Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 181 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-25-590 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 CHRISTOPHER FRANKLIN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR APPEAL FROM THE PHILLIPS OF THE CITY OF HELENA-WEST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HELENA, ARKANSAS [NO. 54CV-25-208] APPELLANT HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER MORLEDGE, JUDGE V. REVERSED, VACATED, AND DISMISSED. STATE OF ARKANSAS EX REL. TODD. H. MURRAY, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY APPELLEE NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice Appellant Christopher Franklin was the elected mayor of Helena-West Helena, Arkansas. The State alleges he abused his office and routinely violated the law. He was fined, ordered to pay attorneys’ fees, and ultimately removed from office by the circuit court. We do not reach the merits of the State’s claims. Instead, we hold that the summons in this case was constitutionally defective and that, as a result, the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over Franklin. For that reason, we reverse the decision below, vacate all orders entered in this matter, and dismiss this case without prejudice. Facts and Procedural Background Christopher Franklin is a frequent character in our recent case law, and this is just his latest appearance. Franklin was elected mayor of Helena-West Helena, and he assumed office in January 2023. Two years later, in June 2025, the State filed this case against Franklin seeking civil penalties, damages, attorneys’ fees, and Franklin’s removal from office. It alleges that Franklin engaged in a plethora of illegal conduct and abused his office. That lawsuit began in an unusual way. Normally, a plaintiff, like the State here, files a complaint in circuit court and the circuit court clerk (or a deputy clerk) issues and signs a summons soon after. That did not happen here. Instead, on June 24, 2025, the State apparently handed its complaint to the circuit court judge in open court and the circuit court judge then issued and signed the summons himself. That summons was issued in the name of the State and contained a deadline for responding to the complaint and an accompanying motion for a restraining order. The next day, those documents were filed with the circuit court clerk, and on that same day, the circuit court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining Franklin from exercising any mayoral authority and barring him from municipal buildings. Four days later, on June 29, 2025, Franklin filed a motion to dismiss, a motion for a continuance, a notice of appearance, a jury demand, a motion to dissolve the ex parte TRO, and his first (of many) motions asking the circuit court judge to recuse from the case. Most importantly for our purposes, Franklin argued that the summons was fatally defective because it had been issued and signed by a circuit court judge rather than the circuit court clerk or a deputy clerk. The day after Franklin filed these motions and a second motion seeking the circuit court judge’s recusal, the circuit court held a hearing on the ex parte TRO and various other matters. At that hearing’s conclusion, the circuit court announced that it was imposing civil 2 penalties, assessing attorneys’ fees, and removing Franklin from office because Franklin had violated state fiscal responsibility and management laws and had violated court orders in another pending matter, City of Helena-West Helena v. Williams, CV-23-575. The circuit court reduced its rulings to writing in two separate orders published on July 8, 2025. On July 10, 2025, Franklin filed a motion under Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure requesting to have the circuit court’s written orders vacated. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Then, on July 31, 2025, Franklin filed a third motion seeking the circuit court judge’s recusal. The circuit court did not rule on Franklin’s Rule 60 motion, and after 30 days, it was deemed denied by operation of law. See Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 4(b)(1). This appeal followed. Discussion Franklin raises multiple issues on appeal. But to resolve this appeal, we need only address his argument that the summons in this case was invalid. Because the State failed to serve Franklin with a constitutionally valid summons within 120 days of filing its complaint, the circuit court never obtained personal jurisdiction over Franklin. That renders the proceedings below void ab initio and requires that we dismiss this case without prejudice. We begin with the basics of service of process. Under Arkansas law, a plaintiff must serve the defendant with a valid summons “within 120 days after the filing of the complaint or within the time period established by an extension granted” upon “a showing of good cause.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)-(2). If that does not happen, the circuit court never acquires personal jurisdiction over the defendant and “the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice on motion or on the court’s initiative.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1); 3 see Nucor Corp. v. Kilman, 358 Ark. 107, 122, 186 S.W.3d 720, 729 (2004) (“Service of valid process is necessary to give a court jurisdiction over a defendant.”). Personal jurisdiction, moreover, is not a mere technicality; it “is an essential element of jurisdiction without which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (cleaned up). Thus, as relevant here, absent service of a valid summons within the period set by the rules of civil procedure, the circuit court would—absent waiver—lack jurisdiction over Franklin and correspondingly the power to enter the orders that it did below. On that much, at least, the parties agree. They disagree on whether that happened here. First, they disagree over whether the summons undisputedly served on Franklin within the period set by Rule 4(i) was itself defective. Second, they disagree over whether Franklin waived that defect. On both issues, Franklin has the better argument. 1. Start with the parties’ arguments over whether the summons was defective. Franklin argues that the summons was defective because it was signed by the circuit court judge rather than the circuit court clerk or a deputy clerk; the State says that was not required because the complaint was filed in open court. The State is wrong. As relevant here, the rules of civil procedure clearly and unambiguously say that a “summons shall be . . . dated and signed by the clerk or a deputy clerk.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b). Moreover, far from a mere technicality or rule of convenience, that rule effectuates the Arkansas Constitution’s command that “[a]ll writs and other judicial process, shall run in the name of the State of Arkansas, bear test and be signed by the clerks of the respective courts from which they issue.” Ark. Const. art. VII, § 49 (emphasis added). Indeed, reflecting that, we have previously 4 held that the failure to strictly comply with that requirement and the rules implementing it renders a summons invalid and that dismissal is required where a valid summons is not served within the period set by law. See Gatson v. Billings, 2011 Ark. 125, at 5 (2011) (applying our constitution and Rule 4(b)); see also Jones v. Douglas, 2016 Ark. 166, at 6-7, 489 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (applying Rule 4(b)). Applying that rule here, the summons was invalid and dismissal is required. Neither the circuit court clerk nor a deputy clerk signed the summons. Instead, it was signed by the circuit court judge. And the State does not cite any rule empowering the circuit court judge to sign a summons. On the contrary, the State merely cites Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)’s language allowing judges to “permit papers or pleadings to be filed with him” and requiring a judge who does so to “note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 5(d). To be sure, Rule 5 does discuss methods of service, but critically, it does not say anything about signing a summons. In fact, Rule 5 uses the word “summons” just once, when discussing default judgments, and even then, it only says that “[n]o service need be made upon parties in default for failure to appear, except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.” Id. at 5(a). Furthermore, even if we were inclined to read language into Rule 5 that is not there or— perhaps being more generous to the State’s argument—squint, wink, and claim we have to harmonize Rule 4(b) with Rule 5’s language permitting filings in open court, it would not matter because the constitution says that a summons shall be signed by the clerk. We thus 5 conclude that the only summons served in this case was constitutionally defective and— absent waiver—Rule 4(i) requires that we dismiss this case. 2. Next, yet no less flawed, is the State’s alternative argument that Franklin waived that defect. A party can waive jurisdictional defects—even constitutional ones—by appearing and not raising the issue. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”). Consistent with that principle, our rules require a party who objects to service or jurisdiction to do so in its first responsive pleading, whether that is an answer or a motion under Rule 12. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136, 141, 865 S.W.2d 643, 645 (1993). Where a party does that, its objection is preserved for appeal unless it later seeks “affirmative relief.” Id. To constitute affirmative relief, we have previously said that a party’s conduct must be “more than a defensive action.” Id. “An example of such affirmative action is where a defendant file[s] a cross-complaint,” id., a third-party complaint, or a non-compulsory counterclaim that “invokes the jurisdiction of the court” and indicates the defendant “submits to it[s]” jurisdiction. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 319-20, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1987). That did not happen here. Franklin’s first responsive pleading—his motion to dismiss—argued that the summons was defective and sought dismissal on that basis. That preserved the objection unless Franklin sought affirmative relief, and on that score, the State’s claims fall well short. First, the State says that Franklin’s actions were more than defensive because his discovery requests were really “a fishing expedition to dig up potential 6 claims against opposing counsel.” But the State’s disagreement with Franklin’s discovery request hardly demonstrates that he sought affirmative relief from the court. See Farm Bureau, 315 Ark. 136, 141, 865 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (rejecting claim that participating in discovery waives jurisdictional objection); Carter v. Livingston, 2021 Ark. App. 363, 8, 635 S.W.3d 351, 357 (requests for admission, deposition notices, motion for summary judgment, motion to compel, and motion to exclude evidence did not constitute “request[s] for affirmative relief” and waive properly preserved service objection); see also Lechoslaw v. Bank of Am., N.A., 618 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2010) (defendant did not waive jurisdictional objection by propounding discovery requests). Second, the State argues that Franklin sought affirmative relief when he asked to join other potentially essential parties. That argument is better, but it too ultimately falls short, because “[i]t is not inconsistent for a defendant to object that a court has no jurisdiction but prefer to endure only one trial to a void judgment.” Dolan v. Lichtsinn Motors, Inc., 2024 Ark. App. 501, at 6, 701 S.W.3d 772, 778. Indeed, in combination, the State’s argument essentially suggests that to object to insufficient process, a defendant must simply sit still, and that is not the law. See Farm Bureau, 315 Ark. at 141, 865 S.W.2d at 645-46. Accordingly, we hold that Franklin did not waive his meritorious objection to the summons and dismiss for failure to serve a valid summons within the period set by law. Conclusion Our decision today is very narrow. We hold only that the State’s failure to serve a valid summons—that is one, as our constitution says, signed by the clerk—within the period set by Rule 4(i) requires dismissal. We express no opinion concerning the State’s allegations 7 about Franklin or the merits of the circuit court’s decision to remove him from office. Rather, our decision merely enforces the plain text of the constitution and the rules governing civil actions throughout Arkansas. Furthermore, since we do not reach the merits of the underlying action, our dismissal is without prejudice, leaving the State free to pursue additional proceedings against Franklin that are consistent with this opinion and, most importantly, our constitution. Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. Special Justice CORY COX joins. BAKER, C.J., concurs. WOOD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. WEBB, J., not participating. RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Once again, I am concerned that this court is raising and addressing a constitutional issue without adequate briefing. For the reasons explained below, I concur with the disposition but dissent from the analysis. The appellant argues that the court-issued summons violated Rule 4(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the summons be signed by the clerk. The State does not contest this reading of Rule 4(b) but points out that Rule 5(d) allows “papers or pleadings” to be filed with the judge. Our court should respond to the arguments presented and decide whether the Rule 5(d) allowance of a judge to file “papers or pleadings” includes signing a summons. 8 Instead, the majority creates confusion by raising and deciding the case on an Arkansas constitutional provision that requires “[a]ll writs and other judicial process . . . be signed by the clerks of the respective courts from which they issue.” Ark. Const. art. 7, § 49. The parties neither cited this clause nor raised this argument. My concern is the effect this may have on courts in Arkansas that use Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) to perform their judicial functions. Many counties have this issue when a circuit judge is sitting in one county but needs to sign and file something quickly in another county in the judge’s circuit. By deciding that “all judicial process” includes a summons, the majority raises the question whether other filings constitute “judicial process.” The majority may be inadvertently abolishing Rule 5(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Does a judge need a deputy clerk to countersign a show-cause order? The majority creates unnecessary confusion. Our court should avoid raising and making constitutional pronouncements when another reasonable alternative can resolve the appeal. See Solis v. State, 371 Ark. 590, 598, 269 S.W.3d 352, 358 (2007) (“[I]f we can resolve a case without reaching constitutional arguments, it is our duty to do so.”). It would be wiser to decide the case on the grounds raised and briefed by the parties. I would hold that Rule 5(d)’s filing provision does not include executing the clerk’s signature on a summons. The Rule 4(b) signature requirement is distinct from Rule 5(d), which allows courts to file “paper and pleadings.” I would reverse and dismiss accordingly. For this reason, I concur in part and dissent in part. Terrence Cain, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Julius J. Gerard IV (“Jay”), Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 9