Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 157 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-26-14 Opinion Delivered: October 29, 2026 DARIUS BURNETT APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, ELEVENTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60CV-25-8946] LONA MCCASTLAIN; DEXTER HONORABLE PATRICIA JAMES, PAYNE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS JUDGE DIVISION OF CORRECTION; AND ARKANSAS POST-PRISON AFFIRMED. TRANSFER BOARD APPELLEES KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice Appellant Darius Burnett appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his petition for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. Burnett contended in his petition that the appellees erroneously deemed him ineligible for parole pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 2023), which precludes parole for persons convicted of a prior violent felony offense committed after 2001. In 2015, residential burglary was designated a violent felony offense under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5- 4-501(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2015). The record shows that in 2013, Burnett was convicted of three counts of residential burglary before pleading guilty to the crimes he committed in 2019: residential burglary, violation of a protective order, criminal mischief, and aggravated assault. As a result of his plea, Burnett was sentenced to an aggregate term of 120 months’ imprisonment by a sentencing order entered December 6, 2023. Burnett contended that he was parole eligible because the December 2023 sentencing order did not expressly designate that he was being sentenced in accordance with section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B). Burnett requested that that circuit court direct the appellees to recalculate his parole eligibility. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition, finding that because Burnett was sentenced after May 24, 2022, he is not eligible for parole on his 2023 conviction. We affirm. When a declaratory action is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the standard of review is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Schuldheisz v. Felts, 2024 Ark. 137, 696 S.W.3d 817. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court has acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id. In testing the sufficiency of a petition for declaratory relief, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the petitioner, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. Likewise, the standard of review on a denial of a writ of mandamus is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Id. On appeal, Burnett again argues that because the 2023 sentencing order did not expressly designate that he was being sentenced pursuant to section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B), his prior conviction for residential burglary should not affect his parole eligibility. This is incorrect. Section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) states that unless the sentencing order expressly designates that the defendant was sentenced under this section, a violent felony offense does not include residential burglary, committed before April 1, 2015, unless the defendant was 2 sentenced on or after May 24, 2022.1 Given the plain language of this statute, the circuit court correctly found that because Burnett was sentenced after May 24, 2022, he is not eligible for parole on his 2023 conviction. Stated differently, there was no requirement that the December 2023 sentencing order specifically designate that Burnett was being sentenced pursuant to section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B). See Rodgers v. Ark. Parole Bd., 2024 Ark. 176, 700 S.W.3d 876 (the express-designation requirement applied where appellant was sentenced before May 2022). In his argument on appeal, Burnett also claims that the application of section 16-93- 609 to his parole eligibility constitutes an ex post facto application of that statute because section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) was amended in 2023, and the crimes for which he has been denied parole eligibility were committed in 2019. Burnett did not raise this issue in the petition he filed in circuit court. Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-620, Burnett argues that he is entitled to a discretionary transfer. Likewise, this issue was not raised to the circuit court. Arguments raised for the first time on appeal have been waived and will not be addressed. Robinson v. Payne, 2024 Ark. 94, 688 S.W.3d 409. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Burnett’s petition. Affirmed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. WOMACK, J., dissents. WEBB, J., not participating. 1 Section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) was amended to include this language in July 2023 and became effective on August 1, 2023, before Burnett’s sentencing order was entered. 3 SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(1), Darius Burnett filed a petition for a declaratory judgment and injunctive and mandamus relief against three state actors: Lona McCastlain, Dexter Payne, and the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board. In his petition, Burnett claimed that the State was improperly requiring him to serve 100 percent of his sentence before he was eligible for release. The circuit court denied Burnett’s petition, finding that he was not eligible for parole under section 16-93-609(b) because of his sentencing date. The circuit court, however, should not have reached the merits of Burnett’s claim. Instead, it should have dismissed Burnett’s claims because they are barred by sovereign immunity.1 Here, Burnett “improperly made the State a defendant when he petitioned for mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief in a new civil action below[.]” 2 Had he petitioned for relief in his underlying criminal case, the circuit court may have been able to reach the merits of his claim.3 But Burnett did not do that, so this court should reverse and dismiss, not affirm. Respectfully, I dissent. Darius Burnett, pro se appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 1 Rodgers v. Ark. Parole Bd., 2024 Ark. 176, at 17–18, 700 S.W.3d 876, 887. 2 Id. 3 Id. at 18, 700 S.W.3d at 887.