Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 145 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-22-305 Opinion Delivered: October 8, 2026 OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.; AND AARON MARVELL APPEAL FROM THE ST. FRANCIS FOSTER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT APPELLANTS [NO. 62CV-20-141] HONORABLE E. DION WILSON, V. JUDGE MOTION TO RECUSE DENIED BY FRANK MCMILLION, ALLEN JONES, JUSTICE WOOD INDIVIDUALLY CARLTON PETTUS, HUNTER HEREIN. BOKKER, BENGI BOKKER, AND ZACK BILLINGSLEY APPELLEES RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice A judge has a professional duty beyond deciding cases, which includes interactions with other judges, attorneys, and lay people. I have diligently and deliberately extended my judicial outreach to promote civic education about the justice system. This work can be just as important to the justice system as deciding cases. See Ark. Code Jud. Conduct R. 3.1 cmt [1] (“Judges are uniquely qualified to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, such as by speaking, writing, teaching, or participating in scholarly research projects.”). Under Arkansas law, judges have a duty to decide a case unless there is a valid reason to disqualify. See Perroni v. State, 358 Ark. 17, 24, 186 S.W.3d 206, 210 (2004). Judges are also given a presumption of impartiality. See Searcy v. Davenport, 352 Ark. 307, 312, 100 S.W.3d 711, 714 (2003). However, a judge must recuse if her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Ark. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). A judge must therefore weigh the duty to sit against the appearance of partiality. In this manner, a justice bears a heightened duty to sit due to the nature of an appellate court. In a circuit court, it is a much simpler process for another elected judge to hear a matter. Turning to the facts: One of the appellants’ lawyers participated in the Lady Justice Women of the Court podcast in the first year of its existence from September 2020 through July 15, 2021. This ended five years ago, absent a single-episode return. The podcast went on for several years after her exit. I’ve had nothing but flattering things to say about my interactions with her in which we shared the common role of shepherding our respective courts’ commission on children. Appellants’ counsels’ statement that “we bonded over the children’s issue” was a reference to our respective work on our states’ children’s commissions. State supreme court justices who sit in similar administrative roles often interact, as they should. But said counsel has not been a sitting justice for several years, and we have not interacted on this issue since she retired from her state supreme court in June 2021. I also recently participated in a panel alongside this lawyer during a meeting of the Texas Supreme Court Historical Society. Quite often around the country, and in Arkansas, attorneys who practice before a court sit together on continuing legal education panels with judges. It is not uncommon for justices on the Arkansas Supreme Court to sit on panels with judges whose decisions they review. This does not suggest impropriety. It would not serve the public to have a justice remain isolated from the workings of the community or 2 broader justice system. Our panel discussion involved a general discussion of our respective states’ unique constitutional history. And as much as the appellees allege something inappropriate about a firm sponsorship of an event where a justice speaks, this again is common—and yes, this lawyer’s firm was one of the roughly thirty-nine sponsors, but I did not receive any stipend or travel accommodations from the event for my attendance. In reaching my decision, I compare my interactions with the opposing side’s counsel. I have also said flattering things about several of the appellees’ counsel and worked with two of them for nearly two years on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Committee on Civil Practice for which I am the liaison. If anything, my interactions with them have been much more frequent than any interactions with the legal counsel for the appellants, especially when considered in context with the timing of this case. And both parties hired appellate specialists. One of the appellees’ counsel, who worked with me on the Civil Practice Committee, also joined their team for appellate purposes and we celebrated him with a cake during our committee meeting last spring. It is common for litigants to hire an appellate specialist for the appellate side of a case. One should not presume an impure motive without evidence for it. The recusal motion rests on the assumption that a judge must recuse herself if she is friends with a lawyer, has nice things to say about her, or has shared the stage on a continuing legal education panel. Appellees provide no precedent that would justify such a rule. Indeed, the case appellees cite in support of their motion provides exactly the opposite view: Parrish v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The allegation of lack of impartiality stemming from Judge Varner’s . . . friendship with . . . defense counsel 3 is likewise tenuous. It does not exceed what might be expected as background or associational activities with respect to the usual district judge.”). As this court itself has noted, “[f]riendship with a member of the bar is not a ground for recusal.” Comm. for Util. Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 290 Ark. 283, 286, 718 S.W.2d 933, 935 (1986) And the other case cited in support of the motion involved a judge and counsel who went on a joint family vacation together after trial. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1536 (7th Cir. 1985). This social relationship, which “implie[d] extensive personal contacts,” could cause an objective observer to doubt the judge’s impartiality. Id. at 1538. I can assure the litigants that I have not jointly vacationed with appellants’ counsel. Our friendship derives from our contact at professional gatherings, commitment to civic education, and care for the administration of justice. Notably, the former justice from the Texas Supreme Court has appeared in front of the colleagues she served many years without event––again, this is not uncommon. Granting this motion would negatively impact the judiciary and civic education. It would stifle judges from engaging with others. That would harm the judiciary, lawyers, and the public. For these reasons, I deny the motion. Individual Motion to Recuse Denied. 4