Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 198 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. E-25-69 Opinion Delivered: November 19, 2026 BRANDYE MCCUE APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW [NO. 2025-BR-00221] V. REVERSED AND REMANDED; COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DIVISION VACATED. OF WORKFORCE SERVICES APPELLEE CODY HILAND, Associate Justice Brandye McCue appeals from the decision of the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services’ Board of Review denying her unemployment benefits. The Board determined that McCue’s failure to notice that a five-year-old student had left a line of students she was supervising constituted misconduct connected with her work. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. McCue v. Dir., 2025 Ark. App. 569, 725 S.W.3d 90. We granted McCue’s petition for review to clarify the law governing disqualification from unemployment benefits because the court of appeals highlighted case law that departs from the plain statutory language. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(c)(5). As the record does not contain substantial evidence that McCue’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514, we reverse and remand for an award of benefits, and the court of appeals’ opinion is vacated. I. Factual and Procedural Background McCue worked as an art educator for the Strong School District. On November 20, 2024, McCue was escorting a group of students from one room to another when a five- year-old student left the line without permission to retrieve crayons. McCue did not notice that the student had left and continued escorting the remaining students to their kindergarten classroom. Two to three minutes later, a music educator found the student crying in the art classroom. The student was unharmed. On December 13, 2024, the District notified McCue via a letter that she had violated District Policy 3.27 by failing to supervise the student.1 Following a hearing ten days later, McCue was terminated. McCue subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. The Division of Workforce Services denied her application, concluding that because she had been discharged for violating employer rules by leaving a child unattended, she was disqualified for unemployment benefits under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514 (Repl. 2025). McCue appealed, but the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the denial, as did the Board of Review. The Board acknowledged McCue’s arguments that she was hurrying because of time constraints, was distracted by misbehaving students, and believed the child had returned to the line when she called to him. The Board nevertheless concluded that McCue’s 1 Strong School District Policy 3.27, titled “Licensed Personnel Supervision of Students,” provides: “All District personnel are expected to conscientiously execute their responsibilities to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the District’s students under their care. The Superintendent shall direct any administration to establish regulations ensuring faculty supervision of students throughout the school day and at extracurricular activities.” 2 knowledge that she could request assistance with unruly students demonstrated that her negligence was sufficiently serious to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. It therefore determined that McCue had been discharged for misconduct connected with her work. 2 On May 30, McCue appealed from the Board’s decision to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the Board’s decision. See McCue v. Dir., 2025 Ark. App. 569, 725 S.W.3d 90. McCue also filed a petition for review in this court, which we granted. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(c)(5). When we grant a petition for review, we consider the appeal as though it had originally been filed in this court. Oxley v. Lumpkins, 2025 Ark. 98, at 5, 712 S.W.3d 272, 275. II. Law and Analysis McCue argues that the Board erred in determining that her conduct constituted misconduct sufficient to disqualify her from receiving unemployment benefits. We agree. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Walther v. FLIS Enters., Inc., 2018 Ark. 64, at 5, 540 S.W.3d 264, 268. We construe a statute just as it reads, giving its words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. at 6, 540 S.W.3d at 268. When the language is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the words used. White v. Owen, 2021 Ark. 31, at 5, 617 S.W.3d 241, 244. 2 “Although [McCue] argued that she was in a hurry due to time constraints, distracted by misbehaving students, and assumed the child returned to the line when she called him, the Board notes that [McCue] was aware that she could request assistance with unruly children as needed because she had done so in the past. Consequently, the Board is convinced [McCue] was negligent to such a degree as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. Accordingly, the Board finds [McCue] was discharged from last work for misconduct connected with the work.” 3 Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514 provides, in pertinent part: (a)(1) If so found by the Director of the Division of Workforce Services, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he or she is discharged from his or her last work for misconduct in connection with the work. ... (a)(3)(A) Misconduct in connection with the work includes the violation of any behavioral policies of the employer as distinguished from deficiencies in meeting production standards or accomplishing job duties; and (B) Without limitation: (i) Disregard of an established bona fide written rule known to the employee; or (ii) A willful disregard of the employer’s interest. (a)(4)(A) Misconduct in connection with the work shall not be found for instances of poor performance unless the employer can prove that the poor performance was intentional. (a)(4)(B) An individual’s repeated act of commission, omission, or negligence despite progressive discipline constitutes sufficient proof of intentional poor performance. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)–(B), (a)(4)(A)–(B) (Repl. 2025). Taking the statute just as it reads, a person is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when an employer discharges the person for “misconduct in connection with the work.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(1). There are two ways for a person to commit “misconduct in connection with the work,” either through a violation of one the employer’s behavioral policies or through poor performance. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(3) (behavioral policies); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-514(a)(4) (poor performance). 4 Violations of behavioral policies generally occur when an employee fails to conform to the employer’s standards of professionalism. The statute provides two, nonexclusive examples: “Disregard of an established bona fide written rule known to the employee”; and “[W]illful disregard of the employer’s interest.” The statute does not generally require an intent element for a finding of “misconduct in connection with the work” based on a violation of an employer’s behavioral policy. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(3)(A) (omitting an intent element). However, when the violation of an employer’s behavioral policy occurs through the “disregard of a bona fide written rule[,]” the statute includes a knowledge element. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(3)(B)(i) (including “known to the employee”). And when the violation of an employer’s behavioral policy occurs through the “disregard of the employer’s interest[,]” the statute includes a willful element. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(3)(B)(ii) (including “willful”). The statute explicitly distinguishes instances of poor performance from violations of behavioral policies. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(3)(A). To conclude a person committed “misconduct in connection with the work” through poor performance, there must be a finding that the person intentionally performed poorly. Ark. Code Ann. § 11- 10-514(a)(4)(A). Intentional poor performance can be proved through evidence of repeated poor acts despite progressive discipline. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(4)(B). Nowhere in the statutory scheme is “a degree as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design” relevant. Nevertheless, here, the Board found that McCue’s actions were “negligent to such a degree as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design.” That is not a part of the statutory text. 5 We now apply our standard of review to the correct statutory framework. We review the Board’s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Mamo Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 375 Ark. 97, 100, 289 S.W.3d 79, 83 (2008). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id., 289 S.W.3d at 83. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible from it in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id., 289 S.W.3d at 83. Even when the evidence could support a different result, we affirm if the Board could reasonably have reached its decision on the evidence presented. Id., 289 S.W.3d at 83. The question, then, is whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that McCue’s conduct rose to the level of misconduct contemplated by section 11-10-514. It does not. The undisputed evidence establishes that a five-year-old student left the line while McCue was escorting the other students to their classroom. McCue failed to notice the student’s departure, and the student was found unharmed in the art classroom two to three minutes later. Although McCue’s failure to maintain supervision was a minor lapse in her job performance, the record simply does not establish that she intentionally left the student unattended or willfully disregarded the District’s interest. The Board relied on McCue’s prior knowledge that she could request assistance when students misbehave. That knowledge, however, does not establish that McCue intentionally failed to supervise the student on this occasion. Nor does the record establish repeated negligence despite progressive discipline, which the statute identifies as sufficient proof of intentional poor performance. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(4)(B). 6 The District’s policy required personnel to conscientiously execute their responsibilities to promote the health, safety, and welfare of students under their care. McCue’s lapse in supervision was inconsistent with that responsibility, yes. But an innocuous violation of an employer’s expectations does not, standing alone, resolve whether the employee’s conduct constitutes disqualifying misconduct under section 11-10-514. The statute expressly distinguishes poor performance from intentional poor performance. We hold that substantial evidence does not support the finding that McCue’s negligence constituted intentionally poor performance. Accordingly, we reverse the Board and remand for an award of unemployment benefits. Furthermore, the court of appeals opinion is hereby vacated. Reversed and remanded; court of appeals’ opinion vacated. Special Justice JOHN RAINWATER joins. WEBB, J., not participating. Mitchell, Blackstock, Wright & Alagood, PLLC, by: Michael Muskheli, for appellant. Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Managing Attorney, and David A.F. McCoy, General Counsel, Arkansas Division of Workforce Services, for appellee. 7