Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 125 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-164 Opinion Delivered: October 1, 2026 JOHN CULLUM APPELLANT V. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE DISSENT FROM THE DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REVIEW. NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice John Cullum successfully delayed his own trial, and he now argues that delay denied him a speedy trial. He asks us to reverse his conviction and order dismissal. His argument is preposterous. Nothing in the federal or state constitution supports his request, and as an original matter, it’d be dismissed out of hand. Yet Cullum’s claim is supported by this court’s unreasoned and, so far as I can tell, utterly groundless approach to speedy-trial issues. Rather than whistle past our precedent, I’d grant the petition and reconsider it. Anything less invites ad hoc decision-making and incentivizes gaming the system. This court pretends Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.1 reflects the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See Williams v. State, 2024 Ark. 12, at 14, 682 S.W.3d 313, 322 (asserting sans analysis that Rule 28.1 “embodie[s]” the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial); Parker v. State, 2023 Ark. 41, at 11, 660 S.W.3d 815, 823 (same). Hardly so. Rule 28.1 and our case law applying that rule isn’t a requirement that a defendant be brought to trial within a reasonable time, but an arbitrary time limit that’s at odds with the Constitution. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 529 (1972) (rejecting “the fixed-time period” view of the Sixth Amendment “because it goes further than the Constitution requires”). That difference has serious consequences. It elevates form over substance, encouraging defendants to continuously delay proceedings in the hopes of inching past an artificial deadline so they can walk free—regardless of what the Constitution says. Cf. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 358 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (violating “a technical rule” isn’t the same as violating the Constitution). It sets the guilty free, denying victims and the public justice—despite the evidence and regardless of whether a defendant has been prejudiced. See Parker, 2023 Ark. 41, 682 S.W.3d 313 (reversing and dismissing the defendant’s conviction for carrying out a drive-by shooting and killing a police officer who died in front of five children in his home, without considering whether the delay harmed or benefited the defendant). And it’s yet another example of “a prior blunder” that we’re obligated to correct. State v. Minor Child, 2026 Ark. 66, at 6, 732 S.W.3d 18, 23. In short, as an original matter, the trial court reached the right result here. But given how we’ve treated similar cases, I’m less confident that other courts—let alone this court— will get it right in the future. Unlike the majority, I’m unwilling to take that risk. So I’d grant the petition and put an end to attempts, like Cullum’s here, to game the system. I respectfully dissent. Special Justice CORY COX joins. 2