S.W.3d 1, 7–8. Summary judgment may be granted only
if there are no disputed material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over the Liens
The circuit court held it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Calvert’s lien
appeals. Accordingly, it dismissed them. Compliance with the timeliness of appeals is
mandatory. Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark. 129, 135, 133 S.W.3d 382, 385–86 (2003).
When an appeal is untimely, the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
Arkansas law specifies how and when property owners may appeal a “clean-up lien”
decision:
The determination of the governing body confirming the amount of any clean-up
lien or court lien and creating and imposing any clean-up lien or court lien under
this section is subject to appeal by the property owner or by any lienholder of record
in the circuit court, filed within forty-five (45) days after the determination is made.
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-903(h)(1) (Supp. 2025).
The City voted to impose liens on Calvert’s Third Avenue property on April 23,
2019, on the Ash Street property on July 23, 2019, and on the Dave Ward property on
April 13, 2021. Calvert appealed these decisions on May 28, 2021. The circuit court found
that the appeals were untimely as to the Third Avenue and Ash Street properties and
dismissed them in the summary-judgment order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Calvert argues that the circuit court erred because the City filed the liens
prematurely. He contends that the City had to wait forty-five days before imposing the
11
liens, then his time would begin. This is wrong. The statute explains that the appeal must
be “filed within forty-five (45) days after the determination is made.” Id. (emphasis added).
The statute does not require the City to delay its lien filing during the forty-five-day appeal
window. Calvert failed to timely appeal the liens on the Third Avenue and Ash Street
properties.
Second, Calvert states that the liens were “inherently unlawful.” He seems to suggest
timeliness is irrelevant if an owner believes the liens are unlawful. He argues that a city can
file liens only against vacant properties. But the statute provides different lien types. A
“[c]lean-up lien” is one for “the cost of work undertaken by a town or city to remove,
abate, or eliminate a condition in violation of local codes or ordinances.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 14-54-903(a)(1)(A). Calvert mistakenly refers to a “[p]riority clean-up lien” that is for “an
unsafe and vacant structure.” Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-903(a)(3). Regardless, Calvert did
not timely appeal, so the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider those liens.
Calvert timely appealed the Dave Ward lien. Yet the circuit court dismissed it as
moot. A case is moot when any judgment would have no practical legal effect on the
controversy. Gray v. Thomas-Barnes, 2015 Ark. 426, at 5, 474 S.W.3d 876, 879. Payment of
a fine or satisfaction of a judgment generally moots the appeal. See City of Little Rock v. Cir.
Ct. of Pulaski Cnty., 2017 Ark. 219, at 4, 521 S.W.3d 113, 116.
The lien was paid when Calvert sold the property. So there was no live controversy
for the court to resolve, and the lien issue was moot. Calvert argues that there is a live
controversy because he sold the property for less money due to the lien. But this argument
is based on speculation and not fact. The only evidence in the record is that Calvert
12
purchased the property for $76,000 and sold it for $125,000, which is a 66 percent increase.
Nothing in the record shows, and Calvert does not argue, that the payment of the lien by
the title company was involuntary. Nor did he present evidence of the property’s value with
or without the lien.4 We cannot hold that the circuit court clearly erred in finding the issues
involving the lien on the Dave Ward property were moot. This resolves Calvert’s first,
second, and third points on appeal.
B. Remaining Points on Appeal
Calvert’s fourth point on appeal contests the circuit court’s statement of facts, asserts
that the search and seizure were unlawful, and ultimately claims that the City’s actions
“violate[s] Article 2 section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution by denying [his] right to remedy
wrongs.” We have explained that “when the appellant does not cite any authority, nor make
a convincing legal argument, and where it is not apparent without further research that the
point is well taken, we will affirm.” City of Greenbrier v. Roberts, 354 Ark. 591, 594, 127
S.W.3d 454, 456 (2003) (explaining its decision to affirm without analysis after the City of
Greenbrier failed to support its position in five points of appeal over 6 pages without any
caselaw). This is true whether a pro se appellant or a city attorney. Calvert’s lone conclusory
argument and citation to the constitution are not enough.
The dissent says this decision is in “haste,” which it is not, and mistitles our work as
a finding on preservation. But we did not find it unpreserved because Calvert brought this
claim and argued it below. What Calvert fails to do is pursue it on appeal—he abandons any
4
Calvert alleges it was later resold for more, but again, without appraisals or other
evidence showing the lien impact, he did not meet his summary-judgment burden.
13
semblance of legal argument. Our duty of neutrality means we do not pursue arguments for
litigants, no matter how academically interesting the arguments may be. Calvert’s lone
conclusory argument and citation to the constitution are not enough (even with the dissent’s
assist). We require more detailed legal arguments developed by law.
Finally, Calvert’s fifth point on appeal is that a city cannot hold a property owner
responsible for the tenant’s actions. He cites Arkansas Code Annotated section 8-6-406
(Repl. 2022). We repeat that conclusory statements are insufficient to support an argument
on appeal. But giving Calvert the benefit of his statutory citation and slight argument here,
we hold that he misconstrues the statute’s applicability. Section 8-6-406 allows fines,
community service, and other sanctions for violations of litter-disposal limits on properties.
Calvert is correct that section 8-6-406(a)(3)(B) states that a property owner cannot be held
accountable for the conduct of the tenant. Yet the City’s actions were not under this code
section. Rather, it was acting under Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-54-901 et seq.,
which allows it “to order the owner” to comply with city ordinances. As we find no merit
to Calvert’s argument, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in granting summary
judgment for the City.5 We affirm.
Affirmed.
Special Justices CORY COX and TIFFANY BROWN join.
WOMACK and BRONNI, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
WEBB and HILAND, JJ., not participating.
5
Calvert also argues that certain City officials filed false reports against him and should
be prosecuted. These and other arguments were raised for the first time on appeal. We will
not address such arguments. Brown v. Lee, 2012 Ark. 417, 424 S.W.3d 817.
14
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I
agree with the majority’s disposition of all issues on appeal but one. I cannot agree that
Calvert’s challenge to the lien on his Dave Ward property became moot simply because the
lien was paid when he sold the property.
The majority concludes that payment of the lien extinguished the controversy. But
payment alone does not establish mootness. Our cases distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary satisfaction of “fines” and “judgments”. See Reynolds Health Care Servs., Inc. v.
HMNH, Inc., 364 Ark. 168, 182–83, 217 S.W.3d 797, 808–09 (2005). If payment is
voluntary, the appeal is moot. Id. If payment is involuntary, the appeal may proceed. Id.
The very case on which the majority relies recognizes this distinction. Maj. Op. at 12,
citing City of Little Rock v. Cir. Ct. of Pulaski Cnty., 2017 Ark. 219, at 4, 521 S.W.3d 113,
116.
The dispositive question, then, is not whether the lien was paid, but why it was paid.
The majority fails to account for that distinction. It observes only that Calvert did not argue,
and the record does not show, that the title company’s payment was involuntary. Maj. Op.
at 13. But this overlooks the nature of the obligation itself. A municipal lien is not a passive
obligation; it is a present encumbrance on title. It impairs alienability and clouds ownership.
When a property owner satisfies a lien to convey clear title, the payment bears the hallmarks
of compulsion, not acquiescence. The owner is not choosing to accept the lien’s validity;
he is removing a legal impediment that would otherwise prevent the transfer of his property.
Such a payment is properly characterized as involuntary. The majority’s analysis fails to
account for that compulsion. Indeed, payment under these circumstances does not establish
voluntary satisfaction of the lien.
Because I would not treat the satisfaction of this lien as a voluntary abandonment of
Calvert’s challenge, I would reach the merits of that issue.
I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. In
its haste to dispose of Paul Calvert’s pro se appeal, the majority simply ignores Calvert’s due-
process claim. Apparently, the majority finds that claim unpreserved because it wasn’t
accompanied by “certain magic phrases.” Lovett v. State, 2025 Ark. 100, at 5 (Bronni, J.,
concurring). But our “preservation rules shouldn’t be a trap for litigants,” id., and we
shouldn’t hold parties to the spellcasting precision of Hermione Granger to review an issue. 1
Instead, whenever a party fairly raises an issue, we should address it—magic words or not.
Applying that approach, I’d review Calvert’s due-process claim on the merits.
To be sure, Calvert’s appellate brief doesn’t use the words “due process.” Yet it’s
hard to understand how the majority could view Calvert’s argument––that the City of
Conway violated his rights by denying him “an opportunity to call any witnesses to establish
if a violation actually happened”––as anything other than a due-process argument. Due
process is all about whether an individual had an “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Conway’s brief also acknowledges as much,
1
“It’s Levi-o-sa, not Levio-sa!” Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (Warner Bros.
Pictures 2001).
16
explaining that Calvert’s due-process claim arises from allegations that “he was not allowed
to present evidence and cross-examine any witness at City Council meetings regarding the
clean-up liens being placed on his properties.” That’s why, in stark contrast to the majority,
Conway spends more than ten pages addressing Calvert’s due-process claim.
Ultimately, the majority dismisses a litigant’s claim that he didn’t get an opportunity
to be heard on the merits by refusing to acknowledge his claim, let alone address it on the
merits. Pro se or not, Arkansans deserve better. And when constitutional rights are at stake,
parties deserve a clear answer.
Paul Calvert, pro se appellant.
Jenna Adams, for appellee.
17