Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 164 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-25-437 Opinion Delivered: November 5, 2026 JAMES VALLEY APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PHILLIPS V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 54CV-23-7] GREG WILLIAMS APPELLEE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER W. MORLEDGE, JUDGE APPEAL DISMISSED. KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice This is a companion case to Franklin v. Williams, 2026 Ark. 173 (Williams II) (CV- 25-343), which we also hand down today. Here, appellant, James Valley, also appeals from the Phillips County Circuit Court’s February 13, 2025 order finding both Valley and the mayor of Helena-West Helena, Christopher Franklin, in contempt of court. On appeal, Valley presents the same points raised by Franklin in Williams II: (1) the circuit court’s contempt finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because a person cannot be in contempt of a declaratory judgment; and (2) the circuit court’s finding that Valley is in contempt of court is a violation of Valley’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process because he is not a party to this case, nor has he ever been served with process. Because we reverse and dismiss Williams II, having concluded that the circuit court’s contempt order was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, we dismiss this appeal as moot. I. Facts and Procedural History This is the third appeal stemming from an ongoing legal dispute concerning the passage and subsequent veto of two Helena-West Helena (the “City”) ordinances. The facts and procedural history underlying this dispute are set forth at length in City of Helena-West Helena v. Williams (Williams I), 2024 Ark. 102, 689 S.W.3d 62, and again in today’s companion case, Williams II. To summarize, on December 30, 2022, the City Council (the “Council”), of which Christopher Franklin was then a member, passed the two ordinances at the center of this dispute—Ordinance 39-22 and Ordinance 40-22. The following day, then Mayor Kevin Smith vetoed both ordinances. On January 1, 2023, Franklin was sworn in as the City’s new mayor who, upon taking office, attempted to rescind Smith’s veto. On January 10, appellee, Greg Williams, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and a petition for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the City and Franklin (collectively, “the defendants”). Williams did not name Valley, the mayor’s chief of staff, as a codefendant. On January 11, the circuit court entered an order granting an ex parte TRO and later extended the TRO to “March 20, 2023 at 9 am, or until further order from this Court,” ordering that the defendants were “still enjoined and prohibited from taking any action in accordance with Helena-West Helena Ordinance 39-22 and 40-22” until such time a full adjudication could be had. Following a hearing on April 24, the circuit court entered an order granting Williams’s request for declaratory relief. Specifically, the circuit court held that “all actions 2 taken on December 30, 2022 by the Helena-West Helena City Council, including Helena- West Helena Ordinance 39-22 and Helena-West Helena Ordinance 40-22 are hereby null and void and any actions taken in accordance with said ordinances are hereby null and void.” Franklin and the City appealed from the circuit court’s declaratory judgment, and this court affirmed. See Williams I. After the mandate issued in Williams I, Williams filed a motion for contempt, and later an amended motion, against the City and Franklin asserting that the circuit court’s January 11 order granting an ex parte TRO restrained any action or salary increases based on Ordinances 39-22 and 40-22 but that illegal funds continued to be paid out. Franklin responded, primarily arguing that the circuit court’s April 24 declaratory judgment did not enjoin or prohibit the defendants from taking any future actions and that a person could not be held in contempt for conduct that a court’s order does not expressly order or prohibit. The circuit court held a hearing on Williams’s motion for contempt during which the court heard testimony from Sandra Ramsey, city clerk for the City of Helena-West Helena, regarding the disparity between the set base pay for the City’s mayor and chief of staff and the salaries received by Franklin and Valley, as well as the City’s practice of enacting pay raises through budget resolutions. On February 13, the circuit court entered an order finding both Franklin and Valley—but not the City—in contempt, ruling that they had willfully disobeyed its April 24 order declaring Ordinances 39-22 and 40-22 null and void. Relevant here, to purge the contempt, the circuit court ordered Valley to either pay $33,000 within ninety days or report to jail. Valley filed an objection to participation, motion to dismiss, and motion to 3 vacate contempt order pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Valley maintained that he was not a party to the case because a summons had never been issued for him and he had never been served with process. Valley further argued that the circuit court’s April 24 order was a declaratory judgment and did not expressly prohibit or command any future conduct; therefore, alleged noncompliance with the order could not serve as a basis for the circuit court’s contempt finding. Valley further argued that the circuit court’s contempt order violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due-process rights because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him as a nonparty. Valley subsequently filed a notice of appeal. II. Points on Appeal As stated above, Valley presents two points on appeal. However, because we reverse and dismiss Williams II, concluding that the circuit court’s order finding Franklin in contempt of a declaratory judgment was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, we dismiss this appeal as moot. As a general rule, the appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot because to do so would be to render an advisory opinion. Lott v. Langley, 2013 Ark. 247 (citing Allison v. Lee Cnty. Election Comm’n, 359 Ark. 388, 198 S.W.3d 113 (2004)). Generally, a case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. Id. We have, however, recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Deer/Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Kimbrell, 2013 Ark. 393, at 22, 430 S.W.3d 29, 45. The first exception involves issues that are capable of repetition 4 yet evading review, and the second exception concerns issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest, which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. Id. The issues presented in this appeal stem from Valley’s position that the circuit court’s contempt finding was erroneous. However, the circuit court’s contempt order has already been reversed and the contempt matter dismissed in Williams II. Stated differently, the order from which Valley now appeals has been vacated in its entirety as to both Franklin and Valley. Therefore, the pertinent issues have been resolved, and there is no live controversy for this court to decide. See, e.g., Mississippi Cnty. v. City of Osceola, 2017 Ark. 63, 511 S.W.3d 330. Moreover, neither exception to the mootness doctrine applies to the present case. First, the issues underlying the circuit court’s contempt finding are not capable of repetition yet evading review “because the instant case turns on distinct facts that are unlikely to be repeated.” See, e.g., Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. O.J.’s Serv. Two, Inc., 2015 Ark. 388, at 4, 473 S.W.3d 24, 26. Specifically, the circuit court’s contempt finding at issue in the instant appeal, as well as in Williams II, arose from a case challenging outgoing Mayor Smith’s veto of two specific City ordinances, and the court’s contempt order was based on both Franklin’s and Valley’s alleged noncompliance with its April 24 declaratory judgment declaring those ordinances null and void. Similarly, these issues do not raise considerations of substantial public interest, which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation, because “a determination of the issue[s] presented would be dependent on the specific and unique facts presented.” See id. Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal as moot. Appeal dismissed. 5 Special Justice CORY COX joins. WOOD and HILAND, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. WEBB, J., not participating. RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The majority evades a threshold question about appellate jurisdiction: whether Valley’s notice of appeal was timely. Notably, the appellee’s first point on appeal asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction. This court should not leapfrog over this argument. Even then, the majority reaches the correct conclusion but disposes of the case incorrectly. For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part. We are obligated to address this court’s appellate jurisdiction before addressing any other issue. See Reed v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 341 Ark. 470, 473, 17 S.W.3d 488, 490 (2000) (explaining “it is not only the power but the duty of the court to determine whether it has jurisdiction” when first addressing the notices of appeal and cross-appeal); Henson v. Cradduck, 2017 Ark. 317, at 6, 530 S.W.3d 847, 850. Valley has a right to appeal because the circuit court’s contempt order affects his pecuniary interest. Swindle v. Benton Cnty. Cir. Ct., 363 Ark. 118, 122, 211 S.W.3d 522, 524 (2005). And because he has that right, the ordinary rules governing notices of appeal apply to him as a “party . . . taking the appeal.” Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 3(e)(i). In other words, as one held in contempt, Valley must file his own notice of appeal and do so within the timelines set forth in our appellate rules. See Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Shipman, 25 Ark. App. 247, 253, 756 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1988). Here, the circuit court entered its contempt order on February 13, 2025. A party generally has thirty days from entry of the order to file a notice of appeal. Ark. R. App. P.– 6 Civ. 4(a)(1)(A). But a timely posttrial motion extends that deadline until thirty days after the motion is ruled on or deemed denied. Id. Rule 4(b)(1). Valley filed a motion to vacate on February 21, which was within ten days of the order. The motion was not ruled on; it was therefore deemed denied on Monday, March 24. Valley’s notice of appeal was therefore due thirty days later, on April 23. He filed it the day before, and his appeal is timely. Rather than address this threshold issue, the majority dismisses the appeal as moot. But the majority should first ensure that we have appellate jurisdiction before making that determination. And secondly, even then, dismissal for mootness is not the correct disposition, and it is not how this court disposes of companion cases.1 We should reverse and dismiss for the same reason presented in the companion case: one cannot be held in contempt for violating a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. HILAND, J., joins. James F. Valley, pro se appellant. Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull, PLLC, by: Laura O’Hara, for appellee. 1 See, e.g., City of Fort Smith v. Hackler, 364 Ark. 114, 216 S.W.3d 603 (2005) (explaining appeal affirmed for the same reasons found in companion case City of Fort Smith v. Carter, 364 Ark. 100, 216 S.W.3d 594 (2005)); Stay Strong, Status Quo v. Van Buren Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 2020 Ark. 329 (affirming for the same reasons stated in companion case Stay Strong, Status Quo v. Bradford, 2020 Ark. 331); Cenark Inv. Grp., LLC v. Walther, 2023 Ark. 30 (reversing and remanding for the same reasons stated in companion case A-1 Recovery Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Walther, 2023 Ark. 34, 660 S.W.3d 797); see also DeSoto Gathering Co., LLC v. Hill, 2017 Ark. 324; Harris v. Texter, 235 Ark. 497, 361 S.W.2d 75 (1962); Pennington v. State, 2017 Ark. 304; THE/FRE, Inc. v. Martin, 349 Ark. 503, 78 S.W.3d 772 (2002). 7